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Abstract
Ways of Being in Trauma-Based Society: Discovering the Politics and Moral
Culture of the Trauma Industry Through Hermeneutic Interpretation of
Evidence-Supported PTSD Treatment Manuals

Sarah Peregrine Lord
Antioch University Seattle
Seattle, WA
One-hundred percent of evidence-supported psychotherapy treatments for trauma related
disorders involve the therapist learning from and retaining fidelity to a treatment manual.
Through a hermeneutic qualitative textual interpretation of three widely utilized
evidence-supported trauma treatment manuals, I identified themes that suggested a
particular constitution of the contemporary way of being—a traumatized self—and how
this traumatized self comes to light through psychotherapeutic practice as described by
the manuals. The manuals included: 1) a trauma focused cognitive-behavioral therapy for
children; 2) an eye-movement desensitization and reprocessing therapy for adults; and,
3) an early intervention and debriefing therapy series for post-traumatic stress disorder
and other trauma related problems of military service members. Through the
interpretation, I conceptualized trauma as a way of human being in contemporary culture,
and in particular, as an unacknowledged way of expressing enactments of dissociated,
unformulated, or unarticulated political arrangements and events. I identified and
interpreted the following shared themes and exemplars across the three manuals:
mind-brain as protector and the political use of cognitivist ideology; the healed trauma
iv

survivor as functional worker; trauma as universal and culture-free; and, indoctrination
into a social void of scientistic managed care. I discussed how trauma treatment manuals
instantiate how to be human in contemporary society through compliance with managed
care and the embodiment of scientistic and cognitivist ideology. I then discussed how the
way of being that contemporary society creates and idealizes is one in which people
easily assume the identity of trauma survivor: an enterprising, functional and fiercely
individual member of a warrior cult. In the warrior cult society, to think or talk about
social causes and public solutions to daily political suffering is thought of as either
non-germane or dangerous; individuals are seen as free from all dependencies and social
ties, able to overcome personal and public adversity by arming or forifying their brain
and replacing thoughts in their computer-like mind. In conclusion, I raised questions
about how evidence-based trauma therapies may contribute to perpetuating a particular
constitution of self that has disavowed society’s violent ethics and practices. The
electronic version of this dissertation is at OhioLink ETD Center, www.ohiolink.edu/etd
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Introduction
We live in a trauma-based society. 44.6% of news coverage is devoted to crime
and disaster, compared to other topics like community interest (13%), education (4.1%)
or regional government (0.6%) (Federal Communications Commission [FCC], 2011).
The word “trauma” was cited in U.K. newspapers under 500 times a year in the early
1990s and is now cited over 5500 times a year (Furedi, 2004). Many popular television
shows and movies from the United States (U.S.) center on disaster, war, and violence,
and sometimes the protagonists even describe themselves as suffering from posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) after events they experienced (e.g., Nicholas Brody on Homeland,
Dr. Owen Hunt on Grey’s Anatomy, Starbuck on Battlestar Galactica, Hank on Breaking
Bad, the imprisoned women in Orange is the New Black, the shell-shocked valet in
Downton Abbey, and Katniss in Hunger Games: Catching Fire). An international Google
trends analysis revealed that the relative interest on a scale for the search term “PTSD”
has risen from 60% to 97% (a 37% increase) from 2004 to 2013 (Google.com). Massivemultiplayer online videogames like Second Life now include PTSD treatment centers
where an avatar can participate in a manual-based therapy with other avatars; after the
avatars are cured they can resume their activities in the virtual world (University of
Southern California [USC], 2012).
In June 2013, an Amazon.com book-title search for the word “trauma” revealed
13,662 results with titles such as: Eight keys to safe trauma recovery: Take charge
strategies to empower your healing (Rothschild, 2010), Trauma-proofing your kids
(Levine & Kline, 2008), Trauma junkie (Hudson, 2001), Life after trauma (Rosenbloom,
Williams, & Watkins, 1999), and The trauma of everyday life (Epstein, 2013). The books
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ranged from personal accounts of emergency aide workers, to self-help books, to
treatment manuals, and medical compendiums. When narrowing the search to “PTSD
manual,” over 250 different titles for step-by-step trauma intervention manuals emerged
(e.g., An operators manual for combat PTSD (Hart, 2000), The trauma tool kit: Healing
PTSD from the inside out (Pease Banitt, 2012), and When war comes home: Christcentered healing for wives of combat veterans (Adsit, Adsit, & Waddell, 2008). It seems
that we are obsessed with creating, destroying, protecting, curing, and consuming trauma.
Following the U.S. cultural obsession with trauma, the study and treatment of
PTSD has become a burgeoning industry in what Nikolas Rose (1989) calls the psi
disciplines: psychiatry, psychology, and other mental health related fields. The American
Psychological Association (APA) first officially recognized PTSD as a psychiatric
disorder in 1980. Since then, the rate of diagnosis and cultural interest in this disorder has
increased to the point that PTSD became known as the diagnosis of the 90s (Farrell,
1998).
Currently there is a perceived epidemic of PTSD in which approximately 37
million Americans are exposed to trauma annually and 5.2 million are diagnosed with
PTSD each year (Bonnie, Fulco, & Liverman, 1998; Dowd, Keenan, & Bratton, 2002).
There is now seemingly endless funding from government agencies and pharmaceutical
corporations to research and treat this growing national and increasingly international
epidemic of trauma (Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 2012). For example, in 2012,
the U.S. Veterans Administration (VA) and Department of Defense (DoD) funded over
$100 million dollars in PTSD research. When the sequester and budget resolution in 2013
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led to major federal budget reductions, PTSD research for the DoD was earmarked as
protected (Basu, 2013).
Not only do federal institutions grant large sums to conduct research, there is also
a proliferation of smaller research projects focused on understanding PTSD. In 2013,
ClinicalTrials.gov, a site designed to track all NIH funded trials internationally, identified
807 registered research trials—531 based in the U.S.—that focused on interventions for
PTSD (National Library of Medicine, 2013). Between 1990 and 2013, staff at the
National Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder index over twenty thousand research
articles, reports.
The majority of studies funded in the past two years were designed to find
biological indicators of the trauma (called bio-markers) and to identify prevention
strategies, interventions, and treatments for PTSD (American Forces Press Service
[AFPS], 2012). In 2012, an interdisciplinary team from the University of Pennsylvania
and the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia received over $3.5 million in DoD funds to
identify the neural circuits in the brain affected by stress exposure and to identify
biomarkers for resilience to stress (Baum, 2012).
While researchers have continued to move towards brain-based and
neurochemical interventions, there is also increasing interest in modular, brief
psychotherapeutic treatments that are compatible with managed care settings. These
treatments can be easily disseminated, trained via a treatment manual, and evaluated for
effectiveness. Models for PTSD therapy that are amenable to a brief-treatment format
(three to five sessions), dismantling (i.e., where the therapy can be delivered in single or
multiple module treatments depending on the capacity of the clinic), and delivery by any

4
health care provider have been assessed in both controlled research (Bryant, 2007) and in
real-world settings (Roy-Byrne et al., 2005). Presently, 100% of well-established
evidence-supported psychotherapeutic treatments for trauma disorders involve the
practitioner-therapist learning from and continuing to retain fidelity to a specific trauma
treatment manual in their therapeutic practice (Bisson & Andrew, 2007; Department of
Defense [DoD], 2010; Foa, Keane, & Friedman, 2000; Foa, Keane, Friedman, & Cohen,
2008; Forbes et al., 2010; Rosen et al., 2004; Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration [SAMHSA], 2013; World Health Organization [WHO], 2013).
The obsession with PTSD that grew out of the U.S. and Europe has now been
exported internationally and may be “homogenizing the way the world goes mad”
(Watters, 2011, p. 1). There has been a recent surge in the Western world to send
psychological first-aid all over the globe after a crisis. In particular, trauma therapists are
sent to resolve the problems of genocide, civil war, and a range of natural disasters
(Fassin & Rechtman, 2009). Medical anthropologist Allan Young reflected that “PTSD
has displaced hunger as the first thing the Western general public thinks about when a
war or other emergency is in the news. We were spreading these ideas around the globe
so effectively that PTSD was becoming the way the entire world conceived of
psychological trauma. The spread of the PTSD diagnosis to every corner of the world
may, in the end, be the greatest success story of globalization” (Watters, 2011, p. 71).
For example, after the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka, numerous directors of mental
health agencies from the U.S., Europe, and Australia initiated a call for global action to
address psychological damage from PTSD. Pharmaceutical representatives and people
from non-government organizations sent resources and therapists to the country. Many
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mental health experts were quoted saying that the biggest problem facing Sri Lanka’s
government leaders would be a “second tsunami” of PTSD (Watters, 2011, p. 70).
When therapists arrived in Sri Lanka they brought manual-based treatments, and
as several scholars and anthropologists have since pointed out, they also brought
assumptions of personhood, time, memory, a source of moral authority and ideas about
how people become broken by disaster and healed through Western mental treatments
(Bracken, Giller, & Summerfield, 1995; Fassin & Rechtman, 2009; Watters, 2011).
We are attracted to trauma as the root of dysfunction in our lives. My intention for
this study was to place trauma at the beginning rather than the end of social
understandings of suffering and wonder about how trauma has become essential to a way
of human being. Questioning something that is so ubiquitous and culturally precious may
feel foreign at a minimum. This study will no doubt raise some discomfort as I ask the
reader and myself to let trauma fall out of everydayness (cf. Heidegger, 1996)—to notice
what it feels like to ask questions about something so commonplace in our lives.
My intention was not to discount those who consider themselves trauma survivors
or expound a discourse about trauma as a myth. We are affected by and engage with
trauma in ways that fundamentally constitute and shape our lives. The object of my study
was to examine the world that gives rise to trauma culture; a world that maintains
concepts like victims, survivors, perpetrators, rescuers, PTSD, trauma and traumatic
stress.
I have selected to analyze evidence-based trauma treatment manuals as exemplars
of contemporary trauma culture because they have become such an integral component of
contemporary psychotherapy. How therapy is being conceived, trained, practiced and
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exported across the world is increasingly determined by a manual rather than mentorship
and supervision; what constitutes good therapy, what it means to be disordered and
healed, is represented in these texts. Studying the messages embedded in these manuals
and thinking about the world that gave rise to them is imperative given their increasing
utilization and the continued cultural obsession with trauma, especially within the U.S.
but increasingly internationally since the 1980s.
Although there has been much mainstream, quantitative psychological research
performed on the efficacy and effectiveness of popular trauma treatments, there has been
a relative absence of critical, hermeneutic studies about the understandings of the good,
the prescriptive and proscriptive elements implicit in trauma treatments and how
treatment techniques bring about compliance with those embedded understandings.
Furthermore, studies have rarely explored what we can learn from all that about the social
world that gives rise to the concept of trauma, the identity of trauma victims and the
taken for granted acceptance of trauma treatments—in other words, a trauma-based
society. Therefore there is a need for further interpretation of trauma culture and the
practice of trauma therapy from a hermeneutic perspective.
It is not enough to realize and identify that trauma abounds in the social world.
An aim of my study was to describe how contemporary society identifies and understands
trauma, to interpret what it means, what it stands for, what it substitutes for, and the many
political meanings—especially discomforting or dangerous political meanings—it
contains. I have conceptualized trauma as a way of human being in contemporary culture,
and in particular, as an accepted way of expressing enactments of dissociated,
unformulated or unarticulated political arrangements and events. In a more general sense,
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through my interpretation of trauma treatment manuals, I treat trauma as a system of
references to historical discourse and traditions that are relevant to contemporary
practice. One of my primary hopes in conducting this study was that through thinking
about trauma from historical, philosophical and moral perspectives, alternative, perhaps
previously unformulated insights, about how we think and act in this traumatized world
may come to light.

8
Background and Literature Review
To understand trauma treatment manuals as a system of references to historical
discourse and the social world, one must outline the precedents in history for the practice,
social concerns, and purposes of the texts (Stigliano, 1989). In this section, I review
literature that presents the mainstream conceptualization of trauma in psychotherapy as a
mental health disorder. This conceptualization is reproduced by the majority of evidencesupported trauma treatment manuals today, including those analyzed in this study. I also
present a history of trauma related disorders that the treatment manuals and the majority
of trauma-related treatment texts in psychotherapy refer to when describing the
theoretical orientation to or rationale for trauma treatment. I then present four key
moments in the history of traumatology that the majority of trauma-related treatment
texts in someway refer to, reproduce or re-appropriate the conceptualization of trauma
that was developed during these moments in history.
After presentation of this general background and history of trauma treatment, I
present background literature that is specific to the themes I identify and discuss in the
results and discussion chapters. This is followed by a presentation of the theoretical
background of the methods, the design, importance, and purpose of the study, as well as
the areas of inquiry and research questions. Overall, the purpose of the Background and
Literature Review chapter is to describe the social and historical context that gives rise to
contemporary trauma culture. I also comment on how psychotherapy has historically
simultaneously reflected and produced particular understandings of trauma and human
being; these understandings are reproduced and shaped by the trauma treatment manuals
that I interpreted in this study.

9
Context for Trauma Culture
Trauma as a medical, mental health disorder in mainstream psychotherapy.
PTSD has become the poster child of trauma mental health disorders since the 1980s and
is presently representative of the mainstream conceptualization of trauma as a
psychological phenomenon. This section describes how persons who are suffering from a
range of different problems might first encounter being understood as traumatized,
having a trauma disorder, and meeting criteria for PTSD in contemporary society. Often
this process occurs through psychological assessment and education about how one’s
problems should be understood as a trauma-related mental health disorder. Given the
widespread nature of trauma culture which I described in the Introduction, exposure to
assessment and education about being traumatized can occur in a range of subtle ways
just by living in contemporary society; however, explicit transformation by labeling a
person as a trauma survivor or as having PTSD often occurs at primary care doctors’
appointments, through referral to psychotherapy, and increasingly through self-help and
diagnostic materials found on the internet, books and other media.
For the purposes of this study, describing the mainstream conceptualization of
trauma as a mental health disorder is particularly important because meeting diagnostic
criteria for PTSD is currently a prerequisite for receiving most evidence-supported
trauma-focused psychotherapy treatment. The three trauma treatment manuals that I
analyzed in this study center primarily around treating PTSD and related traumatic stress
symptoms (e.g., subclinical traumatic stress, sleep disorders and acute stress responses).
I have withheld from significant discussion and critique of the mainstream
conceptualization in this Background chapter because this will be included in the
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description of my interpretation of trauma treatment manuals; however, in this section I
begin to describe some of the ways of human being that are suggested by the mainstream
conceptualization. In the results and discussion chapters, I further elaborate these taken
for granted assumptions of human being in trauma culture. Thus this section provides
necessary background to understanding the historical context that gave rise to mainstream
conceptualizations of trauma, and the practice of manualized trauma treatment. Here I
review the PTSD diagnosis, its etiology as explained through psychoeducation and
cognitive-neurobiological theory, protective and risk factors associated with PTSD,
epidemiological data on prevalence and treatment standards for trauma related disorders.
PTSD diagnostic criteria. It is important to understand the diagnostic criteria for
PTSD because who is understood as traumatized and deserving of trauma treatment often
begins in psychotherapy or a primary care physician’s office with an initial assessment of
traumatic symptoms and diagnosis of PTSD. All evidence-based trauma treatments listed
in Table 1 require initial assessment of trauma symptomology for treatment planning
purposes. Treatments that are utilized in managed care settings often require an
assessment of PTSD symptoms for billing purposes. For example, the U.S. Veteran’s
Administration requires that patients1 meet criteria for PTSD in order to receive treatment
and related services for any problematic symptoms post-deployment (Rosen et al., 2004).
The trauma treatment manuals that I interpreted in this study were written before
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5)

1

The person seeking, participating in or receiving psychotherapy from a therapist has
been referred to in a range of ways historically (e.g., Foucault, 1973). In contemporary
psychotherapy, the words “patient”, “client,” and “consumer” are used in a range of
different clinical contexts. Throughout this study I have used the word patient unless
otherwise indicated.
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(2013) was released and thus all refer to the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders Fourth Edition- Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR) diagnostic criteria for
PTSD. In the DSM-IV-TR, PTSD was defined by clusters of intrusive,
avoidance/numbing and arousal symptoms that occur after a traumatizing or lifethreatening event in which one experiences fear, horror, and helplessness (American
Psychological Association [APA], 2000, pp. 463–468). To meet criteria for PTSD one
needed to meet Criterion A: the experience of fear, horror and helplessness after exposure
to a traumatic event, and Criteria B, C, and D: one intrusive symptom (e.g., intrusive
memories, distressing dreams, flashbacks, or extreme physiological reactivity), three
avoidance symptoms (e.g., avoiding thoughts, activities, people, emotional numbing,
inability to remember the trauma, and sense of foreshortened future), and two arousal
symptoms (e.g., difficulty sleeping, outbursts of anger, difficulty concentrating,
hyperviglance and exaggerated startle response). These symptoms needed to occur for at
least one month to be diagnosed as PTSD (Criterion E). Symptoms occurring for less
than one month post-trauma were considered under the acute stress disorder diagnosis in
DSM-IV-TR (pp. 469–472).
In 2013, the APA released the DSM-5, which has likely changed the way
practitioners understand trauma and who is considered traumatized since its publication.
The DSM-5 included an entirely new section of diagnostic criteria: Trauma- and
Stressor-Related Disorders (APA, 2013b, p. 265). Attachment disorder, PTSD, acute
stress disorder and adjustment disorder were grouped under this new section, and a new
diagnosis was added: disinhibited social engagement disorder. Previously, trauma related
disorders like PTSD had been categorized as anxiety disorders in the DSM-IV-TR (APA,
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2000). The DSM-5 task force explained the creation of this new trauma section by
describing the wide range of variation of expression of clinical distress following
exposure to catastrophic or aversive events (APA, 2013b). They stated that while the
majority of stress-related symptomology can be categorized under anxiety and fear-based
responses, many individuals exhibit more prominent anhedonic and dysphoric,
externalizing angry and aggressive, or dissociative symptoms. The heterogeneity of
trauma symptomology, according to the developers of the DSM-5, meant that the
expression of PTSD and other trauma related disorders was too unique to be considered
under anxiety disorders (p. 265).
Other notable changes to the PTSD diagnosis occurred in the DSM-5. First, PTSD
was revised to include four clusters of symptoms instead of three. Avoidance symptom
Criterion C was divided into two clusters as distinct criteria: avoidance, and persistent
negative changes in both cognition and mood. The latter cluster was expanded to include
negative emotional states such as dysphonia, anger, guilt and shame and PTSD related
cognitions including exaggerated negative beliefs like: “I am bad,” “People in authority
can’t be trusted,” and “The world is completely dangerous” (p. 272). Second, the
subjective reaction of fear, horror and helplessness from Criterion A was removed; one
was still required to experience a traumatic event to meet Criterion A but need not have
specific subjective reactions at the time the event occurred. The implication of removing
Criterion A is that one may not feel frightened, helpless or horrified during a traumatic
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event, but can develop PTSD symptoms later without these specific subjective
experiences.2
The third major change from the DSM-IV-TR to the DSM-5 was the addition of
distinct criteria to diagnose PTSD in children six years of age and younger. Previously
children needed to meet the same symptom categories as adults. Proponents of expanding
child disorders in the DSM-5 believed that earlier versions of PTSD criteria led to underdiagnosis of children because many of the symptoms were defined in terms of adult
cognitive processes, like thought avoidance, which often needed to be expressed verbally
and thus could not be assessed in pre-verbal children (Nemeroff et al., 2013). For
children to meet criteria of PTSD in the DSM-5 they must meet a revised version
Criterion A which, in addition to the adult criteria, includes hearing about a traumatic
event occurring to a parent or primary caregiver. Criteria B, C, and D include presence of
one intrusive symptom (e.g., intrusive memories expressed in play or dreams,
dissociative reactions, psychological distress to cues that resemble trauma, and
physiological reactions), one avoidant symptom or one negative alteration in cognition
(e.g., socially withdrawn behavior, negative emotional states), and two arousal symptoms
(e.g., hyperviglance, temper tantrums, sleep disturbance). Like adult PTSD, these
symptoms must exist for at least one month in order to be diagnosed (Criterion E).
The changes in the DSM-5 reflect the cultural conceptualization of traumatic
experiences as a mental disorder that is unique from other psychopathology (e.g., in a
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In practice, this means the patient can still meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD even if
they do not believe they experienced a traumatizing event. The new definition thus allows
the diagnostician’s interpretation of the event as traumatic to take primacy over the
patient’s subjective experience of the event.
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separate trauma disorder section) and as a common problem for adults and children (i.e.,
it does not require the patient subjective experience of a uniquely horrific event).
Traumatic events that cause PTSD. Given the emphasis on Criterion A in the
DSM-IV-TR diagnostic category for PTSD, many manual-based trauma therapies begin
with an assessment of the amount and kind of traumatic events that the patient
experienced. The number of traumatic events experienced by a patient is often assessed
as part of the standard diagnostic procedure before beginning any trauma-focused
psychotherapy treatment. All of the manuals that I analyzed in this study began or ended
treatment with a formal assessment of PTSD symptoms and traumatic events
experienced. The traumatic events that meet Criterion A for PTSD in the DSM-IV-TR and
DSM-5 for child and adult PTSD fall into broad categories including: accidents, natural
disaster, war, directly witnessing harm or threat of harm to others, and experiencing harm
or threat of harm to self. These categories are reflected in several widely utilized
standardized assessments of cumulative trauma burden including the Traumatic Events
Questionnaire (TEQ) (Vrana & Lauterbach, 1994), Traumatic Life Events Questionnaire
(TLEQ) (Kubany et al., 2000), and the Stressful Life Events Screening Questionnaire
(SLESQ) (Goodman, 1998) and in structured clinical interviewers such as the Composite
International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI) in the U.S. National Comorbidity Survey
(Kessler et al., 1994) and the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV (SCID) (First,
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1995). These traumatic event assessments were developed
through content analyses of case studies and clinical screenings in which all possible
traumatic events prior to onset of PTSD symptoms were identified.

15
Traumatic events that can lead to PTSD symptoms that are incorporated on the
above traumatic event assessments are quite wide ranging. They include: serving as a
peacekeeper or relief worker in a war zone or a place of ongoing terror, being an unarmed
civilian in a place with war, revolution, military coup or invasion, being a refugee, being
kidnapped or held captive, exposure to toxic chemical substances that caused serious
harm, life-threatening illness, life-threatening automobile accidents, work-related life
threatening accident, natural disaster like flood, hurricane or earthquake, man-made
disaster “like a fire started by a cigarette or bomb explosion” (WHO, 2001), life
threatening illness, child abuse, domestic violence, being repeatedly ridiculed, ignored or
told “you were no good” by a parent, family member or romantic partner, assault, armed
robbery or mugging, rape, sexual assault, stalking, unexpected death of close family
member, illness of close family member, being a victim of torture, witnessing domestic
violence as a child, witnessing someone be badly injured or killed, seeing a dead body,
accidently killing someone or seriously injuring them, purposefully injuring torturing or
killing another person, and seeing carnage of mutilated bodies and mass killings. The
traumatic event questionnaires conclude with catch-all trauma categories such as asking
the participant to list any other extremely traumatic or life threatening event not asked
about.
Though only one event is needed to meet Criterion A, traumatic event
questionnaires function as trauma checklists where the total number of events
experienced is referred to as the patient’s cumulative trauma burden. Epidemiology
studies often compare cumulative trauma burden as a metric of traumatic exposure for
different populations (e.g., Blanco, 2011). It is also important to note that the traumatic
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events on these scales are considered relative to each other and thus are not weighted for
being more or less tragic (e.g., being an unarmed civilian during a military coup carries
the same psychometric weight—a count of one—as being in a motor vehicle accident or
being ridiculed by a family member).
Trauma explained through popular PTSD psychoeducation. Prior to referring a
client to trauma treatment or beginning a manual-based therapy, clinicians often educate
potential patients about the nature of posttraumatic stress symptoms by reading from
PTSD psychoeducational texts such as informatory pamphlets, textbooks, and websites;
psychoeducation is also a standard part of the majority of evidence-supported trauma
treatments (SAMHSA, 2013). The manuals that I analyzed in this study included
psychoeducation that was similar to that described here.
The following is an example psychoeducational excerpt from the National
Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH) website in an online article titled “What is PTSD?”:
When in danger, it’s natural to feel afraid. This fear triggers many split-second
changes in the body to prepare to defend against the danger or to avoid it. This
“fight-or-flight” response is a healthy reaction meant to protect a person from
harm. But in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), this reaction is changed or
damaged. People who have PTSD may feel stressed or frightened even when
they’re no longer in danger. (National Institute of Mental Health [NIMH], 2013)
Thus, according to the NIMH, a goal of educating PTSD patients about
their disorder is to remind them that they are not necessarily in danger when they
experience symptoms, rather their survival instincts have gone awry.
It is also common for PTSD psychoeducational texts to extend the metaphor of
trying to survive midst lions and other predators in the African Savannah. For example, in
Zayfert and Becker’s (2006) cognitive behavioral treatment manual the psychoeducation
section asked the patient to imagine himself or herself in Africa on a vacation. The

17
therapist was instructed to ask the patient to imagine they volunteered to go to get water
from the watering hole where a lion awaits. The therapist was then instructed to walk the
patient through all the emotions and reactions that surge through the patient’s body after
seeing the lion by following this script:
Therapist: Do you notice anything else when you are faced with the lion and your
fight-flight response is activated?
Kate [Patient]: Well, I tend to feel kind of queasy and light headed. How can that
be helpful?
Therapist: Well the thing to keep in mind is that when survival is at stake your
body is going to pull all its resources toward helping you get away and divert
resources from non-urgent matters like digesting and storing food for future
energy, thinking, problem solving or planning for the future. […] Whereas before
you were focused on getting water, now your only thought is, “I’ve got to get out
of here!” or “I’m gone die!” Staying focused on the threat is important. (p. 67)
In this quotation, the therapist explained to the patient why survival
instincts are helpful when seeing a lion but can hinder when away from the lion
(e.g., problem solving and planning for the future the patient needs brain
functions that were turned off during the survival situation).. The script continued
by describing what would happen when the patient leaves Africa:
Therapist: When you return home from Africa, you notice that you feel nervous
every evening around dusk, the same time you met the lion at the watering hole.
You even have a panic attack when an orange tabby cat walks in front of you; just
the sight of an orange fuzzy creature triggers your fear. These situations and
objects have become triggers or cues that remind you of the lion and activate your
fear. […] Unfortunately many of these triggers are serving as false alarms. Rather
than keeping you safe, they prevent you from enjoying life. […]
Kate: Hmm. That really makes sense. You know, sometimes my anxiety dos
come from out of the blue. Are you saying there are triggers and I just don’t know
it?
Therapist: Exactly. (pp. 69-70)
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In this script, the therapist helped the patient learn where her mysterious anxiety
was coming from by relating the process to an instinctual or primitive survival
mechanism that was malfunctioning and transformed everyday experiences into trauma
“triggers.”
This type of psychoeducation sets the stage for the taken for granted assumptions
about trauma culture that are communicated to the patient during trauma treatment. In
these examples some of the surface-level assumptions about human being in trauma
culture include: response to everyday experiences can initiate a biologically-based,
natural, universal response that is designed for survival, anything in the world can
become a trauma trigger, and these responses have existed in the same form throughout
time (as long as our ancestors lived on the Serengeti) and are hardwired in our brain.
Some of the more subtle or deeper assumptions about human being in trauma culture
include: traumatic and social events are reified and located internally in a universal form,
when persons feel traumatized therapists tell them not to trust their instincts (e.g., that
they are danger) but to understand this is a survival mechanism that is gone awry and can
be rest by therapy. In this study, I further explore these kinds of assumptions about
human being in trauma culture within the local and historical context of evidence-based
trauma treatment manuals.
Cognitive-neurobiological framework for understanding trauma disorders. The
diagnostic description of PTSD in the DSM-IV-R and DSM-5 and the psychoeducational
texts previously described exemplify a cognitive-neurobiological orientation to trauma as
medical pathology. From a mainstream, empirical perspective, the central tenants this
approach with respect to trauma center on the cognitive-neurobiological model of threat
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reactions. This model is mentioned in numerous trauma treatment manuals and books
about trauma (e.g., Bryant & Harvey, 2000; Cozolino, 2002; van der Kolk, McFarlane, &
Weiseth, 2012) including those analyzed in this study. While behaviorists like Walter
Cannon first described the fight-or-flight reaction, Joseph LeDoux (1994) developed the
cognitive, neurobiological model of threat reactions associated with PTSD.
LeDoux theorized that humans have evolved to be able respond to fear without
conscious thought (LeDoux, 1994; Nader, Schafe, & Le Doux, 2000). The evolutionary
theory of brain development supported in LeDoux’s research suggested that the layered
structures of the brain reveal our evolution as mammals. The brainstem or “reptilian
brain” is concerned with self-preservation, the intermediate brain or limbic system is
concerned with emotions and memory, and finally the neocortex including the frontal
lobe is involved with intellectual tasks.
According to LeDoux’s research, the primary structure of the brain involved in
response to a traumatic event is the amygdala located in the limbic system (Nader et al.,
2000). When humans perceive danger the thalamus receives the stimulus and directs a
response to the amygdala. The amygdala rapidly responds sending signals to the
autonomic nervous system (ANS) to begin to respond to the threat; all of this is before
conscious or intellectual thought occurs in the cortex. A graphic that is commonly used to
describe how traumatic memories become embossed in the brain via cortical pathways in
the limbic system is represented in Figure 1. In the figure, the person, represented as a
brain with eyes on the left, sees the snake and messages are sent to the brain stem before
any conscious thought can occur. The frontal cortex inactivity is represented by an
absence of arrows leading from the eyes to the top of the brain.
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Figure 1. Le Doux’s (1994) cognitive model of fear responses.
LeDoux (1994) included neurochemical and neurological correlates of fear
responses in his model, such as the catecholamine norepinephrine. As the amygdala
triggers the release of norepinephrine, this catalyzes an increase in blood pressure and
heart rate, which triggers the release of glucose and lipid breakdown, and dilates our
blood vessels to prepare us to respond to an attack. The energy of the body is diverted
away from cognitive processes to the instinctual responses of the reptilian brain. When
the rational abilities of the cortex are over-ridden, what cognitive psychologists would
call the conscious, integrated, and sequential narrative memories of the traumatic event
are also disrupted. The usual memory consolidation process that occurs between the
amygdala, hippocampus and cortex does not occur. Instead, what has been coined
“hyper-consolidation” of the memory occurs. In this process, what would typically
remain a soft association of sensory information to later be integrated into long-term
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memory is instead deeply and quickly embossed into our long-term memory as driven by
the norandrogenic responses of the amygdala (Nader et al., 2000).
The physiological state post-trauma allows for hyper-memory of fragments of an
event (e.g., sounds, images) that might otherwise be remembered differently in a nontraumatic event. Though memory of trauma is intensified, it paradoxically may remain
largely unconscious (only triggered by a sound or smell) because of the inhibition of the
frontal lobes and atypical processing (Nader et al., 2000).
One of the messages about human being that is taken for granted in Le Doux’s
(1994) model is that traumatic events that occur in a social and political world can
become represented psychologically and biologically in the individual person. In
LeDoux’s model, the idea of the unconscious or split-off traumatic memory is introduced
as if it were part of an intrinsic and universal biological function; the historical tradition
for this idea I describe in the History of trauma as a mental health disorder (pp. 47-99)
section of this study.
PTSD born from neurochemical imbalance. Mainstream approaches to
understanding trauma disorders embrace the cognitive neurobiological framework
proposed by LeDoux, which suggest that the psychological effects of experiencing
trauma are primarily the result of a neurochemical imbalance or physiological or genetic
predisposition to being traumatized. The previously mentioned NIMH (2013)
psychoeducational article called “What is PTSD?” continued with a sub-section titled
Causes of PTSD:
Genes. Currently, many scientists are focusing on genes that play a role in
creating fear memories. Understanding how fear memories are created may help
to refine or find new interventions for reducing the symptoms of PTSD. For
example, PTSD researchers have pinpointed genes that make: Stathmin, a
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protein needed to form fear memories. […] Researchers have also found a
version of the 5-HTTLPR gene, which controls levels of serotonin—a brain
chemical related to mood-that appears to fuel the fear response. Like other
mental disorders, it is likely that many genes with small effects are at work in
PTSD.
Brain Areas. Studying parts of the brain involved in dealing with fear
and stress also helps researchers to better understand possible causes of PTSD.
One such brain structure is the amygdala, known for its role in emotion,
learning, and memory. The amygdala appears to be active in fear acquisition, or
learning to fear an event (such as touching a hot stove), as well as in the early
stages of fear extinction, or learning not to fear. Storing extinction memories
and dampening the original fear response appears to involve the prefrontal
cortex (PFC) area of the brain, involved in tasks such as decision-making,
problem solving, and judgment. […]. The ventromedial PFC helps sustain longterm extinction of fearful memories, and the size of this brain area may affect its
ability to do so. Individual differences in these genes or brain areas may only set
the stage for PTSD without actually causing symptoms. Environmental factors,
such as childhood trauma, head injury, or a history of mental illness, may
further increase a person's risk by affecting the early growth of the brain. Also,
personality and cognitive factors, such as optimism and the tendency to view
challenges in a positive or negative way, as well as social factors, such as the
availability and use of social support, appear to influence how people adjust to
trauma. More research may show what combinations of these or perhaps other
factors could be used someday to predict who will develop PTSD following a
traumatic event. (p. 1)
All causes of PTSD that the NIMH presently (2013-2014) recognizes are
presented above; indeed, according to the NIMH, there are now only two causes of
PTSD: genes and brain areas. The traumatic event itself or any other environmental,
relational or social experiences are not listed as causes but acknowledged as risk factors.
Notably a positive attitude is listed as a protective factor. Because the genes and brain
areas have, as the article said, “set the stage” for PTSD, the taken for granted assumption
about human being in contemporary trauma culture that is suggested in the article is that
if one’s genetic composition and brain are healthy and large enough when exposed to any
stressful event PTSD may not develop.

23
Localizing PTSD in the brain on a micro-level has been one of the primary foci of
new research on PTSD (AFPS, 2012; Baum, 2012). Over the 10-year development of
DSM-5, one of the primary aims of the revised manual was to identify the biomarkers in
our DNA for major disorders such as PTSD, depression and schizophrenia. In a special
issue of BMC Medicine focusing on current controversies surrounding the DSM-5,
Nemeroff et al. (2013) described how the “unbridled enthusiasm [for biomarker
identification] followed on the heels of the sequencing of the human genome and the
then-existing strong belief that many complex diseases in medicine would be simplified
by the results of genome-wide association studies” (p. 1). Alas this promise was not
reached by the development of the DSM-5 and instead understanding of genetic basis for
disease became more complex or “sophisticated” due to emerging disciplines like
“epigenetics, non-coding RNAs, microRNAs, transcriptomics and protemotics”
(p. 1). The authors noted that the scientific community’s enthusiasm for identifying direct
links from genetics to mental health disorders was reminiscent of the burgeoning field of
brain imaging studies, which produced much data about neurobiology related to mental
health disorders yet no findings which could be incorporated into a diagnostic manual.
Nemeroff et al. (2013) concluded that it is difficult to find the genetic determinants of
disease, but cited trauma as a major factor that alters gene expression.3

3

They also suggested that the controversy surrounding inclusion of biomarkers in the
DSM-5 was pithy and if psychology were less politically active and more like a medical
science, the field would readily accept the move to biological markers for disorder. The
authors stated,
Do the American Neurological Association or the American Cancer Society have
demonstrations outside their national meetings protesting their disease
classifications? Do they have those in their ranks refusing to use the new ICD-10
disease classification? Clearly not. Was the DSM-5 handed down to our field on
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Despite the inability to find specific biomarkers to include in the DSM-5, the
authors discussed the enhanced benefits of the cross-reference between the DSM-5 and
the International Classification of Diseases-10th edition (ICD-10). Now all mental health
disorders in the DSM-5 can be identified according to ICD-10 medical diagnostic criteria,
further positioning mental health and psychology as a medical discipline. (Pragmatically
from a managed care perspective this also means that mental disorders can be billed
following the established medical billing system).
Nemeroff et al.’s (2013) final quote in the article was “Will the DSM-6 include
sensitive and specific diagnostic tests that are biological based for schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder and PTSD, to name a few? We all certainly hope so!” (p. 3). In an unintentional
journal formatting formality, following their concluding sentence expressing hope for
identifying PTSD biomarkers, the authors’ competing financial interests were listed in a
block of text. These included: consultation for nine pharmaceutical development firms,
stockholding of five biological pharmaceutical intervention companies, equity and
income from eight additional pharmaceutical firms, two patents for transdermal delivery
of lithium and assessing antidepressant drug therapy, and finally serving on the board of
Anxiety Disorders Association of America (ADAA), Skyland Trail, and AstraZeneca
Pharmaceuticals (2009); and board of directors of American Foundation for Suicide
Prevention, Mt. Cook Pharma (2010), NovaDel (2011), Skyland Trail, Gratitude
tablets from Mount Sinai? Of course not. […] Overall is it an improvement over
the DSM-IV? Yes, but perhaps not what we all wished for at this stage in our field.
Will the DSM-6 include sensitive and specific diagnostic tests that are biological
based for schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and PTSD, to name a few? We all
certainly hope so. (p. 3)
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America, and ADAA. Nemeroff et al.’s final quote juxtaposed with their competing
financial interests in the article almost perfectly captures what Nikolas Rose (2006) has
called the contemporary shift to an economy of “neurochemical selves,” where variations
in mood, emotions, desires and thoughts are increasingly being understood as variations
in brain chemicals that can only be managed by proprietary treatments.
Rose (2006) discussed how health has become a central ethical principle in
contemporary society and has recently taken the shape of somatic individuality in such a
way that the self is understood in terms of biological health, “we understand ourselves,
speak about ourselves and act upon ourselves as the kind of beings whose characteristics
are shaped by our biology” (Rose, N. S., 2006, p. 480). The shift to a neurochemical self
has allowed society to become amenable to economies of vitality. Nikolas Rose described
the practices that allow the neurochemical self to be transformed into an economy of
vitality as occurring in a phased process where persons or companies who stand to profit
from disease (e.g., pharmaceutical companies, insurance companies, patent holders,
shareholders): a) identify social ills and cultural discontent; b) link this discontent to
psychological disorders that can be cured by their products; and, c) then incorporate the
social narratives into advertising (both in direct-to-consumer ads and in sponsored
clinical trainings) linked to the product. This can occur on a more subtle level in
academia and clinical training when, for example, a trauma research study describes
symptoms that may be a reflection of the social and political world as medical problems
that reside purely in the individual brain or neurons.
In addition to linking social problems to products, Nikolas Rose (2006) also
described how psychological symptoms are further concretized and broken down into “a
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series of distinct and discreet objects- that can be isolated, delimited, stored, accumulated,
mobilized and exchanged … -in the service of many distinct objectives” (p. 7). This
fracturing of neurochemical self into many distinct components further allows health
companies and corporations to market and profit from each piece that comprises this
cultural construction of a healthy neurochemical self. In this construction, no longer does
it make sense to pursue a one-size fits all treatment for general anxiety, but to find
specific treatments for each sub-classification of anxiety (e.g., PTSD, acute stress, panic)
and symptom specific treatments within that (e.g., prazosin for PTSD related nightmares,
mortazipine for PTSD-related insomnia; see, e.g., Rosen et al., 2004).
Nikolas Rose (2006) suggested that when social problems are reified and located
in the brain as distinct medical problems, these problems and the related sense of a
healthy self can then be manipulated psychopharmaceuticals and evidence-supported
psychotherapies that target brain function. Rose suggested that psychiatrists and
researchers, like those on the DSM-5 task force, have created novel links between truth
and commodification in which life becomes amenable to economic relations (e.g.,
community problems are now understood as pieces of a brain can be modified and
profited from). In this world, parts of the neurochemical self can be healed and
strengthened, where others may be processed, and yet others are stored and utilized for
other functions. The taken for granted nature of the neurochemical self has allowed for
the creation of modular, brain-based mental health treatments for trauma, like the
treatments described by the manuals that are analyzed in this study.
The PTSD epidemic. The likelihood of a person being diagnosed with PTSD and
encountering the mainstream conceptualization of trauma as a medical, biologically
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based disorder is increasing. The majority of trauma-focused psychological and medical
journals have framed PTSD as a public health epidemic where over half of the world’s
population may be vulnerable to experiencing a traumatic event that could lead to PTSD.
The website for the National Center for PTSD proclaims that over 60% of people will
experience at least one trauma in their lives and 5.2 million adults retain the diagnosis of
PTSD each year in the U.S. (National Center for PTSD [NCP], 2007). Trauma treatment
papers commonly begin with statistics about PTSD such as: 37 million Americans,
including one quarter of the U.S. population of children and adolescents, make a visit to
the emergency room each year as the result of a traumatic accident (Bonnie et al., 1998;
Dowd et al., 2002). Studies have shown that within the first year after a traumatic
accident, ten to forty percent of individuals develop symptoms consistent with PTSD
(Zatzick et al., 2004). In this section, I review epidemiology literature that reports PTSD
prevalence in the U.S. and internationally.
In a comprehensive review of epidemiological studies of PTSD, Blanco (2011)
noted that rates of conditional lifetime prevalence for PTSD across the U.S. varied
considerably in the general population (e.g., 8.8% in a study of young adults in midAtlantic City to 23.6% for young adults in Detroit). Measurements of conditional PTSD
lifetime prevalence include persons who continue to meet PTSD criteria long after
exposure to the initial trauma and throughout their lives. In Latin America, the
conditional probability for lifetime PTSD in Mexico between 1990 and 1992 was 15%
and in Chile it was 4.4%.
According to the National Comorbidity Survey (NCS), a national study conducted
between 1990 and 1992, which many epidemiologic claims about PTSD in the U.S. are
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currently based upon, women are twice as likely to develop PTSD than men (10% vs.
5%) despite being exposed to fewer traumatic events in their lifetime (51.2% vs. 60.7%)
(Kessler et al., 1994). This rate was replicated in later studies conducted from 2000 to
2002 (Breslau, Wilcox, Storr , Lucia, & Anthony, 2004; Kessler et al., 2005). In Europe,
a cross-national European Study of the Epidemiology of Mental Disorders examined
rates of PTSD in six Western Europe countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and Spain) and found that lifetime prevalence of PTSD was on average
1.9%, with women having over twice the rate prevalence than men (2.9% vs. 9%). In
Australia, the National Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing found that men and
women had a relatively equal lifetime prevalence of PTSD (1.2% for men and 1.4% for
women).
When examining the diagnostic trends from an epidemiologic stance, it is
apparent that since the 1990s the U.S. has had the highest rates of PTSD diagnosis when
compared to other countries in national surveys of mental health. Across counties
surveyed, with the exception of Australia, women were reported as being exposed to less
traumatic events but developed PTSD at a rate two times or more than men. The literature
provides minimal to no context and explanation as to why these trends in trauma
pathology diagnosis are occurring. Some of the studies note that certain groups may have
more biological vulnerabilities to PTSD or may be exposed to more trauma due to
geographic location. Blanco (2011) reported that the majority of studies reviewed
attributed the discrepancy in high rates of PTSD between women and men as primarily
due to women experiencing more sexual trauma.
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When examining the studies involved in the analyses, the Australian study was
the only study to control for type and numbers of traumatic events, in addition to the
amount of time that passed since the event occurred; when these factors were controlled
for all effects for male and female gender disappeared. Thus the PTSD epidemic may
affect women and men equally or not depending on the statistical analysis utilized and the
sample selected; however, the common understanding in the scientific community
nationally (as reflected in the National Center for PTSD and NCS reports) is that women
develop PTSD more than men when faced with a trauma. The majority of studies use the
phrase women “develop” PTSD rather than are more frequently diagnosed with PTSD,
assuming that all other factors being equal (or even with women experiencing less
traumatic events) women are somehow more susceptible to PTSD. 4
The PTSD epidemiology research has yet to extend to countries with prolonged
civil war or genocide (e.g., Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Darfur, Iraq). Thus the previous estimates
of prevalence are based on countries where the relative national stability has been present
for the past twenty years. There have also been limited large-scale epidemiologic studies
conducted on differences between rates of PTSD diagnosis and ethnic and racial groups.
A follow-up study to the NCS called the NCS-R (N = 5424) found that lifetime
prevalence was highest for non-Hispanic blacks (7.1%), followed by non-Hispanic whites
(6.8%) and Hispanics (5.9%) (Kessler et al., 2005). The NCS-R and the epidemiology
studies reviewed by Blanco (2011) included surprisingly little detail about these
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It should also be noted that the majority of studies examining PTSD prevalence rates
across genders examined those who identified (or were forced to identify due to survey
design) as a women or men; no queer gendered (e.g., pangender, bi-gendered, nongendered, gender fluid, other-gendered, cis-gendered) or transgendered persons were
identified in the analysis.
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discrepancies and also did not appear to make distinctions between race, nationality,
immigration status, and ethnicity when reporting trends.
Given the dearth of national and international epidemiologic data on ethnic and
racial differences, I reviewed some smaller national studies. Within these studies,
American Indian and Alaskan Native (AI/AN) persons were the racial group that was
identified as being the most likely to experience a traumatic event in their lifetime and
develop PTSD. In the Southwestern American Indian community the prevalence of
lifetime PTSD (21%) and traumatic event exposure (81%) was considerably higher than
in the general U.S. population (Robin, Chester, Rasmussen, Jaranson, & Goldman, 1997).
Another study of two reservation-based populations observed the lifetime rates of
exposure to at least one traumatic event ranged from 62% to 70% (Manson, Beals, Klein,
Croy, & AI-SUPERPFP Team, 2005). In one study of approximately 3,000 trauma
survivors treated at 69 hospitals nationwide, AI/ANs had the highest risk of all racial and
ethnic groups for experiencing symptoms consistent with PTSD twelve months after their
injury (Zatzick et al., 2007).
In the U.S., Australia, and Germany numerous studies have reported a link
between socioeconomic class and PTSD where those who are considered low
socioeconomic status according to national standards and who live in regions of the
country where the majority of the population lives below the poverty line are more likely
to have high rates of lifetime PTSD. These studies attribute this discrepancy to high rates
of assault and violence between people described as having low socioeconomic status
(Blanco, 2011).
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The final factor associated with high-risk of PTSD is mental health disorder comorbidity with one or more additional psychiatric diagnosis (Blanco, 2011). 20. 87.5% of
those with PTSD have one other diagnosis and 77.5% have two or more additional
diagnoses (Blanco, 2011). The diagnoses most commonly associated with PTSD are
mood and dissociative disorders. Alcohol and drug dependence are also commonly comorbid with PTSD at a rate of 31.2%. Factors that have not consistently been identified
as risk factors or trends in PTSD epidemiologic data include: marital status and
education. Sexual orientation has not been examined on an epidemiologic level as being
linked to PTSD diagnoses.
The epidemiological data paints a picture of whom is most likely to included in
evidence-based treatments refer to as a “target population” for PTSD intervention. The
review of the literature indicated that PTSD target populations are most likely to include
women, African-American, and American Indian persons, immigrants, and persons
identified as low socioeconomic status. People considered to be a part of this target
population group are theoretically the most likely to receive an evidence-based PTSD
treatment given the wide dissemination of brief, evidence-based, manualized treatments
in community-based clinics.5
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In reality, those who are identified as the most deserving of PTSD treatment (according
to the literature), are also the least likely to receive it (Trusz, Wagner, Russo, Love, &
Zatzick, 2011). A range of issues prevent this group from being interested in or able to
access treatment such as logistical barriers (e.g., not able to take time off work, insurance
does not reimburse, no transport to clinic), clinical barriers (e.g., where treatments prescreen out patients with comorbidities such as psychosis and alcohol dependence),
stigma, and disinterest in treatment (Trusz et al., 2011). Some populations are not only
not interested in receiving treatment, they find the majority of evidence-based treatments
culturally incongruent and even colonial in nature (Gone, 2007).
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Overall, it is important to consider epidemiological data when attempting to
understand how trauma-culture that is communicated and reproduced in evidence-based
treatments. The data suggests that evidence-based treatments are marketed to therapists
and clinics that serve specific groups of people who are considered to be the most
traumatized. The groups that identified as most likely to develop PTSD are also the most
historically underprivileged and politically marginalized in the U.S., yet, as I will explore
throughout this study, social and political interpretations why these trends in pathology
occur (or are seen as such) are largely absent from the mainstream understanding of
trauma as a mental health disorder. For example, PTSD epidemiology literature
suggested that women and American Indians are significantly more likely to develop
PTSD after a traumatic event when compared to men and other ethnics groups. They are
in a sense seen as being more vulnerable to develop pathology after exposure or even
mentally weaker than other groups. Yet when studies control for the type and number of
traumatic events, in addition to the amount of time that passed since the event occurred,
all effects for gender disappear. This that mainstream interpretation of PTSD
epidemiology reflects and perpetuating a particular understanding about U.S. society isn’t
necessarily supported by the data. It would be more accurate to say that women, black,
AI/AN, immigrants and persons living below the poverty line are more likely to receive a
PTSD diagnosis after a traumatic event, but that these groups may not have an inherent
vulnerability or predisposition to develop PTSD symptoms.
From a hermeneutic perspective, U.S. society extends the boundaries of the
medical and biological understanding of trauma more deeply into historically
marginalized groups—as if to explain political and social inequities and power
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arrangements as a product of an internal, brain-based, and pathological weakness and
vulnerability to traumatic events. The implications for this understanding of PTSD and
trauma are explored further through the interpretation of the trauma manuals in this study.
PTSD prevalence in the military. Within the military, several large-scale studies
have found average PTSD prevalence estimates from 14-16% post-deployment (Hoge et
al., 2004; Tanielian & Jaycox, 2008). These studies note that they may underestimate
prevalence because of stigma and the potential negative consequences associated with
disclosing mental health difficulties.
In a review of 177 studies of military PTSD prevalence, Gates et al. (2012)
compared immediate post-deployment assessments of PTSD (i.e., within a month after
deployment) and lifetime prevalence of PTSD. In immediate post-deployment settings
after the Vietnam War, PTSD prevalence ranged from 4 to 18% (mean of approximately
11%) and a lifetime prevalence of PTSD of 10 to 35% (mean of approximately 15%).
After the Gulf War, post-deployment rates of PTSD a ranged from 3 to 33%. Overall,
Female veterans and Kuwaiti veterans had the highest mean rates of PTSD (20 and 33%
respectively). During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq, 21.8% of nearly 300,000 OEF/OIF veterans who first
received care at a VA between 2002 and 2008 were diagnosed with PTSD. Other studies
on OEF/OIF post-deployment have revealed rates of PTSD prevalence from 4 to 33%
with the average being around 15%. No lifetime studies of PTSD prevalence have been
conducted (perhaps because OEF continues in at the present moment and limited
retrospective or longitudinal data can be assessed).
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Similar to the epidemiology studies on civilian PTSD, women in the military
experience lower levels of combat exposure but have significantly higher rates of PTSD
(Gates et al., 2012). Also like the civilian literature, the discrepancy between male and
female prevalence of PTSD in the military has been attributed to high rates of military
sexual trauma (Gates et al., 2012).
PTSD within the military is reported to be similar across ethnic groups with
African-American veterans being slightly more likely to be diagnosed with PTSD than
Caucasian or Hispanic veterans (14% versus 13%) (Gates et al., 2012). AI/AN veterans
also had a higher prevalence of PTSD than Caucasian veterans.
Factors that have been associated with a strong effect for increased risk of PTSD
in the military include: severe combat exposure, perceived life threat, combat-related
injury, peritraumatic distress or dissociation, and post-trauma factors including: lack of
social support, negative homecoming experience and exposure to additional life stressors
upon returning home (Gates et al., 2012). Intermediate effects are found for: lower
intelligence, lower education, lower military rank, lower socioeconomic status, prior
trauma, prior psychiatric history, family psychiatric history, behavioral problems in
childhood and child abuse (Gates et al., 2012).
Bracken (2002) reviewed the work of several scholars who have argued that
wartime trauma is not inevitably associated with psychiatric morbidity and PTSD
diagnosis of veterans. In communities where the violence was prompted by public outcry
(e.g., 1970s riots of Northern Ireland) and in wars where neighbors and friends took care
of soldiers involved in fighting (e.g., Spanish Civil war of 1939) there were notably less
reported psychiatric problems when compared to wars that were staged by the
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government from the top-down (i.e., where government recruits its unwilling citizens). In
these cases where a government has staged wars with limited public support or in cases
where the government works systematically to undermine social cohesion and solidarity
(e.g., conflicts in South America in the 1970s and 1980s) rates of community distress
increase. Thus, Bracken argued that patterns in trauma pathology reflect the social and
political context of the violence; the more engaged the community the less likely its
members experience pathological symptoms of PTSD.
The work of Bracken (2002) and other scholars (e.g., Brave Heart, 2003; Fassin &
Rechtman, 2009; Sommers & Satel, 2006; Watters, 2011) have highlighted the context
and culturally dependent nature of PTSD; however, the majority of evidence-supported
treatment manuals were designed based on the assumption that PTSD is worldwide, or
even culturally universal epidemic that can be treated systematically using Western
developed psychological treatments. The assumption that trauma is a universally
experienced phenomenon that expresses itself as PTSD symptoms and can be treated with
a manual-based treatment is one example of a taken for granted assumption about human
being in trauma-based society that I describe in this study.
PTSD and trauma related diagnoses treatment standards. International
organizations have embraced the concept of PTSD as a worldwide epidemic and have
contributed to the promotion of evidence-based treatments as a response to the epidemic.
The organizations that define best practices for trauma treatment nationally and
internationally include but are not limited to the: World Health Organization (WHO),
Institute of Medicine (IoM), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), National

36
Institutes of Health (NIH), U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, International Society for
Traumatic Stress (ISTSS), National Child Traumatic Stress Network (NCTSN), The
RAND Corporation, United Kingdom (U.K.) National Institute of Health and Clinical
Excellence (NICE), National Collaborating Center for Mental Health (NCCMH) and
Cochrane Collaborative. These organizations are predominantly English speaking and are
based in the U.S. or U.K. (the only exception is WHO which is based in Geneva,
Switzerland). Several scholars have documented the impact the Euro-American
domination over the trauma industry and the Western exportation of mental health
(Fassin & Rechtman, 2009; Furedi, 2004; Gone, 2007; Rose, N. S., 2006; Smith, 1999;
Sommers & Satel, 2006; Watters, 2011).
All evidence-based psychotherapy treatments that are recommended by these
organizations have met the effect size criteria of well-established or probably efficacious
treatments (Chambless et al., 1998; Chambless & Hollon, 1998).6 Current best-practices
for PTSD treatment defined by these organizations include evidence-supported
psychotherapy from manual-based treatment models and if needed, augmentation with
psychotropic medications (e.g., SSRIs, SNRIs, mirtazapine) (Bisson & Andrew, 2007;
DoD, 2010; Foa et al., 2000; Foa et al., 2008; Forbes et al., 2010; Rosen et al., 2004;
SAMHSA, 2013; World Health Organization [WHO], 2013). When reviewing the
evidence-based psychotherapies recommended by the national and international
6

In clinical research, there is a difference between efficacy and effectiveness. Efficacious
treatments are those that have been demonstrated to lead to significant symptom
reduction in controlled research settings (e.g., randomized control trial with highly
trained psychologists and engaged patients who are paid to attend the therapy for research
in a university clinic). Effective treatments are those that that have been demonstrated to
work when disseminated to clinicians working in a range of settings and with real-world
populations (e.g., in a community-based clinic or hospital with bachelors or masters-level
staff that have attended one workshop training).
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organizations listed above, three primary treatment approaches are consistently
recommended: exposure-based therapies (trauma focused cognitive behavioral therapy
with prolonged, imaginal or in vivo exposure, e.g., Foa, Chrestman, &
Gilboa-Schechtman, 2009), cognitive-based therapies (cognitive processing therapy, e.g.,
Resick & Schnicke, 1993), and eye-movement desensitization and reprocessing therapy
(EMDR; e.g., Shapiro, 2001). Some organizations such as WHO, NICE, and The
Cochrane Collaborative, recommend only trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy
(TF-CBT) and EMDR as first-line treatments.
The IoM (2009) was perhaps the most conservative in their recommendations for
PTSD treatment. After reviewing 2,800 abstracts and identifying 90 randomized control
trials, 53 psychotherapy studies and 37 pharmacotherapy studies with adequate design
and effect size for further assessment, the IoM concluded that there was only enough
evidence for exposure-based therapies; evidence for EMDR and cognitive-based
therapies was not considered adequate (Institute of Medicine Committee on Treatment of
Posttraumatic Stress, 2008). Furthermore, the IoM could not recommend treatment with
any pharmacotherapies primarily because the research was almost exclusively funded by
drug companies, individuals who developed the therapies, or their close collaborators.
Presently, all evidence-supported psychotherapy treatments recommended by
these organizations are trained to practicing therapist via a manual of treatment protocols.
Similarly, these organizations recommend that therapists are periodically assessed for
treatment fidelity according to manual guidelines (i.e., therapists are evaluated on manual
adherence when in training and when performing therapy). A comprehensive list of all
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evidence-based trauma treatments that are currently (2013-2014) recommended in the
U.S. by SAMHSA can be found in Table 1.
With the exceptions one treatment, Kognito Family of Heroes, that is intended to
be administered via a computer without a therapist, all treatments recommended by
SAMHSA involve the therapist learning from and retaining adherence to a treatment
manual.
When reviewing the list of child and adult civilian trauma treatments found in
Table 1, it is apparent that certain therapeutic approaches are completely excluded. Most
of the organizations’ treatment recommendations are based on the findings of metaanalyses of treatment efficacy. The meta-analyses include data from many randomized
control trials evaluating trauma treatments that have large enough effect sizes and
adequate design to be included in a meta-analyses. Many approaches to trauma treatment
have not had sufficient evidence from randomized-control trials to become endorsed as
best practices (e.g., gestalt, relational psychoanalytic, attachment-based, object-relations,
play therapy, interpersonal).7 This was the case in widely-cited Cochrane Collaborative

7

Often meta-analyses of treatment effectiveness reveal relatively little difference
between psychotherapeutic treatment modalities; they tend o show moderate
effectiveness for all psychotherapy treatments that could be included in the analysis. This
phenomenon is referred to as the dodo bird verdict in reference to Lois Carroll’s Alice in
Wonderland where “everybody wins” the race. The decision to include an evaluation of a
psychotherapy treatment in a meta-analysis hinges on whether the approach has enough
data from randomized control studies to achieve a moderate effect size. Many
psychotherapeutic approaches have not received funding for research trials for a variety
of reasons (e.g., NIH preference to fund brief interventions that can be widely
disseminated and administered by anyone). Some approaches are not amenable to limited
longitudinal analyses (i.e., outcomes determined from 6-months to one year) and
specifically reject the technicist approaches that are geared towards managed care.
Psychotherapeutic approaches that do not have enough data to be evaluated in metaanalyses fail to win even the Dodo bird verdict, and are thus excluded from the list of best
practices.
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reviews (Bisson & Andrew, 2007; Rose, S., Bisson, Churchill, & Wessely, 2002; Rose,
S., Bisson, & Wessely, 2003) and other meta-analyses (Bradley, Greene, Russ, Dutra, &
Westen, 2005; Brewin, Andrews, & Valentine, 2000; Forbes et al., 2010) that all
ultimately recommended TF-CBT and EMDR as first-line treatments for PTSD in part
due to the availability of adequate research data to include in the analyses.
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Table 1
Evidence-Supported Treatments (EST) for Posttraumatic Stress and Trauma-Related Symptoms (2013)
Intervention Title
(Year validated as EST)
Boston Consortium Model: TraumaInformed Substance Abuse
Treatment for Women (2009)

Evidence-supported Treatment Targets2

Ages

Setting(s)

N = Recommended
sessions and format
(total minutes per
session)

• Substance use

26–55

Residential
Outpatient

25 group (60–80)

6–17

Outpatient

4–5 individual (60)

0–55

Home
Other
community
settings

50 dyad: parentchild (varies)

6–12

School

10 child group,
1–3 individual
(varies)

• Mental health symptomatology
• Posttraumatic stress symptoms
• HIV sexual risk behaviors
• Perceived power in relationships

Child and Family Traumatic Stress
Intervention (2012)

• Posttraumatic stress symptoms
• Anxiety symptoms
• PTSD diagnostic symptoms

Child-Parent Psychotherapy (CPP)
(2010)

• Child PTSD symptoms
• Child behavior problems
• Children's representational models
• Attachment security
• Maternal PTSD symptoms
• Maternal mental health symptoms

Cognitive Behavioral Intervention
for Trauma in Schools (CBITS)
(2010)

• PTSD symptoms
• Depression symptoms
• Psychosocial dysfunction
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Table 1 (continued)
Evidence-Supported Treatments (EST) for Posttraumatic Stress and Trauma-Related Symptoms (2013)
Combined Parent-Child Cognitive
Behavioral Therapy (CPC-CBT):
Empowering Families Who Are at
Risk for Physical Abuse (2011)

• Children’s PTSD symptoms

Coordinated Anxiety Learning and
Management (CALM) Tools for
Living Program (2012)

• General symptoms of anxiety

6–55

Outpatient

16–20 individual
and dyad: parent–
child (120)

18–55+

Outpatient

6 individual,
computer-based
(6–90); 6 with
primary care doctor

18–55+

Outpatient

1–3 individual
(60 – 90);
additional
depending on level
of severity

6–12

Home
School

9 individual, 1
dyad: parent–child
(60)

6–12

School

2 individual, 7
group, 1 dyad
parent-child (60)

• Parenting skills

• Disorder-specific symptoms of anxiety
• Symptoms of depression
• Functional status

Eye Movement Desensitization and
Reprocessing (2010) 1

• PTSD symptoms
• Anxiety symptoms
• Depression symptoms
• Global mental health functioning

Grief and Trauma Intervention
(GTI) for Children (2011)

• Posttraumatic stress symptoms
• Depression symptoms
• Internalizing and externalizing
behaviors

I Feel Better Now! Program (2011)

• Trauma-related symptoms
• Problem behaviors
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Table 1 (continued)
Evidence-Supported Treatments (EST) for Posttraumatic Stress and Trauma-Related Symptoms (2013)
Kognito Family of Heroes (2012)

• Preparedness to recognize signs of
post-deployment stress

18–55+

Home

1 individual,
computer-based
(60)

26-55

Outpatient

15 group (90)

0-12

Outpatient

12 individual (4560)

18-55+

Outpatient,
Other
community
settings

8 to 15 individual
(90)

• Preparedness to discuss concern with
veteran and motivate him or her to
seek help at a VA hospital or Vet
center
• Self-efficacy in motivating veteran to
seek help at a VA hospital or Vet
center
• Intention to approach veteran to
discuss concerns
• Intention to mention the VA as a
helpful resource
Living in the Face of Trauma
(LIFT): An Intervention for Coping
With HIV and Trauma (2010)

• Traumatic stress symptoms

Preschool PTSD Treatment (PPT)
(2012)

• PTSD symptoms

Prolonged Exposure Therapy for
Posttraumatic Stress Disorders
(2007)

• Severity of PTSD symptoms

• HIV sexual risk behaviors
• Substance use

• Depression symptoms
• Social adjustment
• Anxiety symptoms
• PTSD diagnostic status
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Table 1 (continued)
Evidence-Supported Treatments (EST) for Posttraumatic Stress and Trauma-Related Symptoms (2013)
Real Life Heroes (2007)

• Trauma symptoms

6-17

Residential,
Outpatient,
Home

25-72 individual
(Varies)

13-55

Inpatient,
Residential,
Outpatient

5 group or
individual (60)

13-25

Residential,
Outpatient

10-11 group or
individual (75)

6-55+

Outpatient

4 group (120+)

• Problem behaviors
• Feelings of security with primary
caregiver
Seeking Safety (2006)

• Substance use
• Trauma-related symptoms
• Psychopathology
• Treatment retention

SITCAP-ART (2010)

• Trauma-related symptoms
• Internalizing and externalizing
behaviors

Surviving Cancer Competently
Intervention Program (2008)

• Teen posttraumatic stress symptoms
• Parent posttraumatic stress symptoms
• Current anxiety level of parents
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Table 1 (continued)
Evidence-Supported Treatments (EST) for Posttraumatic Stress and Trauma-Related Symptoms (2013)
Trauma Focused Coping
(Multimodality Trauma Treatment)
(2011)

• PTSD symptoms

6-17

School

14 group (50)

18 – 55

Residential,
Outpatient

24-29 group
(Varies)

0-55

Outpatient

12-16 individual
and dyad: parentchild (90)

13-55+

Outpatient,
Correctiona
l

1-10 individual (90
to 120)

• Symptoms of depression
• Anxiety
• Anger
• Locus of control
• General mental health functioning
related to trauma and its treatment

Trauma Recovery and
Empowerment Model (TREM)
(2006)

• Severity of problems related to
substance use
• Psychological problems/symptoms
• Trauma symptoms

Trauma-Focused Cognitive
Behavioral Therapy (TF-CBT)
(2008)1

• Child behavior problems
• Child PTSD symptoms
• Child depression
• Child feelings of shame
• Parental emotional reaction to child's
experience of sexual abuse

Traumatic Incident Reduction
(2011)

• PTSD symptoms
• Depression
• Anxiety
• Expectancy of success

Note. PTSD indicates post-traumatic stress disorder; VA indicates Veteran’s Administration. 1 Selected for interpretation in this study. 2 Some
treatments target PTSD symptoms and diagnostic status whereas others target post-traumatic stress symptoms that do not meet full diagnostic criteria for
PTSD.
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In sum, the two primary treatments for PTSD that are recommended by reputable
organizations that set national and international best-practice treatment standards are
exposure-based trauma focused psychotherapy and EMDR. These treatments are often
recommended in conjunction with psychopharmacotherapy; however, some organizations
have questioned the efficacy of psychotropic medication for treating PTSD. Details
regarding the structure and specific content of EMDR and TF-CBT are found in the
associated treatment training manuals (e.g., Shapiro, 2001; Cohen, Mannarino, &
Deblinger, 2006) and will be explored further as an object of study in this study. The
important point to note here is that regardless of culture or location in the world, the
organizations that set treatment standards internationally have recommended the use of
evidence-based trauma treatment (trained via manuals) as a response to community
suffering, national disasters, terrorism, war, and all other events that have been
compressed under the label of trauma.
Summary of contemporary mainstream understanding of trauma as a
mental health disorder. In this section I described the mainstream psychological
understanding of trauma as a mental health disorder. This perspective is reflected and
reproduced by evidence-based trauma treatment manuals, including the three I interpret
in this study. To summarize this conceptualization, in the psi disciplines, trauma is
described as an event that produces fear, horror or helplessness and can lead to a
pathological, brain-based medical disorder such as PTSD. These disorders are described
within a cognitive-neurobiological framework in mainstream psychology. Within this
framework, fear-based reactions to trauma are understood as normal, innate, or instinctual
processes. PTSD is considered an abnormal response to a horrifying event because fight-
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or-flight instinctual responses occur long after exposure to the event, even in situations
that are considered to be non-dangerous. PTSD can include reactions such as avoidance
to otherwise benign stimuli that have been associated with the trauma known as triggers.
If these reactions occur longer than one month, they may fit the diagnostic category of
PTSD; less than one month and they are considered under the acute stress disorder
criteria. In mainstream trauma theory, as it is represented in psychoeducational texts
about PTSD, traumatic events are described as becoming inscribed and stored within the
individual trauma victim (e.g., in memory, the brain or psyche depending on the
approach) as an intrusive, bad, and/or unconscious representation.
The causes of PTSD are presently understood as genetic and brain based variation
that predispose one to vulnerability to PTSD after a traumatic event. Traumatic events
that can lead to PTSD are extremely wide ranging from catastrophic natural disasters,
genocide, torture and war to car accidents, sexual assault, seeing a dead body, hearing of
a loved ones illness, and experiencing invalidation or criticism from a loved one. Each of
these events constitutes one trauma. In the DSM-5, the subjective experience of the event
as creating fear, horror or helplessness has been excluded from the diagnostic criteria.
Also in the DSM-5 children can be easily diagnosed with PTSD with the addition of child
criteria including developmentally adjusted expressions of traumatic sequelae (e.g.,
replaying the traumatic events in play).
PTSD epidemiology reported between 40 and 60% of all people will experience a
traumatic event and over 5.2 million adults will retain the diagnosis of PTSD each year.
Within the military, rates of PTSD post-deployment have ranged from 4% to 33%.
According to the majority of scientific research, one is more likely to develop PTSD after

47
a traumatic event if one is female, an immigrant, African-American or American Indian,
living in the U.S. and identified as being of low socioeconomic status. There are
additional risk factors that are strongly associated with increased PTSD diagnosis for
military populations such as lack of support, negative homecoming experiences and
additional traumatic events upon returning from deployment.
The national and international organizations that set practice standards in
psychology recommend evidence-supported psychotherapy treatments for trauma that are
manual-based. The primary treatments recommended for PTSD included EMDR and TFCBT. Regardless of culture or location in the world, the organizations that set treatment
standards internationally have recommended the use of these two trauma treatments,
which are trained via manuals, as a response to community suffering, national disasters,
terrorism, war, and all other events that have been compressed under the label of trauma.
The mainstream understanding also includes certain taken for granted
understandings about what it means to be human in trauma-based society, which are
further explored in interpretation of three selected evidence-based trauma treatment
manuals in this study. In this section I highlighted a few of the taken for granted
assumptions about human being in trauma-based society that were embedded in the
PTSD diagnosis, psychoeducational texts, neuro-cognitive models of fear, and
epidemiology data that I reviewed. These assumptions included, but are not limited to:
1.

Trauma is a universally experienced phenomenon in which disturbing
events in the world become reified and embossed in the individual psyche
and brain and are expressed as post-traumatic stress symptoms, such as
those described in the DSM-IV diagnosis of PTSD;
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2.

Variations in mood, emotions, desires and thoughts are understood as
variations in brain chemicals or problems with brain structures that can
only be managed by proprietary treatments such as modular, brain-based
mental health treatments for trauma; and,

3.

Descriptions of trauma related mental health disorders and victimhood
extend to historically marginalized groups in such a way as if to explain
political and social inequities and power arrangements as a product of an
internal, brain-based, and pathological weakness and vulnerability to
trauma.

The history of trauma as a mental health disorder. How did we arrive at this
contemporary understanding of trauma as a mental health disorder? In this section, I
attempt to address this question by first describing the normative history of trauma
disorders that is commonly presented by trauma historians and is referred to in many
treatment manuals. It is beyond the scope of this study to provide a comprehensive
review of the history of trauma and each conceptualization; however, to provide depth to
the history, I have focused on four specific events that are described in nearly all
historical accounts of trauma as a mental health disorder: Freud and Ferenczi’s
psychoanalytic conceptualizations of trauma, studies of Holocaust survivors, the
emergence of PTSD in post-Vietnam era, and feminist psychology’s reestablishment of
PTSD as a primary diagnosis for sexual assault and incest survivors.
The normative history of trauma disorders (circa 1980). I reviewed authors that
have written about the history and shifting conceptualization of trauma as a mental health
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disorder and summarized their developmental narrative in Appendix A.8 This narrative
can be seen as the history of trauma disorders that has been prominent in mainstream
psychology since the 1980s after the Vietnam War.
By each trauma conceptualization in Appendix A, I have provided a footnote that
lists the original source (when it could be located) followed by historians and other
authors in the psi disciplines who considered the conceptualization as important to
present within a history of trauma disorders. I excluded conceptualizations from
Appendix A that were mentioned by one or none of the trauma historians or traumafocused authors I reviewed. I also included the dates that trauma diagnoses appeared in
the DSM and the researchers who contributed to the disorder’s inclusion in the manual.
Some notable exclusions in the history presented included: 19th Century Indian Wars,
American Indian and Alaskan Native dislocation and oppression, trauma research on
slavery, research on survivors of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, studies on
torture, the Armenian Holocaust, and the majority of child development research. I am
sure there are many other events that have also escaped mention in this history.
There are some surface-level trends apparent from Appendix A. It can be
observed that interest in trauma appears to rise around war, industrialization,
developments in new technologies and major political upheavals or movements. The
8

The majority of the authors I reviewed cited and referred to primary texts, which when
available, I read and quoted from directly when defining the traumatic construct in
Appendix A. I quoted directly from the texts in attempt to retain some historical context
and authenticity to the language of the time in contrast to language used by some
historians who tend to insert vocabulary from mainstream the cognitive-behavioral
trauma psychoeducation into past conceptualizations; this language remains in some
descriptions when I could not locate the primary text. The appendix also provides a gross
comparison of some of the major political events of the time, which were notably absent
from some presentations.
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population of clinical interest shifted from “feeble-minded” women, “inebriates” and
soldiers, to normal persons in extraordinary situations (war, genocide, chronic abuse),
and most recently to children. While Freud discussed the role of childhood trauma in
adult neurosis (and Ferenczi challenged Freud’s perspective), the child as a traumatized
patient of consistent mainstream focus emerged more in the 1940s with Bowlby’s
attachment research and with Judith Herman’s research on child abuse. It was not until
2013 that the DSM-5 included specific child criteria for PTSD.
Key events in the normative history of trauma. There are four key historical
events in the normative history of trauma disorders that are mentioned repeatedly in both
traditional, scientific and mainstream accounts of PTSD history as well as postmodern,
critical and hermeneutic accounts of understanding trauma: Freud and Ferenczi’s
psychoanalytic conceptualizations of trauma, studies of Holocaust survivors, the
emergence of PTSD in post-Vietnam era, and feminist psychology’s reestablishment of
PTSD as a primary diagnosis for sexual assault and incest survivors. These events are not
necessarily directly represented in the normative history of trauma (Appendix A) and yet
they permeate the majority of theory and treatments from the 20th century. While there
are many other key events and conceptualizations of trauma throughout history, these
four historical moments have been selected for discussion because they are mentioned
ubiquitously by all of the trauma historians I reviewed (see citations in Appendix A).
Description of these events here is important to contextualize the contemporary
understanding of trauma and how psychotherapy has shifted over time to its present
instantiation in evidence-based, manualized trauma treatments.
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Freud and Ferenczi’s psychoanalytic conceptualizations of trauma. Freud was
referenced in all histories of trauma I reviewed to the extent that authors often glibly
reflected on Freud’s centrality to the discussion on trauma, “It all begins with Freud, of
course. And the more I read of contemporary trauma theories, the more I believe that
Freud had already said a great deal” (Kaplan, 2005, p. 25); and, “Freud won’t go away”
(Roth, 2012, p. 117). According to Hoffer (1991), “if Sigmund Freud was the father of
psychoanalysis, Sándor Ferenczi was the mother” (p. 466) in that Freud represented the
intellectual and authoritarian perspective and Ferenczi represented the relational,
experiential and romantic elements of psychoanalysis . This subsection reviews Freud’s
development and abandonment of the seduction theory in the context of the late 1800s as
well as Ferenczi’s theories on incest, familial violence and child rape as causes of
neurosis.
In 1895, Sigmund Freud wrote in a now famous private letter to Wilhelm Fleiss,
“I am on the scent of the following strict precondition for hysteria, namely, that a primary
sexual experience (before puberty), accompanied by revulsion and fright, must have
taken place” (Reisner, 2003, p. 387). Freud’s idea that childhood sexual trauma was the
dominant and singular source of neuroses has now come to be known as the “seduction
hypothesis.” With entire symposiums, books and articles devoted singularly to its
interpretation, the seduction hypothesis has been the focus of many psychoanalytic
debates.9 As another example of U.S. cultural obsession with trauma (or within a
psychoanalytic approach one might even say fetishizing of trauma), the contemporary
psychoanalytic profession is riveted on reconstructing and deconstructing how and why
9

This is particularly intriguing considering that mention of the hypothesis appears as the
focus of only three of Freud’s papers—all published in 1896 (Meyers, 2006).
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Freud developed the seduction hypothesis, exploring what it meant and means for
psychology, and revisiting the debate between Freud and Ferenczi about trauma.
Makari (1998) described Freud as a visionary who challenged the medical
zeitgeist,
In the 1890’s when Freud was attempting to solve the riddle of hysteria […]. He
was writing about highly contested ground, and any hypothesis was freighted with
implications for his own identity within his intellectual, professional and societal
communities […]. Freud was deeply concerned with his relationship to the
medical and scientific community, whose dominant ideology was, of course, 19th
century natural science. (p. 46)
Indeed, Freud’s writings on trauma emerged at a time where political, economic
and social ideology was increasingly based on rationality; the truth could be located and
extracted from the world through mental processes (e.g., Kant’s filtering the world
through an innate mental structure), and more specifically, through the application of
scientific method (Cushman, 1995). Madness had exclusively become an object of
medical study and institutions devoted to its study allowed for the development of the
human sciences (Foucault, 1973).
Freud was writing during the rise of capitalism and modernity, in what Max
Weber called the “disenchantment” where mystery, nature and creation was replaced by
bureaucracy, scientific and administrative procedures (Lerner, 2003). In the modern
world, scientific procedures became authoritative over local traditions, and the rationalist
way of knowing and being entered into everyday understanding of the world, intimate
social lives, and bodies (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Lerner, 2003). Sciences continued to
embrace some of the Enlightenment ideals. For example, in the 1860s, thirty years prior
to Freud’s writing the seduction hypothesis, trauma was discussed in the medical
community as if it was an imprint or fixed disease-like pathogen in the brain that could be
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identified, localized, and possibly contained or removed. The idea that objects, germs, or
ideas enter the mind was predicated on the philosophical assumptions of structuralism
(Kant) and dualism (Descartes) that mind and matter are separate, and human experiences
are reified, can be known, and manipulated.10
Freud’s seduction hypothesis emerged when the medical community believed
they could still uncover the root or cause of neurosis in the mind and body; it was
desirable and possible for doctors to contain and treat these causes. The ideology of
science that gripped the medical community only allowed certain scientific questions
about trauma to emerge. Asking “Where is trauma located in the brain?” was an
acceptable, powerful, respectful to understanding and healing humans. The answers to
this question re-affirmed that indeed trauma is located and knowable in the brain.
The late 1800s also embraced the Victorian Era belief that good and healthy
persons can contain and dominate their internal, wild, physical-emotional world through
rational mental processes (Cushman, 1995). This meant that a healthy person looked like
a compliant industrial factory worker or restrained obedient woman (Foucault, 1995). A
10

Looking to the primary texts of Réne Descartes, the tradition of traumatic naturalism in
the 1800s continued to follow the premises of traumatic association that Descartes
(1649/1911) wrote about:
People’s unusual aversions, which make them unable to tolerate the smell of roses
or the presence of a cat or similar things, come only from having been badly
shocked by some such objects at the beginning of life […]. The smell of roses
may have given a child a headache while he was still in the cradle, or a cat might
have frightened him badly, without anyone having been aware of it and without
him having had any memory of it afterwards, though the idea of the Aversion he
had then for the roses or the cat may remain imprinted in his brain to the end of
life. (Descartes, 1649/1911, as cited in Good, 2006, p. 7)
Descartes’s aversion centers on a biological “shock” or headache, thus the internal
world of the headache within the brain creates and defines what is traumatic.
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diseased person was unable to control their emotions and bodies. Healers like
psychiatrists came to assist their weak minds in the process of control. It is important to
note that the rise in interest of hysteria also coincided with the industrialization, which
provided social conditions for train and machine accidents, large-scale wars and a
growing bourgeoisie class (where the bourgeoisie family became the site of female
hysteria).
From 1885 to 86, Freud received a travelling fellowship to study with Jean-Martin
Charcot, a physician who rediscovered Mesmer’s treatments of hysterical women with
hypnosis (Good, 2006). In the late 1800’s hysteria was in seen in the medical and
psychological community as directly related to the effects of the uterus contaminating
other bodily systems, particularly the mind (Cushman, 1995). Similarly, Charcot believed
that hysteria was a type of neurosis of the brain that was caused by psychic trauma in
hereditarily predisposed persons (Good, 2006). He believed that trauma, like Mesmer’s
hypnotic induction, created a hypnoid phenomenon in which patients were more
susceptible to unconscious suggestion, including erotic and sexual vulnerability
(Cushman, 1995; Good, 2006). Once in a hypnotic auto-suggestive state, Charcot thought
a particular event would become a fixed idea (idées fixes) in the unconscious; this fixed
idea that was at the root of neurosis, what he called traumatic hysteria (Cushman, 1995;
Good, 2006). With the majority of Charcot’s hysterical patients being women, he also
found that certain points, mainly in erogenous zones on a women’s body, could set off
hysterical fits.11 Thus throughout Charcot’s work there was a connection between what
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Herman (1997) described Charcot’s scientific approach to the study of hysteria as one
where he often paid attention to minute shifts in symptoms but was disconnected from the
humanity and emotional experience of his patients (e.g., Charcot described their speech
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was seen as sexual, hysteric and traumatic, but he denied that hysteria was in itself a
sexual neurosis, by citing that men and children also become hysteric (Cushman, 1995).
Charcot’s work reflected the simultaneous urge to locate the root of hysteria in
female fertility and sexuality, while also seeking to create a broad universal theory that
explained why neurosis might exist in all humans, including men and children. In
Germany, the diagnosis of hysteria was only briefly used for both women and men before
an alternative diagnoses emerged for working-class men (Lerner, 2003). The symptoms
of disorders like railway spine, diagnosed in 1889 by John Eric Erichsen, that came from
witnessing machine accidents while working on the railroad were strikingly similar to
those experienced by hysterical women (e.g., shaking, stuttering, tics, tremors, paralyses,
and disturbances in sight, hearing and movement) (Lerner, 2003). Male reactions to
trauma were described as direct neurological shock from industrial, factory and military
work. Men were not completely exempt from the diagnosis of hysteria, but Lerner (2003)
explained how a conscious political and social effort was made to shift the cause of
neurosis from mental weakness due to the female reproductive system (as in women) to
one of an inevitable violating environmental cause (for men).

as “vocalizations”). During one Tuesday Lecture, he placed a woman in a hypnotic trance
to demonstrate a convulsive hysterical attack and asked interns to press on her ovarian
region. According to Herman (1997), Charcot said,
“Let us press again on the hysterogenic point.” The woman cried out,
“Mother, I am frightened.” Charcot narrated, “Here we go again.
Occasionally subjects even bite their tongues but this would be rare. Look
at the arched back, which is so described in textbooks. Note the emotional
outburst. If we let things go unabated we will soon return to the epileptoid
behavior.” The patient again cried, “Oh! Mother!” and Charcot continued,
“Again, note these screams. You could say it is a lot of noise over
nothing.” (p. 11)
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During the time of this divergence in the classification of mental disorders for
men and women, the middle-class in Europe was rapidly changing due to the industrial
revolution in the late 1850s. For example, by 1910, 60% of Germans were living in the
cities. Industrialization brought widespread economic change and lifestyle shifts in which
men who used to work on farms were filing into heavily managed factories (like those
described by Foucault, 1973). The signifiers of modernity at this time became filthy
factories and squalid living conditions, which were often blamed for increases in suicide,
alcoholism, criminal behavior and mental disease. The social question for the body politic
became how to peacefully integrate the proletariat into the cities and into this industrial
lifestyle without a revolution or widespread disorder and decline.
The psychiatric community as feared that asylums would not be able to hold the
ever-expanding numbers of mentally ill. In Germany, they called the period between
1880 and 1910 the Irrenboom or “boom in insanity” (Lerner, 2003, p. 19). This fear
spurred leading German psychiatrists including Emil Kraepelin and Ernst Rudin to
promote national health and fitness through direct state intervention in hygiene, marriage
and reproduction; thus began the early eugenics movement.12 Around this same time
eugenic ideas were also flourishing in Britain, Scandinavia, the Soviet Union and United
States (e.g., Beard, 1881) included phenotypic, racially-based descriptions of those who
are more prone to neurasthenia). Thus as psychiatry absorbed, shaped and propagated the
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According to Lerner (2003), in 1899 psychiatrist Paul Nacke was the first to
recommend the sterilization of who he called “inferiors” as treatment for mental disorder.
The predominant treatments recommended by the Racial Hygiene Association of 1908
included a state commission to pursue research in genealogy, heredity and racial
“regeneration.” The motto of the group became “recognize, cure, prevent,” which later
become the slogan for the Fourth International Congress on Caring for the Mentally Ill, a
eugenics conference, held in Berlin in 1910.
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class prejudices of the turn-of-the-century, a moral and economic category of inferiority
was retained in medical descriptions of trauma related disorders. (This is evident when
looking at the final column of Appendix A; almost all symptomatic persons are somehow
predisposed to mental frailty).
As industrialism flourished and insanity boomed across Europe, neurologists at
the time, including Charcot, Oppenheim13, Freud and Breuer (Freud’s mentor, friend and
collaborator), attempted to localize and define the source of middle-class neurosis. Freud
and Breuer had come to an understanding of traumatic paralyses as a psychical event that
left an indelible source of excitation in the subconscious memory, separated from
awareness (Makari & Greenberg, 2006). In 1893, Freud wrote to Breuer, “any impression
in which the nervous system has difficulty in disposing of by means of associative
thinking or of motor reaction becomes a psychical trauma” (Preliminary
Communications, 1893, as cited in Reisner, 2003, p. 384). The trauma, as a foreign body

13

Hermann Oppenheim was a German neurologist who believed that the etiology of
trauma was different and distinct from hysteria. He posited that shocking experience of
the traumatic events instantaneously created minute lesions in the brain and central
nervous system, which were undetectable and hence untreatable (Lerner, 2003). He wrote
that the “physical trauma is only partially responsible. An important—and in many cases
the major role—is played by the psyche: terror, emotional shock. Even in cases where
there is no external sound, the injury has direct consequences” (Oppenheim, as cited in
Lerner, 2003, p. 2).
Oppenheim’s trauma theory, perhaps more than other theories at the time, directly
linked the environment of industrialization and of terror to the experience of mental ills.
He wrote that his inability to treat the disorder was personally saddening as a physician.
Though we must hold our contemporary interpretations of lightly, it is possible that
Oppenheim’s reported sadness from the inability to treat the effects of railway spine
reflects the limits of the cultural clearing (cf. Heidegger, 1996) (e.g., if neurologists
cannot see the microscopic holes in the brain, they cannot be treated and there is nothing
to be done). The traumatic clearing was severely limited by medical conceptualization.
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and source of energy, continued to create symptoms in the form of hysteria and especially
a type of hysterical reminiscences.
In Breuer’s conceptualization, hysterical people were prone to a fantastical reverie
when they remembered the trauma. He believed this reverie produced a twilight mental
state that splits the consciousness. In contrast to Charcot and Janet, splitting was not seen
as a form of inherent mental weakness, but a product of the twilight state that
accompanied memories of the trauma. In other words, he believed patients who are
hysteric and traumatized appear weak-minded when their mental activity has become
divided. Breuer noted, “This is especially true of people who are of a very lively
disposition, to whom monotonous, simple and uninteresting occupation is torture”
(Breuer & Freud, 1895, as cited in Reisner, 2003 p. 231). He reported that bright young
women often experienced hysteria and splitting after what were considered to be minor
traumatic events and that these women were somehow unable to respond to the traumas
of daily life (e.g., boredom, rote tasks) with the appropriate affect; thus, these experiences
were split off into a separate consciousness. He aimed to permit the release of affect in
his treatment (catharsis).
In 1893, Freud directly challenged and separated from Charcot’s work. He wrote
that the treatment of fixed ideas was “medieval” and that Charcot had simply replaced
“the daemon of clerical phantasy with a psychological formula” (Good, 2006, p. 16). In
collaboration with Breuer, Freud moved away from the fixed idea hypothesis and instead
suggested that mental splitting occurred when “an incompatibility took place
in…emotional life—that is to say an idea or feeling which aroused such a distressing
affect that the subject decided to forget about it because he had no confidence in his
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power to resolve the contradiction between that incompatible idea and his ego by means
of thought activity” (Freud, 1894, as cited in Makari & Greenberg, 2006, p. 47). In order
to integrate the fractured psyche, Freud’s treatment at that time centered on analysis of
the history of conflicting elements of the environment, person and emotional world
(Reisner, 2003).
Freud’s rejection of Charcot’s conceptualizations of neurological pain as an
explanation for hysteria and move to conceptualizing hysteria as the product of psychic
overwhelm and emotional incomprehensibility is perhaps one of his most important
contributions to trauma theory (and arguably to the field of psychotherapy). Freud’s
attendance to the way that life can psychically mark the individual initiated a sea change
in psychiatric conceptualizations of pathology and distress.
The famous letter to Fleiss in which Freud further attempted to identify the root
cause of hysteria as being childhood sexual seduction signified yet another shift in
Freud’s understanding of trauma. In Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of
Defense, Freud elaborated the seduction hypothesis, describing how any pathology
resulting from childhood sexual trauma must occur before the ages of 8 to 10 and that
“their content must consist of an actual irritation of the genitals (of processes resembling
copulation)” (Greenberg, 2001, p. 70). Freud explained his rationale for this root cause in
the Aetiology of Hysteria, where he claimed that all eighteen female hysterics that he had
treated had discovered repressed or unconscious histories of childhood seduction. He
believed that these “coitus-like acts,” which Freud also characterized as attacks, assaults
or abuse, could be done to a child by strangers, care takers, relatives or from one child to
another (Greenberg, 2001). Believing that his hypothesis would illuminate cases of child
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abuse in Europe he wrote, “It is expected that increased attention to the subject will very
soon confirm the great frequency of sexual experiences and sexual activity in childhood”
(Freud, 1896, as cited in Greenberg, 2001, p. 207).
Two-months after his father’s death in 1896, Freud wrote privately that he no
longer believed that perpetrators of sexual abuse could be strangers, nursemaids or other
children and the only perpetrator was the father. A year later, he wrote another letter that
has become known as Freud’s abandonment of the seduction hypothesis. He described
how paternal childhood sexual abuse could not account for or be the root cause of
hysteria. Freud cited evidence for his rejection of the hypothesis including an inability to
account for the high incidences of hysteria with paternal seduction, limited unconscious
surfacing of paternal seduction in cases of psychosis, and the inability to distinguish true
abuse and unconscious fantasized seduction with his patients (Makari, 1998). Freud also
felt that many of his patients falsely accepted the seduction hypothesis as unconscious
fantasy and he was unable to cure them from this belief.
Renick (2006) reflected in a symposium on the seduction hypothesis, “We wonder
why we are talking about seduction hypothesis today and it seems we don’t know why,
but we know it’s important” (p. 107). Most trauma historians readily describe Freud’s
seduction hypothesis as the foundation for trauma theory in psychotherapy but there is
wide variation in how the hypothesis is used to rationalize or provide a tradition for
contemporary trauma theory as well as the degree to which the historical, political and
social context of Freud’s writing is mentioned. What is perhaps most relevant about the
seduction hypothesis to contemporary theories on trauma is Freud’s move away from
understanding psychic trauma as an organic medical disorder to understanding humans as
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permanently psychologically affected and changed by life when it is overwhelming and
incomprehensible.
In 1932, over 30 years after Freud’s so called abandonment of the seduction
hypothesis, Sándor Ferenczi, a student, ex-analysand and deep admirer of Freud,
presented a paper titled “Confusion of Tongues” on the unjust neglect of rape and incest
in families as a pathogenic root of neurosis (Ferenczi, 1988). Ferenczi argued that
neurosis was the result of childhood violence, incest and rape that was ignored or
obscured by the parents and family. Diverging from Freud’s final perspective on the
seduction hypothesis, Ferenczi stated that the sexual abuse experienced by children from
their families and caretakers was real and prevalent in all social classes. He believed
sexual trauma could be truthfully recounted by patients and did not exist only in fantasy
or the unconscious. Ferenczi’s theory also concretized the idea of the individual
perpetrator (i.e., the bad guy) as a root cause of traumatic neurosis; no longer was trauma
seen as a product of individual mental weakness or fantasy, but the result of a family
member taking advantage of and being violent to an innocent child and denying that these
acts occurred.
The 1980s and 90s in the U.S. brought a resurgence of interest and respect for
Ferenczi’s work (see e.g., Gay 1988; Hoffer, 1991; Masson, 1984; Roazen, 1976). This
increased by the mid-1990s around the same time that Herman and feminist psychologists
sought to establish the veracity of trauma and epidemic of child abuse to combat the ideas
of false memory syndrome and the idea that trauma was purely fantasy that emerged in
the late 1980s (see The false memory debate and feminist appropriation section in this
study, pp. 87-97). Though Ferenczi was revived and in some ways re-appropriated by
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trauma theorists in the 90s as providing theoretical legitimacy to the veracity of sexual
abuse as a cause of neurosis, it is important to note that Ferenczi never used broad terms
like child sexual trauma or abuse. He did not homogenize the violent and sexual
experiences of his patients but instead provided specific descriptions like, “real violence,”
“incestuous seductions,” “real rape of girls who have hardly grown out of age of infants,”
and “enforced homosexual acts” (Ferenczi, 1988, p. 201).14 Ferenczi (1988) described
how one might expect children to react these acts with “hatred, disgust, and energetic
refusal” (p. 200), but instead they become paralyzed by enormous anxiety where they
feel,
physically and morally helpless, their personalities are not sufficiently
consolidated in order to be able to protest. […] The same anxiety, however, if it
reaches a certain maximum, compels the to subordinate themselves like automata
to the will of the aggressor, to divine each one of his desires and to gratify these;
completely oblivious of themselves they identify themselves with the aggressor.
(p. 201)
Thus, Ferenczi (1988) posited that a key feature of neurotic sequelae from sexual
trauma was the introjection of the guilty feelings of the adult, which can lead to enormous
confusion and splitting between the child’s conceptualization of being both innocent and
culpable in the act. With repeated abuse the child can become, “a mechanical, obedient
automaton or becomes defiant but is unable to account for the reasons of his defiance”
(Ferenczi, 1988, p. 201). The child can seem willing to please and adoring of the parent,
while also ardently desiring to be free of the oppressive love; this Ferenczi called the
14

In addition to being careful not to appropriate the historical horizon of Ferenczi’s time
with the vernacular of abuse from the 1990s, it is also important to note the words
Ferenczi used specifically given his theoretical emphasis on life’s experiential details.
Ferenczi was interested in the particulars of his patients’ experience and he rejected
overly general, intellectualized, or abstract descriptions (Ferenczi, 1919). Describing rape
and incest using terms like trauma or abuse would perhaps have been understood by
Ferenczi as a form of defensive distancing from the violence and local experiences of
childhood.
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child’s “situation of tenderness” (p. 201). The abusive relationship between parent and
child Ferenczi characterized as the “confusion of tongues”–- confusion between the
adult’s guilt-laden acts of passion and the innocent child’s submission to these acts and
unarticulated introjection of the parent’s guilt.
Ferenczi’s theory also described why children can be confused as more mature
and thus vulnerable to continued sexual exploitation by the parent. He explained that the
parent can see the child as a precocious lover because,
When subjected to a sexual attack, under the pressure of such traumatic urgency,
the child can develop instantaneously all the emotions of a mature adult and all
the potential qualities dormant in him that normally belong to marriage, maternity
and fatherhood. […] The fear of the uninhibited, almost mad adult changes the
child so to speak, into a psychiatrist and, in order to become one and defend
himself against the dangers coming from people without self-control, he must
know how to identify himself completely with them. Indeed it is unbelievable
how much we can still learn from our wise children, the neurotics. (pp. 203-204)
Finally, Ferenczi noted that in addition to the ties of passionate love and
punishment from the adult, the child is bound to their abuser by the “terrorism of
suffering” (p. 205), in which they feel the compulsion to make right the problems in their
family and continue to accept the neglecting of their needs and meet those of the family.
Although the psychological community later heralded Ferenczi’s recognition of
child sexual abuse, there was great controversy about his presentation of “The Confusion
of Tongues” paper; this mainly followed Freud’s outright rejection of the paper, in which
he stated it was merely a repetition of the earlier abandon seduction hypothesis (Aron &
Harris, 2010). Several of Freud’s followers, knowing that Freud did not accept Ferenczi’s
theory, had even attempted to persuade Ferenczi from not reading the paper (Aron &
Harris, 2010). Even before the presentation of “The Confusion of Tongues” Ferenczi and
Freud had a complicated relationship (e.g., where Freud analyzed Ferenczi and then
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Ferenczi later requested to analyze Freud but was rejected). The details of Freud and
Ferenczi’s relationship have been summarized elsewhere (e.g., Aron & Harris, 2010).
Ferenczi was criticized not only for his presentation of sexual trauma as the root
of neurosis, but also for his emphasis on analysts “entering a game” (Ferenczi, 1931,
p.129) with the patient to relive early childhood experiences. Ferenczi supported
enactments of regression and the analyst’s engagement with a child-like state of adult
patients to eventually create a healing relationship that the adult had been deprived of as a
child. Freud critiqued Ferenczi’s willingness to participate in regressive enactment,
fearing that this could lead to indulging the patient’s fantasies of sexual acting out or
gratification with the analyst. Ferenczi, on the other hand, saw the purely verbal form of
psychoanalysis as a repetition of trauma of neglect and distance of the patient’s parents,
The analytical situation—i.e. the restrained coolness, the professional
hypocrisy and—hidden behind it but never revealed—a dislike of the
patient which, nevertheless, he felt in all his being—such a situation was
not essentially different from that which in his childhood had led to the
illness…Small wonder that our efforts produced no better results than the
original trauma. (Ferenczi, 1988, p. 199)
Ferenczi’s (1988) acknowledgement that the trauma could be repeated in the
therapeutic relationship has been identified by relational psychoanalysts as the first
recognition of interpersonal or two-person psychoanalysis (Aron & Harris, 2010). This
awareness of what are now called enactments (cf. McLaughlin 1991, Jacobs, 1996, &
Schafer 1992) in therapy that emerged from Ferenczi’s trauma theory of neurosis makes
his contribution unique from Freud’s perspective on neurosis. Ferenczi acknowledged the
repetition of the patient’s psychic life in the relationship with the analyst in such a way
that both parties participated and enacted the traumatic relationship. Aron and Harris
(2010) wrote that Ferenczi was “not content with the idea that countertransference is only
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a response to the patient’s pathology; he emphasizes the analysts own character traits and
how these inevitably play a part in the establishment of transference and
countertransference. Furthermore, the patient can observe these countertransference
responses and character traits of the analyst and react to them” (p. 19). Hoffman (1983)
credited Ferenczi as being the first to point out the ways in which the patient becomes
interpreter of the analyst’s countertransference experience.
Although the psychoanalytic community continues to mourn and reinterpret the
debate between Ferenczi and Freud, it is also important to move outside of the intricacies
of their relationship and understand the broad political context at the time Ferenczi
presented “Confusion of Tongues.” One year after Ferenczi presented his paper Hitler
was appointed Chancellor of Germany and the first concentration camp was established
(Goss, 2014). By the 1930s, fascism was growing rapidly in Europe and there was
concern about the political threat of progressives, and in particular, intellectual Jews like
Freud and Ferenczi. The political oppression of the time paralleled Ferenczi’s description
of traumatic neurosis, where persons came to act like mechanical automatons—abused
children at the wills of an aggressor—and the violence that Jews were beginning to
endure was unrecognized by the global community. In retrospect, this time period was
the most appropriate but also dangerous time for psychoanalytic theories of trauma and
abuse to emerge—dangerous in that descriptions of neurosis like Ferenczi’s could be seen
as a form of resistance and commentary (e.g., breaking the enactment of violence by
articulating how the suffering of innocent persons can be ignored).
The political context of Ferenczi’s work outside of his relationship with Freud and
psychoanalytic community is little discussed, but it is likely and possible that the
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ostracization that Ferenczi endured after the presentation of Confusion of Tongues—
fissures that were seen as intellectual rejection led by Freud—were heightened by fear
about the political implications of what it would mean for psychoanalysis to return to
considering Freud’s seduction hypothesis, the widespread nature of incest, or to accept
Ferenczi’s more experimental, emotional and romantic forms of practice. In the context
of growing intolerance and political instability, what would it mean for psychoanalysis to
acknowledge unrecognized suffering—one coming from repeated distortion of events
from the parent rather than a neurological or internal failure of a mentally weak person to
integrate the traumatic event?
Though Ferenczi is widely cited in the psychoanalytic community, and
particularly in interpersonal or relational schools today, he is not often acknowledged as
broadly by trauma scholars when compared to Freud. It is unclear why this is the case;
perhaps this is a vestige of Ferenczi’s lack of acceptance by Freudian psychoanalysts or
location outside of mainstream psychology given his later association with feminist and
relational movements and recognition of emotionality and enactment in therapy.
Remembering the atrocities of World War II: Holocaust survivor studies. The
Second World War (WWII) involved two of the most significant atrocities in our recent
history: the Holocaust and nuclear bomb. Since WWII many writers have reckoned with
the imperative to remember the lessons of these events. Leo Etinger, a psychiatrist who
studied survivors of the Nazi concentration camps, wrote:
War and victims are something the community wants to forget; a veil of oblivion
is drawn over everything painful and unpleasant. We find two sides face to face;
on one side the victims who perhaps wish to forget but cannot, and on the other
all those with strong, often unconscious motives who very intensely both wish to
forget and succeed in doing so. The contrast…is frequently very painful for both
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sides. The Weakest one…remains the losing party in this silent and unequal
dialogue. (Etinger, as cited in Herman, 1997, p. 8)
It is likely that the Holocaust would have been forgotten or been excluded from
consideration in psychology trauma studies was it not for the dedicated work of Jewish
psychoanalysts and psychologists beginning in the late 1960s including Dori Laub,
Sohshana Felman, Judith Kestenberg, Eva Fogleman, Victor Frankl, Leo Etinger, Henry
Grunebaum, Martin Bergman, Milton Jucovy, and William Neiderland, among others.
These clinicians consciously brought the Holocaust and its survivors into the purview of
psychology so that the atrocities committed would always be remembered. Many horrific
events, genocide, and exploitation for which the U.S. was directly responsible (e.g.,
slavery and dropping the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki) have not been recognized in
this history as traumatic events, especially to the extent that the Holocaust has. 15 The
efforts of their work are apparent today as trauma histories often mention Holocaust
survivors as a major influence especially in the understanding of how trauma can be
indelibly embossed in memory. Within this frame, memory of the trauma of the
Holocaust is seen as immutable, exact and etched into memory exactly as it was
experienced. While traumatic memories are sometimes seen as inaccessible until therapy
breaks through the reenactments, dissociation or repression of these memories, the
traumatic reenactment literally conveys “both the truth of an event and the truth of its
15

For example, Holocaust survivors are referred to as “survivors” and their progeny as
the children or grandchildren of survivors, yet we continue refer to generations of “exslaves” or grandchildren of “slaves” rather than survivors; the culture of trauma has not
extended to slavery and other atrocities in the same way as it has to the Holocaust. For a
review of systematic exclusion of African American history and slavery from the history
of psychology see Guthrie (2004) Even the Rat Was White. There are also few
psychologists who have taken extensive interest in the effects of the U.S. dropping the
atomic bomb on Hiroshima such as Lifton’s books: On Death and Death Symbolism: The
Hiroshima Disaster (1964) and Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima (1987), as well as
Well’s Hiroshima in America: Fifty Years of Denial (1995).
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incomprehensibility” (Caruth, 1995, pp. 153-154). The literal nature of trauma
representation for these scholars stems from the post-Holocaust assumption that any
attempt to represent the trauma (and specifically the trauma of concentration camps) is
distortive. As Dori Laub (1991) explained, “One might say that there was […]
historically no witness to the Holocaust, either from outside or from inside the
event…The historical imperative to bear witness could essentially not be met during the
actual occurrence” (p. 66-68). The ethic to bear witness and take responsibility for the
truth is embodied in a quote by Elie Wiesel, Holocaust survivor and author, who once
said, “If someone else could have written my stories. I would not have written them. I
have written them in order to testify. My role is the role of the witness…Not to tell or to
tell another story is… to commit perjury” (Wiesel, 1984, as cited in Felman & Laub,
1992, p. 204).
In the 1980s and 90s, Bessel van Der Kolk, Judith Herman and Cathy Caruth
based their clinical work and research on the trauma theory on testimonies of Holocaust
survivors. In 1984, van der Kolk and colleagues conducted a descriptive study in which
patients diagnosed with combat related PTSD and persons suffering from lifelong
nightmares were compared (van der Kolk, Blitz, Burr, Sherry, & Hartmann, 1984). The
subjects were given a variety of psychiatric tests including the Rorschach and semistructured psychiatric interviews and asked to spend a few nights in a sleep laboratory for
all night EEG monitoring. They concluded that the dreams of the combat-related PTSD
nightmares were distinct from those nightmare suffers in that the dreams were literal
replaying of the same traumatic memories suffered in combat with no other latent or
manifest content; the dreams were not bizarre or unreal, nor did they vary in subject. van
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der Kolk and colleagues concluded that the intrusive symptoms of flashbacks, nightmares
and memories were literal memories of the traumatic events. In Traumatic Stress (2012),
van der Kolk further characterized traumatic stress as the literal inscription or engraving
of a traumatic event on the mind in such a way that it is not integrated into ordinary
awareness but exists in a dissociated, literal form where it resists symbolization, meaning
and other processes of integration which might typically occur for non-traumatic
memories (van der Kolk, McFarlane, & Weiseth, 2012).16 While van der Kolk did not
write about the Holocaust directly in his randomized control trials, his book briefly
discussed the connection between the resistance to symbolization and the Holocaust.
Cathy Caruth (1995) similarly conceptualized trauma and argued that while there
have been historical variations in the definitions of posttraumatic stress, to be traumatized
is essentially to be possessed by the image of an event. Traumatic symptoms thus cannot
be interpreted as distortions of reality, or as lending of unconscious meaning, or
repression; traumatic dreams and memories are literally the return of the event in which
one was traumatized. She said, “[The traumatized] carry an impossible history within
them, or they become themselves the symptom of a history that they cannot entirely
possess” (p. 5).
Dori Laub (1991), a psychiatrist who was a child survivor of the Holocaust
himself, devoted his clinical practice to the analysis of trauma survivors, and in particular
survivors of the Holocaust who had immigrated to the U.S. In 1981, he co-founded the
16

The traumatic polarities central to the false memory debate (i.e., trauma as either
complete fantasy and introjection of perpetrator guilt or as a veridical etching of a
completely real event) have been noted by scholars like Leys (2000) as a problematic
trend in trauma culture in psychology. Leys described one of the primary consequences
of characterizing trauma as an either/or experience of fantasy or truth was the loss of
meaning and complexity in understanding trauma.
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Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, which involved videotaping the testimonies of
Holocaust survivors as he interviewed them. Many survivors described the phenomena of
the imperative to tell their story as a means of survival, “We wanted to survive so as to
live one day after Hitler, in order to be able to tell our story” (Laub, 1991, p. 78). Despite
the moral imperative to tell the story of the Holocaust, most of the survivors interviewed
also reflected on how in the U.S. they were only able or willing to provide testimony
almost forty-years after the end of WWII.
In contrast to the U.S., documentation of Holocaust survivors in Europe by
survivors began even while the Holocaust continued, wherever Jewish community life
emerged so did documentation of the Holocaust (Jockusch, 2012). After the liberation in
1945, historical commissions to systematically document the horrors of the Holocaust
were organized by Jewish leaders in major urban centers in Europe, including Munich,
Vienna, and Warsaw. The commissions attempted to gather testimony from survivors
directly but found that many survivors would or could not talk to them about their
experiences. Stories were almost always collected from Jewish community members who
had taken it upon themselves to document the histories of survivors in their community.
The purpose of the commissions’ collection included commemoration, documenting
Holocaust and life before the Holocaust from the Jewish perspective, bringing warcriminals to justice, to heal through public, moral dialogue about the Holocaust, and to
ensure that post-war suffering of Jewish peoples were not ignored or downplayed
politically (Jockush, 2012).
While in Europe documentation of survivors began immediately through a vocal
community, in the U.S. Holocaust survivor studies did not emerge until decades later,
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with the peak interest in Holocaust studies emerging in early 1990s.17 In the 1950s a few
psychiatrists reported that Holocaust survivors would have shorter life spans and suffer
permanent psychological damage as a result of involvement in the war (Jockusch, 2012).
In the early 1960s, psychiatrists, psychologists and social scientists began reporting on
and following the lives of survivors but these reports were met with little critique or
discussion. In general, Holocaust survivors avoided giving testimony to researchers and
scientists.18
Laub (1991) in his efforts to document Holocaust testimony described how he
feared that if the survivors did not tell their story they would become victims of
“distorted memory” and delusion to the point where “not telling the story served as
perpetuation of its tyranny” (p. 79). He pointed to the core delusion, “Hitler’s crime was
not only the killing of the Jews, but getting the Jews to believe they deserved it” (Laub,
1991, p. 79). The collapse of witnessing was central to Laub’s interpretation of the horror
of the Holocaust and the treatment for this trauma was to listen to and witness the stories.

17

Though historians have described Holocaust documentation and discussion as more
prevalent in strong Jewish communities in Europe and internationally when compared to
the U.S., Laub has given lectures in which he described a group of elderly Holocaust
survivors who had been hospitalized for psychosis for years in a psychiatric ward in
Israel who had never been asked about their Holocaust history (Layton, 2014). He
discussed how in Israel was difficult for the community to acknowledge and think about
the Holocaust.
18
This perhaps goes without saying, but the survivors’ fear of talking to scientists no
doubt came from Nazi experimentation on the Jews during the Holocaust. These socalled medical experiments were so unethical, gruesome and torturous that one result of
the Nuremberg Trials was the drafting of ethics guidelines and construction of oversight
boards for medical and social research to ensure that such atrocities would not be
committed again (the Nuremberg Codes). Those survivors who did talk about their
experiences to psychiatrists often only did so to Jewish psychoanalysts who had a vested
interest in the Holocaust (Jockush, 2012).
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In Testimony (1992), Shoshanna Felman and Dori Laub interpreted the Holocaust
as a crisis of witnessing. They extended the definition of testimony beyond its legal roots
and into a discursive practice of clinical healing. Laub and Felman were also interested in
how testimony, represented in literary works and art, make us encounter strangeness.
Felman analyzed film, art and literary works, namely those of Camus, from the lens of
testimonial imperative. In Testimony (1992), Laub took a clinical approach to testimony
and asserted that while the Holocaust has been heavily documented, “the trauma—as a
known event and not simply as an overwhelming shock—has not been truly witnessed
yet, not been taken cognizance of” (p. 57). The process of therapy became for Laub a
witnessing and knowing of the event in narrative form for the first time for both the
trauma survivor and the therapist, “Through [the therapist’s] very listening he comes to
partially experience trauma in himself…The listener has to feel the victim’s victories,
defeats and silences, know them from within, so that they can assume the form of
testimony” (Felman & Laub, 1992, p. 58). Laub explained how listening beyond the
facts, to the secrets of survival, to the silences and events the survivors could not know
consciously, to the resistance to experimentation, “through her very testimony [the
patient] is breaking out of Auschwitz even by her very talking” (Felman & Laub, 1992, p.
62).
Laub and Felman (1992) suggested that what was traumatic about the Holocaust,
beyond the facts of violence, was the public and private refusal to acknowledge and
witness testimony; a collective silence in the face of tragedy. Though trauma scholars in
the normative history do not recognize Camus, The Plague (1948) and The Fall (1956)
were discussed in Testimony (1992) as descriptions of the imperative to witness. Camus
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was an anarchist and participant in the French Resistance against the Nazi German
occupation during World War II; he participated in the publication of underground
newspapers during this time period. In August 1945, he was one of the few French
editors to publically express disgust and opposition to the U.S. dropping the bomb on
Hiroshima.
Following Laub and Felman’s (1992) interest in Camus and his relevance to the
Holocaust studies and remembrance of World War II in trauma studies, here I review
Camus’ (1946) essay “Neither Victims Nor Executioners.” This particular work was also
referenced later by Vietnam trauma scholars (e.g., Lifton, 1973) and thus is important to
include in this review of key moments in trauma history.
Immediately after World War II, Camus (1946) wrote about the world as facing
collective tragedy—tragedy promoted by the government and dissociated through
collective silence by the public. 19 He believed that the rise of national security ideology
led to technologies that increased the lethality of murder and distanced executioners from
the consequences of murder.
Camus (1946) believed that isolation via modern technologies and the abstraction
of bureaucratic procedures allowed for murder to become depersonalized. People were
viewed as consumers or spectators that could be appealed to by fear, rather than by
interest in social relationships. Obedience to the national security state was valued over
19

The essay was written at a time before unmanned drone attacks occurred on a regular
basis as they do now in 2013. While our present technologies have allowed for murder to
occur so remotely that a teenager in New Jersey can command an airstrike across the
world, like scoring points on a video game, and return home for dinner. In the mid 1940s
these technologies were perhaps less distant, but equally as problematic. Camus (1946)
described them as: comfortable air-conditioned rooms filled with working men
calculating risk and designing bombs to be dropped in a remote area of the globe.
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individual responsibility for social policy. In the world Camus (1946) described, he does
not mention the word trauma but names what have presently become considered
traumatic events in contemporary society: murder, violence, and war. While these actions
are condemnable, Camus argued society has been complicit in allowing these tragedies to
occur without dialogue and action. To Camus these collective tragedies could only exist
when people become so frightened that they stop reflecting about the world they live in,
“Mankind’s long dialogue has just come to an end… The result is that –-besides those
who have not spoken out because they thought it useless—a vast conspiracy of silence
has spread all about us, a conspiracy accepted by those who are frightened and who
rationalize their fears in order to hide them from themselves, a conspiracy fostered by
those whose interest it is to do so” (Camus, 1946, p. 28). He continued:
…who can deny we live in a state of terror? We live in terror because persuasion
is no longer possible; because man has been wholly submerged in History;
because he can no longer tap that part of his nature, as real as the historical part,
which he recaptures in contemplating the beauty of nature and of human faces;
because we live in a world of abstractions, of bureaus and machines, of absolute
ideas and of crude messianism. We suffocate among people who think they are
absolutely right, whether in their machines or in their ideas. And for all who can
live only in an atmosphere of human dialogue and sociability, this silence is the
end of the world. (Camus, 1946, pp. 28-29) 20
Camus (1946) wrote about how overcoming the terror that grips daily life requires
the ability to reflect and to act accordingly, yet the atmosphere of terror that gripped the
cold war could not encourage reflection. In the final conclusion of his essay, Camus
asked in that “midst of a murderous world” could society agree to reflect on society’s
violent actions and then make a choice: to live as neither victims nor executioners; to live
20

When Camus writes about History I believe he is referring to culturally constructed
historical narratives rather than lived experience. Camus believes Histories have
rationalized war. He suggests that we do not think about the life experiences of having a
mother, a friend or a child and how those who we murder are also mothers, friends and
children.
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in way where our actions are not in contradiction to the end we seek: life. After making
this choice, members of society might better be able to distinguish those who accept the
consequences of being murderers and those who refuse to do so.
In sum, the ethic of the Holocaust that was translated into trauma-focused
psychotherapy was that of the therapist and patient witnessing the testimony of the
incomprehensible together in the therapy room. The Jewish psychiatrists movement to
study the Holocaust was a public form of witnessing—an intentional political movement
to never forget. One application of this ethic in the theory of trauma (especially of those
promoted by Laub, van der Kolk, Herman, and Caruth) was the indelible, veracious,
etching of the trauma into memory. While the memory of the trauma may be repressed or
dissociated, its enactment reflects the simultaneously true yet incomprehensible reality of
the horrors of this time. Camus (1946) extended the conscious reflection and dialogue
about one’s role in living in a murderous world. The major themes of Camus’ work
(1946, 1948, 1956) include: taking responsibility, speaking the truth about atrocities that
occurred, and not seeking a means in contradiction to the end we seek.
The only part of the Holocaust tradition of trauma research that remains in
mainstream contemporary trauma theory is the etching of trauma into memory (e.g. in
studies that tacitly embrace antimimetic trauma theory) and the need to bring conscious
narrative to unconscious traumatic memories (e.g., in narrative and exposure-based
therapies). Rarely are these concepts directly tied to the historical context of the
Holocaust or the Jewish movement to remember; nor do they extend into the political and
moral territory that Camus opened. While the direct ties to history are unapparent, the
results of Holocaust trauma research are represented in Appendix A beginning in the
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1980s with Bessel van der Kolk’s research on PTSD; his definition notably preceded and
heavily influenced the formulation of the formal diagnosis in the DSM-III. The context of
the Holocaust or the consequences of nuclear war are absent from this definition of PTSD
and its representation in mainstream trauma history but the message of absorbing an
indelible and veracious trauma remains in the description of the pathology.
In their attempts to continue the tradition of remembrance and witnessing, trauma
scholars like van der Kolk, Caruth, and Herman in an unforeseen way also contributed
heavily to the construct of trauma as an empirical, reified object in the brain (see Leys
(2000) for continued discussion of this phenomenon). To understand how this shift came
about it is also important to understand the context of the post-Vietnam era when these
scholars were working and the rise of false memory phenomenon in the 1990s.
The rise of PTSD in the Post-Vietnam era. After World War I, American
scientists established the National Research Council (NRC) that reported on the scientific
discoveries psychologists made during the war; this field came to be recognized as
applied psychology (Samelson, 1974). The wartime effort created renewed interest in
applied psychology as a market for assessment, namely in personality and intelligence
testing for the military. The NRC publicized the role of psychologists in providing army
mental tests. Robert Yerkes, the APA president at the time, offered psychologists service
in designing and providing assessment to eliminate “feeble minded and unstable recruits”
(Samelson, 1974, p. 109). As war continued the field of psychology benefited; more
psychologists were needed to provide assessment.
World War II (WWII) saw the first large-scale systematic screening for
psychiatric disposition to mental collapse. Of the 18 million men who volunteered for
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military service in WWII, 29% were rejected as unfit for combat for physical reasons and
another 18.5% were rejected for neuropsychiatric disorders and emotional problems
(Gabriel, 1990). Despite these attempts to eliminate the weak minded from the military,
psychiatric causalities were the largest single category of military disabilities granted by
the government after WWII (Gabriel, 1990).21
In comparison to WWII, scholars have suggested that in Vietnam the degree of
exposure to actual battle contact was low. Of the 2.8 million men who saw service in
Vietnam only 280,000 engaged in direct combat (Gabriel, 1990). When attacks did occur
they were described as ambushes lasting less than two minutes. Though in a quantitative
sense combat exposure was less than WWII, the Vietnam War was undoubtedly brutal
and gratuitous in unexpected ways that were incomparable to much of WWII. The
Vietnam War was essentially jungle based guerilla warfare, which usually took the form
of U.S. troops moving between basecamps, looking for the enemy: the Viet Cong (Tick,
2005). The Viet Cong organized guerilla and army units manned by peasants in the areas
they controlled. The enemy was often indistinguishable from civilians; in villages the
enemy often refused to do battle and the majority of the time they were actually civilians.
Marin (1981) attributed the gross depravity of the Vietnam War to the military
being unprepared for guerilla warfare and two fundamental differences in the type of
violence when compared to other wars: a) programmatic, widespread and intentional
policies that included the slaughter of civilian populations (perhaps only comparable to

21

One interesting (though perhaps unsurprising) finding was that men who were already
diagnosed with aggressive psychopathic personalities were the only persons to remain
mentally unbroken after thirty-five days of exposure to battle; those were screened as
being mentally sound quickly degenerated from exposure to war and other factors such as
lack of food and sleep (Gabriel, 1990).
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the WWII firebombing of Dresden), and b) the common spontaneous development of
arbitrary violence, like the massacre Vietnamese civilians in My Lai. This also included
recreational violence, such as American GIs gunning down women or children for fun.
While there is no systematic documentation of these events, stories from veterans reveal
that they were granted implicit permission to act out at will gratuitous acts of violence to
the people of Vietnam.
One solider who participated in the My Lai massacre wrote:
The predominant emotional tone here is all-encompassing absurdity and moral
inversion. The absurdity has to do with being alien and profoundly lost, yet at the
same time locked into a situation as meaningless and unreal as it is deadly. The
moral inversion, eventuating in the sense of evil, has to do not only with the
absolute reversal of ethical standards, but also with its occurrence in absurdity,
without inner justification, so that the killing is rendered naked. (Lifton, 1973,
p. 37)
Another solider described passing the time by engaging in “body races” which
involved collecting the dead bodies of Vietnamese troops, smashing their pelvises and
spines with entrenching tools, tying the bodies into balls with belts and straps and rolling
them down the hill as a platoon to see whose corpse would get to the bottom first (Young,
1995, p 144). When this solider was asked if body races were an atrocity, he said he had
no particular feelings about it.
Edward Tick (2005), psychologist and anti-war activist, described an interview
with a solider, Isaac Bonilla, who eventually died from exposure to Agent Orange.
Bonilla’s role was to translate orders to Puerto Rican soldiers who were employed as
“tunnel rats” to fight in hand-to-hand combat with the Viet Cong in their underground
tunnels. The Puerto Rican soldiers who didn’t speak English were seen as more
expendable and were supposedly chosen as tunnel rats for their smaller size when
compared to white officers. Bonilla was in charge of translating, and thus giving the
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orders to the Puerto Rican GIs. He described often wanting to refuse but was told, “Give
that order or you’ll go into the tunnels yourself” (p. 114). The Puerto Rican soldiers,
Bonilla’s friends, would beg him for an alternate assignment, Bonilla answered in
Spanish that it was not his order and that they had either to take their chances in the
tunnel or to run away into the jungle. Tick (2005) wrote, “Once he did refuse to pass the
order. His lieutenant put a pistol to his head and told him, ‘Deliver it or die.’ He delivered
it” (p. 114).
These examples are just a small selection of the atrocities of the Vietnam War that
have been reported. They reveal how the morality of the war was constantly in question,
yet orders were often carried out regardless of soldiers’ commitment to the war. This
moral doublethink (cf. Orwell, 1984) is reflected in the now famous quote from an
unnamed officer in Vietnam, “We had to destroy this village in order to save it” and
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s dictum, “In order to do good, you may have to do
evil” (Morris, Williams, Ahlberg, Bilson, & Glass, 2004).
From the start of the Vietnam War the total number of evacuations for psychiatric
reasons was at 6% until 1970 and 1971 when the intensity of battle fell off and the
number of psychiatric evacuations rose to 50% (Gabriel, 1990). As the need for
psychiatric treatment rose, Robert Lifton’s (1973) book characterizing the soldiers’
reaction to war was used as a basis for the creation of post-Vietnam syndrome, which
later became known as PTSD. Lifton described how his work was attributed to have first
identified PTSD because he was the first to suggest there would be lasting psychological
effects from the war in a testimony to the U.S. Senate subcommittee on the Vietnam War
in January 1980 (Lifton, 1973). In fact, Lifton did not advocate for the general use of a
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category of symptoms to describe veteran’s reactions to the war. While he noted there
was indeed psychological impact that was often expressed in a particular pattern, he
argued that PTSD was “a dubious, easily-abused category, especially in its ready
equation of effects of war with a clinical condition (a ‘syndrome’)” (Tick, 2005, p. 420).
It is clear from Lifton’s (1973) book that creating a diagnosis was not his agenda.
He described the shifting role of soldiers in Vietnam who were no longer expected to be
heroes but a member of a warrior class whose acts of killing were intended to maintain
social order (i.e., killing in the service of promoting life). He identified the ways that
soldiers were ritually socialized to become numb to individual acts of violence and to
lose sense of a larger purpose, morality or identity outside of the warrior ethic. Despite
Lifton’s protests about utilization of his work in legitimizing PTSD as a mental health
disorder, people perceived his book as advocating for diagnostic recognition.
While there is no consensus on figures, by the end of the war approximately
500,000 to 1.5 million Veterans were diagnosed with PTSD (see rates reported in the
PTSD prevalence in the military section of this study, pp. 29-32). While several authors
note the paradoxical shift in rates of mental health problems increasing in 1971 when
exposure to combat decreased, this was also the year that (thanks to Daniel Ellsberg’s
courageous whistleblowing) selections from the Pentagon Papers were reprinted by New
York Times (Ellsberg, 2003). The Pentagon Papers led to public awareness and eventually
outrage that the war was fought under false pretenses. Soldiers who perhaps expected to
return as heroes continued to feel conflicted about their actions in the war and were
greeted with political protest upon returning home. While the this protest was directed at
leaders rather than soldiers (e.g., chants of “Hey, hey, LBJ how many kids did you kill
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today?”), the cultural perception of Vietnam veterans homecoming is still ingrained, “A
Vietnam veteran, arriving home from the war, gets off a plane only to be greeted by an
angry mob of antiwar protesters yelling, 'Murderer!' and 'Baby killer!' Then out of the
crowd comes someone who spits in the veteran's face” (Ulin, 1998). According to Jerry
Lembcke (1998) no incidents of spitting on veterans have ever been documented. He
believed the spitting image was contrived as right wing propaganda to further polarize
anti-war efforts and veterans and discredit the core of anti-war peace movements.
Lembcke argued that U.S. society’s attachment to this image reflects lingering national
confusion over war.
After the Vietnam War, psychiatrist Peter Marin published an essay in 1981 in
Psychology Today that many veterans still refer to, entitled “Living in Moral Pain.”
Marin declared that upon returning from Vietnam veterans had learned a “terrible and
demanding wisdom”—the irreversibility of a type of knowledge where one’s actions of
killing and maiming in war irrevocably determined the destiny of victims such that there
was no way to deny one’s responsibility or culpability for those mistakes. In theory,
Marin suggested the knowledge could bring veterans deeper in their community, but
instead it isolated them and “locks them simultaneously into a seriousness and silence
that are as much of a cause of pain as are their past actions;” the veterans raised questions
that the nation did not want to confront. Marin aptly stated, they raised questions “for
which, as a society we have no answers” (p. 74).
The American Psychiatric Association recognized the diagnosis of PTSD in
1980. The diagnosis first emerged as “delayed stress syndrome” where long after the
wars end veterans who were previously thought to be well began to exhibit flashbacks,
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nightmares, uncontrollable anger, paranoia, anxiety and depression (Marin, 1981).
Review of the literature on case studies of veterans revealed psychiatrists’ use language
that diffused the moral content of veteran’s experience (e.g., refusal to kill during war
was reframed as “acute combat reaction” and the effects of genocide were called “stress”)
(Marin, 1981). Through the ideology of cognitive psychological terms, the horrors of war
were masked. As Marin said, the psychiatrists’ responsibility thus perversely became “to
keep soldiers in the mood for killing” (p. 72). VA therapists, aware of the moral pain the
veterans experienced, moved to “deresponsibilize” their patients or get them to blame
external causes rather than moral choice. Marin describes how guilt was transformed to
“survivors guilt” –-“shame not for what was done, but for having outlived one’s
comrades” (p. 72).
Soon after the introduction of PTSD into the psychiatric nosology in 1980, reports
emerged that portrayed the disorder having occurred throughout human history (Young,
1995). For example, in the Diary of Samuel Pepys the author describes his reaction to the
Great Fire of London in 1666; this was reinterpreted through the lens of PTSD symptoms
and incorporated into the normative history of PTSD (Young, 1995). Shakespeare’s King
Henry IV, Part 1 was seen as referring to PTSD as well as Homer’s Odyssey, and the
Gilgamesh (Ben-Ezra, 2004). This tradition continues today with ever-emerging
interpretations of history as experienced through the lens of PTSD (see e.g., Ben-Ezra,
2004; Birmes et al., 2010; Breithaupt, 2005; Jones & Wessely, 2006; Wilson, J. P.,
1994).22

22

These histories are not purely constructive, indeed there must be some similarities in
human distress reactions to war throughout history; yet, as authors like Young (1995) and
Samelson (1974) suggest the specific expression of traumatic symptomology prior to the
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Allan Young (1995), in an ethnography of PTSD, argued that the diagnosis
achieved general acceptance only after the Vietnam War and the disorder is not in fact
timeless and does not possess intrinsic unity; the normative history of trauma disorders
that culminates in the discovery of PTSD (Appendix A) he called a “harmony of
illusions” constructed from research. Young spent between 1986 and 1988 researching in
a psychiatric unit of the VA Medical System now known as the National Center for the
Treatment of PTSD (National Center). Amazingly, he was permitted to attend all
therapeutic sessions for the purposes of completing his study. He described in detail the
early diagnostic process for PTSD (i.e., meeting DSM-III criteria for PTSD from a
clinical interview, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory subscales, review of
military records, and behavioral observations). He witnessed how wide variation of
symptom expression and war stories were considered under the umbrella of trauma and
PTSD. During each intake at the National Center, a team of psychiatrists and
psychologists carefully considered each case before the diagnosis could be assigned.
Through the diagnostic assessment process, what were once unique stories with complex
moral dimensions (e.g., the difference between “body races” and Bonilla’s attempt to
protect his soldiers by resisting translation) were flattened in order to be represented in
the PTSD symptom profile. Young reflected on how the diagnostic team believed they
would have easier time diagnosing PTSD if they could somehow bypass the things that
the men said about themselves and their past. This indeed occurred through the invention
of PTSD screening and checklists that are currently used for screening in the military
1980s was embedded in the political and social life at the time (see description of
nostalgia in Appendix A). The history that emerged around the 1980s presented in
Appendix A suggests that PTSD, in its contemporary form, has existed thousands of
years ago and it was simply undiscovered.
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(e.g., Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska, & Keane’s, 1993, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
Checklist [PCL]). The checklists identify symptoms but prompt for no narratives about
actual war experiences.23
The technologies of parsimonious diagnosis were soon translated into the
technologies of treatment, such that all men with the PTSD diagnosis were placed into
identical regimens of therapy.24 In addition to relaxation therapy, a film series with
therapeutic discussions and autobiography sessions weekly, veterans were assigned daily
group psychotherapy, psychodynamic individual therapy twice a week, and cognitive
skills sessions as needed. This became the National Center’s model therapy following
Congress’s mandate Public Law 98-528 to provide specialized treatment for PTSD,
distribute findings related to the diagnosis, and conduct research (Veterans' Health Care
Act of 1984, 1984).
The congressional mandate also came with a strong incentive to create a
distinctive treatment program from other VA centers, in part to justify the large staff and
budget (Young, 1995). While it was not difficult to construct the program, fulfilling the
secondary mandate of Congress—identify mechanisms underlying PTSD—was more
challenging. Thus Young described the National Center’s primary contribution to PTSD
was a “knowledge-product” (p. 188) to somehow link the narratives of veterans and their
observed behaviors to the symptoms of PTSD and to the mental structures that were at
23

Now even the brief PTSD checklists have been reduced from 17 to 3 or 4 items for
ease of dissemination (Engel et al., 2008). Thus what once took hours of face-to-face
time with veterans and careful decision from a team, was reduced to less than a half-hour
and now takes a matter of minutes.
24

At the time of Young’s research, manual-based, brief (5-session) and evidencesupported approaches to PTSD had not yet emerged, so what Young viewed as perhaps
one-size-fits all treatment approaches would today be viewed as a luxury.
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the time theoretically associated with PTSD. Young described how the development of
this knowledge product, the naturalization and universalizing of PTSD, occurred in
stages:
Stage one. Therapists elicit etiological narratives from patients during
group and individual psychotherapy. They re-narrate the patients’
accounts and use the new stories to explain (to the patients and to
themselves) the meaning of the patients’ current behavior at the center.
Stage two. Each therapist provides the clinical director with a
double account of what has happened at stage one: an account of the
patient’s narrative and behavior and an account of the [therapist’s]
perceptions […]. This takes place during weekly supervision and at the
“debriefings following each group psychotherapy session. Stage two
mirrors stage one, in the sense that the therapist’s narrative is re-narrated
by someone (the clinical director) with privileged access to the meaning of
the narrator’s words.
Stage three. The knowledge product of stage two is inscribed in
documents for internal circulation, for a quarterly PTSD newsletter edited
at the center, and for papers presented at VA conferences and annual
meetings of professional groups […]. (p. 188)
This staged process reveals how each veteran’s personal narrative was stripped of
context and transformed into words such as stress responses and acting out. Through this
process, trauma became reified as a horrifying event (of any kind) and the soldiers
reactions were seen as universal, biologically based, or innate symptoms that fit within
the forthcoming DSM-III PTSD description. One can also observe in this process how the
PTSD ideology was translated into published documents whereas the actual stories of
veterans were not distributed. In this way the research served the creation of the PTSD
origin myth in which history is transformed to sanitize the growing complexity, danger
and confusion of our time (cf. Cushman, 1995; Samelson, 1974). PTSD research, with the
promise of curing disease and finding truth, thus obscured the role of psychology in
shaping and retaining the sociopolitical conditions that lead to mental distress, especially
for veterans and those who have been historically underprivileged.

86
While most of Young’s (1995) account of the creation of PTSD paints a grim
picture of war psychology, he also described in detail the different efforts of patients and
therapists to resist these stages of the therapeutic process by acting out. These behaviors
tested the structure of the VA and were described by the National Center as unconscious
urges and conflicts. All patients’ acting out was uniformly responded to with increased
discipline and control. Young related the story of a patient interrupting a group process
by accusing his primary therapist of pressuring him to talk about his traumatic
experiences. This initiated the therapeutic process of limit setting, which involved the
patient’s required appearance in front of an multidisciplinary treatment plan (MDTP)
panel. At MDTP meetings the binding treatment goals were set and then announced at a
community meeting. Thus what was seen as helping veterans (e.g., setting treatment
goals) placed them in a double-bind: to question or reject their treatment goals was to
suggest that they have failed treatment, which resulted in further restriction, diagnosis of
pathology, and more of the treatment they were rebelling against in the first place.
Young’s (1995) accounts of patients rebelling against their MDTP plans are eerily
reminiscent of McMurphy rebelling from Nurse Ratched in Kesey’s (1962/2002) One
Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest;25 however, unlike the portrayal of Nurse Ratched, the
treating therapists at the National Center were not often seen (and probably did not view
themselves) as power-tripping prison guards. In fact, from Young’s descriptions, it’s
likely that the majority of researchers and therapists at the National Center were
extremely well meaning and hoped their treatments would alleviate suffering. To view
25

One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest was written in the peak of the civil rights movement
and during the conversation about deinstitutionalization of asylums in the US. The book
was banned from schools in at least six states during the Vietnam era.
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the history of PTSD’s development as a maniacal plan to devalue Veterans, restrain their
anger against the government, or continue to fund future war effort would be overly
simplistic; however, the counter position to this story, a purely patriotic effort to use
science to cure suffering is equally obtuse. While there has been discussion of how the
soldiers struggled to reckon with the moral pain they bore in a society that couldn’t bear
to take responsibility for its mistakes, there is limited literature on how the therapists
conducting these restrictive treatments also operated within what they believed was a
moral imperative to help the soldiers. The nuances of this history from a moral
perspective and local context, including the gory details, must be considered, as scholars
Lifton, Young, Marin, Tick and others have demonstrated; they have taken steps to
restore the depth of history to the diagnosis of PTSD.
In sum, scholars who have studied the Vietnam War from a moral and
ethnographic perspective have chronicled how the diagnosis of PTSD and its
corresponding treatment were developed in such a way to alleviate responsibility from
the government, society and veterans from the atrocities of war. Most veterans developed
symptoms in 1971, perhaps not coincidentally after the publication of the Pentagon
Papers. Veterans felt betrayed by their government and returned to a country not as
heroes but as victims of the state or, worse, as war criminals. The process of diagnosis
developed by the National Center for PTSD served to eliminate the collection and
publication of the unique histories of veterans by replacing their narratives with
psychoeducational scripts, void of moral content, about the process of contracting PTSD
from the war. The war was framed as inevitable and without fault and its consequences as
a natural mental disorder that could be treated. The treatment employed at the National
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Center was seen as the model scientific treatment of PTSD for Veterans Administration
hospitals across the country.
Congressional mandates and an outpouring of research funding further supported
the communication of the research-developed narratives that promoted psychotherapy,
rather than community action or policy change, as the primary treatment for the problems
of war. It was this effort and a shift in cultural consciousness about the nature of trauma
that surrounded the development of the normative history of trauma (Appendix A). Prior
to the 1980s this history cannot be located in its comprehensive form, from inclusion of
nostalgia, soldier’s heart, shell shock the seduction theory to the diagnosis of PTSD (see
citations under Appendix A for histories that cite each disorder; all publications are dated
in the post-Vietnam era or later).
The false memory debate and the feminist appropriation of trauma diagnoses. In
the early 1990s, repeated cases of women uncovering long-forgotten memories of child
sexual abuse began emerging in the news and sparked controversy around a phenomenon
known as false memory syndrome. The question became were these memories falsified
by women for personal gain or indeed could a traumatic event be repressed and
uncovered through trauma processing therapies. The research of Elizabeth Loftus
contributed to a third hypothesis that perhaps these memories were actually introduced or
altered by therapists during the therapy sessions. The false memory controversy brought
together the interests of law, politics, and psychology such that cognitive scientists,
feminist advocates and psychologists and lawyers began publically debating the nature of
trauma, and specifically of how traumatic memories are stored and recalled.
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In response to the false memory controversy Judith Herman (1992) and other
feminist psychiatrists and psychologists like Laura S. Brown (e.g., Pope & Brown, 1996)
argued that traumatic memories could indeed be repressed and also recalled with
accuracy, similar to the phenomenon of a Vietnam veteran experiencing a flashback.
Herman and Brown’s thesis was that many women who had been diagnosed with
disorders like bipolar were actually suffering from a form of PTSD. They argued that
there was an implicit male bias in defining PTSD and that symptoms experienced by
veterans in ways that excluded symptoms commonly experienced by victims of domestic
violence and survivors of child sexual abuse and incest. Around this same time there was
a revival of interest in Ferenczi’s trauma theory of neurosis, which also emphasized child
sexual abuse and incest, and the problems of familial distortion or denial of abuse (e.g.,
Masson, 1984; Hoffer, 1991).
In her best-seller, Trauma and Recovery (1997), Herman described how traumas
that are considered “acts of God,” (p. 7) like natural disasters, are morally unambiguous
whereas events of human design, like domestic violence and sexual abuse, put society in
a place to take sides with the victim or the perpetrator. To side with the perpetrator was to
see no evil in the acts of trauma. Herman believed this stance was easier for society to
accept, whereas taking the side of the victim asked society to share the burden of pain
and demanded action. Herman, like Laub, invoked the role of testimony, “the only way to
begin to make our experiences known to ourselves was to start with the testimony about
the concrete conditions of our lives” (Herman, 2000, p.1). Herman drew an analogy from
the Holocaust to an epidemic of violence against women and described how secrecy and
silence were the perpetrators first line of defense in promoting the forgetting of trauma,
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before blatantly attacking the credibility of the victim. The more devalued the victim is in
society, the more likely it is that the bystander will side with the perpetrator in
invalidating and silencing her reality. Following the lessons learned from Holocaust
studies, Herman wrote about how psychological trauma is about rendering the victim not
credible and invisible.
Herman’s aim in writing Trauma and Recovery was to establish that the traumatic
events women experience are credible and real by aligning the interests of the feminist
movement, patients who have experienced invalidation, and investigators conducting
psychological research on trauma (namely that of van der Kolk and Brown). She argued
that the study of psychological trauma is inherently a political enterprise because it calls
attention to the experience of oppressed persons. Without the support of political
movement for human rights, Herman (1997) wrote, “the process of bearing witness
inevitably gives way to the active process of forgetting” (p. 9). In her book, Herman
(1997) reinterpreted the normative history of trauma including Freud’s seduction
hypothesis and the discovery of shell shock from her position within the feminist
movement. The aim of recounting this history, she reflected in the afterword to her book,
was in part to ensure that the field of traumatic studies would not be disappeared like
stories of the Holocaust survivors.
Herman (1997) is also famous for coining the term “complex PTSD” for the
experience of persons who have experienced prolonged, repeated trauma. She believed
that the diagnosis of PTSD as it was defined in the Vietnam era was derived from
“circumscribed events” like combat, disaster and rape and did not capture the experience
of living for years or a lifetime with a perpetrator of violence, such as in child abuse (p.
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119). She again made analogies to the Holocaust experience saying that complex PTSD
occurred under conditions of captivity including concentration camps, slave labor camps
and prisons; these same conditions occurred in the unseen domestic captivity of abused
women and children. She proposed new criteria for complex PTSD including subjection
to totalitarian control over a prolonged period (months to years) (p. 121). Herman’s work
had an impressive effect politically and in forensic psychology to the extent that the
defense of women’s suffering often invoked PTSD and complex trauma diagnoses in the
courtroom (Alpert, Brown, & Courtois, 1998; Pope & Brown, 1996).
A key facet of complex PTSD was the deconstruction of identity and the self,
“The identity formed prior to the trauma is irrevocably destroyed” (p. 56) and “the victim
of chronic trauma may feel herself to be changed irrevocably, or she may lose the sense
she has any self at all” (p. 86). Fragmentation and the creation of a “double-self” is
another consequence of trauma—the self that experienced the trauma is irreconcilable
with identity and thus must be split off in order for the victim to survive (p. 107). The
trauma “invades and erodes the personality” (p. 86) to the extent that the victim’s identity
is seemingly replaced by reenactments of the trauma and she continues to be imprisoned:
Many abused children cling to the hope that growing up will bring escape and
freedom. But the personality formed in the environment of coercive control is not
well adapted to adult life. The survivor is left with fundamental problems in basic
trust, autonomy, and initiative. She approaches the task of early
adulthood―establishing independence and intimacy―burdened by major
impairments in self-care, in cognition and in memory, in identity, and in the
capacity to form stable relationships. She is still a prisoner of her childhood;
attempting to create a new life, she reencounters the trauma. (p. 110)
In the 1990s, Herman reflected on the loss of the social and political context of
her work as the field of traumatology grew; she referred to this as the “price of
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respectability” (Herman, 2000, p. 4) and insinuated that researchers could not gain
funding for the truly interesting questions that arise from clinical work with trauma:
If you want to keep it clean, it’s nice to have some nice, clean auto accident
victim study. And hopefully not where there’s any sort of corporate liability in the
accident, corporate negligence, but where it was truly an accident. And then you
don’t have to get into any of this murky, messy, social issue stuff. And you can
just do a nice psychobiological study … I’m not against it. I just think that’s not
where the really interesting questions lie. (Herman, 2000, p. 4)
While Herman and others ensured that women would be recognized as
traumatized, now the suffering of middle-class white women has arguably become
exclusively recognized as trauma (Haaken, 1995; Leary, 2005; Tolleson, personal
communication, October 17, 2013). Jan Haaken (1995) writing in the midst of the false
memory debate suggested that narratives of sexual abuse became the only officially
recognized accounts that grant legitimacy to women’s experiences of suffering. Haaken
viewed the false memory debate as an indictment of middle-class life. She argued that the
feminist, adult child survivor movement sought to broaden trauma to include a
dysfunctional middle-class American family. In other words, one needn’t come from a
background of poverty or a “broken” family in order to be the target of sexual abuse.
Haaken reflected that historically, public concern over child abuse has emerged during
periods of great social change where the family becomes the locus of generational
struggles. The third wave feminist movement found empowerment in the language of
trauma and carved out a space for women’s suffering to be heard in a new light. Haaken
conceptualized the sharp increase in reported incest allegations and sexual abuse that
followed this movement as a cultural metaphor for other female boundary violations
within the family, including but not limited to sexual abuse. Narcissistic, detached, and
physically abusive parents may have created just as much damage to their daughters as
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those who are sexually abused, yet, Haaken pointed out, only sexual abuse became the
officially recognized trauma for women. Thus identifying as a sexually abused and
traumatized woman provided a socially sanctioned way to break out from familial
entrapments in the 1990s.
Haaken (1995) was careful not to suggest that incest and sexual abuse allegations
were untrue, but unlike the veridical accounts of trauma presented by Herman, Caruth,
van der Kolk and others, Haaken argued that the clinical significance of sexual abuse
memories can be often ambiguous even when there is a clear, demonstrated history of
sexual abuse. She suggested that the false memory phenomenon was no doubt influenced
by the immense power of sexual abuse metaphors for women in the 90s to the extent that
both patient and therapist may have “appropriate[d] sexual abuse narratives” to fill in
gaps of memory (p. 192). Haaken described how therapy that focused exclusively on
veridical trauma-based elaborations could intensify women’s fears of powerful feelings
and desires. Instead, she suggested that in therapy the capacity for fantasy must be
recognized and explored along with the history of trauma without reducing one to the
other. In this way the fantasy and the irrational feelings can become less frightening and
more accessible to creative interpretation.
Similar to Haaken, Cushman (1995) wondered if the word abuse had become a
catchall phrase for unarticulated, unnamed or unnoticed problems at this time. Cushman’s
thesis on abuse was that contemporary culture has come to exclusively rely on trauma
theory to articulate a multitude of social problems in the late 20th century American
social terrain. In this terrain only dyadic relationships show up, and as a result of many
types of damage and oppression do not come to light. It is difficult to see and especially
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to productively discuss political and moral issues except when concerned within the
dyad—either the parent-child dyad, husband-wife dyad, or the dangerous perpetrating
stranger-youngster dyad. Political problems, such as war, racism, poverty, misogyny or
heterosexism might get collapsed or conflated into the only concept recognized and thus
available: the dyad. As a result important political action gets undermined and public
attention gets focused only on what happens within the smallest of relational stages.
While white middle-class women’s suffering in the 1990s became increasingly
recognized as traumatized, African-Americans, Latinos and American Indians were less
likely to be seen as traumatized and were more often considered to be criminals or as
being unengaged or un-amenable to treatment following a traumatic event (Fine, 2012;
Gone, 2007, 2009; Leary, 2005). Similar to Haaken’s identification of sexual trauma as
the accepted dialogic space for women to express suffering, Michelle Fine (2012)
suggested that women today are expected to and often do accept that the failings of
society are indeed due to their individual problems. Fine called this a cultural “hyperresponsibilization” and scrutiny of women, and especially of women of color. Her
research highlights how ironically women of color, immigrants and persons living in
poverty are seen as more likely to meet criteria for PTSD according to the
epidemiological research but do not often receive the label of traumatized because their
testimony is not seen as trustworthy. Depending on the needs of the institutions in power,
they are seen as liars or criminals or as trauma victims.26

26

Fine (2012) described the vignette of a recent news story from New York in which
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund and
presidential candidate in France, sexually assaulted Nafissato Diallo, a maid at the New
York Hotel Sofitel who was an asylum seeker from Guinea living in the Bronx. In
comparison to the debate about false memories that centered largely on middle-class
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Joy deGrurey Leary (2005) in her book Post-traumatic Slave Syndrome has also
documented the historical exclusion of African-Americans from the diagnosis of PTSD in
the U.S. When referring to the history of war-stress related diagnoses in the Civil War,
like shell shock and soldier’s heart, she wrote, “I don’t remember reading about any
counseling centers that were set up for freed slaves after the Civil War” (p. 120).
Similarly, when viewing the lists of events that constitute the DSM-IV-TR’s PTSD
Criterion A, the experience of slavery or history of slavery in one’s family does not
appear as a legitimate stressful event or trauma listed in the standard assessments of
traumatic life events.
To acknowledge the experience of descendants of slaves, Leary (2005) created
her traumatic diagnosis: posttraumatic slave syndrome (PTSS), which she defined as the
result of multigenerational trauma resulting from centuries of slavery and continued
oppression from institutionalized racism. She added that the diagnosis includes an
absence of opportunity to access the benefits available in society. The behavior patterns

white, therapy-going women, in this example there were major differences in power,
class, nationality and race. Diallo was not offered the privilege of the PTSD diagnosis,
nor was her testimony seen as somehow more legitimate because it involved sexual
assault. Instead, she was accused of hanging out with “unsavory characters” such as men
who are in prison for dealing drugs. She was also accused of lying about gang rape in her
home country to establish asylum in the U.S. and categorized as an inconsistent mother
with unstable housing and invalid documentation. Despite medical evidence, material
evidence in the hotel and personal testimony, Diallo’s case was considered “not
credible.” Even though Strauss-Kahn was responsible for previous documented cases of
sexual aggression (some of which were acknowledged by his wife as seduction), she was
seen as a liar.
Fine has responded to the epidemic of trauma by resuscitating politically engaged
psychology that does not produce science that recapitulates the status quo of the
neoliberal state. Her set of commitments to reclaiming scientific evidence in a socially
responsible way can be found at the website for the Public Science Project at the
Graduate Center, CUNY (www.publicscience.com).
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resulting from PTSS include three clusters: vacant esteem, ever-present anger, and racist
socialization. Vacant esteem refers to believing that oneself has little or no worth.
Rebuilding self-esteem is an activity for white persons who find intrinsic worth and the
idea of self as a container worth filling.27 Leary pointed to the disproportionate number of
African American’s in the prison system; when African-Americans don’t fit society’s
conceptualization of a healthy self they are seen as criminals, academically deficient and
sexually irresponsible. Rather than being turned into objects for healing, AfricanAmerican distress is seen as dysfunctional and criminal to the point where it is unworthy
of healing.
Leary (2005) recommended that African-Americans attend therapy under her
diagnosis of PTSS, rather than being excluded from mental health treatment entirely (e.g.,
as criminals) or conceptualized within the culturally white contemporary notion of PTSD
that is decontextualized from the history of slavery. She also recommended that to treat
PTSS African-Americans must engage in their faith and religion, contribute to their
community by learning to trust and rely upon each other and establish leadership in areas
like politics, education and social activism.
Using a somewhat similar strategy of feminists like Judith Herman to legitimate
women’s suffering as trauma, Leary’s work can be seen as appropriating the cultural
discourse of trauma to make the suffering of African-American’s more visible. Leary
27

When considering this symptom in light of questions arising from hermeneutic
historical analysis (e.g., Cushman, 1995): What is seen as a healthy or unhealthy person
and how do healers maintain the health of the society? Leary’s answer appears to be that
African-Americans feel and can be seen by society as not worthy of healing or possessing
the notion of “self” that is promoted by the majority society. When white women do not
fit within the normative conceptualization of mental health they are seen as unhealthy or
possessing an individualized mental health problem of PTSD; black women and men on
the other hand cannot be seen within the clearing of psychological maintenance.
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does not entirely “use the masters tools” (cf. Audre Lorde) by transforming the history of
slavery into an ahistorical diagnostic category. Instead, her description of PTSS
intentionally situates the traumatic symptoms of African Americans within history and
traditional and local culture, thereby by rejecting the white and mainstream definition of
PTSD.
In sum, following a similar process to that the VA used to reduce the vilification
of soldiers through PTSD diagnosis, Herman, Brown and other feminist psychologists
and psychiatrists legitimated the experiences of abused women and children that were
previously doubted as false memories or bipolar symptoms. They appropriated post-war
trauma theory and the vernacular of PTSD to describe the experiences of incest and
abuse. The indelibility and veracity of the trauma was a key aspect of the feminist trauma
approach; this also fit with van der Kolk’s biologically oriented studies that emerged
around the same time where trauma was seen as etched into memory and the brain in an
unaltered form. It is notable that Brown, Herman, Caruth and van der Kolk are Jewish
and all consciously reference the Holocaust studies in their research following the
imperative of testimony and remembrance.
Another central tenant of Herman’s approach, which she connected to Charcot,
Freud, Janet and Ferenczi, was how trauma necessarily led to a split in the self. This split
was sometimes so extreme that parts of the self could be come fractured, multiplied or
void; the trauma filled these spaces and in many ways became an inescapable way of
being in the 1990s for women (e.g., “attempting to create a new life; she reencounters the
trauma”). Thus, a primary consequence of the feminist trauma movement was recognition
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of a new dialogic space for women to express discontent and suffering: through the
language of trauma and sexual abuse.
As pointed out by Haaken, Cushman, Fine, Leary and others, since the 1990s the
suffering of white, middle-class women indeed became understood within the framework
of trauma to the extent that other possibilities for discontent with the family or world
could not come to light. Leary (2005) and Fine (2012) argued that despite the seeming
inescapabilty and universality of traumatic recognition for women, women of color and
those in poverty were not often considered traumatized when suffering but were more
often given the label of criminal or liar. Fine especially emphasized how the expansion of
trauma culture after the feminist movement allowed the failings of neoliberal society to
fall further under the purview of women’s individual problems and responsibility. Leary
argued that while African American women and men have been excluded from the
dominant trauma culture, their suffering is intrinsically tied to the history of slavery and
cannot continue to be treated as ahistorical, invisible, or worse, criminalized. Thus, since
1990s women’s suffering through trauma has become further removed from the political
roots of the feminist movement. Yet this history continues to define what suffering is
recognized as trauma for women in contemporary trauma culture; the tradition defines the
limits of the cultural clearing of suffering and how women express discontent with the
world.
Summary of key events in the normative history of trauma. Four events are
mentioned in almost every account of the history of trauma and by any psychologist or
psychiatrist who has contributed heavily to the study of traumatology: Freud and
Ferenczi’s psychoanalytic conceptualizations of trauma, Holocaust studies, PTSD in
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Vietnam veterans and feminist psychology’s reestablishment of PTSD as a primary
diagnosis of sexual assault and incest survivors. The description of these four events was
not intended to provide a comprehensive or complete picture of traumatology history (see
Appendix A for all conceptualizations) but to focus on a selected few events that are
mentioned frequently. It is notable that these events occurred in reaction to developments
in technologies, especially those of violence or control, and periods of political upheaval
and great human suffering such as the industrial revolution in Europe, World Wars I & II,
the atomic bomb, the Holocaust, and the Vietnam War.
In the 1980s, the diagnosis of PTSD that had been associated with industrialism
and war was extended to describe chronic abuse of women and children as part of a
political movement initiated by second-wave feminists Judith Herman, Laura Brown and
other feminist psychologists and psychiatrists. It was also in the 1980s, following the
inclusion of PTSD in the DSM that the normative history of trauma (Appendix A) was
constructed; this history identified the existence of PTSD in historical works and medical
diaries perhaps since the beginning of humanity.
Through my review of trauma research, Freud’s mention was ubiquitous in this
history whereas Ferenczi’s is mentioned primarily in psychoanalytic circles. Herman’s
work has been removed from its ties to social and political movements, including
Holocaust studies and the feminist movement, and instead has been subsumed into
mainstream trauma theory. The veridical theoretical tenants of Herman’s work are now
represented in cognitive-behavioral and neurobiological trauma theory (e.g., the NIMH
psychoeducational scripts). By the end of the 1990s, a wide range of events had come to
constitute trauma (from the holocaust to child abuse to a car crash). The diagnosis had

100
become associated with legitimate and truthful suffering, as well as with fundamentally
shaping and constituting the traumatic self.
Specific Background Information Relevant to Results
The following background sections are germane to the results chapters; they
provide the historical, philosophical and theoretical context to some of the taken-for
granted assumptions about trauma culture that I identified in my interpretation: the ideal
of the functional worker-patient; narcissism as self-maintenance in the 20th century; the
fantasy of a return to pre-traumatic innocence; the structure of cult indoctrination; and,
the specific uses of trauma as universal and culture-free construct.
Rather than go into depth about the history of these assumptions in the results
section, I have provided the background information here. Thus, these sections may
appear disconnected from immediate relevance (and each other) but I return to them in
the results and discussion sections.
The functional worker-patient ideal: From Foucault to neoliberalism. Paul
Lerner (2003) in Hysterical Men: War, psychiatry and the politics of trauma in Germany,
1890-1930 presented case studies of German veterans from World War I who attempted
to claim pension from the government for nervous pains. Lerner described the case of one
solider, Franz Müller, who was discharged from the army for “nervous shock.” In his
final pension review Müller said, “I was a healthy man when I became a solider, and I
was discharged a cripple…Had I never been a solider, and never been in the war, I would
not have these nervous pains” (p. 224). The medical experts that decided Müller’s case
challenged his traumatic narrative and pointed to a preexisting medical condition in
which he had “insufficiently formed testicles” and “unsatisfactory development of his

101
secondary sex traits” (p. 224). Müller was seen as a weak neurotic man who was not
masculine enough, and perhaps suffered more like a hysterical woman than a veteran
with nervous shock. The court concluded that “like countless neurotics,” the war was not
the cause but an excuse “with which the neurotic once again hopes to fulfill his wish of
escaping the difficulties of daily life” (p. 225). Thus it was fairly common in World War I
for those who suffered from anything like posttraumatic shock to be discounted as weak,
feminine war profiteers that simply didn’t have enough stamina to participate in the
demands of everyday life. The court saw the extraordinary conditions of war as somehow
normal, and the normal responses to war as pathological or contrived efforts to escape
work.
Lerner (2003) concluded that German psychiatry in the late 1800s was uniquely
brutal and nationalistic in a way that foreshadowed the Nazi regime. Psychiatry’s role
was emphasized in “a broader modernization process, a general tendency of increased
medical control over individual life and the eclipsing of subjectivity in a faceless
administrative modernity” (p. 250). Despite the brutality of this time period, Lerner also
suggested that this history has continued to permeate the medical materialism of trauma
in which mental suffering from war is stigmatized more than physical wounds. He argued
that the functional ideal of the “worker-patient” who contributes to society and continues
to work despite traumatic suffering, is sometimes the still unspoken desire of
contemporary trauma treatment.
The cultural construction of the worker-patient in a time of increasing
industrialization and modernization in Europe was most notably studied by Michel
Foucault. In History of Madness (1973), Foucault was critical of any historical gaze that
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somehow naturalized the present state of mental pathology, such as that of the idealized
worker-patient. In contrast to normative histories of pathology, the History of Madness
was a history of limits—a description of how a culture rejects something as exterior and
thus asserts its values. Foucault analyzed how conceptualizations of madness have shifted
over the years in response to systems of institutional exclusion and new modes of social
control.
Beginning with the Renaissance era (1440 to 1600), Foucault’s (1973) history
revealed how madness was once perceived as indicating the boundaries of reason and
order. Madness revealed to humanity knowledge about the ordered world and underlying
chaos. It played a cultural role to indicate discrepancies between human ideals and
practice; this was often interpreted within a Christian framework in Europe in which the
mad were seen as channeling a religious experience. While the mad revealed the limits of
reason, this was not purely pathological; the mad brought an alternate, albeit sometimes
frightening, vision or wisdom about humanity. At this time, mad people were sent out of
the cities to live in remote areas or villages.
In the 17th century, madness shifted to be seen as rejecting rather than
commenting on reason. Places of confinement for the mad emerged throughout Europe.
Foucault (1973) pointed out that these institutions were not medical establishments, but
like prisons in which the blasphemous, deviant and unemployed were considered to have
consciously chosen to reject truth and reason. Thus the basis for confinement at this time
was on ethical and not medical grounds. Over time, as medicine became increasingly
under the influence of the new empirical sciences, a transition was made where madness
became an object of medical study. The insane were confined and could be manipulated
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or observed by doctors in the medical profession. Madness transitioned from moral
deviancy to a scientific phenomenon.
By the 19th century, madness had exclusively become an object of medical study.
Institutions devoted to its study emerged: insane asylums and psychiatric hospitals.
Foucault (1973) described how asylums allowed for the development of the human
sciences. The space of cure and of exclusion became paired in social practice to the
extent that it seemed almost natural to lock-up the mad in order to cure them. Similarly,
psychiatrists, like Philippe Pineal, were later celebrated as philanthropists for freeing the
mad when it was the medical profession that led to continued confinement as treatment in
the first place.
Foucault (1973, 1987, 1995) observed by 20th century that clinics, hospitals,
schools, prisons and factories had become standardized and resembled each other in their
shape. Factories were designed after fortresses in which workers were admitted at the
sound of a bell and placed into partitioned, individual workstations that were designed for
one function. At the end of the day, the workers were released simultaneously by their
supervisors at the sound of the bell. Factories concentrated production, reduced
distractions (e.g., theft, interruptions, conversations between workers) and separated
workers from each other to reduce the potential of an uprising or any other community
organizing. Similarly, in schools pupils were separated into classrooms depending on the
function of what they needed to learn (e.g., art, history, literature) and within these
partitioned groups sometimes further subdivided based on achievement to increase
competition. Where previous classroom models allowed for teachers to spend time with
each pupil individually depending on what they were learning (the remainder of the class
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sitting idle), the new arrangement of the classroom meant the teacher could oversee the
class at all times and efficiently teach everyone the same subject. Medical patients were
also transferred from their home into a ward with countless others who could then be
efficiently administered medicine on the same schedule.
The structuring of social spaces, like the factory, school, and clinic, according to
Foucault was designed to “carve out individual segments and established operational
links; they mark places and indicate values; they guarantee the obedience of individuals,
but also a better economy of time and gesture” (Foucault, 1987, p. 94). Persons within
these systems were seen as increasingly similar, pulled to a norm, and in some ways
replaceable or expendable; all pupils in the classroom learn the same content, all workers
are interchangeable and are prescribed their role by the station at which they work.
Eventually the structure of the capitalist social space became associated with
concepts like efficiency and safety to the extent that the arrangements of the factory
became common sense for the workplace, hospital and school. Foucault noted how the
continuation of these arrangements need not be through top-down enforcement of a
managerial time-table and active separation of workers but through appeal to common
sense; how else could life be structured? (Foucault, Martin, Gutman, & Hutton, 1988).
Thus, Foucault (1987) suggested that the ideal of the functional worker-patient was not
just promoted through a mechanism of reproducing and absorbing discourse in a topdown manner (e.g., from the state to the therapist to the patient) but many forms of daily
and social life, such as through living in physical spaces that structured social interaction
(cf. dispostif).
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In addition to living in social spaces, Foucault also described how language is
used in social interactions to transform life into something that is amenable to treatment
in for-profit structures, like private hospitals and clinics. In Birth of the Clinic (1973),
Foucault coined the term “clinical gaze” (p. 115) to describe the reification of the human
body and disease as an object that can be known and separated from the person and the
social world, such that it can be subject to manipulation and utilization. He most often
used this term to describe pathologizing human experience by defining sickness as
something that could only be treated by doctors in hospitals, and thus transformed life
into an economy that maintained the clinic’s power structure. He said, “The hospital
became viable for private initiative from the moment that sickness, which had come to
seek a cure, was turned into a spectacle. Helping ended up by paying, thanks to the
virtues of the clinical gaze” (Foucault, 1973, p. 103). Foucault emphasized the role of
language and the naming of disorder as a particularly powerful element in how helping is
transformed into an economy.
To summarize, in Foucault’s (1973, 1987, 1995) interpretation, most mental
pathology, including traumatic stress, was a diagnosis of social control. Persons who
might otherwise be given help from their community were considered objects of study or
medical treatment and excluded from their community and cultural privileges of society.
This exclusion occurred in cultural practice through social and spatial isolation in which
those who were considered mad were physically separated from their community to
receive care in treatment centers under supervised guidelines. Exclusion also occurred
through utilization of procedural and instrumental language for disorders and pathology
that was adopted in clinics. Foucault described how human experience could be labeled
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in a way that made it amenable to manipulation, treatment and financial gain in private
clinics and hospitals. He described how practices of social control eventually became
institutionalized and applied through a form of self-surveillance in which self-care or management of mental health came to fit with what is good and is common sense about
human being.
Scholars who have followed Foucault and critically analyzed the functional and
instrumental culture that gave rise to the worker-patient in psychotherapy from a social
constructivist perspective have identified two primary features of this culture: a) the
disembedding of social identity from political, local, and moral tradition and context, and
b) individuals and communities lives are increasingly governed via technologies and the
role of the expert (e.g., Binkley, 2011; Cushman & Gilford, 2000; Layton, 2010, 2013;
Rose, N. S., 1989, 2007). Managed care and evidence-based practices today in many
ways functions similarly to factories, prisons and schools that Foucault observed, in
which patients are seen as modular objects fitting within “care decision trees” or
treatment plans to maximize efficiency and reduce costs for health care corporations.
Within this framework, traumatic events continue to be transformed from social
phenomenon to objects of scientific study that need to be adequately treated/controlled
through various medical technologies. Patients have learned to fit themselves neatly
within treatment decision trees and modular care by requesting specific medications and
self-diagnosing; what it is to be a good healthy human somehow fits naturally within
these practices of social control. Through a postmodern lens, the work of trauma
therapies has become void of personal, local and historical value and is increasingly
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becoming a prescribed, ordered treatment that could be delivered by any practitioner to
any patient (e.g., by following a treatment manual).
The contemporary phenomenon of people acting in such a way that they believe it
is desirable and good to fit themselves into proscriptive treatments and maximize their
health by utilizing technologies and expert advice has been characterized by Nicholas
Rose (2006) as a shift to somatic individuality and neurochemical self (described
previously on p. 23) and by Binkley (2011) as the cultural ideal of “the enterprising self.”
Binkley argued that contemporary life is “lived through a dynamic enterprise in which
others appear, not as objects of psychological investment toward a relation of mutuality,
but as pure resources in an environment of opportunity [the] neoliberal psy[che] disposes
the healthy individual to further maximize her or his own emotional potentials through
the manipulation of life-elements” (pp. 92-93).28
Binkely’s description of the enterprising self focused particularly on the role of
neoliberal governmentality in everyday psychotherapy practice.29 One consequence of
neoliberal thinking has been what Binkley (2011) called “the marketization of social
relations” (p. 92) where reconciliation and public social practice is recast in a negative
light as dependency and docility that halt the entrepreneurial spirit of individuals to meet
28

Both Binkley (2011) and N. S. Rose (2006)’s description of the enterprising and
neurochemical self is reminiscent of Heidegger’s (1954) notion of standing reserve,
where life and the world are transformed into instrumental resources, and of Foucault’s
(1975) description of the clinical gaze, which I present at the end of this section.
29
Economist John Williamson defined neoliberalism as moving control of the economy
from the public sector and government to the private sector and corporations
(Williamson, 1990). Neoliberal theory supports free market capitalism where the private
market determines value rather than a collective group, publically elected government or
regulatory oversight system [cf. Adam Smith’s (1777) concept of the invisible hand of
supply and demand]. In neoliberal culture responsibility for social well-being has been
removed by the state and replaced with private resources or not replaced at all (Fine,
2007).
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their potential optimal production in the system. To be considered functional within a
neoliberal capitalist system one must contribute works of value to the system; failure to
survive in the system is a threat to life and survival. Thus, in neoliberal theory, there is
emphasis on individual choices and works as being related to success or failure. If
someone is not happy, is impoverished, is starving or suffering, the theory would suggest
that this is ultimately due to an individual failing in neoliberal functionality (e.g., they
should get control of their life, return to work, etc.). Personal needs are sent to the
marketplace and to the family (and particularly the dyad) rather than understood within
the public sphere.
Michelle Fine (2012) has written extensively on the topic of privilege, exclusion
and inclusion within neoliberal society as it pertains to mental health diagnoses and
research. Critics of neoliberalism, like Fine, have pointed out how neoliberal policies
have deliberately created substantial inequality in the U.S. through anti-unionism, antiinflation and profiteering in the health industry. Fine wrote about the discursive
psychological orientation toward privatization, punishment and scientific scrutiny in
which public concerns are recast as private troubles, individual choices, the home and
family. This point has also been elaborated by Lynne Layton (2010, 2013) who argued
that therapists might unconsciously collude in sustaining neoliberal practice by favoring
performance and achievement over comfort with dependence or “favor a kind of care of
the self that disregards care for the collective good” (Layton, 2013, p. 78). Layton (2013)
suggested that therapists should be normalizing social dependency rather than crafting
therapy to create a human that seems to function happily regardless of their social
context.
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The phenomenon of a therapy that takes for granted the ideal of a functional
enterprising self, disconnected from all social ties, was described by Nikolas Rose (1989)
as a form of psychology that “obliges us to be free.” The needs of the welfare state (i.e.,
the return to being a productive worker) have become represented by experts (in this case
therapists) through their appeal to the enterprising spirit of individuals. Rose reminded us
that the discourse of freedom through producing capitalist social goods with vigor can be
contextualized as stemming from the needs of those who benefit from neoliberal social
arrangements, like private insurance companies; yet, when therapists reproduce this
discourse (e.g., by literally reading from a therapy manual that contains neoliberal values)
the therapy reflects and reproduces these conservative political arrangements. Though
this process the therapists and patients are invited to believe that neoliberal ideals are
their individual values (cf. Foucault, 1987). Rose stated “Individuals are to become, as it
were, entrepreneurs of themselves, shaping their own lives through the choices they make
among the forms of life available to them” (Rose, N. S., 1989, p. 230).
Narcissism as self-maintenance in the 20th century. Cushman (1995) described
how the ideals of early modern Enlightenment philosophers were heavily embodied by
contemporary U.S. society at turn of the century—a society that was characterized by “an
extreme expression in the unrelieved individualism, pragmatism, and communal isolation
of the bourgeois American” (p. 63). He suggested that the loss of tradition, religious
certainty, and the effects of industrialization and spread of capitalist business created a
sense of vulnerability, alienation, and uncertainty that foreshadowed the societal
embodiment of the post-World War II “empty self.” The term self in this context refers to
the hermeneutic concept of a shared understanding of what it means to be human.
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Cushman (1990) described the empty self as one that experiences absences in the loss of
community and tradition in an interior and cognitive way, as a lack of personal worth or
conviction. The empty self strives to compensate for what has been lost politically (i.e.,
as a consequence of World War II) by consuming products, goods, advertising and
therapy.
The early twentieth century was dominated by the sociohistorical phenomenon of
the therapeutic ethos and mental hygiene movement where one could focus on improving
oneself to overcome any social problem. The concerning consequence of such a
movement was that personal well-being was the desirable end rather than the outcome of
striving for public good (cf. Reiff, 1966). Cushman (1995) noted how the cultural shift to
the empty self was reflected in advice manuals where “personal magnetism replaced
craftsmanship; technique replaced moral integrity” (p. 65). Cushman suggested that the
focus on solving public problems through self-care, maintenance and the development of
personality that characterized early twentieth century self was similar to the
psychological description of narcissism. In the results and discussion chapters, I discuss a
similar point about the contemporary cultural terrain as narcissistic and self-focused, and
thus in this section I have reviewed characterizations of narcissism.
McWilliams and Leppendorf (1990) reviewed major psychoanalytic theories on
narcissism from 1900 through the 1980s (e.g., Ferenczi’s identification of childhood
grandiosity, Freud’s (1914) identification of narcissism as both structural character
pathology and residue of childhood grandiosity, Reich’s (1933) “phallic narcissistic
character” and so forth); they concluded that narcissism can take many forms but all
conceptualizations have in common the effort to self-aggrandize. In particular,
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McWilliams and Leppendorf discussed the early 1980s as a peak of cultural narcissism.
This was when analysts had high enthusiasm for Kohut (1971, 1984, 2009) and Alice
Miller’s (1981) Prisoners of Childhood became a cult classic.
Features of narcissism that McWilliams and Leppendorf (1990) described in the
article included “the illusion of self-sufficiency” (cf. Modell, 1975) or the disposition to
not need others; discomfort in admitting mistakes and failures; emphasis on a grandiose
self that is without need and without sin; the ideal of constant internal self-cohesiveness;
and need for constant self-approval. In relationships, the focus is on the repair of the
narcissist’s inner self-concept and the maintenance of the illusion of perfection rather
than a focus on mending relationships with other people and the external world.
According to Stolorow (1975), any mental activity can be narcissistic when “its function
is to maintain the structural cohesiveness, temporal stability and positive affective
colouring of the self-representation” (p. 179).
Stolorow (1975) described how psychoanalytic theories on narcissism moved
away from economic and drive explanations that were popular in the early 1900s to
functional explanations by the 1950s. Rather than discussing narcissism as a flow of
instinctual energy, psychoanalysts in the mid-20th century began to focus on how mental
activities interact with or serve the id, ego and superego forces in personality. This
movement in psychoanalysis to functional explanations of narcissism was part of the
same cultural shift to the empty self that Cushman (1995) described. Functional
psychoanalytic theories reflected the idea of an empty narcissistic self that used or
consumed the world and other people (i.e., narcissistic objects) to defend against fragility
and maintain self-cohesiveness.
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Stolorow (1975) reviewed functional understandings of narcissism since the
1970s and pointed out that many analysts (e.g., Arlow & Brenner, 1964; Freeman, 1964;
Eisnitz, 1969) have described how narcissism functions as a retreat from dreaded object
relations and instinctual conflicts. Stolorow credited Reich (1953,1960) with being the
first to clearly articulate the primary function of narcissism was maintenance of selfrepresentation. Reich described how narcissistic patterns of self-inflation and craving
attention served to repair damage done to self-representation by early traumatic
experiences. These experiences are often the result of hateful, ignorant, disregarding or
abusive relationships with a self-focused or uncompassionate primary caregiver; analysts
sometimes describe the lack of regard and care in early relationships as creating a
narcissistic wound, scar, or injury.
Others who drew from Reich (Arlow & Brenner, 1964, Kernberg, 1970) described
clinical examples of patients who utilized both literal and social mirrors (i.e., dependent
relationships that provided constant reassurance) in order to restore a sense of lost
identity. Kohut (1971) described this pattern in detail and suggested that the narcissistic
object was a substitute for self-esteem.
While narcissism has come to be understood as intensive self-focus in efforts to
maintain a cohesive image or sense of identity, this is not always expressed as overt
grandiosity. For example, analysts have described more subtle forms of narcissism in
relationships, such as the rejection of compliments (e.g., the grandiose as a secret-self; cf.
Horner, 1979) and masochistic acts. Stolorow (1975) wrote specifically about the
narcissistic function of masochism as an unconscious omnipotent fantasy. In this fantasy,
hurting oneself in a variety of ways (e.g., through self-sabotage, martyrdom or through
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creating situations that elicit psychic or physical pain) can be a form of intense control
and manipulation over the narcissist’s fragile sense of self. Stolorow argued that the
narcissistic masochistic pain may actually create a bounded or organized sense of self
that the narcissist lacks—a momentary sense of being more alive and real. This kind of
controlled masochistic pain may be more preferable to the pain of unpredictable and
actual intimacy in relationships—intimacy that may leave the narcissist vulnerable and
defensive in fear of reinjuring the narcissistic wound.
Stolorow (1975) noted that other analysts (e.g. Berliner, 1947, 1958) have
discussed how narcissists can develop a masochistic character in order to retain an
idealized image of their primary caregiver or parent as all good. In this scenario, selfdestruction is preferable to recognizing the destruction that occurred because of the
parent; it is better to defend against acknowledging the parent as actually abusive or
hostile by assuming that the narcissist was control of and responsible for their
disorganized and hateful sense of self. By producing failure after failure and provoking
defeat, isolation and humiliation, the narcissist may eventually experience “the illusion
of magical control and triumphant power over his object world” (p. 445). Thus acts of
narcissistic masochism assume that the cause of both good and harmful things in the
narcissists life are not due to other people or the social world, but are ultimately the
product of individual actions and completely within the scope of a controlled, interior
self.
When considering how narcissism may be expressed characters in therapy,
McWilliams and Leppendorf (1990) described how narcissists (as patients or therapists)
may approach therapy “with the corrupt premise that the point of attaining insight is to
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perfect the self rather than to learn about it, accept it, and direct it” (p. 17). A narcissistic
therapy would focus on self-perfection and omnipotent control of one’s social world
through self-focused or internal manipulations (e.g., responding to a social problems by
changing ones thoughts about the problem rather than talking with others about the
problem or building social relationships). I will return to discuss this concept in the
context of trauma treatment manuals in the results section.
The popularization of narcissistic therapies (i.e., those that assume the patients has
a damaged or fragile sense of self that must reach a state of self-perfection through
internal maintenance and consumption of products) and pervasive consumerist culture
that seemingly reached a peak in the U.S. by the 1980s foreshadowed the movement to
another way of being in the early 21st century, which Cushman (1995) has described as
the multiple self. The multiple self is characterized by a,
propensity to gather about itself a number of identities that are located around the
outside of the person, external to but identified with the individual, although this
identification takes on a different, less essential, or intense valance than
identifications within a deep self. This is an exterior self with less complex or
conflicted identities to draw from ⎯ identities that cluster on, not inside, the
individual, decorating and standing ready to appear on center stage when the need
arises. (Cushman 1995, p. 3)
By the 21st century, the desire to fill the empty self with a deep, cohesive and
consistent identity waned. Though consumerist culture and neoliberal ideals continued to
pervade everyday life, consumption of identity took a different form in which the ideal of
self-cohesion was replaced with the ideal of multiple identities that could be selectively
employed when needed and were ready to adapt to and function in any situation. I raise
this point about the 21st century multiple self in the context of a review of narcissism
only to point out that narcissistic expressions can shift as the culturally constructed ways
of human being change. Thus narcissists expression of self-focus, aggrandizement and
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understandings of human perfection as well as how the narcissist defends against forming
intimate relationships and expressing vulnerability are dependent not only on the
fracturing of a primary relationship or a weakened internal self-concept but the cultural
clearing (cf. Heidegger, 1996) of what it means to be human.
The fantasy of a return to pre-traumatic innocence: A brief history of the
child as innocent pre-world war II (pre-1939). This section provides some background
into early conceptualizations of the child as innocent that predate the post-World War II
(WWII) interest in child development. Beginning in World War I and after WWII the
majority of child developmental theories that are still discussed today were published
(e.g., Anna Freud’s ego psychology and child developmental stages [1945/1969], Spitz’s
developmental research [1945/1965], Bowlby’s attachment theory [1951], Lewin’s oral
triad [1950], Melanie Klein’s developmental stages [1945/1989] and analytic play
therapy [1955], and Erikson’s life cycle model [1959/1980]). I have focused on preWWII conceptualizations of the child as innocent because these theories present some of
the essential context for the societal wish to return children to a state of pre-traumatic
innocence—an assumption that is present in many of the post-World War II theories.
David Archard (2004), professor of philosophy and public policy at Lancaster
University, has identified the concept of child innocence as rooted in the Christian ideal
in which children are closer to God because they only arrived recently in the world;
adults are correlatively furthest from God and are closest to Nature and Society. Within
Christian theology, innocence is understood on moral terms as goodness or without fault
or sin; thus, trauma can be understood as a fall from innocence, tainting, or sin. Archard
quoted several biblical passages that referenced a return to a childlike state, such as to
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enter to Heaven once must become “as little children” (Matthew 18:3, English Standard
Version). Being without fault or sin also implies ignorance to wrongdoing. Archard
pointed out the empty vessel concept of the child is akin to Locke’s tabula rasa and said,
“The innocence of the child is, in an important sense, an empty one” (p. 46).
Archard contrasted the Hebrew Bible’s vision of the child slowly becoming
corrupted to the Christian understanding of the child born with original sin. In the
seventeenth and eighteenth century Puritanism and Calvinism thought the child was
predisposed to sin and only rigid discipline could correct child. The Proverbs read, “The
rod and reproof gives wisdom; but a child left to himself bringeth his mother to shame”
(Proverbs, 29:15, English Standard Version in Archard, 2004, p. 46). The dialectic
between child as originally sinful or innocent has also been reflected throughout literature
and theory. Archard pointed to Rousseau’s Emile which begins with the quote
“Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates
in the hands of man” (p. 46). Rousseau’s work describes the child as born good and then
corrupted by human society.
The pull between needing to correct the child and the child being pure is also
reflected in the writings of rationalists like Descartes. He wrote about the fetus in the
womb:
it seems most reasonable to think that a mind newly united to an infants body is
wholly occupied in perceiving or feeling the ideas of pain, pleasure, heat cold and
other similar ideas which arise from its union and intermingling with the body.
Nonetheless, it has itself the ideas of God, itself, and all such truths are as called
self-evident, in the same way as adult humans have when they are not attending to
them; it does not acquire these ideas later on, as it grows older. (Matthews, 1994,
p. 24)
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Descartes’s innatist belief that children are born with all knowledge, and
particularly the moral knowledge and knowledge of Goodness and Sin, can be contrasted
with the experientialism of Locke, who wrote:
Let us suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters,
without any ideas:—How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by the vast
store which the busy and foundless fancy of pan has painted on it with an almost
endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this
I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE. (Matthews, 1994, p. 24)
In psychoanalytic conceptualizations of children, meeting of the demands of each
developmental stage somehow determined the structure of the child’s personality and
pathology (e.g., Freud’s psychosexual development from the oral, anal, phallic, latent and
genital, Klein’s stages from the paranoid-schizoid to depressive, Oedipal and object
related). Charcot and Janet’s studies into hysteria and neurosis in the late 1800s posited
that a traumatic factor from the external environment early in life could split the
personality and lead to the instantiation of a traumatic kernel (e.g., the idées fixes) that led
to hysteria (see pp. 54-55 in this study). Freud’s seduction hypothesis introduced the idea
that traumatic events in the outside world, in particular parental abuse and incest, could
mark the child’s psyche and lead to hysteria. While Freud abandon this hypothesis,
concerned that the abuse reported by his patients was primarily fantasy, in the 1930s
Ferenczi revived interest in sexual trauma in his paper “Confusion of Tongues”. He
argued that familial abuse and violence against the child was a common and real event
that led to traumatic neurosis (see pp. 60-65 in this study).
While there are many nuances between their conceptualizations of childhood in
Ferenczi’s and Sigmund and Anna Freud’s conceptual framework of child development
all of their work emphasized the unformulated and at times undefended nature of the
child psyche that allowed the trauma, such as the parents guilt about sexual abuse, to
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become more easily introjected. Ferenczi’s (1988) conceptualization in particular
emphasized how the child’s “personality was not completely consolidated” such that they
were “completely oblivious of themselves” (p. 201) during the traumatic event to the
point where identification with the perpetrator of the abuse became the only defense
against the instability of trauma (e.g., knowing the abuser in this way allowed the child to
alleviate the overwhelming anxiety brought on by the abuse). While I cannot do justice to
a full review of psychoanalytic conceptualizations of childhood and their variations in
this section, overall, children were seen in psychoanalysis as being more innocent in
terms of having a more unformulated, pure, vulnerable psyche.
By the 20th century there were several theoretical models about what children
came into the world with and what they learned. These theories could be roughly divided
along innatist (Descartes, Christian tradition) and experientialist (Locke) lines and almost
all theories had a staged model of child development; trauma was seen as changing the
structure of personality or halting the child in a particular stage of development.
A third primary conceptualization of child development that emerged in the early
20th century was the recapitulation model. This model was captured by the slogan
“Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” (cf. Haeckel and Darwin) and described the child as
repeating the entire history of humanity in their development. Some scholars have noted
that this theory is philosophically rooted in an Aristotelian conception of childhood that
suggests four types of causality with the Final Cause of a living organism is that it only
performs normally when it reaches maturity (Matthews, 1994).
In U.S. psychology, recapitulation models are most often associated with G.
Stanley Hall’s work: Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology,
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Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime and Religion (1916). G. Stanley Hall’s writings
characterized pre-adolescent children as savages that needed to learn to fear God and
only with strict discipline could they mature into adults. (G. Stanley Hall later supported
his research on eugenics and advocacy of selective breeding and forced sterilization using
this same theory.) In 1946, recapitulation theory was brought into the mainstream by Dr.
Spock who wrote in Baby and Child Care, which for 52 years was the best selling book
second to the Bible (Brody, 1998). He wrote,
Each child as he develops is retracting the whole history of mankind,
physically and spiritually, step by step. A baby starts off in the womb as a
single tiny cell, just the way the first living thing appeared in the ocean.
Weeks later, as he lies in the amniotic fluid in the womb, he has gills like a
fish. Toward the end of his first year of life, when he learns to clamber to
his feet, he is celebrating that period millions of years ago when man’s
ancestors got up off of all fours. (Spock, 1946 as cited in Matthews, 1994,
p. 30)
When reviewing the history of pre-traumatic childhood innocence in psychology,
the philosophical traditions of innatism, experientialism, and the recapitulation model, are
present in most 20th century psychological theories on development. Experientialism is
perhaps best reflected in behaviorist theories in which the internal world is dependent
upon and entirely shaped by the environment and experiences in the world. This is in
contrast to innatism that is reflected in the early writings of Piaget (1933) and theories on
language development that gained popularity in the past thirty years (e.g., Noam
Chomsky’s and Steven Pinker’s language acquisition models).
The structure of cults and cult indoctrination. Cults are a group of people who
worship a specific deity, leader or theory and dogmatically follow a doctrine. Cults
include the following three major characteristics: a) a cult leader that is persuasive,
charismatic, and domineering that centers veneration on themselves, b) an authoritarian
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structure, that is seen as innovative and exclusive with a double-set of ethics (e.g., be
open and honest to leaders but not to non-group members), and c) the practice of
controlling members behaviors and worldview in a totalistic or all encompassing manner
(M. T. Singer, 1995).
Hochman (1990), in his study of cults since the 1960s, described several common
themes that cults possess: cults don’t want to be identified or known as such, they do not
want their inner workings exposed and may employ consultants and agencies to maintain
their image, and they are uninterested in altruism as a moral imperative (although
pseudo-altruistic activity helps image building). He described cults as interested in
extracting wealth and power from its members through financial gain, and through
devotion of all aspects of life and relationships (work, school, romantic) to the cult.
Cults use behavioral and ideological control via group confrontation, physical
punishment or threatened expulsion, and limitation of opportunities (e.g., sleep, food,
recreation and pursing individual interests) to control their members. The primary
technique of ideological control and indoctrination is called “thought reform;” this is also
known as brainwashing30 or mind control in popular culture. Thought reform broadly
includes a range of psychological techniques to change thinking and force an acceptance
the ideas of the cult or organization (West, 1993). Thought reform is a hyper-efficient
form of indoctrination that can only be achieved when secrecy impairs the indoctrinees'
awareness of what is happening to them (M. T. Singer, 1995). West (1993) has suggested
that the term thought reform can be used to suggest both forms coercive mental torture
(e.g., forced procedures to give up basic political, social and religious beliefs), as well as
30

The term brainwashing was coined by a journalist who wrote about non-violent forms
of Communist indoctrination of Moa Tse-Tung in China (Lifton, 1989).
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seemingly benign procedures such as introducing persuasive propaganda into an
environment. The term thought reform has been extended in the literature to include any
procedure to induce compliant behaviors in dominated individuals that include nonviolent group-based methods to change political and social views.
The primary scholars that are credited with establishing the study of cult structure
and thought reform in psychology and psychiatry include Robert Lifton (1989) and his
study on Maoist brainwashing following the Chinese Civil war, and Mikhael Heller
(1988) and his study on mass indoctrination in Soviet Russia. Both of these scholars
initially conducted ethnographies of totalitarian Communist and Socialist governments
post-World War II. Although these ethnographies were context-specific, both Lifton and
Heller identified social psychological principles of mass psychology, indoctrination, and
thought-form that led to the development of a general model of cults as a broad social
phenomenon. Other notable studies on thought reform have included Schein, Schneier,
and Barker’s (1961) studies of coercive persuasion, O’Neill and Demos (1977)
identification of stages of indoctrination, M. T. Singer’s (1995) studies on systemic
manipulation of psychological and social influence, and Cushman’s (1986) studies on
indoctrination in restrictive groups and mass marathon psychology trainings.
Lifton’s study of thought reform. Most scholars studying cults, totalitarianism,
and indoctrination over the past twenty years have cited Lifton’s (1951/1989) important
study of reeducation camps in post-revolutionary China. Lifton described a set of
behavioral techniques used to indoctrinate European civilians (e.g., missionaries,
businessmen, journalists) in prisons known as reform camps and to indoctrinate Chinese
intellectuals in universities that were known as revolutionary colleges. The European
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civilians had been identified by police as espousing anti-Communist views and were
often arrested after entering the country. Lifton interviewed 25 different European and 15
Chinese participants about their experiences in the prisons and universities that were
designed to convert the prisoners to the beliefs of Mao Tse Tung’s Communist practice.
Lifton worked with an interpreter for the majority (11 participants) of the interviews with
the Chinese intellectuals.
A critical component of thought reform was the creation of an identity crisis that
could only be resolved by accepting the ideology of the group. Lifton (1989) called this
the “assault upon identity” and described how the European civilians each “felt his sense
of self become amorphous and impotent” (p. 45) as they progressed through stages of
thought-reform. Lifton referred a set of behavioral techniques that were used to create
this identity crisis, which he called thought reform milieu techniques. Lifton pointed that
although he viewed the prison camps and colleges utilization of thought reform as
coercive, the Chinese Communists who ran these organizations viewed their actions as
“morally uplifting, harmonizing and scientifically therapeutic experiences” (p. 27).
Through his interviews, Lifton (1989) identified the following types of thoughtreform techniques:
•

Milieu control: Taking over the entire group or milieu through
manipulation and control of their bodies and environment, including but
not limited to controlling food, rest, schedule and communication;

•

Mystical manipulation: Provoking a specific behavior from an individual in
the group, framing it to look spontaneous, and explaining the behavior as a
universal truth and infallibility of the organization;
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•

The demand for purity: Creating an idealized or perfect model to strive for
in such a way that the members never feel satisfied or competent and thus
increase reliance on the group leader and the official ideology to guide the
members;

•

The cult of confession: Public humiliation to degrade and make the
prisoners subservient and compliant;

•

The sacred science: The organization’s ideology is said to embody a
universal truth that comes from a source that transcends humankind;
Questioning, doubting or disagreeing with this ideology is prohibited or
seen as an indication of a personality flaw;

•

Loading the language: Speaking in “thought-terminating clichés”; the new
language serves to create intellectual confusion, maintain group
cohesiveness and keep outsiders from making meaningful contact with the
group;

•

Doctrine over person: The organization respects and values its doctrine and
objectives more than individuals. This can lead to situations where the
brutalization of the individual is condoned or even encouraged (e.g., an
individual’s suffering may be attributed to misapplication or doubting of
the group’s doctrine); and,

•

The dispensing of existence: Simulating fear of extinction such that
deviating from training or attempting to leave the training suggests a lifeor-death scenario in which they are likely to die. Being allowed to stay in
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the training and receive approval from leaders for adhering to the
guidelines is thus highly desired.
Through subjugation to these thought reform techniques, Lifton (1989) observed
the indoctrinees go through discreet phases of identity crisis beginning with rejection and
ending with identification with the group. O’Neill and Demos (1977) have labeled these
stages as: resistance, non-cognitive reform, ideological action, and ritualization of
ideology. In the first stage, resistance, the prisoners responded to thought reform
techniques by attempting to assert their previously established views and beliefs. In the
second phase, the leaders engaged in thought reform techniques to undermine existing
beliefs and create an identity crisis that could only be resolved by group membership and
eventually the giving up of individual beliefs for the group doctrine. In the third,
ideological action phase, the indoctrinees were placed in situations in which they were
encouraged to respond according to the group doctrine before acting and to reflect on the
significance of their behavior. In the final, fourth phase of ritualization of ideology, the
indoctrinees come to comprehend why dissent from the group doctrine was restricted and
they have developed patterns of automatic thinking and behaving that are consistent with
the ideology of the group (e.g., using group-specific language to respond to resistance
without providing support from the group-doctrine; similar to Lifton’s “thoughtterminating language”). By the end of indoctrination, Lifton described how the prisoners
had gone through an “agonizing drama of death and rebirth.” (p. 42).
Heller’s triangle of thought reform. Though a study of Soviet Russia, Heller
(1988) proposed a model called the triangle or triad of thought reform that included three
elements: miracle ( in the ideology, miraculous powers attributed to leaders or the
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activities of the cult), mystery (obscuring actual beliefs and practices), and authority
(claims on members time, talents, bodies, or property to meet group needs). In Soviet
Russia, Heller described the miracle as creation of a New Man (homo sovieticus) based
on the “science” of Marxism-Leninism, the secrecy involved under reporting or hiding
significant news and limiting access to knowledge that would threaten the power, and
authority through sealing off borders and destroying competing political and religious
ideologies.
Singer’s studies on conditions for thought reform. Margaret T. Singer’s (1995)
studies on systemic manipulation of identity also described conditions that needed to be
present for thought reform to occur. The goals of thought reform included:
1.

To destabilize a person’s sense of self;

2.

To get the recruit to radically alter his or her worldview, version of reality,
and reinterpret life; and,

3.

To develop dependence on the organization.

For these goals to be met the organization must retain the following conditions,
which are similar to those identified by Heller (1988) and Lifton (1989) :
1.

Keep the recruit unaware of what is going on;

2.

Control the person’s time, and if possible, physical environment;

3.

Create a sense of powerlessness, covert fear and dependence;

4.

Suppress old, pre-indoctrination behaviors and attitudes;

5.

Instill new behaviors and attitudes; and,

6.

Put forth a closed system of logic that does not allow input or criticism.
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Studies on thought-reform in the military. Some scholars have described the
process of military socialization as a coming of age ceremony that resembles the first
phases of cult indoctrination described by Lifton (1989), Cushman (1986, 1989) and
O’Neill and Demos (1977): creation of an identity crisis that can only be resolved
through group identification. In the post-Vietnam era, and Dobrofsky (1978) wrote about
how the military is designed to re-capitulate the lifecycle where boys enter as a skinnedhead recruit, attend warrior initiation, and for some, leave the military as men—badged
and rewarded in retirement. Arkin and Dobrofsky identified phases of ritual socialization
military recruitment (e.g., enticing youth with the promises of becoming mature and
masculine, living-out fantasies of war movies, and post-war wealth) and basic training
(e.g., physically and mentally shaping future soldiers into cogs of the military machine,
bonding through survival situations, and creating a dynamic of group loyalty such that
peer misconduct is not reported). Many activities in basic training are designed such that
individual action and thinking in response to the problems presented results in failure or
punishment for the entire platoon. Thus an environment is developed in which the
recruits preexisting beliefs and culture is associated with shame and punishment, and
group conformity is rewarded.31 Arkin and Dobrofsky’s thesis was that for soldiers
between the ages of 17 and 20, a time period often seen as the transition between
adolescence and adulthood, the military creates an environment for formation of a
masculine military identity that is so powerful that soldiers are unable to give up this

31

Arkin and Dobrofsky (1978) identified three masculine coming-of-age archetypes that
emerged during each phase of military socialization: the heterosexual female archetype
which is to be dominated and conquered as a part of war, the team archetype in which
failing is letting down your friends and compatriots, and the family archetype in which
soldiers are prepared for ongoing separation from loved ones.
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identity during the transition back to life at home. This leads to many of the problems that
have now been identified as symptoms of PTSD (e.g., avoidance of relationships, anger,
replaying military events).
Arkin and Dobrofsky’s suggestion that the difficulties soldiers have when leaving
the military identity are similar to PTSD was shared by many scholars (all writing around
the same time PTSD was added to the DSM) who identified this same trend for persons
who leave totalist cults or restrictive groups (e.g., Clark, 1979; Cushman, 1986, 1989;
Etemad, 1978; Galper, 1982; Goldberg & Goldberg, 1982; Langone, 1990, M. T. Singer,
1978). West (1993) summarized the psychiatric sequelae leaving a cult as: a) sudden,
drastic alteration of victim’s value system; b) reduction in cognitive flexibility and
adaptability, c) narrowing, blunting or distortion of affect; d) psychological regression; e)
physical changes (e.g., mask-like facial expression, weight loss), f) psychopathological
changes like dissociative symptoms, obsessive ruminations, delusional thinking and
hallucinations.
Though scholars have challenged conceptualizing the military as a cult because of
its transparency about its techniques (see Hochman, 1990), West (1993) points out that
many laws and codes of ethics overtly accept the vulnerability of people to intimidation
and deception; thus allowing cults to continue. A question remains if all aspects of cult
thought-reform exist in an organization but the organization makes transparent that many
of these experiences will occur, does this exempt the organization or group from
consideration as a cult? West’s (1993) point was that questions like these are often central
in court cases about cult victimization, but such questions are rarely asked by therapists
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and other health-professionals who are involved in the support of the cult-like
organization (p. 14).
In sum, research on thought reform and cult indoctrination described techniques
of manipulating physical and social environments to create intense group dependency and
adherence to the doctrine of the cult. The literature outlined similar processes and
conditions that occurred across cults in the 1970s as well as in totalitarian governments
across the globe. All of the models of thought reform described techniques, stages, and
necessary conditions for persons to give up their beliefs and sense of self in favor of a
group doctrine and identity. Scholars have recognized that many of these phases are
present in military organizations.
Trauma as universal and culture free. The theme of trauma as universal and
culture free has been identified by critical postmodern scholars as existing in psychology
and trauma-culture broadly. Fassin and Rechtman (2009) argued that trauma’s
universality has taken shape in two forms in the psi disciplines: through considering all
people as traumatized and labeling all events as “traumas.” The universalization of
trauma was one way that Fassin and Rechtman (2009) have identified that those in the psi
disciplines have “made use of” the category of trauma, through appropriation and
reformulation for various strategic purposes (p. 12). Fassin and Rechtman pointed out the
problem of considering all historical traumatic events regardless of how different the
context and level of atrocity as being universal or having roots in a similar social
dysfunction. The outcome of universalizing trauma is its trivialization, Fassin and
Rechtman explained, “In these models, every society and every individual suffers the
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traumatic experience of their past. Not only do scales of violence disappear, but their
history is erased” (p. 19).
Despite the seeming universality of trauma, critical scholars have noted that
certain genders, classes and races have been excluded from the humanity of trauma.
While Herman and others ensured this would not be the case for women in the 1980s,
now the suffering of middle-class white women has arguably become exclusively
recognized as trauma (Haaken, 1995; Leary, 2005; Tolleson, personal communication,
October 17, 2013). Despite being identified as the most likely to meet PTSD diagnosis,
African-Americans, Latinos and American Indians are also more often seen as being
unengaged or un-amenable to treatment following a traumatic event and are more often
considered to be criminals rather than seen as trauma victims (Fine, 2012; Gone, 2007,
2009; Leary, 2005). Those who are considered to have the highest cumulative trauma
burden and PTSD severity are also the least likely to complete evidence based PTSD
treatments such as trauma-focused CBT (Trusz et al., 2011).
As mentioned previously in The PTSD Epidemic section of this study (pp. 23 –
32), one racial group particularly at risk for PTSD in the U.S. has been identified as
American Indians and Alaskan Natives (AI/ANs). Despite high rates of PTSD being
identified, AI/ANs are the least likely to receive services for PTSD (Gone, 2007). Gone
(2007) suggests that this is true for the AI/AN population because AI/AN persons do not
seek mental health services within a clinic setting; perhaps they would not be interested
in bringing their child in for twelve sessions of clinic based TF-CBT with a therapist that
is not from their community.
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While some psychologists promote modification or cultural tailoring of EST for
different cultures (cf. Derald Sue), Gone (2007) suggested that top-down approaches
where preexisting therapies are modified are ultimately less acceptable to the AI/AN
population and less effective than descriptive, bottom-up therapies where local cultural
practices for healing are identified and evaluated by community psychologists. Rather
than exporting Western mental health care, Gone (2009) recommended local methods
healing be identified and supported within the community.32
According to Gone (2007), clinics are seen as a form of Western medical care that
is complicit in the neo-colonial endeavors of Western cultural proselytization. Where
mental health professionals see their jobs as “community outreach,” “helping” or
reducing “mental health disparities” by bringing evidence-supported mental health
treatments to native communities, this is viewed by many AI/AN community members as
32

Gone categorized this form of community psychology as a community-based
participatory research method. Gone (2009) attempted to identify healing practices used
by AI/AN peoples in the treatment of historical trauma. The discursive primary treatment
agenda Gone suggested was to politicize and historicize the symptoms of trauma and to
reframe personal problems and social pathologies within the history of colonialism.
While Gone did not dispute that AI/AN communities are at greater risk of exposure to
trauma and subsequent diagnosis of PTSD, he reframed traumatic symptoms as an
intergenerational accumulation of mental health problems as a result of colonial
subjugation including systematic ethnic genocide and coercive cultural assimilation
through government-administered and church-run schools. While many of the symptoms
of historical trauma are similar to PTSD, Gone identified PTSD as a “soul wound”
inflicted through the experiences of colonization (Gone, 2009, p. 752). Additional
symptoms included: holding an emotional burden, experience of loss of culture and
ancestral land, and dreams in which colonization is re-experienced (Brasfield, 2001). In
his suggested treatment model, therapists provide psychoeducation about historical
trauma that highlighted systemic factors (e.g., coercive assimilation) and interpersonal
factors (e.g., maladaptive coping) with the goal of identifying shared community
vulnerabilities (e.g., suppression of Native way of life) as being more problematic than
individual deficits (e.g., impulse control). The aim of treatment is to reduce beliefs that
symptoms were due to ahistorical personal failure or individual vulnerability rather than
historical oppression.
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ongoing cultural eradication. Gone (2007) described how the AI/AN ways of knowing
are fundamentally different and in fact incommensurate with scientific epistemologies
that underlie evidence-based trauma treatment, like those represented in the TF-CBT
manual. A way of being for the AI/AN people was destroyed through colonization under
the banner of bringing “civilization” to the native peoples. Techniques like thoughtreplacement and psychoeducation through clinic-based psychotherapies may remind
AI/AN persons of or indeed be a modern form of this colonization.33
In recent cases of international natural disaster this trend of exclusion from
trauma-culture does not hold. It becomes a national or international mission, regardless of
the race or ethnic background of those affected, to ensure that PTSD does not spread; this
is even the case when mainstream Western conceptualizations of PTSD and trauma
treatment are not recognized by the culture (i.e., they have no language for trauma or
stress; see discussion in Bracken et al., 1995) or are blatantly rejected by a community
(Fassin & Rechtman, 2009; Gone, 2007, 2009; Watters, 2011). Many psychologists in the

33

In an interview with tribal elder Travelling Thunder, Gone asked under what conditions
would he refer one of his people to the Indian Health Service mental health center,
managed by the government. Travelling Thunder responded:
You know, we don’t do that. We never did do that… I guess it’s like a war, but
they’re not using bullets anymore. They’re using sophisticated modern
technology… [It’s] like ethnic cleansing, I guess you could say. They want to
wipe us out. Wipe the Indian reservations out so they could join the melting pot of
the modern white society. And therefore the Indian problem will be gone forever.
That’s the way they want [it], and I think they’re still doing that. But they’re using
a more shrewder [sic] way than the old style of bullets. […] And I guess a lot of
people… want to end up looking good to the Whiteman, I guess. Then it’d be a
good thing to do: go to white psychiatrists, you know, in the Indian Health
Service and say, ‘Well, go ahead and rid me of my history, my past, and
brainwash me forever so I can be like a Whiteman.’ (p. 40)
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field of multicultural psychology have decried the exportation of evidence-supported
treatments as a form of modern colonialism (Bracken et al., 1995; Gone, 2007; Smith,
1999; Watters, 2011). As medical anthropologist Allan Young reflected, “PTSD has
displaced hunger as the first thing the Western general public thinks about when a war or
other emergency is in the news. We were spreading these ideas around the globe so
effectively that PTSD was becoming the way the entire world conceived of psychological
trauma. The spread of the PTSD diagnosis to every corner of the world may, in the end,
be the greatest success story of globalization” (Young, as cited in Watters, 2011, p. 71).
Statement of the Problem
In the last quarter of the 20th century, the psychological concept of trauma grew
enormously in acceptance and in fact became omnipresent in U.S. society. Concurrently,
the most utilized psychotherapy treatments have become thought of as unquestioned,
quasi-medical interventions automatically prescribed for those who fall under the
definition of trauma victim; and yet, scholars who draw from the Interpretive Turn warn
against accepting any social practice without historically situating it, exposing it to
ideology critique, and examining its implicit moral prescriptions about how humans
should comport themselves. Although there has been much mainstream, quantitative
psychological research performed on the efficacy and effectiveness of popular trauma
treatments, there has been a relative absence of critical, hermeneutic studies about the
understandings of the good, the prescriptive and proscriptive elements implicit in trauma
treatments and how treatment techniques bring about compliance with those embedded
understandings. Further, studies have rarely explored what therapists can learn from all
that about the social world that gives rise to the concept of trauma, the identity of trauma
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victims and the taken for granted acceptance of trauma treatments—in other words, a
trauma-based society. Therefore there is a need for further interpretation of trauma
culture and the practice of trauma therapy from a hermeneutic perspective.
In this study I have interpreted trauma culture as it came to light in widely utilized
evidence-supported trauma treatment manuals. The manuals were viewed as living
documents that were and presently are intended for utilization in the therapy room. Just
as psychotherapy simultaneously reflects and shapes trauma culture, the manuals both
represent and shape an idealized best-practice version of trauma therapy. They included
motivations for the therapist to conduct therapy, psychoeducational scripts to inform
patients about why they feel traumatized, and suggested how patients should think and
act as functional beings.
I focused my inquiry on what the manuals communicate about this historical
moment and how their existence may unintentionally perpetuate and shape a traumatic
way of being. Following the work of Bracken (2002), Cushman (1995), N. S. Rose (1989,
2007), Sampson (1981), and others, I was particularly interested in the rise of traumafocused psychotherapy as an industry and how this industry is articulated and perpetuated
through manualized therapies. I was also interested in how understandings of what it
means to be a moral and good human, and especially a good trauma survivor, were
communicated through the treatment as it was represented and described in the treatment
manuals.
Description of the Study
I examined how trauma culture is embodied and perpetuated in psychological
trauma treatments by engaging in a qualitative textual interpretation of three evidence-
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supported trauma treatment manuals and associated training materials that are widely
utilized in contemporary psychotherapeutic practice. I selected manuals for interpretation
based on best practice treatment guidelines and breadth of dissemination. Because this
study focuses on how human being is understood and lived out in trauma-based society, I
selected texts that employed a range of different psychotherapeutic approaches or
techniques and were designed for use with different patient populations: child, adult and
military populations.
I used hermeneutic interpretation as a method of qualitative textual analysis. The
data interpretation proceeded from the insights of Gadamerian hermeneutic philosophy,
the literature on trauma previously reviewed and the pre-judgments about trauma
treatment and culture that I brought to the interpretation as someone trained as a therapist
living in a trauma-based society. I then discussed results of the analyses within a
hermeneutic, cultural-historical, and moral frame with particular attention to how human
being is in a traumatic and traumatizing world.
Areas of Inquiry and Research Questions
The central areas of inquiry guiding my study were:
1.

How is human being defined in trauma-based society?

2.

How do members of society, and especially therapists and patients, define
ourselves in trauma and act in a trauma-based society?

3.

How is trauma culture embodied and perpetuated in psychological trauma
treatments as they are represented in evidence-supported trauma treatment
manuals?
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4.

What does the particular form of trauma we experience today, as it is
represented in evidence-supported trauma treatment manuals, tell us about
this historical moment?

a.

In what kind of world do “trauma treatment manuals” exist?

b.

In what kind of world do these manuals work? What does it tell us about
the concept and function of trauma when a manual-based treatment can
heal any trauma, from child abuse to genocide?

c.

What understandings of the good do trauma treatment manuals implicitly
and unintentionally reflect and prescribe?

I asked additional specific research questions that explored the historical context
and moral judgments about traumatic responses that were described in the texts. A
comprehensive list of all specific research questions is provided in Appendix B.
Importance and Purpose of the Study
There is a perceived epidemic of PTSD (approximately 37 million Americans are
exposed to trauma annually and 5.2 million are diagnosed with PTSD each year) and a
slough of continual funding from government agencies and pharmaceutical interests (over
2 billion dollars per year since 2012 from the VA alone) to research and treat this
growing national and increasingly international epidemic of trauma (Bonnie et al., 1998;
CBO, 2012; Dowd et al., 2002). Current best-practices for PTSD treatment include
evidence-supported psychotherapy from manual-based treatment models to the extent
that 100% of evidence-supported treatments are manual-based (Bisson & Andrew, 2007;
DoD, 2010; Foa et al., 2000; Foa et al., 2008; Forbes et al., 2010; Rosen et al., 2004;
SAMHSA, 2013; WHO, 2013). Managed heath care organizations are now beginning to
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evaluate therapist performance according to fidelity to manual-based therapy models
(Schoenwald et al., 2011).
While there have been overwhelming amounts of research confirming the fact that
these manuals are indeed efficacious, there has been limited examination of how the
manuals embody and perpetuate cultural messages about trauma. There is a similar dearth
of research conceptualizing the world in which these manual-based treatments work.
While there is plenty of critique about problems with technicist approaches to therapy,
there has also been limited critical analysis of the contemporary practice of evidencesupported trauma treatment through a hermeneutic lens. While I did not examine actual
trauma treatment sessions, this study is the beginning of the interpretation of practice by
examining the training doctrines and tools that are utilized in the everyday practice of
contemporary trauma therapy: trauma-treatment manuals.
I selected to analyze treatment manuals as exemplars of contemporary trauma
culture because they have become such an integral component of contemporary
psychotherapy. How therapy is being conceived, trained, practiced and exported across
the world has been increasingly determined by a manual rather than mentorship and
supervision; what constitutes good therapy and what it means to be disordered and healed
was represented in these texts. Studying the messages embedded in these manuals and
thinking about the world that gave rise to them is imperative given their increasing
utilization and the continued cultural obsession with trauma, especially within the U.S.
but increasingly internationally since the 1980s.
Restoring the historicity and context to trauma-treatment manuals in this study is
important so that these texts can be seen as products of a specific time, political interest,
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industry and culture rather than as communicating ahistorical, transcultural truths about
healing. The morality and industry of these treatments and their representation in manuals
is important to think critically about, lest therapists, like Camus (1946) suggested, seek a
means in contradiction to our end, and continue to unintentionally perpetuate the world
that creates such suffering and disorder.
While in some ways therapists will be bound by cultural understanding and
enacting consumption of trauma given the traditions and social world we live in and
unknowingly embody, this study is important because it breaks the traumatic enactment
by suggesting therapists can question and think about rather than dissociate from daily
practices in trauma culture. One of my primary hopes in conducting this study was that
through thinking about trauma from a historical, philosophical and moral perspective
therapists may discover alternative, perhaps previously unformulated insights, about how
one thinks and acts in this traumatized world.
Theoretical Framework
This study is grounded in the philosophical framework of hermeneutics: the
practice of reflective interpretation. Hermeneutic inquiry involves reading a text while
lightly holding interpretations and questions that arise from the reading and describing
how they relate to each other, history, contemporary culture, and to the reader. In this
study, I specifically draw from Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics (Gadamer, 2004).
This approach is based on the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer and his elaboration on and
interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics (Heidegger,1996; Warnke,
1987). I will outline hermeneutic philosophy and the presuppositions that are inherent in
hermeneutic interpretation because they are the basis of my theoretical framework. The
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assumptions inherent in hermeneutics deserve explicit description because they reject
Cartesian dualism and logical-positivist thought that is the basis of most scientific inquiry
and dissertation research.
A brief history of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics was born from a tradition of
study and attempt to gain full understanding of religious texts. The tradition of scriptural
interpretation can be traced back to Midrash (i.e., Jewish biblical commentary on late
antiquity) and in writings of the Stoics. Hermeneutics as a specific field of study became
recognized widely in the European church and academia during the Protestant
Reformation when the Council of Trent (1545-1563) decreed Scripture is unclear without
interpretation from the church (Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999).
Romantic hermeneutics. The work of Fredrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), a
German theologian and philosopher, is cited widely and discussed by Gadamer and other
hermeneutic thinkers as having a profound impact on the move from hermeneutics as a
technique for biblical interpretation to one applicable to every form of human discourse
(Polkinghorne, 1983). Schleiermacher asserted that the aim of hermeneutics is to view the
text with the intention “to understand a writer better than he understood himself”
(Gadamer, 2004, p. 191). In the early 1800s, Schleiermacher defined the first two
cannons of teleological hermeneutic interpretation:
1. Everything that needs a fuller determination in a given text may only be
determined in reference to the field of language shared by the author and his
original public.
2. The meaning of every word in a given passage has to be determined in
reference to its coexistence with the words surrounding it. (Schleiermacher, as
cited in Polkinghorne, 1983, pp. 219-220)
The process of hermeneutic inquiry described by Schleiermacher involved what
hermeneutic philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) later coined the “hermeneutic

139
circle” where “the parts receive meaning from the whole and the whole receives sense
from the parts,” (Dilthey, as cited in Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 221).
Schleiermacher and Dilthey lived in Germany during a time period referred to as
German Romanticism (beginning in 1770, peaking in 1820 and continuing to the early
part of 1900s) (Taylor, 1989). There are a variety of ways to describe Romanticism and
perhaps the most popular is to see this period of time as a rebellion from the neoClassical
norms of the Enlightenment era, 1650 to 1800 (Taylor, 1989). Where the Enlightenment
was characterized by rationalism, empiricism and a quest for order through objective
methods, the zeitgeist of the Romantic period was to see life as primarily subjective and
filled with transcendence, mystery, emotion and passion. The Romantic self contained an
inner voice where one could find knowledge inside and more importantly from internal
feelings. Similarly, God could also be accessed through the personal and internal world.
Schleiermacher’s cannons of hermeneutics reflect the Romantic understanding of human
perception as, “a veil of appearance, a purely phenomenal realm, which conceals a
deeper, underlying reality, the world as it is ‘in-itself’” (Richardson, Fowers & Guignon.,
1999, p. 200).
Though it is beyond the scope of this study to fully discuss, it is important to note
that the shift away from Enlightenment thinking aligned with major political and social
changes in Europe, like the French Revolution. Similar to the Enlightenment, the
ideology of the Romantic period continued to focus on how to break the hegemony of the
church and nobility, but instead of attaining freedom through reason and science, the
Romantics suggested freedom could be uncovered through self-expression of one’s
innate, noble faculties.
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Dilthey’s (1978) work also embodied the Romantic belief in a psychological,
inner domain. Dilthey expanded upon Schleiermacher to establish a study of general
hermeneutics that could be applied to all forms of human discourse (Richardson, Fowers
& Guignon, 1999, p. 200). He believed that Enlightenment philosophers like Kant
produced knowledge that was ahistorical. Dilthey found Kant’s methods of rational
inquiry appropriate for natural sciences where objects are viewed as material things with
no inner life or capacity for intentionality. Within an objectified frame, the world is made
up of decontextualized objects in causal interaction; the goal of the natural sciences is to
explain the events according to laws that regulate these interactions. Dilthey
acknowledged that in order to map the world in terms of scientific laws, abstraction and
de-contextualization of the subject and object is necessary, “if the way we experience
nature, our involvement in it, and the vital feeling with which we enjoy it, recede behind
the abstract apprehension of the world in terms of space, time, mass and motion. […] All
these factors combine to make man exclude himself so that from his impressions, he can
map out this great object, nature, as an order governed by laws” (Dilthey 1976, as cited in
in Richardson, Fowers & Guignon, 1999, p. 202). Thus, while suited for mapping an
abstract world, Dilthey argued that Kant’s analysis was inadequate to account for the
human world expressed in conversations, literature, art, poetry and our informal life
philosophy (Polkinghorne, 1983). In short, because the objectified worldview requires
removal of the human knower it is inadequate to explain humans. In contrast to the
epistemology of scientific studies, Dilthey defined the aim of social studies as:
understanding how humans interpret the meaningful situations and experiences we find
ourselves in.
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Dilthey (1978) believed that the totality of human life experience were not
understood as unified by laws of space and time, but by meaning and purpose. For
example, though the phenomenon of having dinner may be different each time it is
experienced (e.g., different foods, times, places, people involved in making and eating
dinner) the life-experience of having dinner is a culturally-bound and somehow unitary
phenomenon that cannot be explained by reductionism to the parts that make up a dinner
or elucidation of every possible physical law governing dinner-like interactions. Instead,
Dilthey (1978) suggested that we understand life-experience within social historical
context and identify “structures of interactive forces” or recurrent cultural patterns that
are characteristic of human life (Dilthey, 1978, as cited in Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 221).
Richardson, Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon (1999) described Dilthey’s hermeneutics,
“As an ongoing flow toward a stable meaning, [where] life involves a constant process of
interpretation and reinterpretation.” (p. 204). He continued, “we all have a certain
facticity in the sense that we are located in a specific worldly milieu and have already
made choices that limit what is possible for the future. But we also have the ability to
take-up up our facticity and do something with it in carrying out the goals we set for
ourselves in the future” (p. 204).
Dilthey (1978) observed that in careful examination of his own life, that his
experience became removed from the fabric of everyday life and that through thinking
about this event the phenomenon was changed. The interpretations made about lifeexperience using personal life and introspection, Dilthey concluded, were somehow
incorrect because they were necessarily changed through the process of reflection. From
a contemporary standpoint, Dilthey’s observation of the phenomenon of hermeneutic
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introspection sounds like the goal of what is now described as a psychological or clinical
hermeneutics (see e.g., Chang, 2010); however, this was not Dilthey’s aim. He wanted to
develop an objective method of understanding human phenomenon.
Despite the primacy of subjective knowledge during the Romanic period, Dilthey
was not totally comfortable with the role introspection in hermeneutics. In his later
writings, Dilthey wrote that he considered himself a “stubborn empiricist,” and aimed to
define hermeneutics as a social science that could lead to objective understanding of
expressed life (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 222). He turned away from introspection because
he did not believe one’s predispositions could be overcome. 34 Though Dilthey
acknowledged the inescapability of the interpreter, he found that introspection as a basis
for understanding life-categories was problematic. Instead he suggested that hermeneutics
be only applied in the study of art, literature, social life and history and utilize these
phenomenon as objects of study for human sciences.
Ontological hermeneutics. Heidegger’s (1996) philosophical hermeneutics
diverged from Romanic hermeneutics and Dilthey’s (1978) attempt to establish a method
for understanding human existence by proposing that understanding is the basic form of
human existence:
It is not a way we know the world, he said; it is the way we are. […] Heidegger
maintained that to be human is to be interpretive for the very nature of the human
realm is interpretive. Interpretation is not a tool for knowledge; it is the way
34

Interestingly, Dilthey wrote about how the death of his nephew (a traumatic event)
increased the subjectivity and historically embedded nature of introspection, an in effect
shattered the seemingly unitary structure of Dilthey’s life experience. He wrote, “I
experience something which by its intensity stands out in my consciousness. That which
took place previously is also there. I am pained by the death of my nephew; I remain
localized in space and the temporal process. Through introspection I now make this
process an object of my observation. Can I base a science on this?” (Polkinghorne, 1983,
p. 222).
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human beings are. […] Experience itself is formed through interpretation of the
world. Being human is a laying-open of what is hidden: we are beings who
approach ourselves with the hermeneutic question “What does it mean to be?”
(Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 224)
Heidegger (1996) accused Romantic hermeneutic attempts to create a method for
understanding social sciences as retaining a Cartesian idea of reason in which epiteme
(i.e., pure knowledge or ground truth) is achieved by overcoming all doubt. According to
Heidegger, true understanding is the result of human engagement and there is no pure
truth that lies outside of human engagement with the world; the problem of understanding
is not resolved by is overcoming the condition in which we find ourselves. Heidegger
asserted that it is our understanding that brings forth experience to begin with. Method, as
manifested in objective science, abstracts from the truth instead of making it known, he
said, “With our question, we want neither to replace the sciences nor to reform
them…with our question we stand outside the sciences, and the knowledge for which our
question strives in neither better nor worse but totally different” (Polkinghorne, 1983,
p. 227). Thus Heidegger distinguished himself from Romantic hermeneutics who asked
the question, “How can we understand others?,” by asking the question that defines
ontological hermeneutics, “What is the mode of being of the entity who understands?”
(Richardson, Fowers & Guignon, 1999, p. 208).
Heidegger’s magnum opus Being and Time (1927/1996) aimed to a return to the
beginnings of Western philosophy and revive the forgotten Greek argument about being
(Gadamer, 2004). He believed philosophy had been occupying itself with beings and
failed to ask “the question of being:” how and why do beings show up as they do.
Heidegger wrote Being and Time as an interpretation of interpreting beings; his thesis
was that being itself is time (Gadamer, 2004, p. 247). He believed existence and its nature
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have been tuned to become a specific existence—this existence here, “thrown into” the
world (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 225). He proposed that the understanding of being is
possible at all because social practice creates a clearing in which we encounter objects,
events and persons by expressing ontological distinction (i.e., a distinction between our
being and beings; Gadamer, 2004, p. 248). There are some events, people and objects that
we consider part our being and others that we believe are separate beings. For example,
being now may mean that we see ourselves as in the world (versus inseparable from the
world as part of our being). We may see the world as constituted by objects that have
different meaning to us. We comprehend a chair as something to use and something to sit
in rather than just pieces of wood. The way we are with the chair is part of our being in
the world to the extent that we can almost take its existence, our interactions with it, its
form and purpose, completely for granted. It is not until a leg of the chair gives out
beneath us that the meaning of chair might “fall out of everydayness” (as Heidegger said)
for us. In this scenario we might start to notice the chair as if for the first time (e.g., I was
sitting above the ground). Falling out of everydayness can sometimes lead us into the
hermeneutic circle where we might start to think about our social practice of living with
chairs.
To approach the chair hermeneutically, one would first think about the apparent
realities of the chair and how it is experienced, and then about the kind of world that
would need a chair, the demands of that world, and the way someone might live in a
world with chairs; ultimately one would ask: How is being with chairs? To move to a
more social example, someone may see a person as a child or an adult, a friend or
stranger, as a victim or survivor, as embodied by spirits or made up of organs.
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Accordingly, they might talk about and interact with this person differently based on their
understanding of them; when a person is considered culturally a part of one category and
moves to another (e.g., child to mother, rescuer to perpetrator) being with that person
changes. Social discourse affects every aspect of life, including our bodies. If we believe
there is disease or evil in a certain part of the body, in one culture we may place a bowl of
water with a leaf in it to remove water spirits from the air and in another we may
surgically remove the arm. Thus, as scholar Anthony Stigliano (1989) wrote, “We not
only merely classify and understand the world’s parts in discourse; we are these
discourses” (p. 49).
In sum, Heidegger’s (1996) ontological hermeneutics was based on the idea that
understanding is already performed for us by the world in which we exist through the
social meanings contained in language. The primary task for hermeneutics is to explore
how this understanding has come about. Heidegger believed that human being is not
about finding a rule that governs knowledge (i.e., the aim of Enlightenment deterministic
theories), nor is it about understanding the world we have made (i.e., as in existentialist
or constructionist views); instead, being is “what we make of what we find” (Richardson,
Fowers, & Guignon, 1999, p. 212). In other words, being is about interpreting our
interpretations.
Philosophical hermeneutics. Gadamer extended and applied Heidegger’s
hermeneutics in his somewhat ironically titled book: Truth and Method, originally
published in 1960 (Gadamer, 2004). Unlike the Romantic school of hermeneutic thought,
Gadamer explicitly stated that his aim was not to develop a technique or method to
describe others, “[hermeneutics] work is not to develop a procedure of understanding but

146
to clarify the conditions in which understanding takes places. But these conditions do not
amount to a procedure or method which the interpreter must of himself bring to bear on
the text; rather, they must be given” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 295).
Gadamer (2004) believed that we cannot approach the text from outside our given
condition; we cannot avoid ourselves in attempting to know the text and there is no
knowledge outside of the interaction between the interpreter and that which is to be
understood. Gadamer posited that the knower and their previous experiences and
pre-judgments (what Gadamer called prejudices) are central to the interpretation, not as a
source of individual knowledge that can be readily accessed but as a reflection of the
specific moment in history. He noted the limitations of attempting to explicitly
acknowledge and identify one’s pre-judgments, “The prejudices and fore-meanings that
occupy the interpreter’s consciousness are not at his free disposal. He cannot separate in
advance the productive prejudices that enable understanding from the prejudices that
hinder it and lead to misunderstandings” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 295). Like Heidegger,
Gadamer believed that the interpreter need not access understanding; rather
understanding is already performed for the interpreter by the world in which s/he exists;
we are living out historical traditions and the social meanings contained in language.
Gadamer accepted that the hermeneutic circle shapes and was shaped by historical
traditions:
We can understand a detail only in terms of the whole text and the historical
reality itself is a text that has to be understood. […] For history is not only at its
end, but we its interpreters are situated within it, as a conditioned and finite link in
a continuing chain. (Gadamer, 2004, pp. 196-197)
What the interpreters brings to the text is their “historically effected
consciousness” that includes their historical situation and its preceding history (i.e.,
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contemporary practice and its traditions) as well as the interpreters’ prejudices, such as
their culturally-bound values, beliefs, experiences, and privilege (Gadamer, 2004, pp.
300-303). The process of hermeneutic interpretation, Gadamer described as a dialectic
unfolding in which the interpreter engages the text given his or her horizon of
understanding. Gadamer defines horizon as one’s social and cultural situatedness that
“limits our possibility of vision” in its historical finitude (Gadamer, 2004, p 302). The
horizons thus determine what there is room for in the interpreter’s culture’s particular
way of perceiving, and what is excluded from view.
The dialectical interaction between the prejudice and expectations of the
interpreter and the meaning in the text was referred to by Gadamer (2004) as the fusion of
horizons or lying between the polarity of familiarity and strangeness, “It is in the play
between the traditionary [sic] text’s strangeness and familiarity to us, between being
historically intended, distanciated object and belonging to a tradition. The true locus of
hermeneutics is this in-between” (p. 295). Thus the meaning of a text as it speaks to the
interpreter, does not depend on the author and their original audience; it is “codetermined also by the historical situation of the interpreter and hence by the totality of
the objective course of history” (p. 296).
Fusing horizons as a spatial metaphor. To elucidate the spatial metaphors of
Gadamer’s horizon and Heidegger’s clearing I have extended these concepts here in a
way that helped me to understand their meaning, and perhaps will similarly aid the
reader. We, as interpreters, stand in the middle of a spotlight surrounded by darkness; the
spotlight is the clearing or our culturally constructed social practice and traditions,
including language. We have been placed in this particular light through no choice of our
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own (cf. Heidegger’s throwness). We understand ourselves as somehow different from
the spotlight yet only aware of our existence because of the light. We may be unaware we
are even standing in the spotlight of our culture because at times it seems we can only
know or be what is seen in the light. Gadamer (2004) says, “the very idea of [the
hermeneutical situation] means that we are not standing outside it and hence are unable to
have any objective knowledge of it. We always find ourselves within a situation and
throwing light on it is a task that is never entirely finished” (pp. 301-302).
To Gadamer (2004), hermeneutic interpretation is a process of walking to the edge
of this clearing, as if the interpreter is standing at the edge of the spotlight looking out to
the horizon. In this manner, the interpreter takes up the tradition of hermeneutics in a way
where s/he can obtain access to our everyday and past experiences and at the same time
open up new possibilities for the future; the spotlight becomes joined with the darkness in
a grey area, yet sight is only possible through the light. As the horizon of the darkness
and light fuse, it is as if the interpreter is shining light forward and expanding the horizon,
and thus her vision changes. Gadamer suggests that this process is not a static expansion
of an individual’s light onto the world, but rather humans all stand within the spotlight
together, within human traditions and history. Furthermore, we are never bound to one
spot: as we move and our light moves, our horizons move with us. As Cushman (1995)
wrote,
The good news is that the cultural clearing is constructed by social practices and
therefore its horizons of understanding are somewhat moveable. The bad news is
that the horizons of the clearing are difficult for any tradition to move quickly
under any circumstance, and because horizons are tied to the moral vision,
economic structures and power relations of the society, certain individuals and
groups will forcefully resist any attempt to change. (p. 21)
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Moving in-between. Hermeneutics involves movement between the horizons of
the text and interpreter where fusion of the horizons represents holding the dialectic
interpretation of the text as both historically familiar and strange. Stigliano (1989) has
identified this process as moving between the hermeneutic moments of distanciation (i.e.,
seeing the text as reference to historical discourse) and appropriation (i.e., seeing the text
as a reflection of the interpreters world, personal experience, or constitutive of a
particular practice).
Both Heidegger and Gadamer discussed how an interpreter should enter the
hermeneutic circle in the “right way” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 195) or identify the “right
horizon” of inquiry for engaging in fusion (Gadamer, 2004, p. 302). Gadamer believed
that, “A person who has an horizon knows the relative significance of everything within
this horizon, whether it is near, far, great or small. Similarly, working out the
hermeneutical situation means acquiring the right horizon of inquiry for the questions
evoked by the encounter with the tradition” (p. 302). What Gadamer proposed by finding
the right horizon is that interpreters become aware of appropriation and how their
historical consciousness can transpose itself onto the past in such a way that it can claim
the right of the historical horizon. In such situations, Gadamer suggested that the
interpreter aims to seek knowledge or approaches the text with a specific theory rather
than a conversation in which one is attempting to place oneself in the other’s framework.
Claiming the right of a horizon can also look like complete agreement with the text and
judging it purely on contemporary terms or perhaps within an ahistorical light.
To avoid complete appropriation of the text, Gadamer (2004) proposes that we
engage with the text in a dialogue where we acknowledge our historicity and prejudice
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and also attempt to put ourselves in the position of the text (i.e., the historical situation
that the text was written in and the horizon of the person writing the text); to do this we
have to guard against “over hastily assimilating the past to our own expectations of
meaning” (p. 305). Gadamer believed by looking past assumptions that are close at hand
can we listen to the tradition of a text in a way that allows for its meaning to be heard and
in a way that allows us to become aware of our horizon. This process Gadamer referred
to as foregrounding.
A summary of hermeneutic history. To summarize this brief history, the
philosophers I reviewed asked the following questions: How it is that humans
understand? (cf. Kant, Schleiermacher), What is the most objective way to understand
human life and everyday practice? (cf. Dilthey, 1978), How is being? (cf. Heidegger,
1996) and, What kind of world, including personal, social and cultural histories, would
allow for questions about meaning making to exist in the first place? (cf. Gadamer,
2004).
Foregrounding: The assumptions of philosophic hermeneutics. Gadamer
(2004) believed that by becoming aware or “foregrounding” the assumptions that we are
conscious of that the interpreter might be freer to listen to the tradition of a text in a way
that allows for its meaning to be heard in distinction to one’s history and traditions. To
acknowledge the culturally bound and temporally embedded nature of this study, I have
summarized the assumptions made by hermeneutics that informed my study methods.
These assumptions have been previously referred to within this section but are explicitly
summarized here for clarity and referential purposes:
1.

Knowledge is not in the world and cannot be acquired by a method.
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2.

There is no objective truth that is truer than any other truth; yet, there are
practices that seem somehow true and known within one context and
others that seem somehow untrue or unknown in another. Thus,
hermeneutics does not assume all truths are equal and relative, but rather
all understanding exists within human practice and must be interpreted and
evaluated within human context and history.

3.

Being is linguistic and language is constitutive of human life and
understanding, therefore the hermeneutic approach to inquiry focuses on
how language constructs understanding of any human endeavor.

4.

Understanding is already performed for the interpreter by the world in
which s/he exists. Interpreters are living out historical traditions and the
social meanings contained in language. The first task for hermeneutics is
to explore how our understanding has come about.

5.

The text is an example of a culturally—and historically—bounded
exemplar of human life. It is understood as a system of references to
historical discourse that is lived out in practice. Just like dialogue can be
read like a text, a text can be read like living human discourse. The text is
not a preserved historic relic; our lives are shaped and constituted by
engagement with the text.

6.

The researcher is an interpreter of the text and the interpreter’s job is to
understand the text’s meaning. In doing so, the interpreter aims to
understand the people and world that gave rise to the text, its historicity
and traditions.
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7.

The process of hermeneutic interpretation involves moving back and forth
between understanding the parts and understanding the whole of the text;
between familiarity and strangeness. This process involves a dance
between appropriation of meaning (i.e., the text is understood relative to
the interpreter’s culture and traditions) and distanciation from the text (i.e.,
the text is understood relative to its history). Gadamer suggests that this
dialogue between familiarity and strangeness may resolve in allowing for
the upholding of the dialectic between the interpreter and the text, which
in moments achieves a “fusion of horizons.” In this way, interpretation is
co-determined and embedded in the historical situation of the text and the
interpreter.

8.

What the interpreter brings to the text is a historically effected
consciousness that includes: prejudices, fore-meanings, or pre-judgments
such as values, beliefs, past experiences, and privileges. The prejudices
reflect one’s contemporary historical situation and embodied historical
traditions. Because the interpreter brings cultural traditions to the text
(some of which may be taken for granted) they bring “the totality of the
objective course of history” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 296).

9.

The prejudices and fore-meanings that occupy the interpreter’s
consciousness are not free to his/her disposal. The interpreter cannot
separate in advance the productive prejudices that enable understanding
from those that hinder it and lead to misunderstandings. This is sometimes
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achieved in what Gadamer called dialogue, which includes encountering
difference, learning from it, and being affected by it.
10.

The everyday world and traditions that constitute the interpreter’s
experience can never be made fully explicit. Similarly, the aim of
hermeneutics is to bring some awareness of human practices and
traditions, not to exhaustively describe or explain the practices.
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Method
In this study, I followed the hermeneutic tradition of examining what has been
taken for granted, what is enacted in the field of psychology and in U.S. society but not
articulated, and what is unquestioned local practice in our trauma-based society. The
purpose of this study was to understand ways in which trauma culture is embodied and
perpetuated in psychological trauma treatments by engaging in a qualitative textual
interpretation of evidence-supported trauma treatment manuals. The manuals were
considered a cultural representation and continued reproduction of trauma-based society.
I engaged in hermeneutic interpretation as a method of qualitative textual analysis to
identify how the manuals represent and enact political, moral, and social discourse about
living in trauma culture.
In this study, I attempted to move beyond positivist and ontic questions about
trauma such as, “How does trauma change our brains?” and “What symptoms indicate
moderate PTSD?” Instead, I examined the human traditions and practices that allow these
questions to be asked in the first place. Within a hermeneutic frame, the researcher acts
like a cultural anthropologist where the object of study is a text and the goal is to uncover
how humans live in the type of society that would create such a text. I explored the
cultural messages about traumatization, suffering, victimhood and being cured that were
embedded in trauma treatment manuals and discussed their moral, cultural, and political
implications. The data interpretation proceeded from the insights of Gadamerian
hermeneutic philosophy, the substantiative literature on trauma, as well as from my prejudgments about trauma culture. I then discussed results of the analyses within a
historical, political, and moral frame.
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Data Collection and Analysis: A Practical Application of Hermeneutic
Interpretation
Because philosophic hermeneutics resists reductionism and the procedural
limitations of method, it can be philosophically incoherent to apply hermeneutic inquiry
within the framework of a research methodology; yet, all hermeneutic scholars follow an
interpretive process that can be described. While recognizing the limitations of
procedures, scholars including Anthony Stigliano (1989), Victoria Leonard (1993),
Michelle McCoy Barrett (2000) and Jeff Chang (2010) have been able to retain the
philosophic assumptions of Gadamerian hermeneutics in qualitative research. These
scholars have drawn from the theoretical background of philosophical hermeneutics
described above and from disciplines such as nursing that regularly utilize hermeneutic
methods in research (cf. Patricia Benner and Karen Plager). I followed a synthesis of the
processes described by these scholars as represented in Figure 2 and described after the
figure.
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Figure 2: Hermeneutic inquiry as a qualitative research method.
Entering the circle (Spiral 1): Topic engagement. Gadamer (2004) described
the interpretive process as beginning with being addressed by the topic. Chang (2010)
and others have interpreted Gadamer’s use of the word addressed to “refer to the
experience of an issue grabbing you, being captivated by an idea, or of a phenomenon
capturing your attention” (p. 24). I approached my interpretation with curiosity about the
world that gave rise to trauma treatment manuals. Before engaging in the textual
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interpretation, I wrote about my past experiences that led to engagement by this topic, a
summary of which is located in Foregrounding (Chapter IV, pp. 168-188). I refer to topic
engagement as entering the circle and the subsequent phases of interpretation as spirals or
loops around the circle of interpretation as it is represented in Figure 1.
Spiral 2: Text identification. I conducted a search for documents that were
widely utilized the training and practice of trauma therapy. I did not initially set out to
specifically analyze trauma treatment manuals, but given my interest in how psychology
perpetuates and shapes trauma culture, it became clear that examination of the trauma
treatment training process was a worthy object of study.
Treatment manuals were selected because they have become such an integral
component of contemporary psychotherapy to the extent that 100% of well-established
evidence-supported psychotherapeutic treatments for trauma disorders now involve the
practitioner-therapist learning from and continuing to retain fidelity to a trauma treatment
manual in their therapeutic practice (Bisson & Andrew, 2007; DoD, 2010; Foa et al.,
2000; Foa et al., 2008; Forbes et al., 2010; Rosen et al., 2004; SAMHSA, 2013; WHO,
2013). Thus, training manuals are an ideal source to explore how political, moral and
social messages about trauma-based society are communicated. They are promoted as the
training doctrines and therapeutic scripts for widely accepted and practiced contemporary
psychotherapy treatments; they are exemplar texts that are representative of how human
being is conceived of and lived out in trauma-based society.
Training documents outline the cultural ideals of how a therapist and patient
should participate in therapy; they indoctrinate novice therapists or patients into the
practice and culture of trauma treatment. These texts explain what might be seen as
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basics for living in trauma culture, such as detailed descriptions of what is understood by
the field. Therefore I limited my text selection first to texts that were designed to assist in
or directly train therapists in trauma treatment.
Selection criteria. I conducted a search for documents that had the following
qualities, listed in order of importance. I selected texts that:
a)

Described trauma theory, etiology, and were designed to train novice
clinicians in trauma treatment procedures;

b)

Were publically available and widely utilized in psychotherapeutic
practice including community-based treatment settings (i.e., manuals not
available for public use or found only in experimental research contexts
were excluded);

c)

Described accepted best-practices (i.e., with established efficacy and
effectiveness) for treating trauma psychotherapeutically within the field of
psychology and related mental health disciplines including social work
and psychiatry;

d)

Were active training documents (versus reference materials), a selfcontained training course, an instruction manual or protocol, or
supplemental document to a workshop training course for trauma
treatment; and,

e)

Included treatment scripts and protocols that, according to the text, the
practitioner should either memorize or read verbatim during therapy. This
could also include worksheet protocols where the therapist script was
followed by blanks to fill in what the patient responses are to the script.

159
Because this study focused on how human being is in trauma-based society, I
selected texts that employed a range of different psychotherapeutic approaches or
techniques and were designed for use with different patient populations. While each
manual was bound by a specific context and history, commonalities across the varied
manuals illuminated pervasive moral, political and cultural messages about being in a
traumatized world—messages that were not limited to a cultural conception about a
particular population (e.g., age, employment status, type of traumatic exposure) or
theoretical orientation (e.g., cognitive-behavioral, eye-movement desensitization). The
goal of selecting texts with different target populations and techniques was not to obtain
comprehensive representation but rather to select texts that emerged from slightly
different historical and cultural contexts. I selected trauma-focused treatment texts that
were aimed to train therapists in treating in children, adult civilians, and adult military
personnel.
Selecting a child and adult civilian trauma treatment manual. As a proxy for
acceptance in the field, I searched for trauma treatments that were peer-reviewed and met
the evidence-supported effect size criteria of well-established or probably efficacious
treatments for trauma symptomology and PTSD (Chambless & Hollon, 1998). In addition
to established efficacy, I was interested in identifying treatments that were effective and
widely disseminated in community settings and training institutions. In my search, I
included all evidence-supported trauma treatments on the National Registry of Evidence
Based Programs and Practices (NREPP) (SAMHSA, 2013). In addition to searching the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) funded NREPP
list, I also searched for civilian trauma treatment training materials that were supported
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by other national (U.S.) and international (U.K., Australia, multi-country) organizations
that report on or define best practice treatments for trauma disorders see (Bisson &
Andrew, 2007; DoD, 2010; Foa et al., 2000; Foa et al., 2008; Forbes et al., 2010; Rosen
et al., 2004; SAMHSA, 2013; WHO, 2013). A comprehensive list of the manuals I
considered can be found in Table 1.
After compiling a list of all possible trauma related treatments that met my
selection criteria, I chose to include training texts and treatment manuals from traumafocused treatments that have not only been disseminated and practiced nationally but also
locally in the Seattle, Washington area. The reason for adding the local selection criteria
was to be able to easily access trainers and trainees for possible future research in the
practice of trauma therapy. My final selections included two texts from trauma treatment
training programs that I was trained in and that are regularly recommended in coursework
by my graduate training program, Antioch University- Seattle. The final text selections
included: Trauma-focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Children and Adolescents
(Cohen et al., 2006) and Basic Eye-movement Desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR)
Training from the EMDR institute (Shapiro, 2001). Each of these texts came with
supplementary training material and recommended additional treatment protocols.
Selections of the supplementary EMDR treatment protocols from Leeds (2009), Luber
(2010), and Shapiro (2010) were included in the analyses, as well as handouts from the
TF-CBT Web training (Medical University of South Carolina [MUSC], 2005).
Selecting a military-based trauma treatment manual. When selecting a trauma
treatment manual that was designed for the military population, I found that when I
retained the best practice selection criteria, the same treatments that were identified in
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Table 1 emerged. There was only one treatment (Kognito Family of Heroes) that was
both endorsed as a best practice and was specifically designed to target the military
population on the NREPP list of evidence-based treatments (SAMHSA, 2013). This
treatment was a one-session online roll-playing therapy with proprietary distribution that
did not require a therapist. The remaining treatments were initially designed to treat
civilians and have been evaluated to be effective when administered with veterans and
military personnel in an outpatient context (e.g., a VA treatment center). For example, the
EMDR and TF-CBT models that I already selected to analyze for the adult and child
populations were also the primary recommended treatments for veterans based on VA
and DoD guidelines (DoD, 2010). Because I was interested in understanding trauma
culture broadly, including in military contexts, I wanted to select a military-based
treatment manual that was widely disseminated and trained within a post-deployment
military setting for military personnel, rather than identifying a manual that was
developed for civilian populations and delivered to the military in an outpatient setting. I
did not opt to analyze Kognito Family of Heroes therapy because the training manual was
embedded in the one-session online therapy, was proprietary, and could not be easily
accessed.
To select from a broader range of therapies for the military, I altered the selection
criteria for the military-based trauma manual to include a text that:
a)

Was specifically designed for use with military populations in a postdeployment military setting;
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b)

Was created as the result of research or organizational development
funded by the Department of Defense, Veterans Administration or other
military related federal funding agency;

c)

Had been widely disseminated and practiced within the military and easily
accessible to all personnel regardless of status (e.g., officer, enlisted, noncommissioned, veteran, etc.);

d)

Targeted combat exposed military populations in theatre or in post-combat
service or outpatient settings;

e)

Treated or prevented traumatic stress disorders. Prevention training
includes: stress inoculation therapy, coping skill training, resiliency
training, traumatic stress screening and critical-incident stress debriefing.

These selection criteria are listed in order of importance with design for the
military population and wide dissemination being the most important.
Once I eliminated altered versions of the TF-CBT and EMDR manuals I had
already selected for interpretation and applied these altered selection criteria, it became
apparent that some of the trauma treatment and prevention protocols that were widely
disseminated in the military had not been evaluated for effectiveness prior to
dissemination within the military. For example, a comprehensive program evaluation of
trauma prevention programs utilized in the military to-date (e.g., resiliency training and
debriefing) revealed that only five out of twenty-three programs had been formally
assessed for effectiveness in a military setting (Meredith et al., 2011). While many
traumatic stress treatment protocols for the military involved components of efficacious
practices from civilian research, the assemblies of the components into a military-based
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trauma-focused treatment as a whole were not evaluated as an evidence-supported
practice.35 Given the limitation of treatment evaluation for military-based trauma
treatment, I removed the selection criteria of best practice treatment when selecting the
manual, and instead preferenced wide utilization within the military.
Critical-incident stress debriefing was the most widely disseminated
psychotherapeutic treatment for acute-stress and for prevention of posttraumatic stress
after trauma exposure in the military. I selected the Battlemind Psychological Debriefing
training materials and treatment protocol (Adler, Castro, & McGurk, 2007). Battlemind
trainings were broadly disseminated and delivered to all military personnel in the U.S.
Army from 2006-2010. Detailed descriptive information regarding the structure of the
small group Battlemind debriefings was explained in the Adler et al. (2007) report; this
document along with an accompanying train-the-trainers, Battlemind for Leaders
PowerPoint (Castro et al., 2006; Walter Reed Army Institute of Research [WRAIR],
2006c, 2008a) were considered to be the training manual for purposes of this analyses
because they included all aspects needed to conduct a debriefing (e.g., room set-up,
scripts, meeting structure by minute). The content of the Battlemind skills training preand post-deployment were published online and are considered unclassified military
documents (Adler et al., 2007; Castro et al., 2006; WRAIR, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008a,

35

Timelines for policy initiatives set by the Surgeon General and availability of funding
within the Government can lead to wide dissemination of trauma screening and treatment
protocols that can be practiced for years within the military even before internal program
evaluation for effectiveness is conducted. While the military is required to practice these
treatments after receiving a directive, research has also shown that dissemination of the
treatment or prevention protocols is limited by the interest of the local military
commanders (Meredith et al., 2011).
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2008b). The format of conducting the Battlemind debriefings was also published and
included in the analysis (Adler, Bliese, McGurk, Hoge, & Castro,2009).
Though Battlemind was not been established as a best practice for trauma
treatment, in a randomized trial, the trainings were found to decrease symptoms of
posttraumatic stress (Adler et al., 2009). The training was designed for four sub-groups:
warriors (i.e., soldiers), leaders (i.e., platoon leaders), spouses, and National
Guard/Reservists. I selected to analyze the training manual and associated training
materials for warriors and leaders.
Spiral 3: Foregrounding. The process of foregrounding has been previously
described in the Theoretical Framework section (p. 83). According to Gadamer (2004),
foregrounding essentially involves recognizing and describing conscious assumptions.
Through foregrounding the interpreter can be more free to listen to the tradition of the
text in a way that allows for its meanings to be heard in distinction to the interpreter’s
history and traditions. I have foregrounded the assumptions of hermeneutics and some of
my personal experiences with trauma culture presented in the Chapter IV:
Foregrounding: My personal experiences with trauma culture (pp. 113-133). I have also
foregrounded the literature I have reviewed, including mainstream, postmodern and
hermeneutic interpretations of trauma, in the Background and Literature Review chapter
of the study.
Spiral 4: Immersion in texts with research questions. During the immersion
phase of data analysis, I attempted to lightly hold various interpretations of the texts and
approached them with awareness of the literature and recognition of the foregrounded
assumptions described previously. I did not assume I would be able to bracket my
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assumptions or remove my biases during the immersive reading. To first gain a gestalt
impression of the texts, I read each text and recorded my general impressions and aspects
that caught my attention. I noted threads that were repeated and others that stood out as
some how unique or evocative. I then re-read the text with specific research questions
about how therapy is prescribed and represented in the manuals (see Appendix B for
specific questions). After approaching the text with the specific questions, during the
analysis phase I finally considered the overarching questions listed in the Areas of
Inquiry and Research Questions section (p. 80).
As I asked questions of the text, the interpretive process embodied what Stigliano
(1989) noted as the two moments of hermeneutical practice: distanciation (i.e.,
understanding the text as a system of references to historical discourse) and appropriation
(i.e., understanding the text as a reflection of this historical moment and my life). In
answering the questions I engaged with the text in a dialogue where I acknowledged my
historicity and prejudices, but also attempted to place myself in the position of the text
and the circumstances of its creation. I moved between acting like an anthropologist
trying to understand a cultural text from a semi-naïve stance, and that of someone living
in the culture under-study.
Spiral 5: Data analysis as hermeneutic inquiry. My analysis of the text
proceeded from the insights of Gadamerian hermeneutic philosophy and the literature on
trauma previously outlined, as well as from my personal experiences of living in traumabased society. A goal of a hermeneutic account is to reveal and communicate to others
the meaning embedded in everyday practices in a way that facilitates new ways of being
engaged with the problem that inspired investigation in the first place. Thus interpretation

166
begins with looking for commonalities and lines of inquiry in daily practices, and to find
examples that embody these meanings of these practices in such a way that they are not
distorted or trivialized. Following Leonard’s (1993) description of hermeneutic textual
interpretation, 36 I identified patterns of meaning that surfaced in the immersion phase and
categorized them into: themes, specific episodes, and “paradigmatic objects.”
Thematic interpretation. After each document is read several times, lines of
inquiry emerged from commonalities in the texts including themes that repeated across
manuals, which I presented as shared themes, and those that were unique within each
manual, which I titled according to the manual (e.g., EMDR Theme 1). Once the
conceptual map for shared themes was identified, I also conducted word frequency
searches to support some of my findings when a particular word or phrase was mentioned
repeatedly or not at all in a given text. To conduct the word searches I utilized digital
versions of the manuals that were available via CD-ROM (Luber, 2010), on Kindle
(Cohen et al., 2006; Shapiro, 2001), PowerPoint, or pdf format (Adler et al., 2007; Castro
et al., 2006; WRAIR, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008a, 2008b). All of the manuals were
available on some format digitally that could be searched using the given computer
software for the file format.
Silences. While on the surface language seems somewhat intrinsically inclusive as
it describes and constitutes cultural practice, in hermeneutic interpretation it is just as
important to note what is not being communicated and said. Thus, in my thematic inquiry
I attended to what was missing from the texts. From a psychodynamic perspective
silences and exclusions of particular thoughts or discussion about trauma may indicate a
36

Leonard (1993) summarized this process from Patricia Benner (1985) and Karen Plager
in their phenomenological and hermeneutic studies of nursing.
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possible disavowal (i.e., simultaneous knowing and not knowing) of the consequences of
being in trauma culture (see Layton, 2010 for discussion of disavowal). The silences may
also indicate that which is practiced so commonly, and held so dear, that it is taken-for
granted; in a paradoxical way, what is said in the silences may almost be too important to
be stated. I did not include a separate analytic category for silences but noted what was
included and excluded from the presentation of the different themes in each text.
Identification of exemplars. Here I analyzed the scripts, practices, and actions
that were prescribed by the manuals together. I identified exemplars vignettes that
captured what human being is like in trauma culture in such a way that it could be
recognized in other situations that might have very different objective circumstances,
including those outside of the practice of psychotherapy. In particular, I focused on
identifying the therapeutic techniques and practices that trauma treatment manuals
prescribed to training therapists, and noted the similarity between these techniques and
practices to others in the social world. I identified shared exemplars that I found in all
three manuals as well as unique exemplars, which I titled according to the manual (e.g.,
Battlemind Exemplar 1).
Identification of paradigmatic objects. The paradigmatic object37 refers
Heidegger’s (1977) notion of an object in the clearing that focuses and gives constancy to
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There does not seem to be a consistent use of terminology for this concept. I have used
the word paradigmatic “object” which Polkinghorne (1983) and others (e.g., Dryfus
&Wakefield, 1988) have used; however, translations of Heidegger have also described
this concept as the paradigmatic “thing” or “work” (see Heidegger, 1967, 1977). Benner
(1994) refers to paradigm “cases” in her writings on phenomenological interpretation.
Others do not reference an object or thing and describe this concept as a Heideggerian
“paradigm” (e.g., Leonard, 1989). Some have also connected Heidegger’s description of
paradigmatic things, objects or works to Kuhn’s description of a paradigm (e.g., Dryfus,
2009). Some scholars use the terms exemplars and paradigms interchangeably (e.g.,
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the clearing; it re-organizes the background against which the world shows-up.
Heidegger’s (1977) classic example of a paradigmatic object was the Greek temple or
Athenian acropolis. Even though the temple was made of stone blocks that comprised it,
it was not interpreted as just a stone building, the acropolis was an essential instantiation
of what was important to Greek culture and what it meant to be Greek. Heidegger (1977)
said,
A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing. It simply stands there in the middle
of the rock-cleft valley. The building encloses the figure of god […]. By means of
the temple, the god is present in the temple. […]. It is the temple-work that first
fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and
relations in which birth, death, disaster and bless, victory and disgrace, endurance
and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being. The all-governing
expanse of this open relational context is the world of this historical people.
(p. 167)
The temple has meaning and has come to exist in the world because of a
particular Greek way of being. Thus when one views and lives near the temple, the
temple “sets up a world” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 180) or defines the clearing of social
practice. In other words, the acropolis does not represent a Greek way of being, it actually
articulates the way of being or produces a shared way of understanding this way of being.
Dreyfus and Wakefield (1988) explained that the temple as a paradigmatic object “opens

Caelli, 2000); and, in my judgment, refer to the concept of a paradigm when it might be
more accurate to refer to the concept of the clearing.
If I followed Heidegger’s terminology more closely I might add the word thing or
work (e.g., temple-work) for each paradigmatic concept that I present in this study. The
use of the word “object” is somewhat problematic because Heidegger comments on how
things have come to be understood through a subject-object ontology and can be known
as objects (Dryfus, 1997; Heidegger, 1954); thus the term paradigmatic object is almost
prescriptive of an ontology that is philosophically incoherent with the concept of being
that Heidegger (1996) discusses. While acknowledging these problems, I chose to refer to
the paradigmatic work or thing as an object in this study because seemed the most
practical for communicating this concept in contemporary U.S. culture.
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up and organizes a multidimensional world by highlighting crucial issues that then
become the locus of conflicts of interpretation and the starting point of history” (p. 279).
Given Heidegger’s (1977) description of the Greek temple, I understood the role
of the hermeneutic interpreter as similar to a cultural anthropologist uncovering an
artifact that was central to life in the culture of study—the paradigmatic object. In this
light, the interpreter would come to see the artifact, object, thing, space, work or other
human-created material arrangement as reflecting and also producing a way of human
being. While all things and works can be interpreted as constituting a way of being, I
think Heidegger was suggesting that the paradigmatic object was highly quintessential to
the culture in the way it articulates the boundaries of what it is like to be human.
Question generation. In addition to the categories outlined by Leonard (1993)
and others, I added the category of question generation. The interpretation of the data will
no doubt raise questions, some of which may be unanswered by the text, the interpreter
(myself), and the immediate context (e.g., foregrounded assumptions). The unanswered
questions may be indicative of what Donnel Stern (2010) described as an unformulated
experience, where the answer is dissociated (and thus seemingly unanswerable). Answers
to such questions may be first accessible only through enactment and unconscious
practice. The unformulated answer to the question became meaningful and articulated
only in the reconstructive phase of the hermeneutic process described below. I discussed
the importance and context for each question following reconstruction.
Spiral 6: Reconstruction. Reconstruction involved considering the results of the
interpretation in the context of the literature review, the histories of the training manuals,
the foregrounding of hermeneutic philosophy and personal experience, and the horizon of
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contemporary socio-political culture. In this phase, I reconstructed trauma culture as
system of historically grounded distinctions and political practices through the
interpretation of the treatment manuals. The thematic discussions and Conclusion
(Chapter X) present the outcomes of the reconstructive process. I discussed the results of
the analyses within a hermeneutic and historical frame and explored the moral, cultural
and political implications of the results within the framework of the overarching research
question: How does human being come to light in trauma-based society? My relation to
the text in light of my experiences and culture (described in Chapter IV: Foregrounding)
was unavoidably changed through the interpretations reflected in the results, and was
further explored in the Conclusion.
Summary of Methods
In this study I have used hermeneutic inquiry as a qualitative method of applied
textual interpretation. I described the practical steps involved in hermeneutic inquiry as a
qualitative research method: topic engagement, text identification, literature review, text
immersion, data interpretation and reconstruction. The results include descriptive
information regarding each manual and the historical context of their development.
Answers to the questions provided in Appendix B were considered primary, raw data and
were not presented in the results.
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Foregrounding: My Personal Experience With Trauma Culture
In this chapter, I make explicit some of my personal experiences, prejudices and
pre-judgments about trauma culture, and more specifically, with manual-based training.
Gadamer (2004) acknowledged the impossibility of escaping pre-understanding and
encouraged the interpreter to foreground experiences that are “close at hand.” He also
believed that the interpreter will be unaware of which prejudices assist and which hinder
the interpretation, and that it is impossible to be fully aware of one’s pre-judgments.
While this section was an attempt to foreground my prejudice, I was also aware at the
time of writing that I was unconsciously affected by, embodied and lived out the
discourse of trauma culture. As I engaged with the inquiry I became aware of my horizon
and that of the text in such a way that trauma emerged in a new light. I discussed how my
foregrounding shifted in the Conclusion (Chapter X). I wrote this piece of foregrounding
in October 2013, before engaging in the interpretation of the three trauma treatment
manuals:
It perhaps goes without saying that my training in psychotherapy (2006-2013) has
been completely embedded in the neoliberal technicist world where students are
encouraged to “help people” in ways that are ahistorical and removed from local context
but are good because they are “co-constructed,” “empathetic,” and “client-centered.”
Student clinicians are being increasingly trained in procedures, charting, paperwork and
ethics that will prepare us to be modular technicians in a managed care environment.
Without monitoring and formal outcome measures of patient progress, our work is
assumed to be somehow invalid and nonsensical (e.g., “How do you know your
interventions are working?” “How can you measure your progress?”). The more
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evidence-supported treatments we receive certifications in and hoard on our CVs, the
better clinicians we seemingly are.
I have been fortunate to also have the supervision from psychologists who have
taken a relational psychoanalytic and hermeneutic stance to clinical work (namely Drs.
Karol Marshall and Philip Cushman). While sometimes feeling uncomfortable with (to at
times abhorring) the practices I am learning, I am thankful that from this supervision I
have learned to think about the world I am participating in (however painful that may be
at times) rather than to ignore and feel comfortable about the direction of the field. Here I
describe how I have approached my topic by describing some of the notable recent
experiences in trauma culture that I bring to this study:
In 2012, I faced the daunting prospect of applying for an APPIC internship. I was
looking forward to this year away to separate from my increasingly entrenched career in
trauma research that began in 2006 as a full-time research assistant and trainee clinician
for the University of Washington’s Department of Psychiatry of Behavioral Sciences. By
2009, I had become a lead research coordinator in the Department. I managed several
multi-site NIMH funded r01randomized-control trials assessing early interventions for
post-traumatic stress, depression and substance abuse. I had also graduated from being
carefully monitored and supervised for fidelity to the manual-based treatments, to
training and supervising other clinicians. For example, in 2010, I co-led a workshop
series for Los Angeles County to train clinicians on mass casualty disaster response and
implementation of brief five-session CBT for post-traumatic stress. By 2012, I was
certified as a motivational interviewing trainer and began leading quarterly continuing
education trainings in this evidence-based approach for the public and the University of
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Washington medical students. My first first-author paper was about assessing readiness
for trauma-focused CBT (Trusz et al., 2011) and since then I have co-authored several
publications about the effectiveness and dissemination of evidence-based treatments
(Dunn, Lord, Lowe, Joesch, & Atkins, 2012; Krupski et al., 2012; Raskind et al., 2012;
Tsosie et al., 2010; Zatzick et al., 2013; Zatzick et al., 2011; Zatzick et al., 2014; Zatzick
et al., 2010). I mention these accomplishments to point out that I was very invested in
researching and training evidence-based trauma treatments to the extent that I eventually
became recognized, at least on a local level, as a clinical supervisor and consultant for
manual-based treatments.
When I began in trauma research, I worked on projects that focused on the
dissemination “stepped-care” PTSD interventions at hospitals and community mental
health centers. Stepped-care is a method of treatment planning for mental health
interventions that is designed, as my principal investigator once explained to me, to help
a lot of people a little bit. Stepped-care is designed to provide patients with more
intensive interventions as their level of acuity increases. For the studies I coordinated and
also those in which I acted as a therapist, we performed the following interventions in
order: crisis intervention, care management of basic-needs, alcohol and other substance
abuse treatment, depression and post-traumatic stress treatment including evidencesupported psychotherapy and psychopharmacotherapy. In most stepped-care models if
the patient does not respond to one level of care they should not be graduated to the next
step; however, in practice this sometimes means not allowing patients access to more
intensive care because they are seen as being unable to benefit from the more specialized
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and perhaps demanding treatment (e.g., if they are dependent on alcohol they cannot
attend five sessions of trauma focused CBT).
In traditional stepped-care models, the patient starts at the lowest step and is
paired with the least trained practitioner, and as they move up the steps they gain access
to more highly trained therapists. Stepped-care thus conserves financial resources for
health centers by limiting access to highly trained mental health clinicians like
psychologists and psychiatrists. In the initial research projects I was a part of, instead of
moving patients from practitioner to practitioner as they progressed up the steps, we kept
the patient with the same practitioner for all steps. In order for this to be cost-effective,
the practitioner had to be inexpensive but be able to deliver all levels of care from crisis
and case management to trauma-focused CBT with prolonged exposure. The question
became: could the project feasibly train the front-line, bachelors-level students to preform
advanced trauma treatment? The investigators believed this could be done if the novice
practitioner could simply read from and retain fidelity to a treatment manual that had
been shown to work in prior effectiveness trials; the sessions could be recorded and
supervised by a psychologist and psychiatrist until it was clear that the novice could
apply the manual in the treatment setting.
As a newly graduated psychology student when I joined the research team, I
became one of a few candidates to become one of these all in one stepped-care
practitioners. I was trained to fidelity in case management, motivational interviewing,
behavioral activation, and trauma-focused CBT with imaginal and prolonged exposure;
an ARNP worked with me in monitoring psychopharmaceutical interventions under the
supervision of a psychiatrist. I found that the “lower step” treatments like case
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management took more time to learn because they were not standardized and needed the
communication of local knowledge from experienced social workers. The “upper step”
treatments targeting depression and PTSD were highly manual-based to the extent that I
was told I could read the script from the manual and by following it exactly, I could
“deliver” the treatment.
Over the course of one year, I was supposed to speak with my patients once a
week and deliver 10 minutes or less of motivational interviewing each time I spoke with
them. Motivational interviewing was designed to target substance abuse and the
motivation to attend trauma focused CBT. If the patient was able to abstain from all
substances, I was instructed to deliver 5 to 20 minutes of behavioral activation and then
assess readiness for entry into a course of CBT, with a maximum of five one hour
sessions. Many patients did not abstain from substances and thus remained permanently
stationed at the motivational interviewing and case management level until their
substance abuse was adequately treated; some of these patients were allowed to augment
treatment with psychopharmacotherapy. Thus the majority of my patients, all of whom
had been referred for PTSD treatment (the last step) remained at the first two steps
wherein I connected them with basic needs and substance abuse treatment for the
majority of the trial. Less than 5% of our patients met all the criteria to receive traumafocused CBT (Trusz et al., 2011). These patients seemed to be fairly well resourced
psychologically and financially in comparison to those who we excluded from more
advanced treatment; the majority of my patients were unemployed and/or homeless
throughout the year I worked with them. Of the 5% that did receive trauma-focused CBT,
almost all of them became “cured” from severe recurrent traumatic stress symptoms after

176
receiving five manual-based sessions. In these sessions, I literally read from the manual
in the room. I was instructed not to prepare heavily (though I often did by re-reading the
manual) and simply read from the manual when stuck. Despite my limited initial training,
all of my patients improved significantly from session-to-session.
Though I retained excellent fidelity to the treatment delivery guidelines and my
patients were improving, I also remember dreading some of the sessions of prolonged
exposure (as I am sure my patients did) and not wanting to listen to rote rehearsals of
traumatic events in great detail. I can still recall today some of the gruesome details that
my patients reported; yet, by the end of treatment I, and perhaps the patients, had become
so numb to hearing the same story over and over again that I believe the therapy met its
goal of reducing the trauma to “just another bad memory.” Though at times I hated
performing the therapy, my principal investigator told me that my patients would be able
to tell if I didn’t believe in the treatment; he gave me the book Persuasion and Healing
(Frank & Frank, 1993). He said if I could force myself to believe in it, or not let the
patients become aware that I didn’t know what I was doing, that they would be cured.
(That indoctrination part, of course, wasn’t written in the manual). I must have convinced
myself to believe it pretty well because all of my patients performed well on their final
self-report assessment; after twelve months of working together they claimed to be PTSD
free. This was especially remarkable because we began therapy shortly after the traumatic
event they experienced and terminated exactly on the anniversary of the traumatic event
twelve months later (this was the research protocol). For patients to consistently improve
month after month and have the lowest level of PTSD on the one-year anniversary of
their trauma was considered a “robust” treatment effect. With these successes, I actually
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did start to believe in the treatment more. I became more interested in the nuances of the
treatment and eventually began to train others in how to deliver the 5-session cure.
Despite my early interest and successes in CBT treatment, my persuasive healing
power as a five-session therapist waned the longer I remained in research. I began
graduate school in 2008, after about two years working in this study, and became acutely
aware of the disservice the profession was providing to patients by treating social and
political problems like individualized, internal and medical diseases. I also became
increasingly uncomfortable participating in research and found the industry to be
exploitative of students who were at the core of its function.
By the end of 2010, my final cohort of trauma-focused CBT patients for some
reason didn’t improve by the time the 12-month assessment rolled around. This was a
dramatic change from three years ago. In this particular trial, my patients had been
steadily reducing symptoms and then when their final assessment came their symptoms
“returned.” Everyone was puzzled. My patients used to have such profound symptom
reduction: What had happened? I was shocked because, while I had a growing distain for
the therapy and research, I remembered feeling particularly good about this cohort of
patients. They seemed engaged, thoughtful, emotionally present, and able to metabolize
the trauma; they had also demonstrated many functional improvements in their life. Why
were they suddenly worse at the 12-month assessment?
My first thought was this was somehow my fault (I had already picked up the
narcissistic altruism of trauma research—it was my duty to rescue and heal my patients).
I worried that my discomfort with scientistic research and CBT had led to some
deviations in the research protocol: Had I strayed too far from the manual? I knew my
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supervisors were assessing my sessions periodically with a checklist and I had been told I
had excellent fidelity, but I still worried that my increasing disinterest in the therapy was
to blame. In a different environment I might have taken a step back to think broadly
about what it meant for my patients to get worse, but instead I was preoccupied with the
possibility of my personal failure to adhere to the protocol. While obsessed about my
personal failings, I also was aware that I didn’t believe in the treatment as much as I used
to after my first successes and on some level, I didn’t want the therapy to work.
The principal investigator rationalized my patients’ failure to improve as an issue
with the sample: we simply hadn’t picked the correct intent-to-treat population. Had the
patients symptoms been more severe to begin with we would have seen a greater
reduction in overall symptoms; this phenomenon is sometimes discussed in literature on
treatment prevention. I accepted this explanation at the time. The treatment was correct;
the problem was a flawed research design.
Around this same time, I started getting calls from patients in our first trial in
2006-2007 whom had been previously “cured.” They had kept my phone number and
wanted to come in for more treatment. Many of them explained they had encountered
new traumas, returned to drugs, and were essentially back where they started. Others said
their symptoms from their first trauma had returned shortly after completing the trial; a
few said they had become lay therapists or social workers themselves. Most of them
wanted return to treatment with me in some form (a few hoped if they did return that we
wouldn’t have to do the procedures in which they repeat details of the trauma over and
over again). The principal investigator, following study protocol, directed me to refer
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them to other CBT therapists in the area. As far as I know few pursued these referrals,
and some continued to call me and left messages for years.
After leaving the trauma research team in 2011, I found myself continuing to
wonder about my patients that “failed” to improve: what were they expressing in their
final 12-month assessment? Maybe their improvement wasn’t captured in our assessment
of PTSD but in other dimensions that we weren’t measuring. Perhaps they appeared to
get worse at the end because it aligned with their trauma anniversary. Perhaps the
treatment actually wasn’t that effective after all. These possibilities fit within the research
frame.
When I started thinking more relationally, different questions emerged: what did
it mean for them to suddenly “get worse” at the end of our relationship? Perhaps they
“got worse” because they were mourning our forced termination. Perhaps they were
saying the treatment didn’t actually work for them or they were aware that I didn’t want it
to work for them. Perhaps they were expressing their displeasure with the process by
simply refusing to adhere to the protocol prescribed for them. Maybe they didn’t feel they
needed to please the research program or me by suddenly resolving all their symptoms;
they would not be “cured” in five sessions. Maybe their problems didn’t have to do with
the single trauma they experienced. Not getting better was perhaps the last freedom they
could exercise in our system of care.
Recently the paper for this study with the uncured cohort was published. The fact
that no patients improved from PTSD treatment was not foregrounded in the manuscript.
Instead, the patients in the intervention arm of the study incidentally reported reduced
weapon use at 12-months, which was not the focus of our grant or the treatment we
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evaluated. The framework of the study shifted to fit the results and was lauded as an
intervention to stop school shootings and gun violence rather than a stepped-care PTSD
study. An interesting discussion about what it means when evidence-based treatments
don’t work was avoided.
I retained my job at the university throughout graduate school, and moved
between different research groups. While my first three years were focused on PTSD
treatment via stepped-care protocols, the remaining two (2010-2012) I spent leading
trainings and supervising new therapists in motivational interviewing. I even continued
remote consulting into 2013, which ended when I was asked to help design a mobile app
that could be fed audio of a therapy session and produce ratings of therapist efficacy (e.g.,
computer says: You have a 4 out of 5 on empathy).
Returning to the APPIC internship process, I wanted to move out of the state as a
passive gesture to end my relationship with this type of evidence-supported research. At
the time I believed that to leave on other terms would make no sense given my status in
graduate school: who wouldn’t want top-notch NIH funded randomized control trial
clinical research experience on their CV?
When I applied in the APPIC internship system, I remember going through the
web-based site directory and selecting “TRAUMA” as a Major Focus from the dropdown menu. This did not narrow down my choices, as nearly all sites in the APPIC
directory appeared to major in trauma. I was then interested in sites that provided training
in psychoanalytic therapy; there was no drop-down menu selection for this approach and
I had to rely on word-of-mouth, and identification of individual supervisors at those sites.
I applied to sites that I believed had supervisors with private practices in psychoanalysis.
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My director of clinical training recommended I apply to at least ten to fourteen sites, so I
broadened my scope to sites that maybe didn’t specialize in but retained some connection
to psychodynamic work.
Though I’ll never know why I was selected for interviews by certain sites, I was
rejected from the majority of them and asked to interview at three different countyfunded clinics who specialized in community-based trauma treatment. Though each of
these sites supposedly had a psychoanalytic informed supervisor I found that upon
interviewing those supervisors had left or could not be worked with directly. I believe my
curriculum vitae betrayed my new interests in leaving manual-based trauma treatment
behind because during the interview process I found that the majority of the sites I could
work for were quite interested in my CBT-based trauma work. Needless to say I ended up
at a site that claimed to be somewhat broad in its views but was unified in the concern for
preventing and treating child trauma according to evidence-supported care guidelines in a
managed care system.
At my interview for this site, I was asked to do a “case conceptualization.” I had
not yet gotten to the theoretical orientation of the conceptualization but as I described
some basic information about the case of a teenage boy who had been neglected I
mentioned some symptoms of traumatic stress. The interviewers nodded when I said
trauma, and mentioned something about how it was important that I had started by
“conceptualizing” the case in terms of trauma. I realized in the moment that they saw
trauma as the approach to the case conceptualization. For this case conceptualization, I
need not describe trauma from a certain theoretical or clinical approach, trauma was
seemingly an orientation itself.
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The majority of my time on internship I worked for a county dependency court
doing family evaluations that eventually contributed to the removal of children from their
parents and termination of parental rights. The other half of my time I focused on child
trauma treatment and attachment-based therapy with parents and their children. To fastforward, a few months into my internship I was indirectly involved in a non-lethal
shooting at our clinic. A woman was coming to our clinic and a man started screaming
and shooting at her with a handgun as she walked towards the clinic. I was leaving for
lunch and started to round a corner and unintentionally (and almost literally) bumped into
the man. Because it happened so quickly, I was unaware that he was shooting and had a
gun until someone started yelling at me to run.
When I discussed the shooting with my supervisors I was regaled with stories of
how they had witnessed similar things and even been directly threatened with guns at
their desk and placed on administrative leave; the fact was shootings were quite common
where my placement was located and they saw their survival in this environment as a
badge of honor. Indeed, there had been a shooting at a different clinic in our network only
a month earlier where patients had actually been wounded.
The longer I worked at the site the more absurd I found mental-health treatment to
be. My patients would leave the office and witness countless gang violence where they
were the direct targets or, like me, were bystanders that lived in fear of the next time they
would be almost shot. There was limited economy or opportunity for jobs outside of
agriculture and drug smuggling. (The agricultural companies probably benefited from
this monopoly on cheap labor to some extent and had moved some of the higher paid
factory packaging jobs out of the area.) I don’t mean to paint a bleak simplistic portrait of
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the area; these issues are very complex and sadly I didn’t have the opportunity to learn
much about them.
I wanted to talk to the psychologists at my site about what we were doing and
what the point of individual therapy was in this context, especially why we focused so
heavily on trauma treatment. I also wanted to talk about the history of the region and how
race, class, gender, and immigration status played into who was considered for traumafocused treatment versus removal of parental rights or jail, but the topic of why we were
doing what we were doing could not really be discussed. I was often met with sympathy
for how difficult it was to “work in this environment” and how necessary our job was
even though it was hard. People often commented how great it was that I was interested
in culture and that I should continue to work to improve my multicultural competency.
I remember once sitting with my supervisor at the site talking about my personal
discomfort with the power of the family assessments in the court. It seemed so strange
that I, as an intern, after having only met these families for a few hours (and sometimes
not at all if they didn’t show) would be able to make recommendations that were
supported by my supervisors and the court; recommendations that would impact the
families for the rest of their lives. My supervisor reassured me that indeed we weren’t
that powerful and our APA Ethics Guidelines and the laws governing the court checked
our power. Sometimes when I broached the subject of the fit of psychotherapy for the
problems we encountered, I was met with bleeding heart dogma or even blatant Christian
rhetoric about how we were “saving children.” It was so good to be a trauma-focused
therapist in this world.
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My questioning about the appropriateness of trauma treatment started to be
received as me “not believing” in trauma, being unconfident in my abilities as a therapist,
or being mentally unstable. (In some ways probably all of that was true). The idea of me
not thinking treatment was not appropriate was so incredulous to my supervisors that
often my questions were met with education: I must simply not understand how
devastating trauma is to these families, I must not see the value of disseminating
evidence-supported psychological treatment to the needy.
If the fit of trauma-therapy could not be discussed, the intersection of race and
culture with trauma therapy also certainly could not be mentioned (i.e., there was no
commenting on the fact we were often recommending children be removed from their
Hispanic families and placed with white families who lived out of the area). My status as
a questioner took a turn for the worse when once with my supervisor I complained about
my other supervisor’s overt Christian rhetoric of saving God’s children. She asked me if
these conversations with the other supervisor were happening in real-life or in my head.
At that moment, I realized if I didn’t join their delusion I would be thought to be the
delusional one.
Months after the shooting, as I felt growing isolation and continued questioning of
my sanity, I called my DCT to ask to leave the site. I discussed my experiences and as
soon as she heard about the shooting she began to screen me for PTSD. Resolving that
my anxiety about internship was untreated PTSD from the shooting, she recommended I
leave the site. She said something to the effect that I could easily get out of my contract if
I said I had PTSD. I remember thinking how ironic it was she was saying this to me; yet,
I also knew she was right. It would be easier for everyone involved if I was traumatized.
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As a young, female student, I could get what I wanted by accepting my anger with my
mentors on internship and isolation from any meaningful discussion about our work as
the pathological symptoms of a trauma victim. My suffering, like that of many of the
patients I worked with at that site, could be distorted and legitimated as a trauma
diagnosis. The diagnosis came to symbolize everything that couldn’t be said about my
experiences there and about training as a psychologist.
It was tempting to embrace PTSD: it would explain away all of the issues I was
raising. I could be understood by my fellow psychologists and overcome the isolation I
had been feeling, they might now even be able to help me because they knew how to
reduce PTSD symptoms. If on the other hand I said what I actually felt: I feeling isolated
from being unable to talk or think about what we were doing here with anyone; this might
have been categorized as a avoidance of talking about my trauma or at a minimum
converted into a point of further “professional development” in my learning plan. I would
probably get some sort of remediation recommendation, “needs to develop competency in
appropriate self-care.” With PTSD it wasn’t my fault, it wasn’t my supervisors fault—no
one really had to take responsibility for what was going on at the internship site or even
think about the larger community problems. My problems on internship were due to the
shooting—a random event that couldn’t have been prevented and could have occurred in
any place at any time.
But I am talking about all this as if I had a choice to be diagnosed, like I could
choose to embody PTSD symptoms for decisive or utilitarian purposes. The reality was I
couldn’t be seen as existing in any other way. As soon as the words “I was in a shooting”
came out of my mouth and the PTSD screening assessment was completed, there was no
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turning back. My anger, distrust and disappointment with the training system were now
just one of many PTSD symptoms; everything I did from that point onward was PTSD
related for the wrong reasons. (Perhaps even writing this dissertation and talking about
the experience now could be framed as traumatic compulsion to replay intrusive
memories of my experience.) Needless to say I felt trapped in the end because I would
have to leave internship on the terms of a PTSD survivor. If I stayed I would be similarly
pathological, a PTSD victim who opted to continue to expose myself to the traumas of
the training site.
Perhaps from the DCT discussing with other faculty, news of my potential PTSD
diagnosis and exposure to the shooting slowly spread through the program. About a
month after the shooting, I received a call from my professor and dissertation Chair, Dr.
Philip Cushman, who had heard about the trauma. We discussed how my experiences
were reflective of a problematic trend in the field where persons who raise moral
questions about psychology or are interested in discussing the consequences of therapy
from a political and social perspective are often isolated, ignored, placated/patronized, or
pathologized. We discussed how my discomfort and resistance to the training structure
and procedures was eventually reinterpreted as PTSD, and how these actions might be
reflective of psychologists’ discomfort and dissociation from daily political struggles.
One of the most important memories of that conversation I had was talking about
pain of living with and being aware of these problems while practicing as being
potentially preferable to the pain of ignoring and dissociating from these realities while
practicing. I found that the most painful consequence for me had been isolation and
feeling unable to actually meaningfully discuss my experiences there in a way that was
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connected to the social reality of Salinas. Therefore, the discussion with Dr. Cushman
provided me a sense of solidarity and relief. Being able to talk about my experience in a
political way was so important. I didn’t fully realize how much the lack of these
discussions was contributing to my despair and also to a potential reenactment of the
traumatic situation—a situation where I felt pressured to accept either the role of a
helpless victim or the role of trauma survivor who could process through the shooting to
emerge as a positive, functional rescuer therapist that could keep helping others through
the same (dysfunctional) system.
At the time I didn’t realize it, but reflecting back on this experience, it was
conversations like the one I had with Dr. Cushman that gave me some room to think
creatively and politically about my experiences without feeling trapped in a do-or-die
compliance situation. Our conversation also led to more political conversations with my
friends and peers in similar training situations, which further helped me gain confidence
and perspective. In the end, I stayed at the internship site purely so I wouldn’t have to
go through the process of applying and getting matched to a potentially similar placement
again. I guess I felt that, given the state of the field and training, this was not an issue
unique to my placement, and that I was able to stay while also being thoughtful about my
participation.
Another notable aspect of my training experience in manual-based treatment was
the common feeling that I was being indoctrinated into a cult. This started perhaps with
my principal investigator telling me to believe in the therapy so that my patients would;
the content was irrelevant unless I could convince the patients I thought the therapy
would work. This feeling grew when I attended my first International Society for
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Traumatic Stress Studies (ISTSS) meeting. At that conference, people told me things like
“you get trauma.” I attended one of these with the principal investigator from the trauma
trials and watched as people eagerly ran up to him to discuss the work we had been doing
in stepped-care treatment.
The peak of cult-like experiences occurred for me when attending workshops for
manual-based trauma treatments. The EMDR Humanitarian Assistance Program level 1
training involved lots of talk about suspending belief about the need to know why the
treatment works and accepting that it does. The training included testimonials from
patients who had become clinicians who would have never thought that literally have
someone wave fingers in front of their face—known in EMDR as bi-lateral stimulation—
would have cured them. They explained that traumatized memories are locked inside our
brains like tiny crystals and EMDR breaks apart these crystals through the mechanism of
bi-lateral stimulation that works for unknown reasons.
The culmination of the training was to read from the therapy manual script
without any prior training and actually perform the treatment on one of our fellow
learners. They claimed no further specialized clinical experience was needed to perform
EMDR as long as we had the manual, and we were allowed to begin the therapy on each
other during the workshop without any direct supervision. As the patient in this exercise,
the trainers didn’t want us to pick a “trauma with a capital T” to work on in our dyad.
They hoped we would pick a benign bad memory to desensitize through EMDR. As the
dyads devolved into crying and hypnotic states, the trainers acknowledged that the
therapy was so powerful that it was hard to not get to the essence of “big T” trauma of
our lives no matter what memory we chose.
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Apparently, the “little t” trauma I chose did not fit within the basic protocol
guidelines. My partner was a graduate student a few years younger than me; she
proclaimed how much she hated these trainings and how vulnerable these exercises made
her feel before we began. I agreed and we both proceeded anyway. She read from the
manual word-for-word and I, as the patient, was asked to select a traumatic memory to
process. As we proceeded through the therapy I noticed I couldn’t access the memory I
had selected anymore. I saw visions of myself becoming entombed in an ice coffin and
looking out as the memory played like a movie behind an ice wall. One of the EMDR
trainers happened to walk by during this moment and yelled to my partner, “Get her out
of there! She is freezing out!” My partner nervously left her chair and the trainer sat
down, removed her cardigan and started rapidly sweeping her hand from side to side in
front of my face. She introduced “a protector figure” into my memory and explained to
my partner that we would learn this technique in Level 2 training (and there was a
different manual needed for this special scenario that we could order online or buy at the
end of the training.) She then asked my protector figure to speak to my memory as if it
was a tiny child. I wish at this point I had just left but I didn’t for a range of reasons I
can’t recall. I am sure I convinced myself to stay because we were required to get Level 1
certification at my practicum site. I had learned by now that resistance to training just
meant you were farther from graduating (it was if at times I had to remind myself I
actually wanted to be a psychologist). In the end I did not have a transformative
experience and left the exercise feeling tired and somewhat exploited.
There were a few of us who weren’t totally on board with EMDR at the end of the
first day of the workshop. My partner began the next day of the workshop crying about
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the horrible experiential exercises we were conducting on each other in the training and
how graduate school was so depleting. The rest of the trainees, who on the first day were
quite skeptical of the program, by day two had somehow become EMDR converts.
Everyone talked about how they had a “new relationship” with their trauma, how “it
didn’t have power over them,” and how they were freed. Apparently this is a common
experience for patients, as later in clinical practice I found many of patients asking
specifically for EMDR so they could think of a bad memory and not feel anything. I also
found my supervisors recommending EMDR for patients whom were so somatically
bound or dissociative that they were “resistant to” or “did not have resources to engage”
in therapies that overtly discussed the trauma without bi-lateral stimulation.
Overall, the second day of the training was littered with trainee success stories
and advertisements for level 2 training and “special scenario” protocols; we were
automatically signed up for three special post-workshop supervision sessions (which as
student trainees we didn’t have to pay for). I never made it to the Level 2 training. And
true to cult-like form, I continue to get emails from the trainers and my old practicum
director saying I will always have a spot in that Level 2 training should I ever want to
accept it.
Like with my patients that seemingly got worse at the end of treatment, I
wondered about my own experience of “freezing out” of the EMDR exercise and what it
means when people aren’t cured from evidence-supported trauma treatments. While I am
sure I will continue to reflect on the meaning of these experiences, I think in this case I
viewed the whole EMDR workshop as somehow coercive. I felt trapped (maybe frozen)
in my training experiences; perhaps I was protecting, as Hillman and Ventura (1992)
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might say, the “raw ore” of my emotional experiences from being processed and
desensitized via the EMDR manual with the distressed intern-therapist across from me.
Summary of My Experiences With Trauma Culture
This section described some of my experiences in trauma culture before
beginning this study (October 2013). At that time, I wrote that I believed I would
approach my study of trauma treatment manuals with obvious prejudice, including distain
for the manual-based training process and also curiosity about the tradition of trauma
psychotherapy. Before beginning the interpretation of the treatment manuals, I wrote that
I was consciously aware of the following assumptions:
1.

There is a cultural understanding in the field of psychotherapy that trauma
therapists are uniquely sensitive persons that get to the heart of the
problem with patients (i.e., the trauma).

2.

There can be a morally righteous or evangelical air to the field of trauma
therapy. Therapists are seen as rescuing patients and performing the good
and necessary work of therapy (cf. N. S. Rose’s 2006, “moral
entrepreneurship”).

3.

Psychologists are given immense power to shape the constitution of self
and expression of symptoms (e.g., five session CBT cures). Some forms of
trauma therapy maximize the power differential in the service of
increasing the potency of the treatment (e.g., therapist need to educate
patients about their experience of trauma through psychoeducation so they
understand the rationale for treatment).
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4.

While therapy can take the form of coercion and control (cf. Foucault,
1973; Szasz, 1974) the field of trauma therapy is often seen as universally
good, especially when helping underprivileged traumatized patients.

5.

Trauma therapy is seen as more difficult than other forms of therapy,
perhaps with the exception of treating Axis 2 disorders (though many
patients diagnosed as meeting criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder
are also conceptualized as victims of trauma and abuse). Those therapists
who work exclusively with trauma victims often take masochistic pride in
their work (e.g., in-group machismo about being strong enough to work
with veterans, overly humble therapists that describe their duty to treat
child sexual abuse for over 40 hours a week).

6.

It is not popular to question the fit of trauma therapy or reject trauma
theory in conceptualizing patients who are seen as traumatized. These
actions can be interpreted as victim blaming, patient abandonment, or the
beginnings of therapist impairment.

7.

My training has been characterized by compliance. Trainees often learn a
kind of doublethink (cf. Orwell’s 1984) when it comes to certain trauma
treatments. When we instinctively don’t want to learn or perform certain
treatments on patients or each other (in training) but we do anyway in
order to comply with the requirements of training programs or research
protocols. We become focused on meeting requirements as if we are in a
survival situation, and stop questioning the means by which we achieve
these goals.
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8.

Most newly trained therapists today (including myself) have difficulty
thinking historically about our work in part because they are not trained to
do so.

9.

In general, therapists tend to stop questioning and thinking about what we
are doing clinically when the explanation of trauma or PTSD enters the
dialogue (e.g., all clinical explanations that culminate in “because she was
traumatized or has PTSD” seem to gain immediate understanding and
privilege).
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Results and Discussion
In Chapters V through IX of this study, I review the research findings and present
my interpretation of the results. Whereas the distinction between results and discussion
typically is fitting for quantitative studies, in this study I have merged the results and
discussion chapters given the nature of hermeneutic interpretation in which all results are
interpretations and are not assumed to be neutral or objective. Thus, each manual chapter
is structured such that the results or findings from the text (e.g., the specific themes and
exemplars) are followed by hermeneutic interpretation and discussion of each finding.
Each chapter includes the history and context of the manual’s development, as well as the
themes, exemplars and questions identified in each text.
The results and discussion chapters conclude with a description of the
paradigmatic object (Chapter IX) that exists across all manuals. I then revisit
foregrounding and summarize the results and discussion in the conclusion through the
process of reconstruction (see Figure 2; Stigliano, 1989). The basic descriptive
information for each text included in the study has been provided in Table 2.
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Table 2
Descriptive Information About Treatment Manuals Selected for Interpretation
Manual Title

Treating Trauma and Traumatic
Grief in Children and Adolescents
(Cohen et al., 2006)

Authors

Judith Cohen, M.D, Esther
Deblinger, Ph.D., and Anthony
Mannarino, Ph.D.

Francine Shapiro, Ph.D.

Amy Adler, Ph.D., Lieutenant Colonel
Carl Castro, Ph.D., and Major Dennis
McGurk, Ph.D.

Publication year
(original year)

2005

2010 (1990)

2007

Primary funding
agencies

Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration;
U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (SAMHSA)

Meta Development and Research
Institute Inc., EMDR Institute Inc.,
Kaiser Permanente, National Institutes
of Mental Health (NIMH)

Walter Reed Army Institute of Research,
U.S. Veterans Administration,
Department of Defense

Text (format)

Training manual (published book),
web-based learning course
(Internet), first year utilization
report

Training manual (published book),
workshop manual, advanced protocols
(DVD or paper)

Training manual (report), associated
training brochures and other training
materials (PowerPoint)

Country of origin
(N = countries with
trained practitioners)

U.S. (60)

U.S. (40)

U.S. (2)

Eye movement desensitization and
reprocessing (EMDR): Basic
principles, protocols, and procedures
(Shapiro, 2001)

Battlemind Psychological Debriefing
(Adler, Castro & McGurk, 2007)
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Table 2 (continued)
Descriptive Information About Treatment Manuals Selected for Interpretation
Manual Title

Treating Trauma and Traumatic
Grief in Children and Adolescents
(Cohen et al., 2006)

Languages available
(modality of training)

English (web-based and paper
manual), Dutch, German,
Japanese, Korean, and Mandarin
(paper manual)

English, Chinese, Danish, Dutch,
French, German, Indonesian, Italian,
Japanese, Norwegian, Polish,
Portuguese, Spanish, Swedish, Thai,
and Turkish (paper-based manual and
in-person training workshops)

English and “Anglicized” English
version for U.K (in-person training
workshops via PowerPoint and paperbased manual)

Patient population age

0-55+

18-55+

17-40

Target utilization
audience

MA or above in mental health field

MA or above in mental health field,
licensed or certified through a state or
national board which authorizes
independent practice

“Military officers with combat
deployment experience who are also
trained in a behavioral health specialty…
Co-facilitators could be enlisted service
members with related specialties (e.g.,
Mental Health Specialist [68X])” (Adler
et al., 2007, p. 4). Civilians may also be
leaders depending on training and
experience

Setting, format

Outpatient clinic, individual child
and parent-child treatment

Outpatient clinic, Individual treatment

Post-combat, In-theatre, group or
individual treatment

Eye movement desensitization and
reprocessing (EMDR): Basic
principles, protocols, and procedures
(Shapiro, 2001)

Battlemind Psychological Debriefing
(Adler, Castro & McGurk, 2007)
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Table 2 (continued)
Descriptive Information About Treatment Manuals Selected for Interpretation
Manual Title

Treating Trauma and Traumatic
Grief in Children and Adolescents
(Cohen et al., 2006)

Eye movement desensitization and
reprocessing (EMDR): Basic principles,
protocols, and procedures (Shapiro,
2001)

Battlemind Psychological Debriefing
(Adler, Castro & McGurk, 2007)

N = recommended
sessions (total minutes
per session)

12 to 16 (90)

1 to 3, more if indicated (60 – 90)

2 skills training (35), unlimited
debriefing (varies)

Required
implementation
materials (cost)

Training manual ($35); 10-hour online
introductory training (free); 2- to 3day, on-site full clinical training
(introductory and advanced training)
(varies); consultation call twice a
month for at least 6 months (varies);
TF-CBT brief practice checklist (free)

Training manual ($62)

Training manual (free); additional
PowerPoint trainings with videos and
scripts for trainers/clinicians (free)

Optional
implementation
materials and costs

Learning collaborative (varies)

•
•

•

•

•

•

Assorted books to support implementation
in various contexts ($18-55)
EMDR book course (includes manual, an
EMDR test, and 8 continuing education
credits) ($154 per participant)
7-day regional EMDR basic training at
various U.S. locations ($2,000 per
participant)
Assorted advanced specialty application
workshops (includes continuing education
credits, which vary by course) ($325 per
participant)
Initial EMDR clinician certification
($350)
2-year EMDR clinician certification
renewal ($200)

None
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Table 2 (continued)
Descriptive Information About Treatment Manuals Selected for Interpretation
Manual Title

Treating Trauma and Traumatic
Grief in Children and Adolescents
(Cohen et al., 2006)

Minimum total required
costs (total optional
costs)

$35 (varies)

$62 ($3047)

Federally funded, training cost not
reported

Supplemental training
materials included in
analysis (format)

TF-CBT Web: http://TFCBT.musc.edu/ (Website based
on Cohen et al. (2006) book)

Luber, M. (2010). EMDR scripted
protocols with summary sheets CDROM version: Basics and special
situations. New York, NY: Springer
Publishing Co. (PDF)

Pre-deployment training
(PowerPoint with trainer notes):

Eye movement desensitization and
reprocessing (EMDR): Basic
principles, protocols, and procedures
(Shapiro, 2001)

Battlemind Psychological Debriefing
(Adler, Castro & McGurk, 2007)

• Battlemind I Training (WRAIR,
2006a)
• Battlemind for Leaders (WRAIR,
2008a)
• Battlemind for Warriors (Adler,
Castro, McGurk, 2009)
Post-deployment debriefing (Adler,
Castro, McGurk, 2007, 2009)
(PowerPoint with trainer notes):
• Battlemind II Training (WRAIR,
2006b)
• Combat and Operational Stress
Control Briefing on Battlemind
Debrief (Castro et al., 2006)
PDHRA Battlemind Assessment
(PowerPoint with trainer notes):
• Clinician Training to Administer
DoD Deployment Mental Health
Assessments (WRAIR, 2005)

199

• PDHRA Battlemind Training
(WRAIR, 2006c)
• Memorandum from Secretary of
Defense on MH Assessment for
Military (DoD, 2009)
Note. MA indicates Master of Arts; MH indicates mental health; TF-CBT indicates trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy.
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Manual 1: Treating Trauma and Traumatic Grief in Children and Adolescents
(Cohen et al., 2006)
In this chapter, I present the results and discussion of my interpretation of the
trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy (TF-CBT) Cohen et al. (2006) manual,
which I refer to as the TF-CBT manual or Cohen et al.’s manual. After presenting the
specific context of this manual’s development, I introduce the shared themes and
exemplars38 that were found in all three manuals (TF-CBT, EMDR and Battlemind),
After presenting the shared themes and exemplars, I then introduce the themes and
exemplars that I identified only within the TF-CBT manual. Before proceeding to the
next manual, I propose and briefly discuss questions that may be unanswered by the text,
the interpreter (myself), and the immediate context (e.g., foregrounded assumptions) but
are important to consider. Thus the structure of this chapter is as follows: shared themes
(findings followed by discussion), shared exemplars (findings followed by discussion),
TF-CBT unique themes (findings followed by discussion), TF-CBT unique exemplars
(findings followed by discussion), TF-CBT questions (questions followed by discussion),
and summary. Following the presentation of each manual, I include a final summary and
discussion in which I consider all of the manuals together in light of the areas of inquiry.
Context of the Manual’s Development
Treating Trauma and Traumatic Grief in Children and Adolescents is a manual
for trauma-focused cognitive-behavioral therapy (TF-CBT) for child victims of trauma
38

Exemplars are stories or vignettes that capture what human being is like in trauma
culture in such a way that it could be recognized in other situations that might have very
different objective circumstances, including those outside of the practice of
psychotherapy.
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and their non-offending parents (Cohen et al., 2006). The manual is a culmination of a
longstanding collaboration between clinical researchers in Pittsburgh (Cohen and
Mannario) and New Jersey (Deblinger) who previously independently developed and
tested trauma-focused treatment manuals for sexually abused preschoolers, school-age
children and adolescents (Cohen & Mannarino, 1992, 1994; Deblinger & Heflin, 1996).
The majority of the foundational efficacy research for the manual was conducted
in the 90s and was influenced by feminist psychologists who attempted to increase
awareness about child abuse (Cohen & Mannarino, 1993, 1998; Deblinger, McLeer,
Atkins, Ralphe, & Foa, 1989; Deblinger, McLeer, & Henry, 1990). The authors also drew
heavily from Edna Foa’s exposure-based TF-CBT model (Foa et al., 2009) and added
suggestions from community based therapists affiliated with the National Child
Traumatic Stress Network (NCTSN) and the Child and Adolescent Treatment
Consortium in New York City that was founded after the September 11, 2001 attacks
(Cohen et al., 2006, p. 35).
Demographics of treatment population. According to evidence-based treatment
guidelines, TF-CBT has demonstrated treatment efficacy with children from birth to age
seventeen, and their parents ages 26-55 (SAMHSA, 2013). It’s unclear why ages 18 to 26
were not reported in the SAMHSA guidelines as an appropriate age for intervention; the
manual reported that the treatment can be used in community settings with any parent
(not specifying parental age). TF-CBT has the most empirical support for effectiveness in
treating PTSD and related problems in children when compared to all other traumafocused psychotherapy treatments (Journal of the American Academy of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry [JAACAP], 2005; Putnam, 2003; SAMHSA, 2013; Saunders,
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Berliner, & Hanson, 2004). Several randomized controlled trials have demonstrated the
efficacy of the specific TF-CBT treatment model described in the 2006 manual (Cohen &
Mannarino, 1996, 1998; Cohen, Mannarino, & Knudsen, 2004; Deblinger & Heflin,
1996), and it has been evaluated with children who have suffered a wide array of
traumatic experiences (e.g., traumatic grief, exposure to domestic or community
violence) (p. 34).
Context of the authors. All of the authors come from a background in federally
funded research and have served as professors and clinicians in U.S., East Coast
universities and their affiliated teaching hospitals. Judith Cohen is a board certified child
and adolescent psychiatrist who, since 1983, has been funded by more than a dozen
federally supported grants to conduct research related to the assessment and treatment of
traumatized children. Cohen is the Medical Director of the Center for Traumatic Stress in
Children and Adolescents at the Allegheny General Hospital in Pittsburgh. Anthony
Mannarino is a licensed clinical psychologist who was described in the manual as “a
leader in the field of child traumatic stress for the past 24 years” (p. vi). He also has been
awarded several federal grants to develop treatments for child traumatic stress and is the
Director of the Center for Traumatic Stress in Children and Adolescents at the Allegheny
General Hospital in Pittsburgh. Cohen and Mannarino were colleagues since 1998 and
collectively have received funding from a range of federal funding agencies including:
NIMH, SAMHSA, U.S. Department of Justice, National Center on Child Abuse and
Neglect, as well as local agencies including the Jewish Healthcare Foundation of
Pittsburgh and the Staunton Farm Foundation of Pittsburgh (p. xi). Esther Deblinger is a
licensed psychologist at Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Medicine and
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Dentistry of New Jersey who also has conducted numerous research trials on child abuse
and PTSD treatment.
Treatment goals, structure, and principles. The overarching goals of the child
TF-CBT treatment presented in the manual were to reduce symptoms of PTSD and
increase the developmentally appropriate functionality of the child. Specific goals were
listed throughout the manual. To give a flavor of the vernacular of the text, I have
paraphrased these goals here while still retaining some of the vocabulary used in the
manual (I have cited the page numbers where the goals are explained in further detail).
The goals of TF-CBT described in the Cohen et al. (2006) manual were to:
1)

Assist the parents in regaining their role as the primary therapeutic
resource and support for their children (p. 47);

2)

Normalize child and parent responses to traumatic events (p. 59);

3)

Reinforce accurate cognitions about what occurred (p. 59);

4)

Teach the child to manage difficult affective states by teaching him or her
in the use of a psychological “tool kit” to select skills from when they are
distressed (pp. 95, 100);

5)

Enhance problem-solving and social skills (p. 95);

6)

Desensitize the child to traumatic reminders and un-pair thoughts,
reminders, or discussions of the traumatic event from overwhelming
negative emotions such as terror, horror, extreme helplessness, shame or
rage (p. 119);

7)

Enable the child to integrate traumatic experiences into the totality of
his/her life (p. 119); and,
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8)

Help the child to gain mastery over the most upsetting, intrusive memories
and images of the trauma (p. 132).

The authors use the acronym CRAFTS for treatment planning to represent the
different treatment targets: C indicated Cognitive problems; R indicated Relationship
problems; A indicated Affective problems; F indicated Family problems; T indicated
Traumatic behavior problems; and, S indicated Somatic problems. They also use the
acronym CRAFTS to describe what they call “the values” of TF-CBT (p. 33) that should
be embodied by the therapist and therapy, where C indicated Components based
(emphasizing skills tailored to patient); R indicated Respect (for the individual, family,
religious, community and cultural values); A indicated Adaptability (creative and flexible
in adapting core components of treatment); F indicated Family involvement; T indicated
Therapeutic relationships (seen as essential to restoring trust, optimism and self-esteem in
traumatized children); and S indicated Self-efficacy (providing life skills and enhancing
individual strengths) (p. 33). At first glance, not all of these elements fit the common
understanding of the word value in terms of human ethics (e.g., a persons principles or
judgment of what’s important in life) but this is the terminology the manual uses to
describe CRAFTS. I explore the particular values of “C” components-based and “R”
respect for cultural values in Shared Theme 3 (pp. 237-247).
The TF-CBT treatment was designed to be completed in twelve to sixteen,
90-minute, weekly individual sessions between the therapist and child. Two optional joint
sessions between a parent (referred to as the “non-offending parent” or “the mother”
throughout the manual) and the child were also recommended. Figure 3 includes the
progression of therapy across the twelve to sixteen week period broken into different
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modules. Because TF-CBT was designed to be component-based it would be possible for
a therapist to spend more than one session on a given module depending on the needs of
the patient.

Figure 3. Cohen et al. (2006) trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy components.
The manual emphasized that the TF-CBT should be “child focused” (p. 36), and
though parents should be incorporated into one or more sessions of TF-CBT, the
identified patient is the child throughout treatment. To tailor the tailor the treatment to
each individual child’s and family’s needs, the manual recommended the format of
individual child treatment as the ideal modality for TF-CBT. The manual noted potential
pitfalls of group work such as children being traumatized by other trauma stories and
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their subsequent legal testimony being compromised (p. 36). Though individual treatment
was the primary modality, the parent is still seen as central to the child’s well-being:
We view the parents as an important source of support and reinforcement for the
children’s progress both during treatment and subsequently. Including parents in
treatment is an optimal means by which to attain TF-CBT goals of enhancing
parenting efficacy, parent-child communication and familial attachments. (p. 38)
The authors stated that TF-CBT was “effective in helping non-offending parents
overcome depressive symptoms as well as abuse-specific distress” (p. 36) but that
parental PTSD and stress reactions were better treated in parent individual therapy.
The presentation of trauma in the manual. Child trauma was presented in the
first chapter of the manual according to the medical model and evolutionary theory of
fear responses described in the Background and Literature Review Chapter (pp. 9-100).
The manual also described trauma pathology according to the DSM-IV-TR definition of
PTSD. Traumatic events were distinguished from other stressful situations using the
following criteria, “sudden or unexpected events; the shocking nature of such events;
death or threat to life or bodily integrity; and/ or the subjective feeling of intense terror,
horror, or helplessness (APA, 2000, p. 463)” (Cohen et al., 2004, p. 4). The manual
suggested that Criterion A (the subjective experience of fear, horror, helplessness) in the
PTSD diagnosis was key to understanding pathology because:
The experience of trauma depends not only upon exposure to a traumatic event
but also on the individual child’s response to that event. This response variation
occurs, in part, because children have unique ways of understanding traumatic
events, making meaning of these events in relation to themselves, accessing
familial and other forms of support, coping with the psychological and
physiological stress associated with these events, and integrating these events into
their larger sense of self. (p. 4)
The manual emphasized the individual and internal characteristics of the child as
the primary determinant of whether an event was traumatic, “the impact of an identical
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stressor may vary considerably from child to child depending on each child’s inherent
resiliency, learned coping mechanisms, and external sources of physical, emotional, and
social support” (p. 4). Similar to the mainstream medical model of trauma, the TF-CBT
manual psychoeducational texts suggested that traumatic events were represented in the
brain as if they have been etched into the physical body:
it is not surprising that trauma events have the potential to alter brain functioning.
When these changes in brain functioning are maintained over a long period (in
some cases long after the traumatic events have ended), they may contribute to the
maintenance of many of the trauma symptoms described earlier. In some cases,
these chronic functional alterations may also contribute to structural changes in
the brain. (p. 14)
The manual described trauma as being etched into the body but not integrated into
the “larger sense of self” (p. 4); thus, integration was one of the primary goals of the
therapy.
In addition the diagnostic description of trauma, the manual described trauma
symptoms using the image of the “sword of Damocles”:
A sense of impending doom (the “sword of Damocles” hanging over their heads)
can impinge on children’s ability to engage in developmentally appropriate tasks
and contribute to their taking on responsibilities well beyond a maturity level
typical for their age. (pp. 6-7)
In this quote, the trauma as the sword of Damocles forced the child away from
age-appropriate behavior. This was one example of many in the Cohen et al. (2006)
manual that described trauma as somehow robbing the child of their childhood, which I
explore further in the TF-CBT Theme 1 section (pp. 262-267).
Key sociohistorical context mentioned by the authors: September 11. The key
historical context of the manual’s development was its creation in reaction to and
stemming out of research on the September 11 (9/11) terrorist attacks. On September 11,
2001 the terrorist group al-Qaeda launched four coordinated attacks targeting the World
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Trade Center, the Pentagon and another location in Washington, DC (the White House or
the Capitol). In New York, the World Trade Center was destroyed after two hijacked
planes were crashed into the sides of the towers. Nearly 3,000 people died as a results of
the attacks; it was also the deadliest incident for firefighters in the history of the U.S.
(Amsel, Neria, Suh, & Marshall, 2006). Random-digit telephone surveys conducted four
to eight weeks after the attacks reported that 7.5% of adult New Yorkers in the Manhattan
area and 4.0% of adults in the Washington, DC area met criteria for PTSD (Galea et al.,
2002; Schlenger et al., 2002). In addition, 17% of the population outside of New York
City experienced acute PTSD symptoms two months after the attacks. The telephone
surveys used the PCL-C and SLESQ to determine level of traumatic exposure and PTSD
symptom severity (see pg. 14 of Background and Literature Review for further
information on these assessments).
In response to the spreading PTSD epidemic post-9/11, large scale therapist
training programs were initiated (Amsel et al., 2006; Difede, Roberts, Jayasinghe, &
Leck, 2006; Katz, Smith, Herbert, Levin, & Gross, 2006; Marshall & Galea, 2004) and
state-wide outreach and counseling programs in New York were rapidly developed and
disseminated (Shear, Jackson, Essock, Donahue, & Felton, 2006). Many of these
programs were targeted to treat children (Cohen, Mannarino, Gibson, et al., 2006; Draper,
McCleery, & Schaedle, 2006).
The authors of the TF-CBT manual (Cohen, Mannarino, and Deblinger) were
asked to set up a series of child-parent treatment centers in reaction to the attacks. It was
out of the research and work during this time the Cohen et al. (2006) manual was created.
The authors noted, “Since the events of September 11, 2001, and the establishment of the
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National Child Traumatic Stress Initiative (www.nctsnet.org), funded by the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), the number of therapists
requesting training in the TF-CBT and CTG [Childhood traumatic grief] treatment
models has increased exponentially” (Cohen et al., 2006, p. vii). While the authors
explicitly mentioned September 11 as related to sources of funding in the introduction,
the manual was promoted as a manual for children suffering from any trauma and not as
one specifically designed for agencies responding to terrorist attacks. As evidenced by
the earlier versions of the manual (Cohen & Mannarino, 1993, 1998; Deblinger et al.,
1989; Deblinger et al., 1990), and the research supporting the manual’s development, the
manual was clearly intended to treat multiply traumatized children, especially those who
have suffered from sexual abuse and traumatic grief.
Despite the broad population the manual was designed to serve, it was also
apparent that the manual was drafted within the U.S. political context post-September 11.
There was recurrent mention of 9/11 in the TF-CBT manual. One example described
cases of child traumatic grief including, “complicated cases of traumatic death where the
remains are not located or identified for a prolonged period of time, as in the case of the
2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S.” (p. 42). Another example discussed aggressive child
fantasies like, “therapists believing that [their patient’s] acting out aggressive or revenge
fantasies (e.g. flying to the top of the World Trade Center and carrying the victims to
safety or killing the terrorists before they crashed the plane)” (p. 129).
Overall, the word “terrorism” or “terrorist” appeared in 17 different examples of
ways children and their parents can be traumatized throughout the manual. When
terrorism was not directly mentioned, disasters associated with September 11 were, such
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as fire (appeared 24 times), explosions (appeared 3 times), bombs (1 time), and an airline
attack (1 time).39 There was even a script for the therapist to coach a parent on recovery
from a terrorist attack (p. 116; see further discussion in Shared Theme 1, pp. 210-225).
The mention of terrorist-related traumas was more prevalent than common-place
traumatic events such as car accidents (appeared 4 times), physical abuse (appeared 5
times), bullying (4 times), and parental death (1 times). The traumatic events that
appeared the most in the manual included domestic violence (59 times) and sexual abuse
(89 times), which is perhaps indicative of the original versions of the manual developed
in the 90s when domestic violence and sexual abuse were exclusively the domain of
women and children’s suffering (see previous discussion on pp. 92-94).
Thus, when considering the Cohen et al. manual, it is important to understand that
it is not a culturally neutral document. It reflects the local context of its development in
the East Coast of the U.S. post-September 11, and the authors direct involvement in the
response to the attacks. This especially important to consider as it pertains to the idea that
the trauma treatment represented in the manual is supposedly designed for dissemination
in all settings and countries. The implications of the manual’s creation post-September 11
and its subsequent dissemination around the world (to 60 countries) are further discussed
below in Shared Theme 3 (pp. 237– 247).

39

In contrast to other manuals analyzed in this dissertation, the words terrorism or
terrorist appeared only once each in the EMDR (Shapiro, 2001) and Battlemind manuals
(e.g., WRAIR, 2006a). Interestingly, September 11 was not mentioned in any of the
Battlemind trainings despite the attacks being one of the primary events that instigated
the wars in Afghanistan.
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Shared Theme 1: Mind-brain as Protector and the Political Use of Cognitivist
Ideology
In this section, I present the first theme that was shared by all of the manuals I
interpreted. All of the manuals predicated therapy on three interrelated assumptions: 1)
You can change the world by changing your mind, 2) When you change your mind you
change your brain; and, 3) Your brain and mind can protect you from trauma (i.e., if you
have inner safety, you are safe and thus the world is safe). The main problem with these
assumptions is the confusion between shifts in individual subjectivity and shifts in the
social world, which can ultimately result in no change to the status quo of existing
political problems and arrangements of power and domination (cf. Sampson, 1981).
Thematic findings: Mind-brain as protector and the apolitical use of
cognitive ideology. This section presents quotations from the Cohen et al. (2006) manual
that are representative of the theme: mind-brain as protector and the political use of
cognitivist ideology. I have divided the section according to the three assumptions listed
above.
You can change the world by changing your mind. A key technique utilized
throughout TF-CBT was cognitive processing with thought-replacement, where the
therapist was instructed to identify and direct the patient to replace post-traumatic
negative or dysfunctional cognitions with positive and functional thoughts. The therapist
was instructed to teach the traumatized child how to change their thoughts like changing
the channel on a TV:
The next step is to encourage the child to learn how to generate alternative
thoughts that are more accurate, or more helpful, in order to feel differently. Some
children may understand this concept better if the therapist compares it to
changing the channel on the TV, “If you don’t like what you are seeing on one
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channel, you can switch to another channel to find a better show. Finding a more
accurate or helpful thought may similarly involve some ‘channel surfing’ until
you find a thought that feels better.” Some young children may find the use of
“thought bubbles” beneficial. (p. 110)
The following quote from the manual demonstrates a thought-replacement
exercise that the therapist would conduct with child patients to teach them to change their
thoughts like changing a channel:
Scenario A [thought]: “Mom’s not being fair.”
Feeling: mad,
Behavior: You say “I hate you!” and run to your room.
Result: Mom punishes you.
Scenario B [thought]: “Mom won’t be mad once she knows the truth.”
Feeling: hopeful,
Behavior: You calmly explain to your mother that you didn’t do it.
Result: Mom apologizes for blaming you unfairly.
The therapist should practice this exercise with the child by discussing several
different scenarios in which the child can change his/her feelings and behaviors
by thinking differently. If possible, these scenarios should be from the child’s real
life. (p. 111)
There were two primary criteria for acceptable thoughts according to the TF-CBT
manual: accuracy and helpfulness. Helpfulness appeared to trump accuracy because
regardless of how accurate the thought was about the trauma, the child was directed to
replace it if it was deemed unhelpful by the therapist and manual:
Accurate but unhelpful cognitions may be seen by the child or parent as “facing
reality” or “accepting the truth”—that is, as something that is necessary to truly
deal with the situation at hand. In fact, focusing on the most horrifying
(unhelpful) realities or possible realities of the traumatic event is a choice, not a
necessity, and doing so may impair the child’s ability to cope optimally with the
trauma and/or loss. (p. 137)
Parents were also instructed on how to engage in thought-replacement. Examples
of positive thoughts that would ideally result from cognitive processing with a healed
parent included:
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•

I can find things to be happy about, and this will set a good example for
my child.

•

Most people are good at heart, and many are trustworthy.

•

Being strong means doing what you have to do, and I am doing that.

•

I am a good parent; I do lots of good things for my child, including
bringing [him\her] to therapy, even though it is painful.

•

Things going wrong is just a part of life; facing challenges can make you
stronger.

•

I am facing the hardest thing that has ever happened to me, and that takes
a lot of courage. (p. 104)

Many of the thought-replacement exercises were designed to encourage the child
and parent to “give themselves permission” to experience happiness “midst dealing with
a life of trauma:” It is very important for children to realize that they still have the
capacity—and permission—to be happy. (p. 187)
Therapists may want to point out to parents that by [giving themselves permission
to be happy] they model positive coping for their children and help them believe
that they can still enjoy happy moments, and deserve to do so, even in the midst
of dealing with a life trauma. (p. 103)
The manual also suggested that therapists train the parents in paradoxical
techniques to plan for a specific time to worry:
Therapists can help parents give themselves permission to relax and enjoy a few
stress-free moments each day, even though their child has gone through a horrible
experience. […] The therapist could instruct the parent to worry about those
matters in the morning only, not at night. […] When the timer goes off, she
should stop thinking about those worries for the rest of the day. (p. 103)
Overall, the manual reflected a taken for granted assumption that changing one’s
thoughts actually was equivalent to changing one’s entire life and interaction with the
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world. This was described in the manual in several ways, such as getting over the past
and focusing on the future:
The therapist should then assist the child in recognizing that no one can change
the past because the past is over. However, all have the ability to change some
things in the present and the future by our own actions. Most of all, we can
change our own thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, as discussed with the child
during the cognitive-processing component (Trauma-Focused Component 5).
(p. 128)
The manual also discussed how thoughts can become self-fulfilling prophecies,
which if not changed could alter the entire life course of the child:
Traumatized children may also develop cognitions that contribute to their loss of
faith in justice, God, or a benign future. This line of thinking can lead to
behavioral choices that become “self-fulfilling prophecies.” For example, a teen
who lost his older brother and several friends to community violence developed
the belief that he was not going to live to see his 20th birthday. As a result, he
began to use drugs, joined a gang, and dropped out of school. These behaviors
greatly diminished his chances of experiencing a positive future and put him at
increased risk for trauma. His own negative expectations or “prophecy” of selffailure led to the very failure he feared. (p. 12)
When you change your mind, you change your brain. The Cohen et al. manual
described talk therapy and thought-replacement as a method of re-wiring the brain and
creating physical changes:
Some professionals believe that only certain types of therapeutic activities can
access pathways for brain changes (e.g., directed eye movements or body therapy
techniques), and that “talking” therapies that do not include specified, physical
activities cannot create meaningful brain or bodily changes in traumatized
children. We suggest that it is possible to restore adaptive psychobiological
functioning in a variety of ways, including through the use of psychotherapeutic
components incorporated in the TF-CBT model. (p. 15)
According to the TF-CBT manual, talk-therapy alters the brain because
everything one does is related to brain activity:
Children’s brains and bodies are integrally involved in the development and
manifestation of emotions, cognitive processes, and behaviors. It is important to
understand that everything a person does, thinks, or feels is associated with some
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brain activity, however transient or inconsequential. Thus it is not surprising that
trauma events have the potential to alter brain functioning. (p. 14)
Not only does the brain change after trauma, the manual argued that the brain tells
us when we feel overwhelmed and cannot cope with trauma:
For the hyperarousal symptoms (e.g., distractibility, difficulty sleeping,
irritability), the child and parent can be told that these are ways that the brain
and/or body indicate that the traumatic event has overwhelmed the child’s
physical ability to cope. (p. 61)
The next sentence argued that talking about the brain was a good way to connect
to patient and parent:
Children and parents appreciate a straightforward explanation that can be easily
comprehended, and they are more likely to form a therapeutic connection with a
clinician whom they can see as down-to-earth and “real.” (p. 61)
Thus Cohen et al. manual suggested that brain-based psychoeducation about
trauma should be common sense to the parent and child and talking about the brain would
actually make the therapist seem more “real.” The brain-based life presented in the
manual was assumed to be so natural that younger children would more readily
understand metaphors using the brain than any other explanations about trauma or
thought, “Younger children may understand “thoughts” as “our brains talking to us””
(p. 108). During a section on progressive relaxation this was reiterated, “For younger
children: ‘You might notice your brain talking to you about other things’” (p. 78).
For older children, the brain metaphor was also written into therapist scripts for
progressive relaxation techniques:
[Mindfulness] is a way to quiet our brains and our bodies, and to feel a sense of
relaxation and peacefulness. I know this may sound funny at first, but if you pay
attention, you will notice that your brain likes to be busy. If you just sit quietly,
you will see that thoughts start coming into your head automatically” (p. 79). The
children are then encouraged to think of different scenarios and ask: “What is this
person’s brain telling [him/her]?” (p. 110)
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Rather than tell the child to reflect on what s/he might be thinking and how s/he
understands these thoughts as a human (e.g., What is this person thinking? What is this
person saying? What should this person do?), the child was directed to think about what
another person’s brain might be telling them to do, as if the brain had ultimate agency
and decision making capability for the person.
Your brain and mind can protect you from trauma (i.e., if you have inner
safety, you are safe from the world). The Cohen et al. manual stated trauma symptoms,
“can have a profound and long-lasting negative impact on [child] development, health,
and safety” (p. 19). The last module in the TF-CBT treatment (Component 10) focused
on restoring a sense of safety and preventing future trauma, “It is important to help the
child express this feeling as well as to recognize the sources of support in the
environment that can enhance the child’s sense of safety right now” (p. 93). The safety
module focused on creating environments of mental safety in an unsafe world because,
“Unfortunately, we cannot and should not assure children that they will never suffer
trauma again, but we can respond to children’s fears by teaching them skills that will
increase their feelings of self-efficacy and preparedness” (p. 157).
In one scenario, the manual presented a script that instructed the therapist to use
what was essentially the Socratic method (which the manual referred to as the process of
“challenging cognitive distortions;” p. 140) to convince a child who was bullied at knifepoint at school that his school would be safe to return to in the future. I will refer to this
script later in this section and believe it is important to reproduce here in its complete
form:
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When referred to treatment, this child was unable to attend school due to
overwhelming anxiety about being accosted again. His recurrent thought was
“Scary things happen at school—it’s dangerous there.”
THERAPIST: So you keep thinking that school is always scary and dangerous?
CHILD: I just don’t think it, it is scary and dangerous. I’m never going back there
again.
THERAPIST: I understand why you got scared; that was a very frightening
experience to live through when it was happening.
CHILD: You got that right. I don’t know why anyone goes there.
THERAPIST: Please help me understand. School is always a dangerous, scary
place, ’cause every single day, something bad happens there, is that right?
CHILD: Not every day, just some days. But it could happen at any time.
THERAPIST: I’m kind of confused. How long have you been going to this
school?
CHILD: This is my third year, and it’s my last! I’m never going back there.
THERAPIST: Help me understand. Every day you’ve been there, something
dangerous has happened there, right?
CHILD: Not every day, just once.
THERAPIST: You mean, you went there every day for 2 whole years, and
nothing bad ever happened there until now?
CHILD: Yeah, but now it’s not safe ever again.
THERAPIST: I’m still confused. From how you described it, it sounded like bad
things happen so often there, they are just a part of that school, and it will never
be safe there again. But now you’re telling me that only one bad thing ever
happened there that you know of, right? So help me understand—how is this
school so dangerous?
CHILD: It wasn’t before, it just feels that way now.
THERAPIST: So it’s not the school itself that’s scary, it’s something that was
different that day from every other day you went there, right? What made the
school so scary that day?
CHILD: Those punks stealing my stuff made it scary. And then they threatened
me.
THERAPIST: Oh, so it was those guys, those four or five guys, not the school
itself?
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CHILD: Yeah, but there could be other guys like them there.
THERAPIST: And if there were, what do you think they would have learned from
what happened to you? Do you think what happened to those guys—having to go
to court and getting kicked out of school—is something other guys would like?
CHILD: No, I guess not.
THERAPIST: So the school is safe, it’s those guys who were scary. And now
they’re gone, and any other guys are going to be worried about messing with you,
’cause you’ll get them in big trouble.
CHILD: Yeah.
THERAPIST: I bet the other kids think you’re pretty brave, like a hero or
something, for standing up to those bullies.
CHILD: You think?
THERAPIST: Oh, yeah! I bet when you go back to school, kids will tell you
they’re glad you’re back and no one will want to mess with you again.
CHILD: Well . . . maybe. (p. 140)
After reading this script, the manual then instructed the therapist, “Once such
distortions are identified (and new ones may develop or be verbalized for the first time at
any point in therapy), cognitive-processing techniques should be employed to explore and
correct them and to practice and reinforce more accurate and helpful thoughts” (p. 140).
Thus, thought-replacement was seen as the modal way to ensure future safety.
Changing ones thoughts and mind was the primary method that the manual
promoted as necessary to keep a child safe but it was not the only one. The final module
of the TF-CBT treatment included instructions for developing a safety plan with the child
and parent (e.g., listing persons who the child can contact or go to when they feel unsafe).
This was presented as the last step in the treatment because the manual suggested that
creating the safety plan may otherwise prompt a sense of guilt about what the child
should have done during the trauma.
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Another reason why safety planning was located in the last module, according to
the logic of the treatment, was that the child had to first be taught how to distinguish
cognitive distortions from actual threats to safety. Thus, the manual recommended that
the therapist first assist the child in creating a mental protective barrier (e.g., by changing
thoughts) and then assist the child to create a safety plan, that would presumably involve
the community and protective adults. Here again the manual gave primacy to changing
thoughts before taking action in the social world.
The Cohen et al. manual described the importance of parents creating an
environment of safety. In the section titled “Enhancing the surviving parent’s sense of
safety” the manual suggested that if one parent has died it is important for the surviving
parent, “to communicate a general sense of safety to the child and provide an
environment of emotional support” (p. 115). One example featured a script that therapists
could use with parents who lost their partner after a terrorist attack:
I hear you saying that it feels like you will never be able to move on since the
terrorist attacks, but I wonder how the people living in Northern Ireland or Israel
manage to carry on amidst the constant fighting and terrorist attacks. Clearly,
many people are choosing to stay there. There must be something positive that
keeps them there. If we asked them, I wonder what they would say. What do you
think they would say? … I have heard some people in these situations say things
like ‘This is my home, my country, and I will not let these few evil people chase
me away or frighten me into not living a full life.’ Others have said, ‘Our way of
[life/religious freedom, etc.] is worth fighting for and even worth dying to
preserve. We have to give a message to terrorists—that they cannot take away our
freedom or way of life—by standing up to them even when we are afraid. ‘ […]
What might we learn from people who are living in situations that seem very
unsafe from an objective viewpoint? What can they teach us about finding inner
safety in our lives? (p. 116)
The final line of this script suggested that a key to responding to political
instability is finding inner safety. The therapist was recommended to connect the terrorist
attack to other political events in the world and to instruct the parent in repeating mantras
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like “This is my home, my country, and I will not let these few evil people chase me
away or frighten me into not living a full life” (p. 116).
Thematic discussion: Mind-brain as protector and the apolitical use of
cognitivist ideology. The TF-CBT manual described the mind and brain as key
components in healing and protecting traumatized individuals. To create inner safety in a
traumatizing world, the manual relied on the therapist challenging and replacing the
patient’s negative thoughts with positive thoughts (referred to in the manual as cognitive
processing). The manual emphasized retreating to an internal and mental state for
protection and suggested that fortification of mental barriers was a way of giving
permission to children and their parents to be happy, functional, and free post-trauma. I
interpret this theme as a reflection of an individualistic, apolitical cognitive ideology that
is prevalent in psychology today.
Cognitivism was described by Sampson (1981) as the dominant point of view in
psychology in the 1980s, when PTSD and other trauma related disorders were
acknowledged formally by the APA. Sampson located the roots of cognitive theory
beginning with Descartes (i.e., Cartesian theory) and Kant (i.e., structuralism) in the
Enlightenment Era. I will not review the assumptions of these theories here; however
further discussion of the primacy of Cartesian thinking, 18th century empiricism, and
19th century structuralism and positivist thought in contemporary psychology can be
found in the critical and historical writings of other scholars (e.g., Atwood, Stolorow, &
Orange, 2011; Buss 1979; Cushman 1990, 1991; Danziger, 1979; Gergen, 1973; Taylor,
1989).

221
According to Sampson (1981), within the cognitive perspective, processes within
individuals’ minds are the central focus of empirical investigations and cognitive
representations are the building blocks of the human mind. There are two key
philosophical assumptions of cognitivism: a “subjectivist reduction,” where the world is
understood as being processed through structures of the "knowing subject" and an
"individualistic reduction" which grants primacy to the individual knower (p. 730).
Within this view reality is the product of individual cognitive operations rather than of
social practice and political arrangements in historical traditions.
Sampson (1981) framed the cognitive perspective in psychology not as a theory or
approach, but as an ideology. Ideology refers to "a systematically distorted or false
picture of reality, one that benefits one group's interest over another" (p. 731). It is also
understood as a way to conceal real interests and advantages by those in the materially
dominant group (cf. Marx and Engels). Secondly, ideology is born out of and reflects a
particular socio-historical consciousness and true social practice. Thus, Sampson pointed
out that ideology is both "true and false" at the same time—true in that it represents the
reality of a sociohistoric era and false in so as that reality may be a systematic distortion
that serves the interests of some groups over others. The falseness of cognitivism, like
any ideological movement, emerges when social practices or institutions become
abstracted from their historical context, reified, and treated as natural, necessary, and
invariant over time.
Sampson (1981) described how cognitivist ideology has led to a disturbing shift
within psychology where humanity is defined by "mental events, mental activities,
mental operations, mental organization and mental transformations that are of greater
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importance than the events, activities, operations, organization or transformation of the
external world” (p. 733). Within the cognitivist approach, mental events are further
placed within the landscape of the putatively interior self to the extent that they are cutoff from subjective experience. When a cognitivist ideology prevails in psychology,
people accept—in fact strive for—changes in their subjective experience instead of
changes in their objective reality, thus allowing existing arrangements of power and
domination to occur. In this sense psychology, while performing cognitivist ideology in
the guise of healing, serves to maintain the isolationist status quo in neoliberal society: by
shifting the way we perceive the world we overlook the need to change it and to turn to
our community to make meaning of and address social problems. In a world in which
cognitive psychology is dominant, the necessity to change the material arrangement of
the social world does not come to light.
In the TF-CBT manual, it is apparent how the therapist was instructed to train the
patient in accepting and performing cognitive ideology primarily through the techniques
of thought-replacement and challenging cognitive distortions. Ultimately, the manual
assumes that the family’s response to both daily and major political suffering (e.g., from
school bullying to September 11) can be dealt with by altering the way the child thinks (a
subjectivist, individualistic reduction). This technique necessarily recapitulates the status
quo of an isolationist, politically inactive and asocial environment that Sampson warns
of, where persons do not act with each other or in the world, but merely change the way
they think about the world.
Though problematic in its basic assumptions, it is possible that the technique of
thought-replacement could be made a little more subversive and socially oriented if the
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therapist suggested that individualistic and isolating thoughts were dysfunctional and
instead the patient should think about the social context that reflects and reproduces their
pathology (cf. Gone, 2009); yet in the TF-CBT manual this is the opposite of what is
suggested. Instead there is an overwhelming emphasis on positivity and ensuring
happiness regardless of the social context and the accuracy of the thoughts about the
traumatic experience and the world. As the manual stated, “Accurate but unhelpful
cognitions may be seen by the child or parent as “facing reality” or “accepting the
truth”—that is, as something that is necessary to truly deal with the situation at hand. In
fact, focusing on the most horrifying (unhelpful) realities or possible realities of the
traumatic event is a choice, not a necessity” (p. 115). The manual encouraged delusional
positive thinking and internal retreat as a preferable choice to reckoning with the horror
of trauma in the community. Furthermore, the manual framed the substitution of accurate
thoughts about the trauma for delusional positive thoughts as a form of political action or
even nationalism (e.g., in the example of coaching the parent on how to respond to a
terrorist attack by finding inner strength and repeating positive thoughts).
Another important aspect of the mind-brain protector theme in the Cohen et al.
manual was the emphasis on neuroscience and brain-based therapy as being integral to
healing trauma. The presentation of research on neuroscience and trauma in the manual
suggested that if the wiring of the brain did not change somehow the therapy might be
moot. Furthermore, the manual advocated the use of brain terminology to explain the
therapy to young children (e.g., “What did that persons brain tell them?” and “What is
your brain saying to you?”). The manual also subtly used the phrases “it’s a choice to
think about x” and “give yourself permission” in ways that suggested patients needed to
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manipulate their brain and mind to allow themselves to feel happiness, as if it were just
their brain—and not the traumatic events that occurred in the social world—that was the
root of their traumatic suffering.
When reading this section I thought of the brain as Bentham’s panopticon (cf.
Foucault, 1995)40 where patients are standing in the prison yard of their lives asking their
brain if they can have permission to move and then listening intently for what their brain
says to do. Perhaps a better metaphor given the context of the manual would be the
patient as a child asking permission from their parent-brain for a cookie or their teacherbrain for a hall-pass to be happy for the day.
The idea of placing the brain rather than the socially embedded human in therapy
has been identified by Nikolas Rose (2007) as a shift in contemporary culture to
understanding human beings as “neurochemical selves,” where variations in mood,
emotions, desires and thoughts are reduced to variations in brain chemicals. Rose
discussed how health is a central ethical principle in contemporary society and has
recently taken the shape of “somatic individuality” where the self is understood in terms
of biological health, “we understand ourselves, speak about ourselves and act upon
ourselves as the kind of beings whose characteristics are shaped by our biology” (p. 480).
40

In Discipline and Punish (1995), Foucault described the transition from overt control to
covert institutionalized practice and eventually to self-monitored rule adherence. The
paradigmatic example of the shift to institutional and eventually internal surveillance was
Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon. The panopticon was a prison designed in a torus shape
with a watchtower high in the center. Within this prison the guards in the watchtower
could see into every surrounding cell but the prisoners could not see when they were
being watched. In order to gain rewards and avoid punishment, the prisoners had to
believe they were always being watched. Thus a culture of self-monitoring and selfpolicing was born such that no guard needed to threaten individuals with whippings and
severe punishment, the prisoners self-monitored their behavior.
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The shift to a neurochemical self has allowed society to become amenable to economies
of vitality (see further discussion Chapter II, pg. 26). When trauma treatment research
describes symptoms as residing in the brain or neurons, it necessarily suggests that these
symptoms can be manipulated through psychopharmaceuticals and evidence-supported
psychotherapies, like TF-CBT, that target brain function.
Writing before brain-based therapies were so popular, Ian Hacking (1998) in
Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory argued a similar
point to Rose (2007) that the contemporary self had become constituted through a
scientific framework. Hacking argued that the notion of soul has been replaced with
memory and moral behavior has become naturalized in the sciences (almost hardwired in
the brain) rather than contingent on a relationship with the Devine. Hacking noted that
the false memory debates that were prominent in the 1990s could only occur in a society
where there was a shared belief that memory was reified and open to scientific
investigations. Whereas these debates previously would have been on moral or spiritual
grounds, they have now moved to the plane of factual knowledge. Thus, Western society
understands the impact of violence and other types of suffering, not as questions of
morality or responsibility, but as questions that can be answered through the science of
psychology and memory. Trauma could be discussed on a moral level and responded to
as social suffering as many scholars and clinicians have done (Bracken, 2002; Furedi,
2004; Gone, 2009; Hillman & Ventura, 1992; Marin, 1995; Ricoeur, 2004); however, in
the manuals analyzed in this study, trauma was described mechanistically as a product of
mental errors (e.g., problems with thinking) and neurological imbalance.
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Shared Theme 2: Neoliberalism in Trauma Therapy: The Healed Trauma Survivor
as Functional Worker
In this section, I present the second theme that was shared by all of the manuals I
interpreted. Economist John Williamson defined neoliberalism as moving control of the
economy from the public sector and government to the private sector and corporations
(Williamson, 1990). Neoliberal theory supports free market capitalism where the private
market determines value rather than a collective group, publically elected government or
regulatory oversight system. One consequence of neoliberal thinking has been what
Binkley (2011) calls “the marketization of social relations” where reconciliation and
public social practice is recast in a negative light as dependency and docility that halt the
entrepreneurial spirit of individuals to meet their potential optimal production in the
system (p. 92). To be considered functional within a neoliberal capitalist system one must
contribute works of value to the system; failure to survive in the system is a threat to life
and survival. Thus, in neoliberal theory, there is emphasis on individual choices and
productivity as resulting directly in success or failure; if someone is not happy, is
impoverished, is starving or suffering, the theory would suggest that this is ultimately due
to an individual failing in neoliberal functionality (e.g., they should get control of their
life, return to work, etc.). I previously discussed these features from the perspectives of
critical scholars in the Background and Literature Review (see Chapter II, pp. 100-109),
in this section I relate these features to my interpretation of the TF-CBT manual.
In all of the manuals, trauma was a major source of reducing neoliberal
functionality and thus the aim of therapy was to restore functionality in this system, like
getting the patient to return to work or school. There were three primary assumptions in
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the manuals that are a reflection of neoliberal culture: a) valorization of the enterprising
self (cf. Binkley, 2011; Layton, 2010; Rose, N. S., 2007), b) the acontextualized nature of
trauma (Layton, 2006), and c) the privileging of modular, efficient therapy designed for
managed care (Cushman & Gilford, 2000).
Thematic findings: Neoliberalism in trauma therapy. This section presents
quotations from the Cohen et al., TF-CBT manual that are representative of the theme:
neoliberalism in trauma therapy. I have divided the section according to the three
assumptions listed above.
Valorization of the enterprising self in neoliberal trauma therapy. In the Cohen
et al. manual, one consequence of trauma was that the victim became frozen or “stuck on
the traumatic circumstances” (p. 19) or “stuck in remembering” (p. 29). This posttraumatic stuckness was described as halting the child’s natural development to move
forward in society and his or her ability to “optimize adaptive functioning” (p. 31). There
was an entire chapter in the manual titled “Optimizing Adaptive Functioning” which the
manual defined as “the child’s ability to function optimally in one’s family, with friends
and peers at school, in a state of physical and emotional health” (p. 41). If children have
attained optimal adaptive functioning through therapy they should have attained the goals
of TF-CBT mentioned previously, such as being able to “express and manage their
feelings more effectively….gain a greater ability to express and modulate these
frightening feelings,” (p. 87), “use thought stopping to interrupt those thoughts and
replace them with “perfect moment” thoughts or other positive images” (p. 104), and
ultimately, “to realize that they still have the capacity—and permission—to be happy”
(p. 187). A healed trauma survivor can continue on the trajectory of natural development,
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which according to the manual would include maximizing “joy and happiness” (pp. 144,
184), exercising “a right to feel pleasure” (p. 85), “a right to get well” (p. 48), control
over the body (e.g., “right to say no”) (p. 212), and believing that the world was a
“trustworthy” (p. 12) “safe place” (pp. 47, 93). The ideal developmental trajectory
proposed in the TF-CBT manual thus exemplifies what Binkley (2011) referred to as the
enterprising self, where life is “lived through a dynamic enterprise in which others
appear, not as objects of psychological investment toward a relation of mutuality, but as
pure resources in an environment of opportunity… to further maximize her or his own
emotional potentials through the manipulation of life-elements” (pp. 92-93).
Following this line of inquiry in the TF-CBT manual, therapy was often framed as
providing the enterprising self with “tools” (pp. 44, 100) to maximize internal and
external resources, “The goal of learning the above skills is for children to be able to
better manage difficult affective states. In essence, they are developing a number of
“tools” to select from their “tool kit” for when they become distressed” (p. 100). A taken
for granted assumption of providing tools to the child is the transformation of the world
into instrumental resources (cf. standing reserve, Heidegger, 1954; see also Fowers,
2010) which is framed in therapy as an environment of opportunity. This environment is
presented to the child as one that can be maximized through internal management of
feeling and thoughts and the catalyzing of intrinsic rights via therapy.
Thoughts about the world that did not fit with this taken for granted assumption
about an instrumentalist way of being were recommended as targets for thought
replacement. For example, if one of the post-traumatic thoughts about the world was that
it was unsafe and the child did not want to return to functional activities, “[the therapist]
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can help the child move toward more constructive thoughts/fantasies/actions through
which to make the world safer in the future” (p. 129). To facilitate the child’s
entrepreneurial goals in the world, “the therapist should encourage the child to write a
corrective story that can be placed at the end of the trauma narrative. The therapist may
prompt the child to include a page entitled “I Would Like the Story to Turn out Like This
in the Future” or “What I Look Forward to in the Future,” or “My Happy Ending.” For
example, some children hope to grow up to become a rescue worker or to work for world
peace or religious tolerance” (p. 129). In these examples, the child is encouraged to
become an enterprising self by eliminating negative or even realistic thoughts about the
world and take advantage of what the world has to offer. The goal for the child is not to
accept their life post-trauma, but to erase the trauma and become a leader in world peace.
The acontextualized nature of trauma in neoliberal trauma therapy. Emphasis
on individual subjectivity, choices and work rather than social and political context is a
central tenant of neoliberal thought. In neoliberal theory, problems in the social world are
often framed as an individual failure in functionality rather than as a community problem
(Fine, 2012; Layton, 2010). Because the Cohen et al. manual embraced cognitivist
ideology (cf. Sampson, 1981) and described trauma reactions as located within the
internal individual and brain rather than the social world, almost the entire manual was
void of social context outside of the dyad of parent-child or therapist-child (described in
Shared Exemplar, pp. 247-262) and the mind of the individual child. I provided several
examples of the lack of contextualizing in the social world in the previous sub-section
Mind-Brain as Protector and the Political Use of Cognitive Ideology (pp. 210-225). In
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this section want to highlight an additional example of how the manual recommended
therapists respond to patients who are having difficulty adjusting socially post-trauma.
One would think the lack of social context in this manual would make the
treatment of symptoms of social avoidance particularly problematic (i.e., How can one
treat social problems and withdrawal outside of the context of relationships and
community?). However, the manual assumed that problems of social rejection or
avoidance post-trauma were the responsibility of and located in the individual child. For
example, the manual described characteristics of traumatized children that make them
attracted to deviant peers and social isolation. One section described how traumatized
children prefer to associate with other traumatized children “because of fear of rejection
from “normal” peers; and/or because for children living with ongoing interpersonal
maltreatment, associating with troubled peers may seem more familiar or comfortable”
(p. 10).41 Feelings of social betrayal post-trauma can lead “the child to undermine
relationships, then attribute disappointment to his/her own personal failings” (p. 12).
In the case vignette script (provided in the previous sub-section), the therapist
convinces the child that his school is safe after he was threatened with the knife. The
therapist in the script appears to have assumed that social avoidance post-trauma was
ultimately the responsibility of, and located in, the individual child by focusing on
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On a side note, I found it strange that the word “troubled” was used in this quote to
refer to the same children that were seen in other parts of the book as innocent victims.
When I reinterpreted this sentence I realized there was an otherness suggested about the
identified patient’s peers, as if the therapist should be suggesting to the parents that their
child is the innocent victim of trauma but other children (namely those the child will want
to associate with) are troubled. A covert message sent through the psychoeducation about
peer interactions was that after TF-CBT treatment children will associate with normal,
age-appropriate peers; without treatment the child will remained troubled, deviant or
somehow other.
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changing the child’s thoughts and not the school environment. After much questioning
and challenging the thoughts about whether the school is safe the child finally relents to
the therapist by changing what he thinks about the school. He also becomes convinced
that not only should he return to school but that he is also somehow a hero:
THERAPIST: I bet the other kids think you’re pretty brave, like a hero or
something, for standing up to those bullies.
CHILD: You think?
THERAPIST: Oh, yeah! I bet when you go back to school, kids will tell you
they’re glad you’re back and no one will want to mess with you again.
CHILD: Well . . . maybe.
Given the focus on turning enterprising child trauma survivors into leaders of
world peace, one might expect the manual to end that vignette with the child saying
something like, “You’re right, I feel much better now! I will go on and save the world! ”
but instead even the child in the vignette appeared to uneasily accept the therapist’s
argument about school safety with “Well….maybe.” A more effective intervention for
school bullying would involve the actual school community with the bullies; instead, in
the Cohen et al. manual the bullied child is seen as containing the trauma and is thus
deserving of individual treatment in cognitive reprocessing. This is an example of what
human being is like in neoliberal trauma culture: when a social event produces suffering
the survivor is encouraged to change the way they see the world (e.g., become unstuck
and move forward as a functional worker)—as if the problem no longer exists because
s/he has made an internal change.
A modular, efficient therapy designed for managed care. The first CRAFTS
value of TF-CBT treatment was the modular, components-based design of therapy (i.e., C
= Components based). The modules are represented in Figure 3 and were designed to be
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spread across twelve to sixteen, ninety-minute individual sessions, with one or two
conjoint child-parent sessions. The authors acknowledged that one of the primary goals
of the therapy in the revised manual was “to be more responsive to the needs of
community therapists” (p. xii) and to facilitate community acceptability and
dissemination of the treatment. It is likely that the design of the manual and therapy in
modular, ninety-minute sessions made it more amenable for dissemination in community
settings because the design allows for therapists in community mental health managed
care settings to easily bill insurance. For example, the 90-minute time limit of the CBT
session aligns with the maximum amount that was allowed for insurance billing under
psychotherapy CPT codes at the time the manual was published (90808). Since 2013, the
maximum billable amount for an individual session has changed to 60 minutes (98037)
(APA, 2013a; Regence, 2013a).
Having the individual child as the identified patient (rather than the family,
school, neighborhood, or community) is also more amenable to billing and profitable for
the clinic. For example, in 2013 the maximum allowable non-facility fee for therapy for
some Regence preferred providers was: $44.13 for group or family therapy, $44.60 for
multiple-family group psychotherapy, $113.15 for family psychotherapy without patient
present, $140.85 for family therapy with patient present and $162.92 for individual
psychotherapy with a family member (Regence, 2013b). Similarly, the average maximum
allowable amount of sessions that were approved for reimbursement on many managed
care psychotherapy plans are limited to twenty or less (Karon, 1995).
In sum, the very design of the therapy presented in the Cohen et al. (2006) manual
was tailored for profit and reimbursement according to the guidelines of private insurance
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companies that largely govern community mental health, yet this was not explicitly stated
in the manual. Instead the authors stated that the therapy was designed to “respond to the
needs of the community.” The manual conflates the needs of the community with the
needs of the profit-driven insurance companies; the actual needs of the community and
community therapists are not elicited or met (e.g., there was no section of the therapy
focused on the community or community needs).
This same process occurred in the manual’s presentation of the CRAFTS “values”
that were largely absent of social or moral human values [for examples of values and
virtues in psychology see Fowers (2005)]. For example, the first value of CRAFTS—a
components-based therapy—is not a human value, like integrity or non-violence, but a
managed care principle that makes the therapy amenable to billing. Ironically, the manual
framed the modular, component-based nature of the treatment as evidence of an
appreciation for the individual patient (not the insurance companies); the components
were actually presented as a solution to reduce the inherent standardized and mechanistic
nature of the manual. The authors wrote that, “the model can end up sounding simplistic
or mechanistic, more like a “cookbook” of ingredients and techniques than a creative and
interactional therapeutic process” (p. 46). But they suggested that the cookbook problem
can be overcome with components-based therapy because the therapists have the freedom
to spend more or less time (within the 12 to 16 session 90-minute structure) on various
primary components (illustrated in Figure 3):
Components-based treatment emphasizes a set of central skills that progressively
build on previously consolidated skills. Rather than describe a rigid session-bysession treatment approach, TF-CBT describes interrelated components, each of
which should be provided in a manner, intensity, and duration that best matches
the needs of the individual child and family. (p. 32)
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The authors did in the end suggest that reading from the manual alone was not
sufficient training, and in fact in order for therapists to become comfortable with the
treatment and avoid the cookbook scenario they should take the online course and then
try the therapy out:
To truly learn about this model, therapists would benefit by putting it into practice
when treating traumatized children. If you are a treatment provider, in addition to
reading the book, you might also consider supplementing it by taking the free TFCBT online training course (available at www.musc.edu/TF-CBT). (p. 51)
Thematic discussion: Neoliberalism in trauma therapy. Scholars who have
critically interpreted neoliberal culture in psychotherapy have identified two primary
features: a) social identity is continually removed from political, local, and moral
tradition and context, and b) neoliberal culture has come to govern the lives of families,
individuals and communities via technologies of therapy and the role of the expert in
therapy (e.g., Binkley, 2011; Cushman & Gilford, 2000; Fine, 2012; Layton, 2010, 2013).
I previously discussed these features from the perspectives of critical scholars in the
Background and Literature Review chapter (pp. 100-109), here I will apply them to the
interpretation of the TF-CBT manual.
The healthy enterprising self was represented in the TF-CBT manual as one that is
able to manage and control emotions and thoughts in such a way that one can optimize
functioning and exercise natural rights to pleasure and happiness in a safe world. A taken
for granted assumption in the manual was that if a child cannot return to school or is
unable to feel happiness or pleasure, they have not learned to optimize their functionality
in society by controlling their individual thoughts, feelings and actions. In other words, if
the world does not feel safe, fair or trustworthy to the child after trauma, it is his/her
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responsibility (along with the parent) to learn the techniques in therapy to become
unstuck from this mindset.
This phenomenon was described by Rose (1989) as a form of psychology that
“obliges us to be free.” The needs of the neoliberal state (i.e., the return to being a
productive worker)42 are represented by experts (in this case therapists) through their
appeal to the enterprising spirit of individuals. Rose reminded us that the discourse of
freedom through producing capitalist social goods with vigor can be contextualized as
stemming from the needs of those who benefit from neoliberal social arrangements, like
private insurance companies; yet, when therapists reproduce this discourse by literally
reading from a therapy manual the therapy reflects and reproduces these conservative
political arrangements. Through this process the therapists and patients are invited to
believe that neoliberal ideals are their individual values. Rose stated “Individuals are to
become, as it were, entrepreneurs of themselves, shaping their own lives through the
choices they make among the forms of life available to them” (Rose, N. S., 1989, p. 230).
The TF-CBT manual can be interpreted through a Foucaultian perspective. Within
the manual’s technicist framework, traumatic events are transformed from social
42

Nikolas Rose (1989) does not use the term neoliberal state but refers instead of the
needs of the welfare state. Rose described how in the first half of the 20th century the
citizen (primarily in the U.S. and U.K.) was one whose obligations and power were
understood as duties to the collective welfare state (e.g., social security and child
welfare). He described how the individual and society would have a mutual claim to each
other but that policies linked these claims to doctrines of social and mental hygiene, selfevaluation and preventative health care; the duty of the citizen became one of selfmonitoring and adhering to expert advice for the greater good. Thus when Rose describes
the welfare state he is describing a state in which public needs are interpreted as a moral
imperative to specific type of healthy self, a self that benefits neoliberal society and does
not benefit or excludes those who are seen as unhealthy or unproductive (cf. eugenics).
Therefore, I have opted to substitute the term welfare state to neoliberal state in
referencing Rose here so as not to confuse the actual needs of the public and community
with that of the state that Rose describes.
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phenomenon to objects of scientific study that need to be adequately treated/controlled
through various medical technologies. Patients have learned to fit themselves neatly
within treatment decision trees and modular care by completing their homework, reading
their psychoeducation pamphlets, requesting specific medications and self-diagnosing.
What it is to be a good healthy human somehow fits naturally within these practices of
social control.
The authors acknowledged that “the model can end up sounding simplistic or
mechanistic, more like a “cookbook” of ingredients and techniques than a creative and
interactional therapeutic process” (p. 46). But they suggested that the cookbook problem
can be overcome with components-based therapy because the therapists have the freedom
to spend more or less time (within the 12 to 16 session 90-minute structure) on various
primary components. I found this argument about modules as the answer to the cookbook
problem so misguided given the fact that treatment is actually trained via a standardized
12-session manual (Cohen et al., 2006). How can it not be like a cookbook when the
therapists are recommended to continue to read the scripts and utilize the forms from the
manual throughout treatment? Especially, in lieu of mentorship and supervision, there is
an emphasis on fidelity to the modules as they are represented in therapist scripts,
handouts and worksheets. The utilization of these forms according to the manual ensures
the standardization of care across individuals and fidelity to the manual (this will be
discussed further in the Shared Exemplar sub-section of this chapter, pp. 240-255). Thus,
filling out a box on a form becomes a substitution for human dialogue and exploration of
trauma, and frames healing within a world of patient and therapist compliance (cf.
Cushman & Gilford, 2000).
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The fact that a practitioner is recommended to learn from and continue to retain
fidelity to the manual should be enough evidence that the TF-CBT manual indeed a
cookbook and that it is not actually tailored to individual families and needs. It seems as
if the authors are caught in a difficult bind: they want to promote the therapy as somehow
universal and easy to disseminate to the community (e.g., designed to treat any trauma,
by any practitioner who has taken the training) but also flexible, personal and “real.”
From a hermeneutic perspective, I do not view the TF-CBT therapy reproduction
of neoliberal values as a form of propaganda or discourse that makes sense to patients
and therapists simply because they are subtly manipulated into believing them. The
neoliberal understanding of trauma as reducing functionality and the notion of healing
through the enterprising self makes sense to therapists and patients not just because
certain discourse (like those in the manual) lead them to value neoliberality, but because
these values exist in many forms of daily life and interaction inside and outside of
therapy. When considering the amount that trauma permeates culture (see Introduction
pp. 1-5), one can imagine a child today watching TV where the protagonists suffer from
PTSD and lead aspirational lives; this child might also hear phrases like “think positive”
and “change your mind, change the world” as responses to daily problems not just in
therapy but in school, at work or from their parents. This is what Heidegger meant when
he said understanding is already performed by being in the world around us (Heidegger,
1996).43
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Dryfus (2004) explained this Heideggerian concept:
Put generally, the shared practices into which we are socialized provide a
background understanding of what counts as things, what counts as human
beings and what it makes sense to do, on the basis of which we can direct
our actions towards particular things and people. Thus the understanding
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When a child encounters trauma and the neoliberal worldview of functionality is
questioned by the child or they are unable to meet the demands of the culture (e.g., they
don’t want to go to school), in the Cohen et al. manual the therapists’ job becomes to
reconstitute this functionality. Again, I would suggest that this reconstitution is not driven
by the therapists wish to colonize the individual with the notions of the state (even though
that may happen) or that therapist is acting with no intention (e.g., a naïve drone that
simply does not realize they are recapitulating neoliberal ideals). Following the work of
Cushman (1995), Bracken (2002) and other hermeneutic thinkers, I believe that therapists
act out of what they see as a moral imperative to reconstitute the cultural clearing of the
child by restoring what the culture sees as the good for this child. What constitutes being
a good healed trauma survivor is not universal, but is necessarily tied to local context as
well as the lived traditions of that context. I will continue this interpretation with regards
to the therapists reconstituting what they see as childhood and being a good child in TFCBT manual specifically under TF-CBT Themes 1-3 (pp. 210-247).
Shared Theme 3: Trauma Is Universal and Culture-Free (Versus Tied to a U. S.,
Western, White, and Middle-Class Context)
In this section, I present the third and final theme that was shared by all of the
manuals I interpreted. In all of the manuals, trauma was presented a universal human
experience that could be treated following the same culture-free treatment manual. I
divided examples of this theme into the following categories: a) trauma symptoms are
tied to universally experienced organ malfunction (e.g., brain problems), b) there is a
of being creates what Heidegger calls a clearing (Lichtung). Heidegger
calls the unnoticed way that the clearing both limits and opens up what
can show up and what can be done, its "unobtrusive governance (Waltens).
(p. 2)
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flattening of all events, local experiences, and narratives of suffering to diagnostic criteria
for PTSD and the word “trauma” or “traumatic events,” c) the technique of thoughtterminating clichés (cf. Lifton, 1989) about cultural competency are often employed, and
d) there is an exclusion of forms of suffering from the definition of trauma that are not
from a U.S., Western, white, and middle-class context.
Thematic findings: Trauma is universal and culture-free. This section
presents quotations from the Cohen et al., TF-CBT manual that are representative this
theme. I have already provided several examples of the first subtheme (a) where the
manual described trauma as located in the brain and suggested that this experience was
universal and based on evolutionary models of fear (pp. 143-151). Therefore this section
will focus primarily on a presentation of examples from the texts of the other subthemes:
b) there is a flattening of all events, local experiences, and narratives of suffering to
diagnostic criteria for PTSD and the word “trauma” or “traumatic events,” c) the
technique of thought-terminating clichés (cf. Lifton,1989) about cultural competency are
often employed, and d) there is an exclusion of forms of suffering from the definition of
trauma that are not from a U.S., Western, white, female, and middle-class context.
Flattening all local experiences and narratives of suffering to diagnostic
criteria for PTSD and the words trauma or traumatic events. Standardized assessments
reduce traumatic life experiences to a number of total traumas (where all events are
considered to be equal to a value of 1), the patient’s interpretation of the event and related
psychopathology is reframed into a check box of meeting PTSD diagnostic criteria. The
first instance of the reduction of narrative, nuance and local stories of trauma in the
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manual was the recommendation to begin the treatment with a standardized assessment of
trauma and PTSD:
Entities that fund treatment and certify treatment facilities require accurate
diagnosis of existing psychopathology. Careful assessment is also essential for
optimal treatment planning. Methods for conducting general child psychiatric
evaluations are described in detail elsewhere (AACAP, 1997), and specific
instruments and techniques for evaluating childhood PTSD are also available
(AACAP, 1998). (p. 20)
The standard assessments of PTSD and traumatic events that were described in
the Background and Literature Review chapter of this study (p. 9) were also
recommended in the TF-CBT manual, in addition to child-specific measures of trauma:
Although the use of detailed semi-structured interviews is the “gold standard” for
evaluating the presence of these PTSD symptoms (AACAP, 1998), these are
time- and labor-intensive, and few therapists in clinical settings have the resources
to use these interviews on a regular basis. Several self-report instruments for
assessing children’s PTSD symptoms are available, which have acceptable
reliability and validity for clinical use. These include the previously mentioned
UCLA PTSD Index for DSM-IV ….Two widely used child behavior measures
include the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach, 1991) and the Behavior
Assessment System for Children (BASC; Reynolds & Kamphaus, 1992).
(pp. 21-23)
These examples demonstrate how the manual recommends that therapists
expediently administer a trauma assessment to obtain a diagnosis for billing
purposes and to reduce the “time and labor” associated with listening to patients
describe their experiences with trauma (p. 21).
The label of trauma was used throughout the manual to refer to a wide range of
social and political suffering. The introduction of the book described how the manual has
been “empirically evaluated with children who have suffered a wide array of traumatic
experiences (e.g., traumatic grief, exposure to domestic or community violence)” (p. 34).
Throughout the manual the phrase “traumatic event” was used in lieu of describing the
details of what actually occurred to the patient; this phrase occurred 67 times in the
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manual. Other semi-generic terms like “abuse” and “violence” were also used frequently
(over 100 times each). Specific words to describe traumatic events were more rare (e.g.,
murder [4 times], bullying [4 times], bombing [1 time]). As mentioned previously in this
section (pp. 208-209), terrorist attacks were featured in a disproportionate way when
compared to other traumas.
When searching for the word “trauma” and “traumas” in the manual I found the
following adjectives that were used to describe trauma without actually naming or
describing the actual event: identical (p. 4); previous/prior (pp. 8, 159); many/multiple
(pp. 22, 61, 67, 135, 160, 175); on-going (p. 4); chronic (p. 4); short-lived (p. 4);
child/childhood (p. 20); and interpersonal (p. 14). These adjectives appeared to categorize
traumatic events not by the unique qualities of the experience but by length of time
endured. Only a few of the adjectives described relationships to other people and the
world (e.g., interpersonal) and none described the severity (e.g., excruciating, horrific) or
made social or moral judgments about the event (e.g., abhorrent, dehumanizing, unjust).
Despite the pervasive use of the generic term trauma, an entire section of TF-CBT
therapy was devoted to eliciting the trauma narrative, the story associated with the
traumatic event, in great detail (pp. 119-136). The authors described how they originally
conceptualized the trauma narrative as “an exposure procedure” (p. 119) for the purposes
of, “neutralizing the intense negative emotions that accompany these traumatic
reminders” (p. 128) and to “un-pair thoughts, reminders, or discussions of the traumatic
event from overwhelming negative emotions” (p. 119). The child was encouraged to reread his/her trauma narrative with the therapist until his/her SUDs (subjective units of
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distress) drop and symptoms of PTSD reduce.44 The manual stated, “If the child’s SUDS
progressively decrease during sessions in which the trauma narrative is created, this
progress can be pointed out to him/her as a sign of how well the child is handling this
challenging task” (p. 125). The final part of the trauma narrative module involved
focusing on what the child can do, “right now to make things ‘come out better’ in the
present or future” (p. 128). The manual continued, “The therapist should then encourage
the child to think about specific ways to achieve symbolic corrective action in the present
and future” (p. 128). The therapist should also, “encourage the child to write a corrective
story that can be placed at the end of the trauma narrative” (p. 129).
In sum, the trauma narrative phase of treatment elicited a specific and detailed
story about the child’s life that was not reduced to universal symptoms or diagnosis of
trauma. In addition to desensitizing the child to the details of the trauma, a primary
purpose of eliciting the story is to re-write it and in some form alter the experience
through positive symbolic correction and a new ending. Thus, while the manual
suggested there be space in the therapy for personal details and narrative about the
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Subjective units of distress (SUDS) are a quantitative measure of self-reported distress
used in many exposure or desensitization-based cognitive behavioral therapies for anxiety
and PTSD (McNally, 2007). To assess the level of anxiety a patients is experiencing
during desensitization psychologist Joseph Wolpe (1973) developed the subjective units
of distress scale (SUDS). Using SUDS, patientss subjectively rate their anxiety from 0 to
10, where 10 is shear panic and 0 is the most relaxed possible (McNally, 2007). Exposure
therapies work best when the patients reports SUDs at a 7 or 8 when reporting a stressful
event. If the patients’s SUDS reach a 9 or 10 then this can evoke a flooding response that
is so intense that, according to Le Doux’s theories, the reptilian brain activates and the
neocortex is no longer involved in the processing and association; the patients may go
into a flight or fight response that is in fact re-traumatizing rather than therapeutic. If the
SUDS are too low (e.g., 5 or below) then the desensitization will not work because the
conditioned anxious response was not evoked. 	
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trauma, this space was significantly reduced through the therapist correcting the narrative
to make it more positive.
Thought-terminating clichés about cultural competency. There was periodic
emphasis on cultural competency in the manual, such as a section (just over one page in
length) titled “The importance of culture in TF-CBT” (p. 40-41), the inclusion of the “R”
value (i.e., cultural respect) in CRAFTS, and some troubleshooting sections focused on
cultural differences between the therapist and patient. The manual used the phrase
providing treatment in “cultural context” (pp. 33, 41) but neglected to actually describe
what this actually would look like in therapy.
Though the manual heavily emphasized community work and disaster response, it
did not seriously consider questions like: what does it mean to be culturally respectful
when one is a U.S. national, white, educated, middle-class who arrives to a community
for two weeks to provide trauma relief for a disaster like Hurricane Katrina or Sri Lankan
tsunamis? How does an APPIC intern who is transplanted to an Alaskan Native Indian
Reservation mental health system conduct culturally respectful therapy while at the same
time requiring families to send their child to 12 individual sessions of TF-CBT at a
treatment center? Is it respectful to take the therapist script about standing up to terrorists
in your mind (as discussed on p. 151 of the study) and say this to someone in Iraq, Spain,
Darfur, Syria, or Mexico? Instead of considering questions like these, thoughtterminating clichés (cf. Lifton 1956/1989) were used to avoid discussion of what it means
to work with patients who therapists perceive as culturally different. Respect for “cultural
context” (pp. 33, 41) and “cultural values” (pp. 32, 33) were a few of the clichés that
were used to acknowledge culture but not actually promote a conversation about how
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cultural respect could or should be approached in therapy. Another cliché was providing
children a “symphony of support” where the therapist provides healing and the family
and community provide “the cultural context in which the child can heal and grow” (p.
41).
The clichés, while somehow suggesting that the manual was culturally sensitive,
also allowed for avoidance of a discussion about culture, race, class, and other political
and social arrangements in such a way that there was no imperative to change the therapy
or status quo of these arrangements. It’s possible these clichés somehow were used to
rationalize the exportation of the manual and training to the 60 countries it has been
disseminated to, in addition to diverse communities nationally in the U.S.
Exclusion from the definition of trauma. How the manual excludes or includes
certain persons from the description of trauma victim is highly related to how the
therapist uses the manual and the recommended screening assessments of PTSD. For
example, to be considered as traumatized and appropriate for trauma treatment one has to
meet minimum criteria on initial assessments of PTSD. Since I didn’t include
observations of the therapy or assessment in this research it was difficult to ascertain how
the label of “trauma” and “traumatized” was being applied in such a way that it would
exclude certain persons from the therapy or the definition of trauma. If anything the
manual suggested that therapists should be overly inclusive rather than exclusionary
when considering children as traumatized (e.g., trauma is universal, applies to every
negative life event, occurs in every culture). I did note that the structure and scripts
provided in the manual almost necessarily demand that the patient conform to U.S.
middle-class cultural standards by having a certain amount of resources (e.g., can take
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time off of work or other obligations to bring their child to twelve to sixteen sessions of
therapy) and exposure to formal education (e.g., worksheet and form literacy; basic
understanding of human biology and neuroscience). Furthermore, the idea of letting a
child sit with a therapist alone in a room and talk about a traumatic experience like
domestic violence or sexual abuse, is not necessarily a comforting one for parents of any
culture or socioeconomic status yet for some reason this idea was promoted as safe in the
manual, and in fact more safe than discussing the trauma with a parent, family or
community member (see further discussion in TF-CBT Theme 3: Parent as protector
versus perpetrator, pp. 273-278).
It’s possible that certain parents and children would not attend the treatment
because they rejected the basic structure or premises of the treatment, and thus might not
be considered trauma survivors. I consider this further in the discussion when thinking of
therapy as recapitulating a form of colonization. Following this line of inquiry, I looked
for examples in the manual of children that somehow didn’t fit the definition of
traumatized or didn’t behave in ways the manual would expect a traumatized child to act.
The following forms of resisting trauma therapy and recommended therapist responses to
these problem behaviors (noted in parenthesis) were described in the manual:
•

Child remains silent (ask open ended questions);

•

Child resists psychoeducation (educate the parent or turn the
psychoeducation into a game);

•

Child doesn’t want to feel better or relax (say: “Everyone has a right to
feel pleasure. This is a safe place, you won’t be harmed while you are
here” p. 85);

246
•

Parent doesn’t believe in therapy (challenge cognitions about therapy
adherence using thought-replacement, interpret resistance as part of
trauma pathology: “suggest that the mother’s guilty feelings about the
accident might make her believe that she did not have the right to get
well” (p. 48);

•

Family is in crisis and doesn’t see importance of trauma treatment (remind
parent of outcomes on initial assessment of PTSD and the importance of
trauma related work over crisis);

•

Parents don’t bring child to treatment (explain importance and then
eventually offer “an out” p. 52);

•

Parents don’t think their child is improving fast enough (educate with
parenting skills, reinforce caring and “maternal gestures” p. 73), and;

•

Family culture embraces “inaccurate beliefs” about the trauma (identify
cultural leaders in community to support therapists in thought-replacement
and cognitive restructuring).

Anger and aggression were often identified as a problematic response to trauma,
which I have explored further in TF-CBT Exemplar 1 (pp. 284-288).
Thematic discussion: Trauma is universal and culture-free. In sum, the TFCBT manual reduced the unique, personal and culturally-specific expressions of trauma
through the process of standardized assessment (e.g., counting total traumas, symptoms
checklists), by applying the word “trauma” to all life experiences that involved suffering,
through re-writing the end of the trauma narrative as one that is necessarily positive and
happy, and through lack of acknowledgement of the specific cultural context (e.g., U.S.,
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middle-class, white) that is embedded in and reproduced by the manual scripts and
structure. The manual attempted to position itself as culturally competent and amenable
to wide dissemination and exportation nationally and internationally by suggesting that
all humans experience trauma similarly (e.g., have the same biological underpinnings)
and by using thought-terminating clichés (“respect cultural context”, provide a
“symphony of support”) about culture that avoid discussion of more difficult questions
about encountering cultural difference in the therapy room.
The manual did not overtly exclude any child or parent from the definition of
trauma, but did interpret resistance to treatment as if it was part of the trauma pathology
rather than rejection of the treatment and perhaps of the traumatized label. This was often
accomplished by directing the therapist to reframe the parent’s response as a form of
denial or guilt, by giving more education, or by assuming the thoughts were inaccurate.
Despite its emphasis on cultural sensitivity, when problematic behaviors arise in
treatment the manual did not propose that the therapist consider the cultural reasons for
resistance, such as the therapy being a form of cultural colonization, instead techniques
like psychoeducation, thought-replacement, or increased number of sessions is
recommended when a child and parent are unsure about the treatment. This was the same
pattern that was described by Young (1995) in the VA; when a patient resists treatment
give them a more restrictive treatment plan and more therapy.
Overall, the treatment developers benefit from universalizing trauma and seeing
the treatment as culture-free because it allows their manual and protocols to be used in a
wide-range of settings and countries. On a political level, when personal narratives of
trauma are disappeared or flattened and thus amenable to a one-size fits all treatment, it
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makes responding to disasters and crises much easier: train therapists in a treatment
manual and send affected persons to therapy. Thus it is not only the developers but also
those who wish to retain the status quo of political and power arrangements who benefit
from broad applications of the word trauma and manualized treatments. To think or talk
about a trauma in more nuanced and complex ways not only takes time and responsibility
on the part of the community, but also might actually lead to political change.
Shared Exemplar: Indoctrination into a Social Void of Scientistic Managed Care
Exemplars are stories or vignettes that capture what the human being is like in a
particular cultural or historical situation. In this study I looked for exemplars that
captured what human being is like in trauma culture in such a way that it could be
recognized in other situations that might have very different objective circumstances,
including those outside of the practice of psychotherapy. In particular, I focused on
identifying the therapeutic techniques and practices that trauma treatment manuals
prescribed to training therapists, and noted the similarity between these techniques and
practices to others in the social world.
The shared exemplar, which I titled, indoctrination into a social void of scientistic
managed care, has four primary features: presentation of an origin myth, locating
pathology and healing within the dyad, overreliance on forms, hand-outs and
PowerPoints, and directive psychoeducation and thought-replacement.
Exemplar findings: Indoctrination into a social void of scientistic managed
care. This section presents quotations from the Cohen et al., TF-CBT manual that are
representative of this shared exemplar. I have divided the section according to the four
features listed above.
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Presentation of the therapy’s origin myth. Samelson (1974) coined the term
“origin myth” to describe the presentation of an apolitical, trans-historical narrative of
incremental progress towards an objective truth and science. In an origin myth, the
subject is decontextualized and presented in the form of discoveries from individual
geniuses (typically white Euro-American men) who each contributed to the development
of the contemporary understanding of psychology.45 The purpose of an origin myth is to
provide legitimacy to contemporary psychological concepts by presenting them as facts
that have existed in the same form for hundreds or even thousands of years (e.g., as long
as our ancestors fought for food with lions in the Serengeti). Each of the manuals
included some version origin myth and often this myth was incorporated into
psychoeducation about why the patient should be attending the specific form of therapy
prescribed by the manual.
The strongest example of an origin myth in the Cohen et al. manual was in the
progressive relaxation module where TF-CBT techniques were described as being
derived from and similar to a form of ancient Indian meditation:
It’s called meditation, which is an ancient practice that Eastern religions have
used for centuries. Studies have shown that, like belly breathing, meditation can
reverse the effects of stress and trauma on our bodies, not just during the times
45

While origin myths can be characterized as embodying a positivist orientation to search
for objective truth, Samelson pointed out that even the roots of positivist philosophy have
been obscured by origin myths and re-appropriated into scientific discourse. Positivism
emerged in the chaos of post-revolutionary Europe (1850s) in which the tools of science
were promoted as a method to gain new social order and freedom from noble rule. Thus,
positivist ideology was not born from an impulse to create politically neutral and factual
knowledge; yet, in practice positivism became the “doctrine of the scientific expert” that
emphasized technology for pragmatic rather than ideological purposes (Samelson, 1974).
Contemporary understandings of the history of psychology are similarly rooted social
political context but suggest that psychological knowledge is ahistorical, universal and
factual.
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that we are meditating, but all the time, if we keep practicing it. Do you have any
ideas about what meditating is like? [The child may describe yoga or other
impressions of meditation here.] Some people think about yoga positions that look
really hard to do, or of people sitting on top of mountains in India. But the truth is,
you can meditate anywhere. […] if your focus is interrupted by thoughts coming
into your head, you observe your own thoughts but do not judge or act on them.
(p. 79)
Here the contemporary technologies of the treatment are connected to generic or
stereotyped images of “an ancient practice” (p. 79) (e.g., people sitting on top of
mountains in India practicing some Eastern religion). While one could argue that the
manual is trying to acknowledge these traditions, the limited amount of description (e.g.,
three lines about ancient Eastern practice) would suggest that this myth has been included
in the manual to invoke the sense of a tradition in order to rationalize the contemporary
practice.
Location of pathology and healing in the dyad. In the TF-CBT manual all human
relationships were described in dyadic form. The primary dyads included: parent-child,
perpetrator-victim, trauma survivor-therapist and child-protector. At times the perpetrator
was described as the non-offending parent, in which case there was an assumed
relationship of perpetrator as offending parent and victim as child, as well as protector as
non-offending parent and victim as child. While some traumas by nature seemed to call
for inclusion of the social world beyond the dyad (e.g., terrorist attacks, natural disasters),
subsequent healing from social traumas was never proposed in a community or even
group setting within the manual, but instead within the child/victim-therapist dyad. In
fact, the manual strongly guarded against group trauma therapy treatment (Cohen et al.,
2006, p. 36). The manual only called for a minimum one conjoint session between the
parent, child and therapist, which was perhaps the greatest extension of the healing
relationship beyond the dyad; yet, the purpose of the conjoint session was for the
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therapist to transition away from healer and protector and allow the parent to step into
that role within the parent-child dyad. Outside of obvious exclusion of the social world
by heavily focusing on the dyad, there are further assumptions about human parenting
relationships (i.e., that the child’s primary caregiver is a parent and that only one
participates in the healing) which are discussed further in TF-CBT Theme 4: Parents as
protectors or perpetrators (pp. 279-284).
Over-reliance on forms, handouts, and PowerPoint in therapy. The TF-CBT
manual relied heavily on quantifying human experience using technologies such as
monitoring SUDs and checklist assessments for symptom improvement. Most of these
technologies were communicated in therapy via forms and handouts. For example, after
each session the child was asked to rate their distress on a scale from 0 to 10 or 0 to 5
using a thermometer, a scale with happy faces, or something called “the symptom
tracking-child report” which compared SUDs at the start and end of each therapy session
across the 12 sessions (MUSC, 2005). These ratings were recorded on a form and
periodically presented to the child to show them they had improved over the course of
therapy. After a session the therapist was recommended to give homework in the form of
several handouts.
The primary homework in TF-CBT was entitled “Practicing the cognitive triangle
during the week” (p. 226). The interconnection between thinking, feeling and action was
represented in the manual as “The Cognitive Triangle,” which I have reproduced in
Figure 3. Despite the portrayal of an equal connection between all three elements in the
figure, the triangle might have been better represented as a hierarchy with thoughts at the
top because the focus of most of the TF-CBT intervention components were on thoughts
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(Components 5–7). The homework for the cognitive triangle included the cognitive
triangle at the top followed by instructions for the child to go back through their week
and think about upsetting situations and then to “ask yourself whether that thought is 1)
accurate or 2) helpful. Come up with alternative thoughts in this situation and write down
how they make you feel and whether they are accurate or helpful” (p. 226). The handout
included blank spaces for the child to identify the situation, thought, feeling, and behavior
and then write in positive and functional replacement thoughts, feelings and behaviors.
Homework also involved additional psychoeducation about trauma. For example
the manual Appendix included:
information sheets to both the child and parent that include such information as
how many children are sexually abused by the age of 18, what are the different
types of sexual abuse, who molests children, and why many children do not tell
others about the sexual abuse. These information sheets can dispel many myths
that the child and parent have about sexual abuse and its consequences. (p. 59)
The forms were justified as a way for the therapist to provide the child and parent
with facts, as if verbal communication from the therapist was somehow less legitimate
than information via printed form:
When the child and parent learn ‘facts’ about the effects of witnessing domestic
violence or being a victim of school or community violence, etc., misinformation
is dispelled and child and parent learn that many other families have encountered
a similar terrifying or tragic event and that this particular family is not alone with
regard to the difficult challenges that they now face. Sample information sheets
are included in Appendix 1. (p. 60)
The TF-CBT manual’s Appendix 1 (p. 207- 228) included two information sheets
on domestic violence, two information sheets on child sexual abuse, a relaxation handout
entitled “How stress and PTSD affect our bodies,” an affective modulation handout
entitled “Ways to feel better right now,” the cognitive triangle practice sheet (described
above) and a sheet with months of the year called “The circle of life” (p. 228).
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Though it appeared there were plenty of handouts for a therapist to utilize during
and after session with the patient, the manual also directed the therapist to TF-CBT web
supplementary material (MUSC, 2005). I examined this resource and found the additional
handouts on types of “thinking mistakes” and more SUDs symptom tracking sheets (for
parent, child and therapist). The website also included over twenty books and websites
for parents and children to learn more about PTSD.
In sum, in an average TF-CBT therapy session the child would be given at least
one in-session handout, such as SUDs symptom tracking sheets, and one homework
assignment such as the cognitive triangle worksheet. The therapist would also use at least
one handout to monitor patient progress and potentially a CBT based treatment plan. The
parent could be provided anywhere from one to five psychoeducation handouts after an
initial session and provided with referrals to over twenty additional books.
Directive psychoeducation and cognitivist thought-replacement. After
administering a standardized assessment for PTSD, the manual recommended therapy
begin with the therapist telling the child and parent what their child has experienced
through a form of education called psychoeducation. The aim of psychoeducation was to,
“to normalize both the child’s and parent’s response to the traumatic events and to
reinforce accurate cognitions about what occurred” (p. 59) and to “provide information
about common emotional and behavioral responses to the traumatic event that the child
has experienced. Any available empirical information bearing on this issue is shared with
both the child and parent. Scientific information that documents common reactions to a
specific type of trauma provides significant emotional validation” (p. 60). Thus the first
therapy hour is spent largely with the therapist providing feedback from the initial
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assessment and talking about what trauma and PTSD are based on in the TF-CBT
medical conceptualization of trauma (see Chapter II: Background and Literature Review,
pp. 9-48).
The manual recommended the therapist include the essential following elements
in initial parent psychoeducation:
•

The child is having significant PTSD or other trauma-related symptoms.

•

Clinical experience as well as research suggests that these PTSD and other
trauma-related symptoms need to be addressed as early as possible to
prevent long-term difficulties.

•

Review the PTSD and other trauma-related symptoms the child is
experiencing, based on the clinical assessment that has been completed
prior to treatment initiation.

•

Talking directly about the trauma is important in resolving these difficulties
and integrating the experience into the child’s life in an optimal way.

•

This component will be implemented in a gradual, supportive manner so
that the child will be able to tolerate the discomfort associated with such
discussion; furthermore, it will typically not be initiated until the child has
learned some skills to help him/her cope with the discomfort.

•

The therapist will work in collaboration with the parent throughout
treatment, and the therapist welcomes the parent’s suggestions at any time.

•

People of different religions, ethnicities, and cultures have different ways
of expressing and dealing with trauma responses; the therapist is eager to
learn from the child and parent the traditions and rituals of their culture,
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religion, and family and will remain respectful of these in the treatment
process. (p. 62-63)
After establishing the rationale for the therapy via the medical model for PTSD
and supported research, the therapist proceeds through the phases of therapy outlined in
Figure 3. One of the last steps of therapy was challenge the negative and dysfunctional
cognitions the patient has learned. According to the manual,
The term cognitive coping refers to a variety of interventions that encourage
children and caregivers to explore their thoughts in order to ultimately challenge
and correct cognitions that are either inaccurate or unhelpful (Beck, 1995;
Seligman, Reivich, Jaycox, & Gillham, 1995). Knowledge and life experiences
help individuals make sense of traumatic events. However, given children’s
limited experiential and knowledge base, they may be particularly prone to
inaccurate or dysfunctional thoughts about traumatic experiences, and these
thoughts can negatively influence their developing views and belief system.
(p. 107)
Thus the primary focus of thought replacement is for the therapist to decide which
thoughts are functional, helpful and positive and which are inaccurate and unhelpful and
to train the child to replace these thoughts. Despite the child gaining a particular form of
traumatic knowledge and life experience from the traumatic event, this knowledge is
assumed to be potentially dangerous. The fear is that if the child’s post-traumatic
thoughts are not replaced in therapy this will have a negative effect on their development
and belief system.
Throughout the manual the Socratic method (reframed as thought challenging or
cognitive restructuring) and thought replacement worksheets like the cognitive triangle
described earlier (Cohen et al., 2006, p. 226) were used to direct and train child patient in
how to identifying dysfunctional thoughts and replacing them with other thoughts. One
form of thought replacement in TF-CBT was called positive-self talk:
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Positive self-talk consists of focusing on the child’s strengths instead of the
negative aspects in any given situation. […] Children may benefit from
recognizing (and focusing attention on) the fact that, despite great adversity, they
are coping—and are often coping quite well. Positive self-talk requires the
therapist to help the child recognize the ways in which he/she is coping well and
to remind the child to verbalize these ways, particularly when feeling
discouraged. (pp. 92-93)
Examples of positive-self talk statements included:
•

I can get through this

•

Things are hard now, but they will get better

•

I still have a family, and they will help me

•

Lots of people care about me and my family

•

Some things have changed, but lots of things are the same as they were
before this happened (e.g., “I still do well in school, I still have friends,
I’m still good at math”; p. 93)

In previous sections of the results I have provided additional examples of child
and parent thought-replacement (see pp. 144-149).
Another aspect of cognitive restructuring in TF-CBT was thought interruption, in
which thoughts are simply stopped rather than replaced or altered. According to the
manual,
Thought interruption is an affective modulation technique that can short-circuit
the cycle of negative thinking that is often problematic for traumatized children
(thoughts of the traumatic event lead to cognitive distortions, which lead to more
upsetting thoughts and more cognitive distortions, and so on, or dwelling
unproductively on very negative thoughts and scenarios). This technique can also
prepare the child for cognitive-processing interventions because it teaches
children that they can have control over their thoughts. (p. 91)
The manual acknowledged that thought interruption is contradictory to the trauma
narrative, exposure approach that the therapist should have utilized three sessions prior.
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The authors suggest that thought interruption can be more functional than narrative
processing when children:
need to be focused on things going on around them, such as at school, when
playing sports, or interacting with friends. Applying this technique teaches
children, first and foremost, that they have control over their own thoughts—not
just which thoughts they choose to focus on, but also when they focus on which
thoughts. (p. 91)
Mastering these techniques before creating the trauma narrative can help some
children feel confident that if they start to feel overwhelmed while talking directly
about the traumatic event, they will be able to interrupt or control these reactions.
(p. 92)
Thus the primary focus of thought stopping is to train the child how to stop
thinking when they are overwhelmed with traumatic symptoms and need to focus on
being a functional or productive worker in school.
Exemplar discussion: Indoctrination into scientistic managed care. This
exemplar had four primary features: presentation of an origin myth, locating pathology
and healing within the dyad, overreliance on forms, hand-outs and PowerPoints, and
directive psychoeducation and cognitivist thought-replacement. Many of these features
are therapeutic techniques that shift therapy into a form of indoctrination into a world of
scientistic managed care that ignores social relationships outside of the dyad and values
compliance and control as good ways to be human.
To indoctrinate the patients into the culture of managed care the TF-CBT
treatment begins with an assessment process where trauma is decontextualized from the
social world as a set of symptoms or count of traumatic events. The way these events and
symptoms are packaged via diagnostic assessment allows for easy communication to
administrative bodies for treatment and planning purposes, as well as ongoing
monitoring. The therapist explains patient distress according to a concrete, ahistorical and
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acultural set of PTSD symptoms and informs the child patients and their parents that their
experiences are part of a common and well-understood medical pathology that can be
cured with the healing technologies of a 12- 16 session treatment: TF-CBT. The
treatment is of course covered by the patients insurance (because it was designed to be
so) and thus seems like an easy or natural fit for the child and parent to pursue.
The TF-CBT manual utilized origin myths in psychoeducational scripts to suggest
to the patient and therapist that the values and practices of the therapy have existed for
centuries and are part of an ancient tradition. Origin myths appeal to the patients’
common sense; they believe they are practicing part of a time-tested healing tradition.
Additional psychoeducation suggests that the formulation of mental illness that the
therapist is presenting is biologically-based, universal, normal, common and to be
expected after a trauma. Because the psychoeducation is designed to present problems
that the therapy will cure (e.g., children have dysfunctional thoughts after trauma that
impact their development for life, this therapy targets dysfunctional thoughts) it
indoctrinates the patient to want the exact type of treatment that they will be offered. This
is why forms of resistance to treatment are often met with more psychoeducation; the
assumption being that if the patient were to be presented with more knowledge, science
and explanation about their problem they will understand how the therapy is integral.
These techniques and ways of being are not limited to TF-CBT therapy or
psychotherapy in general, which is why they have been identified as part of an exemplar.
The techniques (i.e., origin myths, location of healing in the dyad, forms and handouts,
and directive psychoeducation) are all ways that messages about how to be a good human
are communicated by therapists serving in the role of expert in contemporary society.
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Many of the techniques and practices identified in this exemplar are similar to
those described by Cushman and Gilford (2000) in their article “Will managed care
change our way of being?” In this paper, they described how the definition of mental
health disorders, nature and length of treatment deeply affect understandings of what is
healthy, normal, and good about human being. Though this article was written over 14
years ago, at the time of this study (2014), it has only increased in relevance. Managed
care has significantly increased its control of psychotherapy. The article presented how
diagnostic practices take for granted several contemporary assumptions about human
being including: the idea that bias and prejudgment can be removed from the assessment
process, that the way a patient is feeling can be observed through checklist-based forms
of inquiry, that human distress and psychological life are constituted by concrete,
ahistorical, acultural mental health categories, that these categories can be studied
objectively by experts to determine proper planning and administration of treatment
techniques, and that the therapist can apply predetermined techniques to a patient
suffering from a particular diagnosis in a particular time period. The article discusses a
litany of further assumptions that suggested that psychological ills are simple to
understand and fix, and that the self is “highly concrete, psychologically uncomplicated,
behavioral and monocultural” (p. 987). What Cushman and Guilford are suggesting is
that managed care evidence-based practices reflect and shape our way of being and our
understanding of the self.
What is important about these practices is that is that they rely on subtle
assumptions about the patient, such as that the patient does not know what s/he has
experienced and need to be educated about his or her symptoms; these assumptions have
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associated moral implications and political functions. In this case, there is only room
within the therapy for the psychoeducation that is written in the manual. The social
understandings about the causes of trauma that emerge outside of the dyad and symptoms
that do not fall within a cognitivist understanding of PTSD that gives primacy to the
individual and the interior self cannot come to light within the TF-CBT therapy.
The practices also rely on instrumental technologies, such as worksheets and
forms with quantitative monitoring systems, which are difficult to become aware of and
resist via therapy given their directive content, scientific presentation, yet non-assuming
delivery format. When I say non-assuming, I mean that patients are not forced to absorb
the messages of healing in a top-down coercive manner, rather they are given a form or
worksheet that can seem optional or supplementary to the therapy. Yet a patient takes the
text home, leaves it on his or her kitchen counter or carries it around in his or her bag
after a therapy session; the therapy grows into the daily practice of the patient’s life even
if s/he chooses to not to read the form or complete the homework. If the patient does
choose to regard the homework, then that would mean completing daily thought
monitoring with the knowledge that it will be reported back and monitored again by the
therapist, their supervisor and perhaps entered into an electronic chart to monitor
improvement. In the case of a child patient, it would require the parent to ensure their
child is completing their thought-replacement homework everyday. The form becomes an
extension of the clinical-gaze (cf. Foucault) and self-surveillance that is promoted in the
manual: one should always be aware of and control their thoughts. The inclusion of
worksheets and forms in the everyday life of the patient, parent and therapist means that
all parties involved in therapy may embody the social practices described in the manual;
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as therapy progresses and forms and psychoeducation are repeated it will only make
sense to the patients to monitor their thoughts on a worksheet and for the therapists to
respond to patient resistance with more forms and psychoeducation.
Like Foucault’s (1995) description of the prison shifting to the asylum and then
morphing into the clinic and now into self-help books, this type of self-surveillance is
completed not because the patient is pressured to or can’t avoid absorbing the doctrine
but because forms and compliance with managed care principles is associated with
healing from trauma and being a good trauma survivor. The patients want to comply and
control their thoughts because they are told and have come to believe through subtle
messages in therapy and in daily life (e.g., neoliberal ideals) that that is what they should
do to return to society as a functional worker and a good person. Similarly, Cushman
(2013) suggested that the reason that patients accept the practices suggested by evidencebased treatments, like TF-CBT, is not that they are mandated or are better than other
practices but they, “fit hand-in-glove with the predominant self of the early 21st century.
They seem to mainstream therapists and researchers to be unquestioningly correct
because they speak the predominant language of our time” (p. 2). Cushman suggests what
makes sense about evidence-based practices is the language of cognitivism and meeting
the needs of the “multiple-self,” which is characterized by,
a significant attenuation of interiority. It is marked by a propensity to gather
about itself a number of identities that are located around the outside of the
person, external to but identified with the individual, although this identification
takes on a different, less essential, or intense valance than identifications within a
deep self. This is an exterior self with less complex or conflicted identities to
draw from ⎯ identities that cluster on, not inside, the individual, decorating and
standing ready to appear on center stage when the need arises. (p. 3)
He continued that unlike the empty self of the 20th century that was filled with a
gnawing drive to consumerism, the multiple-self in the context of managed care and
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evidence-based therapies is one that can present for public viewing to the social needs of
the moment. When extending this concept to my interpretation of this exemplar in the
TF-CBT manual, the patient is encouraged by the therapy to present as a particular type
of traumatized patient whose symptoms can easily fit within a modular, predetermined
checklist and whose thoughts and feelings can be simply exchanged and replaced as
needed. The self is compliant, easy to make sense of, and readily adaptable or even
replaceable in the moment (e.g., change your thoughts like switching the channel on the
TV). The patient is prescribed modules in which a type of self that is deeply emotional is
accepted (e.g., trauma narrative exposure) and in another module they are expected to
restrain and shut off emotions and thoughts as needed (e.g., thought stopping, emotional
regulation).
In sum, the way of human being that is reflected and reproduced by the Cohen et
al. manual is highly compliant and modular. It is so amenable to management and
managed care that the therapist and patient’s daily life and practices reflect the decision
trees and symptom monitoring technologies (e.g., SUDS, worksheets, electronic charting)
that are used in treatment planning. Questions of morality and political function do not
come to light through the treatment, yet there are strong moral and political messages that
are communicated through the manual and are taken for granted or assumed to be natural.
What it means to be good according to this manual is to respond to upsetting, confusing
and violent social and political events by going to individual therapy and embodying
uncomplicated, asocial, acultural symptoms that align with the cognitivist
psychoeducational trauma narrative about PTSD; symptoms that can be quantitatively
monitored for both therapeutic and insurance or administrative purposes. According to
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my interpretation of the manual, the patient should come to present daily political distress
in such a way that their symptoms are amenable to the specific structure and assumptions
of managed care, evidence-based therapies that ultimately serve the needs of insurance
companies and not the patient or their community.
TF-CBT Theme 1: Children Are Born With Pre-Traumatic Innocence
In this section, I present the first theme that I identified only for the TF-CBT
manual and that I did not interpret for the other two manuals. While studying Cohen et
al.’s (2006) manual I interpreted the cultural practices and implicit understandings about
what a child and a parent are or should be in contemporary culture. When considering
what being a child is like in trauma-based society from the perspective of the Cohen et al.
manual, the specific theme I identified in this manual was that the cultural boundaries of
adulthood and childhood are blurred by trauma. In the context of the manual, childhood
seemed less representative of an age and more of an innocent, protected, and at times,
passive state, in which the child was not fully aware of and thus has no responsibility for
the world, their relationships, actions, and body. Trauma was described as any event that
was destructive of that innocent state, and events became more traumatic the more they
were associated with destroying the cultural qualities of childhood.
Thematic findings: Children are born with pre-traumatic innocence. The
Cohen et al. manual introduction stated, “Children may experience depressive feelings
after a trauma, which may arise in response to an abrupt loss of trust in other people and
the world (e.g., a loss of innocence, trust, faith or hope in the future)” (p. 7). The manual
reiterated, “Traumatized children may also develop cognitions that contribute to their loss
of faith in justice, God or a benign future” (p. 12). In other words, children come into the
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world with an innocent faith in its working and the trauma destroys the child’s blind trust
in the world.
The younger the child the more they were associated with being good and having
the right to protection and a good life. Infants were especially associated with innocence
to the extent that the manual had a small section for working with families who have had
an infant child die. The manual discussed how the family would idealize the infant,
“Because the infants do not have a chance to grow-up we freeze them as ‘little angels’ in
our minds forever” (p. 186). The manual discussed the concept of child innocence as
diminishing as the child becomes an adolescent (at an undefined age somewhere between
12 and 16) when it is expected that the child will begin to act more like an adult, separate
from the dyad of the parent, and engage in “age-appropriate independence and
separation/individuation” (p. 39).
The phrase “age-appropriate” was used repeatedly, “children may avoid ageappropriate peer interactions, preferring to associate with peers who have emotional
and/or behavioral problems” (p. 10), “it is important to recognize developmental
differences between adolescents and younger children, and to encourage age-appropriate
independence and separation/individuation from parental authority,” (p. 39); and,
“Providing realistic, age-appropriate reassurance is important” (p. 101).
The language about age-appropriateness increased in chapters about sexual abuse,
“Some children accidentally reveal their abuse by exhibiting adult-like sexual behaviors
or by sharing sexual knowledge that is beyond their years” (p. 217); and “Children may
exhibit symptoms that are more specific to sexual abuse, such as repetitive sexual talk
and play, age-inappropriate sexual behavior” (p. 214). An explicit definition of what
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constituted age-appropriate behavior was absent but was implied to be very simple,
asexual, pleasant and protected from adult-like content (namely content devoid of
complexity, abstract or philosophical thinking, sexuality, anxiety, horror, or violence).
The manual described children as essentially pure, without knowledge or
experience; yet, they were also described as innately rational beings, little logical
thinkers, that seek order midst the chaos of trauma, “Following a traumatic event,
children will typically search for an explanation for why something so terrible has
happened to them or their loved ones. If no rational explanation is found, children may
develop irrational beliefs about causation in order to gain some sense of control or
predictability” (Cohen et al., 2006, p. 11).
The premise of treatment in the Cohen et al. manual was based on correcting the
thoughts of the child (which the manual refers to as cognitive distortions) to be more
rationalist and adult-like, while also rebuilding a sense of innocence, naïveté and ageappropriate behavior in therapy. The technologies that embody this premise include ageappropriate psychoeducation and thought-replacement exercises, in which the therapist
provides the child a narrative about the traumatization and then identifies which of the
child’s thoughts are irrational and unhelpful (i.e., that deviate from the therapeutic
narrative) and trains the child to stop thinking these thoughts. In practice, the therapist’s
message to the child about how to react to trauma is somewhat confusing: we want you to
know enough about the world in a rational way to make sense of what has happened to
you, but we don’t want you to know so much about this world that your innocence is
corrupted by the reality of guilt, shame, or horror you experienced. The message
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encourages the child to engage with the therapist in order to deny the negative realities of
the trauma.
Thematic discussion: Children are born with pre-traumatic innocence. The
concept that trauma destroys the child’s innate innocence is not timeless or natural, but
embedded in a culturally constructed tradition. Several scholars have written about how
the concept of childhood has shifted throughout centuries and have posed questions about
what constitutes a child in the contemporary social clearing (Archard, 2004; Matthews,
1994, 2010). I summarized these views in the Specific Background Information Relevant
to Results (pp. 100-132) and have referenced them to provide context, but I have not
suggested that this history justifies the particular presentation of childhood in the Cohen
et al. manual.
Following Gadamer’s (2004) insights about the political uses of “claiming the
right of the horizon” (see p. 149 in Methods)—when applied rigidly, developmental
theories necessarily do not allow other possibilities about childhood to come to light. For
example, to maintain that there is only one true understanding of childhood (e.g., like in
the TF-CBT manual where the child possesses an empty, naïve self that needs to achieve
certain developmental stages to reach maturity) is to avoid considering alternatives about
the experiences of children. The history of dominant theories of child development in
psychology in the 20th century suggest an overarching cultural belief that we need to
have a good theory about childhood in the first place; we cannot know children without
an expert, scientific theory of development. The study of children from the three primary
developmental perspectives (innatism, experientialism and recapitulation, see pp. 115119 in Background and Literature Review Chapter) has no doubt led to interesting
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insights and life-changing research. However, there has been little room within the
contemporary clearing for alternative lines of inquiry about children’s experience, and in
this case experiences with trauma, beyond knowing more about them in a scientistic way.
Matthews (1994) a leading scholar in the philosophy of childhood, noted that children
have fallen into what Kant called “the kingdom of ends” (p. 27) and, like Foucault’s
(1973) commentary on madness, children have firmly become objects of study. This
typifies one of the ways of being in a contemporary, trauma-based society: societal
problems can be resolved with further rational study and knowledge.
In hermeneutic terms, traumatic events allow childhood to fall out of
everydayness; when this happens, questions about what a child is are demanded of
society. Following Cushman’s (1995) understanding that therapists usually maintain
society’s particular constitution of the self, the TF-CBT manual can be interpreted as the
cultural script maintaining the mainstream conception of a child. The therapists’ job is to
reconstitute the boundaries of the cultural clearing of childhood by following the manual.
When the trauma might be considered either a point of questioning or laying out of takenfor-granted assumptions in the world, it is framed in the TF-CBT manual as the site of
cultural destruction and repair. The trauma must be removed, processed, and/or
reintegrated in order to relocate the child within childhood or, in some cases, to assist the
child in his or her cultural transition to another state or role (e.g., adulthood, adolescence,
child-survivor).
In the case of the Cohen et al. manual, childhood innocence can be restored
through introducing rationality and a type of naïve, age-appropriate, unknowing (and at
times active rejection) of traumatic experience through the process of therapy. The
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unstated primary goal of TF-CBT therapy was to reconstitute and preserve the ideal of
the innocent child in an otherwise traumatic world. This brings us to the question: Why
was the particular ideal of childhood innocence as a way of being important for human
being at the time of the manual’s creation (2001-2006) and beyond? Before approaching
this question, I first discuss the other relevant themes about childhood that I identified
through my readings of the manual.
TF-CBT Theme 2: Children Are Not Sexual
In this section, I present the second theme that I identified only for the TF-CBT
manual and that I did not interpret for the other two manuals. While studying Cohen et
al.’s (2006) manual I interpreted the cultural practices and implicit understandings about
what a child and a parent are or should be in contemporary culture; one of these taken for
granted assumptions was that children are not sexual. This theme could be seen as what I
referred to in the Methods chapter as a “silence” (pp. 165-166), in that I interpreted a
pattern of lack of discussion about child sexual behavior and sexuality in the manual.
Thematic findings: Children are not sexual. There is a plethora of information
provided in the Cohen et al. manual about treating traumatic stress from sexual abuse and
how to talk to children about preventing future sexual abuse (see Appendix in Cohen et
al., 2006, p. 220), but there is no other mention about how to otherwise talk to children
about sex, sexuality, or sexual behavior. The psychoeducation provided to children about
sexual abuse in the manual primarily focuses on telling children how to possess their
bodies and say “No!”, “All children need to know is that their body belongs to them. If
you feel uncomfortable in the way you are being treated you can tell the person, NO!”
(p. 222).
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While the manual emphasizes the age-appropriate nature of psychoeducation
broadly, the sections about sexual abuse education are not tailored to different ages. The
nuances of unique experiences of the trauma of sexual abuse from the perspective of
different ages, genders, settings, families, or cultures is flattened by the manual to “just
say NO” to people touching you and to sex. While it has been shown that children and
adolescents are engaging in sex (Centers for Disease Control [CDC], 2011; Fine &
McClelland, 2007; Foster & D'Emilio, 2012; Heins, 2001; Kehily, 2012)46 a discussion of
sex separate from the context of abuse is absent in this manual.
From the stand-point of evaluating the Cohen et al. manual as an evidence-based
CBT treatment, one might expect more specific psychoeducation to be provided to

46

During the time the TF-CBT manual was developed and disseminated, the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control surveyed children aged 15 through 18 from 2006 to 2010 about a
narrow form of sexual activity—vaginal heterosexual intercourse. They found that 43%
of never-married teenaged (15 through 18) females experienced heterosexual vaginal
intercourse at least once. The half of the females surveyed who did have sex under the
age of 18 reported having sex for the first time at age 14 or younger (18.9% before age 14
versus 9.4% between 15-17 and 8.9% between 18 and 19); 41% reported that they “really
wanted it to happen at the time,” 48% reported that “a part of me wanted it to happen at
the time and a part of me didn’t’” and 10% reported that they “didn’t want it to happen at
the time.” 41.8% of never married males ages 15 through 18 also experienced vaginal
heterosexual intercourse at least once before the age of 18. Of that group, the majority
surveyed also had sexual intercourse before age 14 (8.9% before age 14 versus 3.7%
between 15-17 and 4% between 18 and 19 years old). The majority of males reported that
they “really wanted it to happen at the time” (62% vs. 32.5% mixed feelings and 5%
didn’t want it to happen). 32% of male teens in this same age group also reported having
between three and five sexual partners (p. 14). For women, sexual partners were more
likely to be three or more years older (17%) while men reported relatively equal
distribution of their partners age (i.e., similar probability that partner was same age,
younger or older than them).
Notably the CDC did not include gay, lesbian, queer or other sexual orientations in
its assessment of sexual activity, nor did it include assessments of children younger than
15, or forms of sexual activity outside of vaginal intercourse. Given the amount of
exclusions from the survey it is likely that the percentage of teens and possibly pre-teens
engaging in some form sexual activity is greater than 43%.
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children about sex and sexual activity given that early versions of the manual were
designed to respond and specifically treat child sexual abuse (Cohen & Mannarino, 1992,
1993, 1998) and sexual abuse is a primary trauma of focus in many examples in the
manual (89 mentions). Despite this centrality, while most psychoeducational scripts in
the manual go into great detail about what should be expected from the world (e.g., how
to respond to terrorist attacks, how to make a safety plan, how to change your thoughts
and brain) there is not much detail about what one should expect to encounter when it
comes to sex and sexuality in the world. Furthermore there was no identified framework
to elicit qualitative discussions about sex from the child (other than to rehearse the trauma
narrative of sexual abuse) nor was there a suggestion or framework for a broader
discussion of sexuality separate from psychoeducation about abuse.
Thematic discussion: Children are not sexual. The dearth of information about
sex or exploration into the child’s perception of the trauma or their understandings of sex
outside of sexual abuse in the Cohen et al. manual suggests that discussions about sex are
unnecessary or perhaps even inappropriate. The message that may be sent to the child
during TF-CBT therapy is that sex and bodies are private and should not be discussed. By
not making room for discussions about sex or understanding about how sexuality
intersects with childhood, identity, and trauma in ways outside of body possession and
saying no, the therapy in some ways aligns with sexual trauma by retaining a narrow and
secretive view about sex. Ironically and unfortunately, the message that is tacitly
promoted in the manual through avoidance of other discussions about sex and sexuality is
similar to the narrative that many abusers tell children (i.e., let’s keep sex a secret).
Archard (2004) noted that, “our justified abhorrence of sexual abuse should not blind us
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either to the possibility that children can engage in sexually non-abusive activities, or to
the realities of any child’s actual sexuality. Indeed, talk of the child’s essential innocence
is in danger of being mythic, and ironically, of being sexualized” (p. 105). It is likely that
there is a realm of other understandings that children may have about sex and sexuality in
a post-sexual abuse scenario that go beyond body ownership and the setting up of
boundaries post-trauma, but the manual doesn’t make room for this exploration in
therapy. What is lost in the obsession with protecting children in the TF-CBT manual is
an attempt at understanding how the child sees and experiences sex, sexuality, sexual
abuse and trauma given their complex experiences.
Michelle Fine (1988) has likened the emphasis on teaching children facts about
body protection, like that demonstrated in the TF-CBT manual, to Foucault’s (1980)
analysis of sexuality as being dominated by experts and science to guise fears and
political controversies; the introduction of the expert in these scenarios is often at the
price of hearing about sex and bodies from the patients themselves (see also Fine &
McClelland, 2007). Children’s reactions to abstinence psychoeducation following sexual
abuse in TF-CBT therapy have not been previously qualitatively evaluated and it might
be important to hear what children think about sex and sexuality (especially those who
are within the 12-18 year old ranges that according to the CDC are engaging in sex)
following the TF-CBT therapy treatment.
While there has been no research on child reactions to the sexual psychoeducation
(or lack thereof) in TF-CBT, prior qualitative explorations into childhood sexuality more
broadly have pointed out the disconnect between society’s association of child sexual
experiences and sexuality with maturity, agency, and loss of innocence (e.g., thinking
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about or having sex at certain ages means being out of control, naïve, or precocious) and
the child’s phenomenological experiences of sexuality in which sexual behavior and
thoughts are not necessarily linked with consent culture, submission/domination (e.g.,
owning of ones body) or loss of control (e.g., Clancy, 2009; Kehily, 2012; Ringrose,
2011). Given the cultural history and traditions of childhood innocence, it is easy to place
childhood experiences of sexuality within a dialectic of passive and innocent versus
agentic and tainted, or as Kehily (2012) pointed out in her deconstructionist study of girls
sexuality, in the dialectic of “girls at risk” and “can do girls.” Yet the adult emphasis on
purity, morality, and protection also places an anxious demand on a child’s experiences
of sexual abuse that forces the child’s understanding of the trauma and of sex into black
and white moral terms (e.g., guilty or innocent) and repetition of simplistic ideas of
protection (“Just say NO!”) that are disconnected from the complexities of sexuality in
contemporary society (e.g., the role of technologies, internet, neoliberal consumer
culture). 47
Though more qualitative explorations into sexual education and discussions of sex
in therapy with children are needed, a ten year federally funded evaluation of abstinence47

Just saying “No!” may not be an effective approach to sexual awareness and safety in
contemporary society primarily because children have been found to be encountering sex
in pervasive and complex ways, such as in entertainment and social media (Kehily, 2012;
Fine & McClelland, 2007). Increasingly in the past five years qualitative explorations
have focused on child sexual identity as it shapes and is shaped by online communities
and social networking sites (e.g., Ringrose, 2011).
It should also be noted that within psychology there are several schools of thought
about the recognition of sexuality and sexual behavior. Some see normative child
development as including curiosity about and experimentation with sex (Bancroft, 2000;
Fine & McClelland, 2007; Gebhard, Johnson, & Kinsey, 1979; Mac an Ghaill, 1994;
Thomson & Scott, 1991).
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base education approaches to sex found that they are ineffective at eliciting and changing
perceptions of sex and has no actual impact on sexual behavior (Trenholm et al., 2007).
Like most research on harm reduction versus abstinence for any behavior, previous
research has also found that the just say “No!” approach to sex is not actually effective at
preventing future sexual abuse or sexual activity with children (Brückner & Bearman,
2005; Haignere, Gold, & McDanel, 1999; Kirby, 1999, 2001, 2002; Kirby et al., 1997).
I should note that the mere recognition and discussion of this theme in this study
is no doubt controversial. To point out something taken for granted and culturally
protected opens us as a society to understanding our traditions in a new light; this can be
perceived as questioning, rejecting or threatening these traditions (Layton, 2006). In this
case, children and sex, sexuality, incest and sexual abuse are tied so closely to specific
cultural beliefs that we may protect and defend our stance on these issues quite strongly.
On a micro-level the concern about child abuse was reflected in the manual where sexual
abuse dominated the examples of trauma (89 mentions of sexual abuse versus 17 about
terrorism) and the majority of funding to create the manual was secured for randomized
control trials to treat child sexual abuse. On a societal level within the U.S., the
importance of the taboo on child sexuality is evidenced in the current (2014) political
climate of war, poverty, abortion and other national crises, when the government and the
public have not abandon but continue to fight passionately political battles about sex,
sexuality and women’s and children’s bodies.
Some scholars have interpreted the obsession with defending cultural ideals
during times of distress as diverting or even locating cultural distress (e.g., war and
poverty) within the child, woman and family (e.g., Fine, 2012; Haaken, 1995). When the
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world is unstable the family, and in particular the ideal of the white middle-class family,
becomes a locus of debate as society attempts to protect it from perceived cultural
dissolution.
When studying the Cohen et al. manual it is also important to remember that the
preliminary research leading to the initial development of this manual was conducted
during the early and mid- 90s, following the Herman-led movement (see Chapter II:
Background and Literature Review, pp. 88-98) to recognize child abuse, and in particular
incest and child abuse in psychology (Herman, 1997, 2000). These early manuals were
revised and combined into the Cohen et al. (2006) manual in such a way that they capture
both the vernacular of abuse and of terrorism to express the daily experiences of women
and children.
TF-CBT Unique Theme 3: Children Have No Agency During Traumatic Events
In this section, I present the third theme that I identified only for the TF-CBT
manual and that I did not interpret for the other two manuals. While studying Cohen et
al.’s (2006) manual I interpreted the cultural practices and implicit understandings about
what a child and a parent are or should be in contemporary culture; one of these taken for
granted assumptions was that children have limited to no agency during traumatic events.
Thematic findings: Children have no agency during traumatic events. One of
the primary aims of child TF-CBT was to correct the dysfunctional or irrational thoughts
that emerge after a trauma; one of the primary dysfunctional thoughts that the therapists
are encouraged to challenge and eventually replace is the belief that the trauma is the
child’s fault. The manual stated, “Children’s developmentally normal egocentric view of
the world may lead to self-blame for the traumatic event, which in turn may lead to
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depressive symptoms” (p. 7). To ensure that children do not blame themselves for the
trauma, the therapist is instructed to tell children and their parents that: a) the child is not
responsible or to blame for the action of adults or the traumatic event, and b) the child
could not have done anything to prevent the trauma from happening. The manual warned
the therapist, “Be careful not to say anything that sounds like you blame him/her, and be
sure to emphasize that the abuse is not his or her fault” (p. 218). The therapist was
instructed, “when possible it is best to postpone the active practice of [personal safety
skills] until later in therapy…A great deal of focus early in treatment on personal safety
skills may inadvertently encourage inappropriate feelings of responsibility and/or guilt
for not having done what the therapist is now suggesting” (p. 94). The therapist should
tell the child things like, “This is all very scary but the most important thing to remember
is that when adults fight, it’s never the child’s fault. Children can’t stop the fighting
between the adults in their home, no matter how good they are” and “No child is
responsible for what an adult does” (p. 221). With regards to sexual abuse the manual
stated, “Although the question of why sexual abuse occurs is frequently asked by children
and their caretakers, there is no simple answer. The main point to remember is that
children and adolescents who have experienced sexual abuse and their non-offending
parents are not to blame” (p. 218).
Thematic discussion: Children have no agency during traumatic events.
While it is often the case that the child could not prevent the trauma (or at least should
not be charged with that responsibility), there is a subtle message about the passive nature
of trauma victimization that is communicated to the child via the TF-CBT
psychoeducation. Outside of the issue of whether or not the child saw the experience as
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traumatic in the first place, anything the child did to lessen, prevent or perhaps exacerbate
the trauma is not recognized; their agency is subtly but forcefully ignored. The
developmental egocentric assumption and fear of creating guilt or responsibility for the
trauma is so great that the therapists are encouraged by the manual to refrain from
discussing what the child could have done (let alone what they did) to prevent the trauma
from occurring until much later in the therapy.
Clancy (2009) has studied the phenomenological accounts of over two hundred
adult survivors of child sexual abuse (65% women, 35% men) and made several unique
observations about their perceptions of guilt and agency that have been excluded from
mainstream psychoeducation about sexual abuse. She found that every victim she spoke
to reported two key characteristics about childhood sexual experiences and abuse: a) the
experiences had damaged them; and b) rarely did they report feeling shock, helplessness,
or fear or experience the sexual abuse as forced or violent. The primary word that 92% of
victims reported to characterize their experience was confusion (p. 38). 85% could sense
something was wrong based on the discomfort, guilt, secrecy or other atypical behaviors
that the child could sense from the perpetrator (p. 39). Most of the survivors reported
perceiving agency in the sexual interactions and did not report feeling taken advantage of,
manipulated or passive recipients of a sexual act. Only 5% of survivors in her study
described attempted to stop the abuse.
The primary reason that the adult survivors reported not stopping or actively
participating in the experience of sexual abuse as children, was that the perpetrators
actions did not seem unique from other experiences of living in the world in general; as a
child, things in their world and the actions of adults often didn’t make sense or were
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confusing. As a child, it was seen as acceptable to do what adults tell you to do even
when its not totally clear why this should be the case. Furthermore, the victims described
great rewards for participating, ranging from the concrete (e.g., buying a toy or ice
cream) to the relational (e.g., love, attention, sense of feeling special, attachment). A few
of the adult survivors also described enjoying the physical pleasure of the encounters.
Others described awareness of needing to maintain the family structure and fear that not
participating would lead to one of the parties being rejected from the family (e.g., the
child returned to foster care, the boyfriend who makes mom happy must leave). Overall,
a very small minority (less than 5%) would say they did not actively consent and
willingly participate in the sexual acts and that the majority of the time this was not
experienced as distressing, forceful or horrific, but as confusing at worst and rewarding at
best.
To avoid what she believed was a sampling error in her first interviews, Clancy
(2009) repeated her study multiple times over a ten-year period and found the same
results. Given her findings, Clancy posed the question, how can we say the trauma is the
cause of harm if most victims she interviewed did not report feeling the classic symptoms
of being traumatized (e.g., Criterion A horror, fear, helplessness)? She brought this
question to another subsequent series of interviews with survivors and found that most of
them reported that at a certain point in adulthood “the cloak of innocence lifted” (p. 116)
and the experience once characterized by confusion was then understood as morally
wrong. At the point of realization (which was not necessarily in a moment but could
occur over time), the adult survivor described feeling overwhelmed, betrayed and then
focusing on self-blame; many of the classic symptoms of PTSD emerged at this point in
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the victim’s life. In other words, awareness of the social and cultural rejection of their
experiences as being abusive and wrong was perceived as more traumatizing than the
actual events.
Clancy (2009) posited that self-blame that occurs after abuse becomes more
damaging upon realization because the societal narrative suggests the child should have
experienced the sexual activity as non-consensual, un-pleasurable, and traumatic and that
they should have reported it years earlier. Many survivors she interviewed stated they
thought their abuse was “unique” or not “classic abuse” because they described letting it
happen (or participating) for years without reporting. Clancy suggests that if society
adopted a narrative like, “You let it happen, and it’s okay. This is normal, you were too
good to know bad” (p. 140) that this would recognize the child’s agency and confusion
without introducing guilt. She argued that because society does not recognize the
normalcy of the child’s active participation and unawareness that the experience is bad,
the survivor believes they are an anomaly and morally corrupt for not saying no
immediately; they become traumatized because they believe they have done something
wrong and may be isolated from society for doing so.
Other scholars like Foster and D’Emilio (2012) have argued that recognition of
children’s agency in sexual experiences is also undermined when society sees and accepts
children (and in particular female children and adolescents) as more vulnerable and
somehow unable to say no to sex. He argues that society becomes complicit in
infantilizing children regardless of their actual ability to protect themselves and make
decisions because society believes their innocence extends into lack of self-control and
even a willingness to be taken advantage. Viewing children as passive is especially
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problematic when viewing the minority of cases who attempted to stop the abuse they
incurred. While many of the children Clancy interviewed saw themselves as actively
consenting it is possible that these same children may have also made decisions to not
participate if there was more acceptance that children are aware of their experiences and
need not blindly accept what adults tell them to do; especially if the child can sense that
the adult feels what they are doing is wrong (cf. Ferenczi’s introjection of adult guilt).
Clancy and others bring to light new possibilities about children’s experience of
agency, responsibility and guilt during sex and sexual abuse; experiences that U.S.
culture refuses to acknowledge let alone discuss in therapy. An important implication of
this lack of discussion, is the loss of recognition that traumatic symptoms following child
sexual abuse may occur because adult survivors fear being rejected by society as being
morally corrupt or wrong because they did not experience the abuse as a helpless victim.
The accepted narrative for child abuse is helplessness, fear and victimhood rather than
confusion or naive, but active and agentic participation.
Unlike Clancy, I would not argue that replacing victim narrative with a different
form of psychoeducation (e.g., “You let it happen, and it’s okay. This is normal, you
were too good to know bad” [p. 140]) would resolve or prevent traumatic symptoms. The
problem is that society, and in this case the TF-CBT manual, promotes one expression of
trauma survival as good (i.e., helpless, fearful, victim), other expressions are either
excluded from the therapy (e.g., not elicited) or are tacitly seen as deviant and bad (e.g.,
when a child allows or even looks forward to sexual acts). When therapies accept one
particular type of traumatic expression at the price of excluding varied phenomenological
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experiences, especially experiences that go against the mainstream narrative (e.g., I
wasn’t a victim) this practice plays a part in creating trauma symptomology.
In sum, the TF-CBT manual reflects the societal belief that trauma, and especially
all child sexual experiences including abuse should be understood as a loss of agency. A
taken for granted assumption that is communicated in the manual to is that patients who
do not report feeling this way, or who do not accept boundary and abstinence oriented
treatment (what the manual perceived as regaining agency by unequivocally saying
“No!” to all forms of sexual experience) are somehow deviant, traumatized and bad.
Therefore, I would argue the therapy itself can contribute to the patient’s perception of
feeling traumatized, helpless and like a victim.
TF-CBT Unique Theme 4: Parents as Protectors or Perpetrators
In this section, I present the fourth theme that I identified only for the TF-CBT
manual and that I did not interpret for the other two manuals. While studying Cohen et
al.’s (2006) manual I interpreted the cultural practices and implicit understandings about
what a child and a parent are or should be in contemporary culture; one of these taken for
granted assumptions was that all children have two, heterosexual parents—a mother and
a father. Within this assumption, mothers were described as natural protectors of their
children, and fathers, if not perpetrators of abuse, were not integral to protecting and
healing the traumatized child.
Thematic findings: Parents as protectors or perpetrators. The child who has
successfully completed therapy according to the TF-CBT manual should believe they
could not have changed the events of the trauma, that adults had power and control over
the situation, and that they were blameless. Because children are seen as innocent,
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vulnerable, pure, and lacking knowledge about and agency to protect themselves from the
world, the question becomes: whose responsibility is it to preserve the cultural ideal of
the child?
The manual suggested that in the protection of the innocent child from trauma is
the responsibility of the child’s primary caregivers or parents. For example, the manual
stated how confusing it can be for children exposed to ongoing interpersonal violence
“typically perpetrated by parents or other adults who would ordinarily be expected to
protect rather than harm children” (p. 11). After a traumatic event occurs, the parent-asprotector role is put into question and in the manual the therapist is recommended to step
in as the primary protector for the dyad. The manual stated,
Re-establishing trust often begins with a single reliable, genuine, and
caring relationship. Ideally parents provide this connection for their
children. However, when a child is traumatized, the parent is often also
traumatized, either directly…or vicariously. In such instances, parents
themselves may be in need of therapeutic assistance before they are able to
provide optimal support to their child. […] Thus the therapist may play a
critical role in modeling trustworthiness and providing support to both
traumatized children and their parents. (p. 47)
In general, the therapist was promoted as the modal rational adult and parent who
embodies the CRAFTS values (e.g., respect and self-efficacy).
It was notable that all children mentioned in the manual were assumed to have
two heterosexual parents, a mother and father, as their primary caregivers. Though the
manual was written within the past ten years (2006), the contemporary realities of
divorce, single parenting, foster parenting, extended family caregiving, gay, lesbian or
queer parents, and other caregiving relationships were not acknowledged.
Despite the ideal of mother-father dyad parenting that was represented throughout
the TF-CBT manual, the manual also indicated that it was primarily the mother’s
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responsibility to protect and heal the child from trauma. A section on troubleshooting
included the question, “What if the child blames the parent for the traumatic event?”
(p. 145). The manual then gave an example in which the parent could be to blame for the
trauma, “the mother may return repeatedly to an abusive partner, placing herself and her
children at risk for ongoing abuse and exposure to violence. Helping the child understand
how the mother’s personal trauma symptoms contributed to her decision making may be
quite complex” (p. 145).
In another troubleshooting example the mother again emerged:
How can I encourage parents to praise their kids more? Some parents of
traumatized children were traumatized themselves as children and never learned
to be nurturing parents. Modeling praising behavior by noticing and remarking on
parent’s positive actions may be helpful in this regard (in effect, “catch them”
being good parents). Praise the smallest maternal gesture you observe on these
mothers’ parts (e.g., helping the child remove a coat).” (p. 73)
In the above example the phrases “maternal gestures” and “these mothers” was
noteworthy given that the context of the troubleshooting question in the paragraph
otherwise discussed parents without a gender designation.
In yet another troubleshooting example the mother was mentioned again:
How do you manage children who are so emotionally “blocked” that they can’t
express any feelings at all? [...] If a child was severely punished by a battering
parent for expressing negative emotions in the past, the therapist can use this
knowledge to assure the child that this will not happen in therapy, where
expression of all feelings is welcome. This child’s mother could also be a
powerful influence on the child in therapy if she were able to encourage the child
to express feelings in the therapy session. (p. 105)
In the three examples mentioned above, the mother appears in the troubleshooting
sections as the solution to the child’s problem and mention of fathers is absent. In a
comparative word search, the word mother appeared 91 times compared and father
appeared 26 times. The first instance of the word father in the manual occurred in a
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clinical example in which the father shot a child’s mother (p. 4). In the second instance,
the father had beaten a mother and child (p. 95). In the third, the father forgot to pick his
child up from school (p. 113). In the fourth a child says “my father cut my mother in the
face” (p. 121) and in the majority of the remaining examples the father attempted to kill
the child or the mother (pp. 147, 148, 155). Out of the twenty-six times the word father
appeared in the manual, there was not one single benevolent mention of a father figure. In
the one example where the father did not attempt to kill or attack the mother or child, the
father ended up dying in a drug overdose (p. 181). When guidance was given to fathers
about how to respond to child sexual abuse they were referred to only as “nonabusive
fathers” (p. 219).
Thematic discussion: Parents as protectors or perpetrators. Research on child
maltreatment has found that 80.3% of perpetrators of child abuse and maltreatment are
parents, 3.1% of perpetrators who have an unknown relationship to the victim, and the
remainder include relatives or unmarried partners of parents (United States Department
of Health and Human Services [USDHHS], 2012). Men are perpetrators 45.3% of the
time and women are 53.5% of the time (USDHHS, 2012). Authors in the domestic
violence field have interpreted these statistics to suggest that women and men (mothers
and fathers) are equally as likely to be identified from a legal standpoint as the primary
perpetrators of abuse (Chesler, 1991). Fathers are more likely to commit violent forms of
abuse than mothers but mothers, perhaps because they are often the sole or primary
caretaker present with the child most of the time, are more likely to be convicted of
neglect (60% of maltreatment abuse cases are neglect related) (Chesler, 1991; Harris,
2010). One study has shown that the court actually favors fathers in cases of child
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maltreatment and in 75% of cases when the father contests a custody or abuse case, they
win, even when the fathers have documented histories of abuse (Jacobs, 1996). Similarly,
when fathers do attend therapy, supervised visitation or related services post-abuse or
trauma, the literature suggests that they are overly credited and praised when compared to
mothers whom are expected to show-up to all services, protect and heal their children
regardless (Parker, Rogers, Collins, & Edleson, 2008).
The manual reflects a cultural story of the mother as the failed protector and the
father as an abusive perpetrator. Where mothers appeared central to healing and the
protecting of the child, fathers, when deemed “non-abusive,” were excluded from or at
best treated as peripheral to the healing and protection process. The therapist was thought
to symbolize and was instructed to act like the modal adult and replacement protector.
The overemphasis on mothers as protectors and healers of trauma not only reflects
cultural assumptions about primary caregivers, but also is an example of what Fine
(2012) called the hyper-responsibilization of women. Fine wrote that when the family is
at risk, women are recruited to accept the responsibilities and guilt of family life and
often do so willingly. On a local level, this may look like a natural extension from the
labor of reproduction and child-care, but the acceptance of the shame and burdens of such
care seemingly stretch to the “vast emotional and relational space of social responsibility
voided by the State” (p. 6). Similar to Haaken’s (1995) identification of sexual trauma as
the accepted dialogic space for women to express suffering, Fine suggested that women
are expected to and often do accept that the failings of society are due to their individual
problems. Traumas that may be completely unrelated to the parents’ ability to care for the
child are still the responsibility of the parents, and primarily of the mother, to heal. The
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lack of agency, blamelessness and passivity during trauma in childhood may add to the
cultural appeal of invoking trauma narratives when as a culture we feel victimized, lack
agency, and are powerless or helpless; yet in the 21st century, we locate the responsibility
to heal these political problems within the family and within mothers.
TF-CBT Exemplar 1: Benevolent Restriction of Angry Responses
to Political Events via Therapy
Exemplars are stories or vignettes that capture what human being is like in a
particular cultural or historical situation. In this study, I looked for exemplars that
captured what human being is like in trauma culture in such a way that it could be
recognized in other situations that might have very different objective circumstances,
including those outside of the practice of psychotherapy. In this section I present an
exemplar I identified during my interpretation of the TF-CBT manual that exemplifies
how therapy can restrict patients angry responses to political events.
Exemplar findings: Benevolent restriction of angry responses to political
events via therapy. In a troubleshooting section of the Cohen et al. manual, a child was
described as acting out “aggressive rescue or revenge fantasies (e.g., flying to the top of
the World Trade Center and carrying victims to safety, or killing the terrorists before they
crashed the plane)” (p. 129). The therapist in this scenario was recommended to “point
out to the child that such actions reflect what he/she wishes could have happened and
then move the child toward more constructive thoughts…through which to make the
world safer in the future” (p. 129).
This vignette is an exemplar from the TF-CBT manual that demonstrates how the
therapy works to actively restrict the child’s angry responses to political events. After the
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child described their fantasy the therapist in the manual framed their response to
September 11 as unhelpful and aggressive. Unsurprisingly, the manual then
recommended that aggressive fantasies be immediately responded to with cognitive
restructuring and though-replacement. As discussed previously there is an entire chapter
in the manual devoted to cognitive restructuring and thought-replacement (pp. 107–168)
and homework handouts to assist the child and parent in continuing this process outside
of therapy (pp. 226–228), like the cognitive triangle homework sheet.
Exemplar discussion: Benevolent restriction of angry responses to political
events via therapy. Overall the notion of fantasy as a form of understanding or catharsis
was excluded from human being in the TF-CBT manual. Fantasy in the manual was
discussed a few times and therapists were instructed to reframe fantasy as the child’s
irrational or unhelpful cognitions. In this exemplar, the child’s fantasy was identified as
an individual, behavioral problem, and a dysfunctional thought.
Another interpretation would be that this child was reflecting a national postSeptember 11 revenge fantasy that indeed turned into a reality. The U.S. government
responded to the vulnerability of September 11 by capturing, torturing, and killing those
who were thought to be responsible—the government tried to annihilate all sources of
vulnerability (Lifton, 2002). The child’s wish to kill the terrorists was not that
fantastical, but by localizing societal revenge fantasies as product of an individual child’s
angry thoughts, the manual instructed the therapist to ignore the society in which the
child is embedded. To frame the child’s aggressive fantasies about September 11 as
dysfunctional rather than reflective of society as a whole may reveal unexamined societal
fears and rage.
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The recommended treatment of this child reveals the subtle way that therapists
live-out and communicate to their patients the primacy of an insular, cognitivist ideology
and the narcissistic belief that we are disconnected from and yet in control of the social
world through our thoughts (see previous discussion in Shared Theme 1, pp. 210-225).
The result of the societal inability to face the violence that is so prevalent in society is the
inevitable continuation of this violence. When therapists fail to situate their child
patients’ fantasies politically, in the context of the social world, these children will learn
from therapy to interpret wide-spread violence in the U.S. as individual distress and turn
inward rather than to create social connections or attempt to stop actual violence in the
community. Attempts to stop violence will eventually seem far from the child’s lived
experience; engaging politically on a community level might seem almost hopeless.
This vignette stood out to me as an exemplar because I was reminded of scenarios
with other populations with adults and veterans that have reflected the national response
to social crises but have been interpreted as individually aggressive or pathological acts.
Young’s (1995) description of the group of veterans at the National Center who were
placed on additional restrictive treatments after expressing anger, and Marin’s (1981,
1995) discussion of the isolation of veterans who confronted U.S. society with the painful
knowledge of the destructive colonial war in Southeast Asia are a few examples that I
have previously mentioned. Also the treatment of Malcolm X during the Civil Rights
movement demonstrated how dangerous and inacceptable it has been in the U.S. for
historically marginalized persons to be angry and aggressive, despite the violence they
have endured or witnessed. I say this not to suggest that the child in the TF-CBT manual
is somehow similar to a mini-Malcolm X, instead my point is that the social practices of
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restricting anger and reframing responses to political events as erroneous fantasies or
pathological anomalies have existed in different forms historically. Now these practices
have become an integral part of therapy in such a degree that they are viewed as benign
or even helpful rather than as restrictive, isolating, or promoting a politicized cognitivist
ideology that has a hand in silencing dissent.
Regardless of whether the child’s fantasy was aggressive, in the manual all
fantasy was responded to and viewed as erroneous (if not pathological) and deserving of
thought replacement. What was excluded from human being in a traumatic world was the
notion that adults might respond to trauma in ways similar to children. Adults may
understand trauma in fantastical or what might be considered distorted or nonsensical
ways or in ways that are not easily understood, controlled, or known. The therapists’ role
as the modal adult in the TF-CBT manual is to instruct the dyad of child and parent on
how to ignore and reduce fantasy and reason their way through a post-traumatic world.
The TF-CBT manual suggested that to restore innocence to children after a trauma,
rationality and control must be introduced. This example is not unique to children or
child therapy but reflects a rationalist Western cultural ideal that is central to being in a
trauma-based society.
TF-CBT Remaining Questions
In addition to the hermeneutic interpretive categories outlined by Leonard (1993)
and others, I have added the category of question generation. Some questions that were
raised through the interpretation of the TF-CBT manual were unanswered by the text, the
interpreter (myself), and our immediate context (e.g., foregrounded assumptions). The
unanswered questions may be indicative of what Donnel Stern (2010) described as an
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unformulated experience, where the answer is dissociated (and thus seemingly
unanswerable). Answers to such questions may be first accessible only through
enactment and unconscious practice. Here I discuss the importance and context for each
question following reconstruction (Stigliano, 1989).
Why were traumatized children represented as destroyed innocents lacking
agency in a post-September 11 world? Given that children have been thought of
historically in a range of different ways, the primary question I was left with after my
interpretation of the Cohen et al. manual was why children were presented in this specific
way at the specific time of the creation of the manual. In other words, why were
traumatized children represented as destroyed innocents lacking agency in a postSeptember 11 world? I wondered if the frame of the destruction of naïve childhood
innocence was a form of unarticulated political suffering about being American in the
post-September 11th world. Did Americans feel like traumatized, abused, or sexually
maimed children after the attacks? Like the children in Cohen et al. manual were
described, did Americans feel they had no agency during this event and yet somehow feel
that it was their fault? Was the manual an unconscious commentary or fantasy about
September 11th?
Although I questioned whether the manual might have been form of commentary
on September 11, alternatively I wondered if or how much the attempt to protect
childhood innocence and vulnerability really had to do with September 11 and the idea of
a singular, earth-shattering trauma. While it was clear that the authors were directly
connected to this event and that it had an indelible impact on the U.S., and especially on
those living near the sites of the attacks, the manual was published five years after the
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attack. I wondered if the attacks and the fixation on terrorism had become the new
vernacular, like child abuse in the 90s, for expressing daily vulnerability and social
distress (cf. Cushman, 1995). In this sense, talking about protection from terrorists might
have become a way we talk about the suffering, disconnection or isolation, vulnerability
and insecurity of everyday life in neoliberal society (cf. Bauman, 2013).
While I cannot presume to answer these questions about the meaning of
September 11 and child trauma, I believe that the daily lives of many Americans have
been so insulated from recognizing everyday political suffering that only after September
11th did their lives fall out of everydayness enough to access experiences of daily
isolation and vulnerability that existed during and before the attacks. The flood of interest
in TF-CBT post-September 11th that the authors refer to in their introduction may be a
reflection of how social vulnerability was expressed through obsession with healing the
damaged child. The psychoeducation in the manual that assured the child it was not his or
her fault and encouraged the child to live a happy life in spite of terrorist attacks might
reflect a societal denial or even refusal of responsibility for political problems. In this
light, child TF-CBT is a form of societal preservation accomplished through the
medicalization of daily political suffering, but one that necessarily must avoid recognition
of the causes of this suffering.
Summary of Treating Trauma and Traumatic Grief in Children and Adolescents
(Cohen et al., 2006)
Questions of morality and political function did not come to light through the TFCBT treatment as it was described in the manual, yet there were strong moral and
political messages that were communicated through the manual and were taken for
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granted or assumed to be natural. The TF-CBT manual included several assumptions
about the traumatized self and how humans can or should be known, managed, and
controlled in scientific ways. Many of these assumptions have been previously outlined
by scholars who have studied managed care therapies and the scientistic trend towards
therapies of technology (Cushman & Guilford, 2000; Foucault 1987, Gone 2007, Rose,
N. S., 2007). Some of the taken for granted assumptions about being that were identified
in the TF-CBT manual, but are not unique to this therapy, included the ideas that
traumatic pathology is easily understood through scientific methods (e.g., removing bias
and prejudgment while using an assessment checklist); symptoms of trauma are
universal, concrete, ahistorical and acultural, trauma pathology is not located in the
community or social world, but is a problem located in the individual and ultimately
healed within the dyad; trauma is healed through a process of the control and monitoring
of symptoms; and the patient is healed when these objective markers of symptomology
have reduced and the patient has returned to an assumed natural, adaptive state of
neoliberal functionality (e.g., happily returning to work and school).
The specific themes from the manual suggest that societal problems can be
resolved with further rational study and knowledge. According to this manual, human
being in a trauma-based society is being born into the world as innocent, asexual, and
lacking agency and knowledge about the world before the trauma. Traumatic events
within the manual were any events that were destructive of that innocent state and
became localized within the child as a site of cultural destruction and repair. Trauma was
thus represented as evil and initiated a fall from innocence. Following treatment, the
healed trauma survivor child will be self-sufficient, optimally functional, happy,
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emotionally regulated, and lacking awareness of knowledge bore through the trauma, and
especially unaware about daily political suffering.
What it means to be good according to this manual is to respond to upsetting,
confusing and violent social and political events by going to therapy and accepting or
embodying uncomplicated, asocial, acultural symptoms that align with the cognitivist
psychoeducational trauma narrative about PTSD. The ideal patient presents their political
distress in such a way that their symptoms are amenable to the specific structure and
assumptions of managed care, evidence-based therapies, which ultimately serve the needs
of insurance companies and not the patient or their community.
The manual gave primacy to being in dyadic relationships generally and
specifically within a tension of a child’s relationship to their singular parent (either
mother or father) as protector/perpetrator and later to their therapist as rescuer. The parent
of the child should be able to give themselves permission to be happy, protect their child
from future trauma and reinforce the tool box of skills the child learned in therapy.
Healing according to the TF-CBT manual involved returning the child to an ageappropriate state by consuming rational cognitions delivered by the modal adult-therapist;
these cognitions provided security to the child after the chaos of trauma and returned him
or her as much as possible to their pre-traumatic innocent state. By reconstituting the
child’s world as one where the child can choose to ignore horror and fantasy, the cultural
concept of the innocent child could be protected. From a moral perspective, this means
the child as an embodiment of the good can be protected and rebuilt through the process
of therapy.
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Being a child in trauma-based society can be isolating (when due to the trauma
one is no longer seen as a child), confusing (when one is told to un-know or choose to
forget the knowledge born through trauma), and controlled (adhering to rational
guidelines for age appropriate conduct and thinking). Yet, the manual’s emphasis on the
choice to be positive and happy in the world suggested that these realities are mental
choices that can easily be overcome through cognitive restructuring and mental
fortification (i.e., mind-brain as protector). The manual emphasized retreating to an
internal and mental state for protection and suggested that fortification of mental barriers
was a way of “giving permission” to children and their parents to be happy, functional,
and free post-trauma. The manual embodied cognitive ideology and a subjectivist
reduction that recapitulated the status quo of an isolationist, politically inactive and
asocial environment where persons do not act with each other or in the world in order to
change it, but merely change the way they think about the world. The exclusion of
society and culture from discussion in therapy (even at an age-appropriate level) reflects
neoliberal values and an ignorance of the public and social sphere that the child and
parent are embedded in.
After interpreting the manual I was left with a final question: Why were
traumatized children represented as destroyed innocents lacking agency in a postSeptember 11 world? I did not attempt to answer this question but explored some
possibilities, such as whether the frame of the destruction of naïve childhood innocence
was a form of unarticulated political suffering about being American in the postSeptember 11th world if talking about protection from terrorism has become a way we
talk about the disconnection or isolation, vulnerability and the insecurity of everyday life
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in neoliberal society; and if child TF-CBT is a form of societal preservation
accomplished through the medicalization of daily political suffering, but one that
necessarily must avoid recognition of the causes of this suffering.

Manual 2: Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR): Basic
Principles, Protocols, and Procedures (Shapiro, 2001)
In this chapter, I present the results and discussion of my interpretation of
Shapiro’s (2001) EMDR manual and supplementary texts. I will be referring to Shapiro’s
(2001) manual as the EMDR manual or Shapiro’s (2001) manual, and Luber (2010),
Shapiro (2010) and Leeds (2009) as supplementary protocol texts.
After presenting the specific context of the Shapiro (2001) manual’s development,
I return to the shared themes and exemplars48 that were introduced in the previous chapter
and were found in all three manuals (TF-CBT, EMDR, and Battlemind). After presenting
the shared themes and exemplars, I then introduce the themes and exemplars that I
identified only within the EMDR manual. Before proceeding to the next manual, I
propose and briefly discuss questions that may be unanswered by the text, the interpreter
(myself), and our immediate context (e.g., foregrounded assumptions) but are important
to consider. Thus the structure of this chapter is as follows: shared themes (findings
followed by discussion), shared exemplars (findings followed by discussion), EMDR
unique themes (findings followed by discussion), EMDR unique exemplars (findings
48

Exemplars are stories or vignettes that capture what human being is like in trauma
culture in such a way that it could be recognized in other situations that might have very
different objective circumstances, including those outside of the practice of
psychotherapy. In this study, I focused on identifying the therapeutic techniques and
practices that trauma treatment manuals prescribed to training therapists. I noted the
similarity between these techniques and practices to others in the social world.
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followed by discussion), EMDR questions (questions followed by discussion), and a
summary. Following the presentation of each manual, I include a final summary and
discussion in which I consider all of the manuals together in light of the areas of inquiry
(p. 131).
Context of the Manual’s Development
EMDR was developed by Francine Shapiro in 1987 following a
phenomenological observation of her own coping behaviors:
While walking one day, I noticed that some disturbing thoughts I was having
suddenly disappeared. I also noticed that when I brought these thoughts back to
mind, they were not as upsetting or as valid as before. […] I noticed that when
disturbing thoughts came into my mind, my eyes spontaneously started moving
very rapidly back and forth in an upward diagonal. Again the thoughts
disappeared, and when I brought them back to mind, their negative charge was
greatly reduced. At that point I started making the eye movements deliberately
while concentrating on a variety of disturbing thoughts and memories, and I found
that these thoughts also disappeared and lost their charge. (Shapiro, 2001, p. 7)
Over the course of six months Shapiro (2001) began refining the eye-movement
techniques she discovered with the goal of developing a therapy to reduce anxiety.
Shapiro’s early studies of EMDR focused specifically on the treatment of PTSD (see
review in van Etten & Taylor, 1998) and were highly successful in the treatment of major
trauma (see e.g., Carlson, Chemtob, Rusnak, Hedlund, & Muraoka, 1998; Ironson,
Freund, Strauss, & Williams, 2002; Marcus, Marquis, & Sakai, 1997; Scheck, Schaeffer,
& Gillette, 1998; Wilson, S. A., Becker, & Tinker, 1995). Numerous controlled studies
have indicated that 77–90% of civilian PTSD can be eliminated within three 90-minute
sessions (see review in Shapiro, 2001; Chapter 12).
Demographics of EMDR’s treatment population. The EMDR manual was
designed for treatment of adults ages 18 and older in an outpatient setting. Though
EMDR was created to target PTSD symptoms it has since been found to be effective at
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treating a range of disorders (e.g., personality disorders, dissociative disorders, anxiety
disorders, somatoform disorders) (Shapiro, 2001, p. 360). The EMDR manual included a
standard protocol (i.e., scripts with steps for the clinician to follow) for treating trauma
disorders, as well as specialized treatment protocols. Shapiro’s (2001) manual included
specialized protocols for: a single traumatic event, anxiety, recent traumatic events,
phobias, excessive grief, illness and somatic disorders, and stress reduction. The manual
also mentioned special protocols for pain control, combat PTSD, chemical dependency
treatment and phantom limb pain.
In Luber’s (2010) supplementary protocol manual there were also specific
protocols for underground mining accidents, emergency room administration,
performance enhancement, increasing positive emotions, child group EMDR, and selfhelp or individually administered EMDR. There was also a specialized protocol called
“blind to the therapist” where the patient did not describe the problem they were seeking
treatment for to the therapist and did not mention the trauma or free associations to the
trauma during the processing (Luber, 2010).
Context of the author. Unlike the other manuals I interpreted in this study where
limited information was provided about the authors, Shapiro’s manual included a
comparatively extensive explanation about her life and how she developed EMDR; the
supplementary manuals also included an abbreviated version of her biography (e.g.,
Leeds, 2009; Luber, 2010).
In 1979, Shapiro was completing a doctorate in English literature at New York
University. She described a deep desire to be “one of those who shed light on our culture
and literature” (Shapiro, 2001, p. 131). At the same time she began reading the work of
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psychologists Salter and Wolpe and found that “the idea of a focused, predictable, causeand-effect approach to human psychology seemed fully compatible with the concepts of
literary character and plot development” (p. 121). Though psychology was a side interest
of Shapiro’s, she said “I held staunchly with those authors who believed in the
perfectibility of humankind. I reveled in the glory of human suffering transformed into
art” (p. 129).
Shortly before beginning her dissertation in English literature, Shapiro was
diagnosed with cancer. This halted her education as she began a long process of
treatment. She became interested in identifying psychological and physiological methods
to enhance physical health:
I believed there had to be some useful psychological and physiological
approaches already developed, but why weren’t they well known? Suddenly,
finding these methods and disseminating information about them to others with
life-threatening illnesses became more important to me. (p. 139)
During this time Shapiro enrolled at the Professional School of Psychological
Studies in San Diego, California (CA)49 in clinical psychology and made her first
phenomenological observations about eye-movement and stress (mentioned above) that
contributed to the first studies of EMDR. In 1987, she graduated with her PhD and since
devoted her life to studying and disseminating EMDR. She is presently (2014) a senior
research fellow at the Mental Research Institute, in Palo Alto, CA, the Executive Director
of the EMDR Institute in Watsonville, CA and the President Emeritus of EMDR

49

This school should not be confused with the similarly named California School of
Professional Psychology- San Diego, which is now a part of Alliant University
International. Shapiro completed her PhD in clinical psychology at the Professional
School of Psychological Studies, San Diego (Shapiro, 2011), which was never accredited
and is now defunct (APA, 2014).
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Humanitarian Assistance Programs, a non-profit organization that coordinates disaster
responses and pro-bono EMDR trainings worldwide.
Shapiro has received numerous awards for her work including the International
Sigmund Freud Award for Psychotherapy, the APA Trauma Psychology Division Award,
and the Distinguished Scientific Achievement in Psychology Award from the California
Psychological Association.
Treatment goals, structure, and principles. The overarching goal of
EMDR treatment is to reduce symptoms of any presenting psychopathology.
Shapiro’s (2001) manual read:
One of the basic premises of EMDR is that most psychopathologies are based on
early life experiences. The goal of EMDR treatment is to rapidly metabolize the
dysfunctional residue from the past and transform it into something useful.
Essentially, with EMDR the dysfunctional information undergoes a spontaneous
change in form and meaning—incorporating insights and affect that are enhancing
rather than self-denigrating to the client. Clinicians should find that the
information covered in this book provides the components and strategies
necessary for this process, wherein the client’s innate information-processing
system is called into play to bring about resolution. (p. 183)
Shapiro initially called EMDR procedure Eye Movement Desensitization (EMD),
and then changed the name in 1990 to Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing
(EMDR) to encompass what was referred to as the “information processing paradigm”
(916-922) or “Adaptive Information Processing model” (p. 16)—the theory at the core of
EMDR. Shapiro explained the model in the introduction to the manual:
The Adaptive Information Processing model is consistent with Freud’s
(1919/1955) and Pavlov’s (1927) early understanding of what is now referred to
as information processing. Specifically, there appears to be a neurological balance
in a distinct physiological system that allows information to be processed to an
“adaptive resolution.” By adaptive resolution I mean that the connections to
appropriate associations are made and that the experience is used constructively
by the individual and is integrated into a positive emotional and cognitive schema.
(p. 30)
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Entire chapters of the manual are devoted to an explanation of Adaptive
Information Processing theory and the research behind each component utilized in
EMDR (e.g., Chapters 2 and 12). The amount of theory and research behind
EMDR that is included in the manual perhaps explains the necessity for
adjunctive EMDR protocol manuals (e.g., Leeds, 2009; Luber, 2010; Shapiro,
2010) that are designed to be utilized by the therapists in the room with the
patient. Shapiro’s (2001) manual also includes versions of these protocols but in a
less user-friendly format.
The eight phases of EMDR treatment and specific goals are represented in
Table 3. The standard script that is read to patients at the beginning of EMDR
treatment roughly explains the basic principles behind EMDR:
When a disturbing event occurs, it can get locked in the brain with the original
picture, sounds, thoughts, feelings and body sensations. EMDR seems to stimulate
the information and allows the brain to reprocess the experience. That may be
what is happening in REM or dream sleep- the eye movements (tones, tactile)
may help to reprocess the unconscious material. It is your own brain that will be
doing the healing and you are the one in control. (Shapiro, 2010, p. 3)
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Table 3
Eight Phases of EMDR Adapted From Leeds (2009)
Goals

Phase
Phase 1:
History Taking

•
•
•
•

Phase 2:
Preparation

•
•
•
•
•

Phase 3:
Assessment

•

•

Establish therapeutic
alliance.
Gather psychosocial and
medical history.
Develop the treatment plan
and case formulation.
Rule out exclusion criteria.

•

Obtain informed consent to
treatment.
Offer psychoeducation.
Practice self-control
methods.
Have patient start a weekly
log.
Strengthen therapeutic
alliance.

•

Access primary aspects of
the target selected from the
treatment plan for EMDR
reprocessing.
Obtain baseline measures
on SUD and VoC.

•

Phase 4:
Desensitization

• Reprocess the target
experience to an adaptive
resolution as indicated by a
0 SUD.

Phase 5:
Installation

•

•

Tasks

Continue reprocessing
target with overt inclusion
of preferred belief.
Fully integrate preferred
belief into memory network
as indicated by 7 VoC.

•
•

•

•

•

Obtain narrative or
structured history.
Objective assessment of
symptoms.
Identify targets for
reprocessing: a) past
events; b) current triggers,
and c) future goals.
Orient patient to issues in
trauma-informed
psychotherapy with
EMDR.
Provide metaphors for
mindful noticing during
reprocessing.
Verify from log patient is
helped by methods for selfcontrol.
Elicit the image, current
negative belief, desired
positive belief, current
emotion and physical
sensation.
Record baseline measures
for SUD and VoC.

• Provide discrete sets of bilateral stimulation and
assess changes via brief
patient reports.
• Return to target
periodically to asses gains
and identify residual
material.
• Use additional
interventions only when
reprocessing is overtly
blocked.
• Provide discrete sets of bilateral stimulation while
patient holds target in
awareness with desired
positive belief.
• Continue until patient
reaches 7 VoC.
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Table 3 (Continued)

Eight Phases of EMDR Adapted From Leeds (2009)
Goals

Phase
Phase 6:
Body Scan

•

•

Tasks

Verify any residual
disturbance associated with
the target is fully
reprocessed.
Allow patient to reach
higher levels of synthesis.

• Provide discrete sets of bilateral stimulation while
patient focuses on
reprocessing any residual
physical sensations until
there are only neutral or
positive sensations.

Phase 7:
Closure

•

Ensure client stability and
current orientation at the
close of each reprocessing
session.

• Use self-control techniques
if needed to assure stability
and current orientation.
• Brief patient about
treatment effects.
• Request patient to keep a
log of self-observations
between sessions.

Phase 8:
Reevaluation

•

Verify whether all aspects
of the treatment plan are
being addressed.

• Adjust treatment plan as
needed based on patient
report from log.
• Recheck target(s) to assure
stable treatment effects.
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Note. SUD indicates subjective units of distress; VoC indicates validity of cognition.
A key component of EMDR is bi-lateral or dual attention stimulation; this occurs
in Phases 4–6 in Table 3. Bi-lateral stimulation is performed on the patient by asking s/he
to follow the clinician’s fingers or a wand as they wave their hand in front of the patient’s
face (crossing the midline), asking the patient to track a light on a light-bar, tapping the
patient on the hands or knees (back and forth from one side to the other) or by asking the
patient to hold balls in each hand that vibrate alternately. Some dual attention stimulation
has been conducted with sound (playing a noise in one ear and then the other) and with
forms of visual tracking on a computer. Given the amount of bi-lateral stimulation needed
for a typical session, many therapists find that waving their fingers in front of the
patient’s face can be exhausting and overtime can lead to shoulder injuries, hence the
development of range of technology assisted bi-lateral stimulation tools for EMDR (see
http://www.neurotekcorp.com and http://emdrelite.com).
The main activity during dual attention or bi-lateral processing is to alternately
stimulate the left and right side of the body while the patient is recounting the initial
traumatic memory and subsequent associations (e.g., feelings and thoughts) to that target
memory. Bi-lateral stimulation is performed in what are referred to in the manual as
“sets.” Typically a set includes 24 to 36 eye-movements (i.e., passes from left to right and
back) or other forms of bi-lateral stimulation (p. 67). The optimal amount of passes in a
set and the speed at which the sets should be conducted are based on the intensity of the
target (i.e., the traumatic memory or thought) that is to be desensitized, the phase of the
protocol, and the specific needs of the patient. During this process subjective units of
distress (SUDs) on a scale from 0-10 are monitored until the SUDs ratings of original
target traumatic memory are significantly reduced (ideally to a 0 within the first session;
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p. 159). During bi-lateral stimulation for cognitive reprocessing and installation of
positive thoughts (Phase 5) the patient monitors their Validity of Cognitions (VoC) on a
scale of 1-7, with one representing completely false and seven representing completely
true. By the end of reprocessing, negative cognitions should be as experienced as
completely false (1) and positive cognitions should be experienced as close to completely
true (7).
Shapiro (2001) argued that dual attention stimulation is therapeutic because it
contributes to “maintaining the patient’s simultaneous external awareness during a period
of internal distress or by activating brain functions inherent in the movements or in the
attention paid to two simultaneously present stimuli” (p. 323). Shapiro acknowledged that
research has yet to demonstrate the component effectiveness of bi-lateral stimulation (i.e.,
evaluation through a dismantling study). Shapiro also suggested that theories as to why
bi-lateral stimulation works are inherently contradictory (Shapiro, 2001, p. 323). Thus it
appears there is no particular theory that accounts for why dual attention processing
works, except that efficacy studies of EMDR suggest that as part of the standardized full
EMDR protocol it is effective at reducing symptoms of PTSD.
It is important to note that hypnotic mechanisms, which can be associated with
eye movement like that used bi-lateral stimulation, were reported by Shapiro (2001) as
being unrelated to EMDR. The manual cited studies that the concluded the altered brain
state and brain wave patterns induced by hypnosis are not replicated in EMDR, and thus
hypnosis and hypnotic phenomena cannot be central to EMDR’s main treatment effects
(see e.g., Barrowcliff, Gray, MacCulloch, Freeman, & MacCulloch, 2003).
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Shapiro (2001) did acknowledge some utilization of hypnosis in EMDR’s
“cognitive interweave” technique (In Phase 5: Installation). During cognitive interweaves
the therapist challenges dysfunctional thoughts, makes an interpretation or connection
between different memories, or directs the patient to think about a particular aspect of the
memory they are recalling. (This aspect of EMDR is somewhat similar to cognitive
restructuring in TF-CBT during which dysfunctional thoughts are directly questioned,
challenged, and replaced.) According to EMDR’s Adaptive Information Processing
theory, the clinician assists in the integration or connection between disparate neural
networks that the clinician believes that the patient could not otherwise merge (Shapiro,
2001, p. 251). Shapiro (2001) noted that EMDR cognitive interweaves were derived from
Milton Erikson’s hypnotic command suggestion.
I have summarized the key principles and assumptions of EMDR using
language drawn from the Shapiro (2001) manual on the pages indicated. The key
principles include:
1.

EMDR directly and non intrusively, without the use of medication,
engages with human physiology to alter pathological elements that
have been stored physiologically (p. 18);

2.

Humans have an innate information processing system that is
intrinsic and adaptive. Pathology occurs because this mechanism is
blocked. If the stored traumatic memory can be access and
activated the information will be taken to “an adaptive resolution”
because “the system is configured to process the information and
restore mental health” (p. 19);
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3.

When information shifts during reprocessing, this triggers a change
in identity constructs. The patient sense of self-worth and selfefficacy automatically shift which leads to more self-enhancing
behaviors (p. 19); and,

4.

EMDR has the ability to facilitate profound therapeutic change in
much less time than other therapies because it facilitates
“therapeutic affects through the adaptive connection of associative
neurophysiological networks in the information processing
system” which are physically proximal and thus are not bound by
time (p. 19).

The presentation of trauma in the manual. Shapiro (2001) stated:
the [EMDR] model regards most pathologies as derived from earlier life
experiences… The pathological structure is inherent within the static,
insufficiently processed information stored at the time of the disturbing
event…pathology is viewed as configured by the impact of earlier experiences
that are held in the nervous system in state-specific form. (p. 16)
In EMDR theory, the traumatic particle resides in the brain and nervous system
until triggered and desensitized through EMDR:
When someone experiences a severe psychological trauma, it appears that an
imbalance may occur in the nervous system, caused perhaps by changes in
neurotransmitters, adrenaline and so forth. Due to this imbalance, the informationprocessing system is unable to function optimally and the information acquired at
the time of the event …Is maintained neurologically in its disturbing state.
Therefore the original material, which is held in this distressing, excitatory statespecific form, can be triggered by a variety of internal and external stimuli and
may be expressed in the form of nightmares, flashbacks, and intrusive thoughts—
the so-called positive symptoms of PTSD. The hypothesis is that the procedural
elements of EMDR, including the dual attention stimuli, trigger a physiological
state that facilitates information processing. … Therefore, in EMDR when we ask
the client to bring up a memory of the trauma, we may be establishing a link
between consciousness and the site where the information is stored in the brain.
(Shapiro, 2001, p. 31)
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The Shapiro (2001) manual suggested that trauma victim’s negative cognitions,
confusion and disturbances come from “disparate information stored in disparate neural
networks” (p. 42). The Adaptive Information Processing model that EMDR supports
suggests that healing comes from the integration of these two neural networks (p. 42).
Shapiro (2001) stated that the treatment follows the same essential phases (Table
3) regardless of the trauma, “most kinds of disturbing life experiences can be successfully
treated, regardless of their origin” (p. 42). The manual divided traumas into “big T”
Traumas, like rape and combat, and “small t” traumas, which included any event that had
a lasting negative effect on the psyche (p. 43). According to Shapiro, both big T and little
t traumas can be addressed following similar EMDR treatment protocols.
Key sociohistorical context mentioned by authors: Shapiro’s journey. No
primary historical or political event was mentioned as the impetus or context for EMDR’s
development in the Shapiro (2001) manual. The development of EMDR appears to have
been largely instigated by Shapiro’s diagnosis of cancer and interest in physical healing
through psychology.
Research on EMDR was initially funded though Shapiro’s dissertation work and
later through the EMDR research institute she founded. Thus initial treatment
development was not driven by the agendas of major funding agencies like the
Department of Defense or the National Institutes of Health as the Battlemind and TFCBT manuals were respectively. Thus EMDR was tied more heavily to Shapiro’s
personal beliefs about healing (e.g., the intrinsic perfectibility of humankind) than would
likely have been possible had she developed the treatment solely under the auspices of a
major research agency.
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The original version of Shapiro’s EMDR manual (1995) was developed in the
time period between 1980s and 1990s when trauma was understood as being embossed in
the brain (e.g., van der Kolk 1980, 1984, 1994, and Herman’s 1997 work). The manual
reflects veridical theories of trauma and the cognitivist ideology present in information
processing models that were popular at the time.
Though direct mention of historical context is largely absent from the manual,
Shapiro does briefly mention the release of the first version of the manual occurring only
a few days after the Oklahoma City bombing. On April 15, 1995, Timothy McVeigh
parked a rental truck filled with explosives outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building
in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The explosion of the truck destroyed the front of the
building and killed 168 people (Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum
[ONCMM], 1995). In response to the bombing, Oklahoma clinicians already trained in
EMDR offered pro-bono treatment services and trainings to all licensed mental health
professionals in the area who were interested in free EMDR training. This event marked
the inauguration of the EMDR Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP), which has since
trained clinicians internationally in EMDR post-disaster in over 30 countries (Shapiro,
2010).
Some of the notable traumatic events and disasters which EMDR HAP has
deployed trainers to have included conflicts in Bosnia/Croatia, Palestine and Northern
Ireland, earthquakes in Haiti (2002), Marmara Turkey (2005), Gujarat (2001; treatment of
16,000 survivors), and the tsunamis in South Asia (2004; treatment of 5,000 victims), as
well as response to 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina (Humanitarian Assistance Program
[HAP], 2014).
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Shared Theme 1: Mind-brain as Protector and the Political Use of Cognitivist
Ideology
In this section, I present the first theme that was shared by the three manuals that I
interpreted. All of the manuals predicated therapy on three interrelated assumptions: 1)
You can change the world by changing your mind, 2) When you change your mind you
change your brain; and, 3) Your brain and mind can protect you from trauma (i.e., if you
have inner safety, you are safe and thus the world is safe). The main problem with these
assumptions is the confusion between shifts in individual subjectivity and shifts in the
social world, which can ultimately result in no change to the status quo of existing
political problems and arrangements of power and domination (cf. Sampson, 1981).
Thematic findings: Mind-brain as protector and the apolitical use of
cognitive ideology. This section presents quotations from Shapiro’s (2001) EMDR
manual and adjunctive protocol scripts (Leeds, 2009; Luber, 2010) that I found to be
representative of the theme “mind-brain as protector and the political use of cognitivist
ideology.” I have divided the section according to the assumptions listed above. Overall
in the EMDR manual there was less emphasis on the mind and more emphasis on direct
manipulation and connection with the brain. Therefore, for the presentation of this
manual, I collapsed the first two assumptions listed above into one theme titled “you can
change the world by changing your brain.”
You can change the world by changing your brain. The EMDR manual heavily
emphasized the concept of healing through direct physiological access and manipulation
of neuronal pathways:
When someone experiences a severe psychological trauma, it appears that an
imbalance may occur in the nervous system, caused perhaps by changes in
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neurotransmitters, adrenaline and so forth. … The hypothesis is that the
procedural elements of EMDR, including the dual attention stimuli, trigger a
physiological state that facilitates information processing. … Therefore, in EMDR
when we ask the client to bring up a memory of the trauma, we may be
establishing a link between consciousness and the site where the information is
stored in the brain. (p. 31)
The pathological structure is inherent within the static, insufficiently processed
information stored at the time of the disturbing event…pathology is viewed as
configured by the impact of earlier experiences that are held in the nervous
system in state-specific form. (p. 16)
The primary mechanism for direct access to the brain was bi-lateral stimulation
(i.e., asking the patient to follow the clinicians fingers or tapping the patient on either
sides of their body while they free associate thoughts and memories related to their
problem). The patient need not understand the mechanisms behind why bi-lateral
stimulation works, they only need to be open to submitting their brain to re-wiring. For
example, at the start of the first reprocessing phase of therapy where bi-lateral stimulation
is used (Phase 4: Desensitization), the patient should be told:
Now remember, it is your own brain that is doing the healing and you are the one
in control. I will ask you to mentally focus on the target and to follow my fingers
(or any other [bi-lateral stimulation (BLS)] you are using). Just let whatever
happens, happen, and we will talk at the end of the set. Just tell me what comes
up, and don’t discard anything as unimportant. Any new information that comes
to mind is connected in some way. If you want to stop, just raise your hand.
(Luber, 2010, p. 404)
While the manual initially stated that the patient is the one in control, other scripts
seem to suggest that the patients should actually be negotiating with and attempting to
direct their brain, which is actually in control and sending messages to the person. For
example:
The back of the brain talks to the front of the brain by arousal. For instance, if you
walk into your home and something is not right, how long does it take for you to
notice? You feel it in your body and the words we use are body feeling words
such as ‘I have a feeling something isn’t right. What’s going on?’ We feel
something isn’t right. We ask, ‘What is going on?’ If the other person says
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nothing, the back of the brain raps on the front harder and you feel more arousal
because you can’t fool the back of the brain. (Luber, 2010, p. 62)
An additional script where the patient is asked to “thank their brain” for
protecting them is described later in this section (p. 313).
Shapiro’s (2001) manual provided extensive theoretical and scientific background
to the therapists as to why they would discuss direct brain healing with their patient.
Despite the complex explanations of theories (like the Adaptive Information Processing
model), Shapiro presented the idea of neural manipulation as a straight-forward and
common sense concept that has existed in many psychotherapy theories:
The invocation of a neurophysiological level is a simple recognition that this is
where all change ultimately occurs. It is not assumed to be specific to EMDR;
rather, any form of successful therapy will ultimately be correlated with a
neurophysiological shift. Such a neurophysiological shift is explicit in models
informing prolonged exposure therapies (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Marks et al., 1998)
and implicit in some psychodynamic models (Horowitz, 1979). (p. 16)
The reference to other therapeutic approaches and especially to “big names” in
trauma research (such as Foa and Horowitz) as well as citing numerous neurological
studies created an origin myth (cf. Samelson, 1974) to legitimate the use of EMDR
therapy. The point of citing these studies appeared to be to emphasize that regardless of
psychological approach, all therapies ultimately change the brain in order to heal the
person,
Regardless of the psychological modality used by the clinician, it is only logical
that any therapeutic change must ultimately be based on a physiological shift of
information stored in the brain (see Chapter 12 for preliminary neurophysiological
data regarding EMDR treatment). (Shapiro, 2001, p. 50)
Shapiro suggested that since EMDR is believed to directly access the brain,
this means that the therapy can be “time-free” (see “Time-free Therapy” section in

311
Shapiro, 2001, pp. 48-50) and thus able to heal chronic trauma symptoms in the
course of a few one-hour sessions:
The clinician’s model must be open to the fact that rapid, profound, and
multidimensional change in a client can take place and can be maintained over
time. For those clinicians trained in a long-term model such as psychoanalysis,
this may be difficult to accept. However, let me stress that clinical observations of
EMDR sessions have revealed that no pertinent stage of healing is skipped:
Symbols become clear, insights occur, lessons are learned, and the various stages
of emotional resolution are experienced, albeit in a accelerated fashion […] It
might be helpful for clinicians to recognize the comparatively short distance
involved in crossing a synapse. (p. 50)
In this quote, Shapiro appealed to the common sense of neuroscience (i.e., the
taken for granted assumption that the brain is responsible for behavior) and suggested
that victims can quickly heal from trauma just like a neurotransmitter crossing a synapse.
This argument is problematic in a number of different ways, namely that the existence of
a small space between a synapse is in no way analogous to human change nor a logical
reason to shorten therapy; however, it appears that Shapiro provided this metaphor with
the idea that it could be helpful in convincing clinicians that length of time in brain-based
therapies is not related to change. The fact that this metaphor was presented as helpful
revealed another taken for granted assumption in the manual: therapists naturally think
about human change in terms of the brain.
Shapiro (2001) continued the application of the brain metaphor to suggest that
change in the brain need only start with the adjustment of one thought and one neuron
and that the interconnected nature of the brain (via neural networks) will ensure that these
small shifts will generalize across the brain through the course of therapy. Generalization
across the brain was then equated to generalizing across the lifespan of the person:
For most clients, successful EMDR treatment results in the new, positive,
cognition generalizing throughout the entire neuro network. Therefore, any
associated memories […] that are accessed subsequent to treatment will result in
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the emergence of the positive cognition (“I’m fine”) along with appropriate affect.
The therapeutic resolution is shown in all aspects of the target (images, physical
sensations, emotion, and so on) and in past and present associated events and is
also manifested in an appropriate change in behavior. (pp. 46-47)
The final sentence of this passage crystalized the connection between changing
the brain and changing human lived experience. Ultimately, it suggested that the
adjustment of one neuronal thought can change all past and present lived experience.
The manual often appeared to take for granted the distinction between a real
world outside of the brain and described the therapy as manipulating an “internal model
of the world” that is managed by “neuro networks” in the brain (Shapiro, 2001, p. 21).
The manual read,
one’s natural “completion tendency” continues to rework the traumatic
information in active memory until it can be reconciled with one’s internal models
of the world. (p. 21)
The neuro networks were described as if they were singularly responsible for
determining behavior and thoughts in the world. One vignette described how a woman’s
self-denigrating neuro network prevented her from being functional in a business
meeting:
When the woman enters a social or business situation and desires something, the
neuro network with the affect that is verbalized by “I can’t get what I want; there
is something wrong with me” will be stimulated, and the associated affect, level
of disturbance, and self-denigrating belief will severely hamper her functional
behavior in the present. (pp. 45-46)
The manual relied so heavily on the assumption that changing the neuro networks
and brain changes the world because the world is represented in the brain, that at a few
points the manual distinguished between the brain world and the actual world by using
the phrase “real-world.” For example, the phrase real world was used when discussing
how to “install” (p. 94) or “resource in” (p. 94) (i.e., implant in the brain) positive visual
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imagery using bi-lateral stimulation with the woman who experiences actual disturbance
the real-world office environment:
The incorporation of a positive template is an aspect of EMDR that includes
visualization work similar to the kind done by some Olympic athletes during
training […] Essentially, once the client has received the appropriate education,
she is asked to imagine the optimal behavioral responses, along with an enhancing
positive cognition. The clinician then leads her in successive sets of [bi-lateral]
stimulation to assist her in assimilating the information and incorporating it into a
positive template for future action. […] The incorporation of these positive
templates allows the client to achieve some sense of comfort and experience with
new situations in the safety of the office. […] Once she has done this, there is a
greater likelihood of actual positive experiences, because these internalized
positive templates will be triggered by future external cues in the real world.
Obviously, the clinician will need feedback about these real-world experiences to
determine if a client needs additional assistance. (Shapiro, 2001, p. 213)
In the above quotation the clinician was directed to “obviously” check in on the
patient’s actual experiences in the real world to see if the positive image and visualization
was able to take primacy over other reactions the patient had to the real world. These
directives suggested that the therapist might otherwise check in on the status of the
“internalized positive templates” in the brain world and forget that these templates were
implanted in the patient for use in real world scenarios. Though the real world is
mentioned in this segment, its purpose is to be controlled or even replaced by the positive
images that were implanted during therapy in the patient’s “internal model of the world”
(Shapiro, 2001, p. 21).
In sum, the manual exemplifies what Sampson (1981) called the “subjectivist
reduction” (p. 730) where the world is understood as being processed through structures
of the knowing subject, and an individualistic reduction that grants primacy to the
individual knower. Within this view, reality is the product of individual cognitive
operations rather than of social practices lived out in historical traditions. EMDR seemed
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to extend cognitivist ideology in such a way that the individualistic reduction was so
interior the brain was actually proposed as the individual knower, and not the person.
Your brain and mind can protect you from trauma (i.e., if you have inner
safety, you are safe from the world). Many of the clinical scripts described the brain as
the protector of the EMDR patient. The scripts asked the therapist to tell their patients:
The brain is very protective and is always looking for things in the current
environment that represent information stored in the back of the brain that may
need attention. (Luber, 2010, p. 62)
The brain is always protective and scanning for sensory input such as sight,
sound, smell, taste, or physical sensation that reminds the brain of past things it
needs to be aware of so it can fire up arousal to protect the person if need be.
(Luber, 2010, p. 63)
Perhaps the best example of brain as protector was exemplified in a script that I
named “the trauma watering hole.” The EMDR manual featured an evolutionary theory
of trauma, similar to that described in the background of this study (Chapter 2, pp.16-18),
in which human response to trauma was framed as analogous to zebras fearing lions that
arrive to a watering hole in the Serengeti. The analogy of humans at the watering hole
draws from LeDoux and other evolutionary theories of neural development where a
“primitive brain” signals fear reactions without conscious thought.50
In the “Introducing Adaptive Information Processing and EMDR: Affect
Management and Self-Mastery of Triggers Script” (Phase 1 in Table 3), the therapist
script began by introducing the watering hole metaphor and discussing differences
between humans and zebras:
50

Out of the three manuals I analyzed the trauma watering hole was only mentioned in
the EMDR manual; however, as noted previously in the Background and Literature
Review Chapter, this metaphor is commonly used in psychoeducational scripts for
anxiety therapy (see e.g., Zayfert & Becker (2006) and Robert Sapolsky’s (1993) Why
Zebras Don’t Get Ulcers).
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In the thousands of years we developed this big part of our brain (point to your
head); we also developed something that the zebra can’t do. The zebra needs to
see, hear, or smell the lion to fire up his arousal system…Isn’t it interesting that
people, with our great brains, only have to imagine a lion to get the same arousal
response and get ready to run? (Luber, 2010, p. 63)
In this Phase 1 script, the therapist was instructed to lead the patient through a
straw man rhetorical exercise of attempting to visually see lions in the office to prove the
patient that no lions actually exist in the therapy room—they are all in the mind. The
therapist script continued,
So here is the secret to starting to control your arousal. If you feel arousal, and
don’t see a lion, it’s most likely a lion living in the back of your head! THANK
YOUR BRAIN for trying to take care of you, but tell your brain it doesn’t need
arousal right then because there is no real lion. (p. 63)
In the subsection of the script titled, “Thank your brain!” (Luber, 2010, p. 63)
different example dialogues were presented to the patients for use in engaging their brain,
blocking their thoughts and thanking their brain. After thanking their brain the patients
are instructed to do “a body scan” (Phase 6) and ask the brain to pay attention to triggers
that represent lions in the back of the brain.
In addition to activating the brain’s innate protective abilities, the EMDR manual
also described how the therapist could install further protection into their brain. In the
second phase of therapy, “Preparation,” the therapist should direct the patient to identify
a safe place which can be “installed” (p. 96) or “resourced in” (p. 96) to the brain (i.e.,
visualized by the patient while the therapist conducts bi-lateral stimulation) for use when
the patient becomes distressed.
Chapters 4 and 9 in the Shapiro (2001) manual were devoted to teaching the
clinician how to work with the patient to identify an appropriate image and safe space for
the patient to mentally invoke when distressed. The script read:
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Bring up the image of a place that feels safe and calm. Concentrate on where you
feel the pleasant sensations in your body and allow yourself to enjoy them. Now
concentrate on those sensations and follow my fingers with your eyes.” At the end
of the set the clinician asks the client, “How do you feel now?” If the client feels
better, the clinician should do four to six more sets. If the client’s positive
emotions have not increased, the clinician should try alternative directions of eye
movements until the client reports improvement. Sets are kept short, 6 to 12
movements apiece. (p. 126)
After installation of the safe space, the patient was then provided a “cue word” (p. 126)
and the clinician and patient were then directed by the manual to practice cuing and selfcuing when thinking of distressing thoughts. The clinician script continued, “Remember,
this safe place is always available to you. Just let me know if you need to return to it at
any time. The clinician should occasionally use the eye movements to reinforce the safe
place. This also maintains a positive association with the eye movements themselves” (p.
127).
In addition to the safe place exercise to further fortify mental barriers, the EMDR
manual recommended utilization of relaxation exercises before and after trauma
processing such as the “Lightstream Technique” (Shapiro, 2001, p. 71). The script for the
Lightstream Technique in a supplementary manual read:
Continue to allow the light to flow into your head, neck, and shoulders. Let it flow
into your chest and down your arms and out your fingertips. Let the soothing,
healing light flow through your torso into your legs and out through your feet. Let
the light flow into every part of your body. Let it completely fill you up, let it
work wherever it is needed inside you, to heal you and make you stronger. Then,
let it spill over and surround you, encompassing you in a healing, protective layer
of light. Finally, imagine saying to yourself the positive words you most need to
hear right now. (Luber, 2010, p. 296)
In EMDR Phase 5, “Installation,” the manual also emphasized creation of mental
barriers and brain protection from the world. During installation, the patient should be
asked by the therapist to recall negative thoughts and replace them with positive
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cognitions during bi-lateral stimulation until the positive thought is seen as “completely
true” (p. 160) on the Validity of Cognition (VoC) scale. The desired outcome of
installation is that the patient has eliminated all negative thoughts or cognitions; if they
do occur the patient should see the thoughts as completely untrue.
Thematic discussion: Mind-Brain as protector and the political use of
cognitivist ideology. Shapiro’s (2001) manual makes the subjectivist reduction that
Sampson (1981) referred to, in which the world is understood as being processed through
structures of the knowing subject. Within this view, reality is the product of individual
cognitive operations rather than of social practices lived out in historical traditions.
EMDR seemed to extend cognitivist ideology in such a way that the brain was actually
proposed as the individual knower, and not the person. There was a sense of the person
needing to manage, appropriately access and install things in their internal world.
The EMDR manual emphasized the brain-based nature of therapy and changes in
the neuro network as being integral to healing trauma. The particular presentation of
research on neuroscience and trauma suggested that re-wiring the brain was integral to
any therapy. To create inner safety in a traumatizing “real-world,” the manual assumed
that the therapist could activate the natural healing power of the brain through EMDR and
the mechanisms of bi-lateral stimulation. Through this process and the therapist’s
installation of a safe space, positive imagery, and cognitions, the patient could cue
himself or herself to reduce distress and retreat behind the barriers of the inner world.
When explaining how to control fear using the trauma watering hole metaphor,
the EMDR protocol characterized the brain as a controlling friend that the patient needs
to talk with, ask questions of, and attempt to gratify or appease in order to reduce anxiety.
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I again thought of the brain as Bentham’s panopticon (cf. Foucault, 1995), this time
where patients are standing in the prison yard of their lives asking the back of their brain
if there are lions somewhere in the distance and then activating a positive image template
or safe space when the alarm sounds.
I found the trauma watering hole script incredibly patronizing and simplistic; yet,
something about this way of talking about trauma undoubtedly makes sense in
contemporary culture. The script draws on evolutionary and neurocognitive metaphors
that have become such a part of everyday thinking and vernacular (at least since the
1990s) that it’s actually possible a patient would not interpret this script as patronizing
but as reaffirming of how their fear responses are adaptive and normal. This response is
no doubt enabled by the demand characteristics of the therapeutic situation and the
desperation to escape the painful symptoms the patient experiences.
Overall, the utilization of watering hole metaphor suggested that trauma responses
are natural, innate, pre-programmed, and as old as humanity. Furthermore, the
psychoeducation regarding innate fear responses laid the ground work for the powerful
assumption that the therapy directly manipulates or speak to the innate, ancient and
primitive parts of the brain in order to treat trauma. The metaphor subtly reduced all
traumatic experiences, regardless of severity, to a rote or triggered response that lacks
unique qualities (every trauma is a lion or a trigger) and can be eliminated through
EMDR.
When interpreting the EMDR treatment of trauma as cognitivist ideology, it
became apparent how the therapist was instructed to train the patient in accepting
cognitive ideology primarily through the techniques of psychoeducation, interweaves or
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thought-replacement, and challenging cognitive distortions. The manual assumed that the
response to both daily—as EMDR would say “little t traumas” (p. 49)—and major
political suffering—Big T Traumas (p. 49)—could be dealt with by altering the way the
brain functions and operates. EMDR necessarily recapitulates the status quo of an
isolationist, politically inactive and asocial environment where persons do not act with
each other or in the world, but merely eliminate or desensitize memories of the trauma
and replace the experience of the world with positive image templates and safe spaces. In
this sense EMDR treatment, while performing cognitivist ideology in the guise of
healing, serves to maintain the isolationist status quo in neoliberal society: by shifting the
way we perceive the world we overlook the need to change it and the need to turn to
community to make meaning of and address social problems. In a world in which
cognitive psychology is dominant, the necessity to change the material arrangement of
the social world does not come to light.
Shared Theme 2: Neoliberalism in Trauma Therapy: The Healed Trauma Survivor
as Functional Worker
In this section, I present the second theme that was shared by all of the manuals I
interpreted. In all of the manuals, trauma was a major source of reducing neoliberal
functionality and thus the aim of therapy was to restore functionality in this system, like
getting the patient to return to work or school. There were three primary assumptions in
the manuals that are a reflection of neoliberal culture: a) valorization of the enterprising
self (cf. Binkley, 2011; Layton, 2010; Rose, N. S., 2007), b) the acontextualized nature of
trauma (Layton, 2006), and c) the privileging of modular, efficient therapy designed for
managed care (Cushman & Gilford, 2000). I previously discussed these features from the
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perspectives of critical scholars in the Background and Literature Review (see Chapter II,
pp. 100-109), in this section I briefly relate these features to my interpretation of the
EMDR manuals.
Thematic findings: Neoliberalism in trauma therapy. In this section I present
quotations from the Shapiro (2010) manual and supplementary manuals (Leeds, 2009;
Luber, 2010,) that are representative of the theme “Neoliberalism in trauma therapy—
The healed trauma survivor as functional worker.” I have divided the section according to
the three assumptions listed above.
Valorization of the enterprising self. The Shapiro (2001) manual chapters on
desensitization and installation (Phase 4 and 5) began with the epigraph, “The great thing
in this world is not so much where we are but in which direction we are moving—Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr.” (p. 144).51 This quote typifies the primary aim of EMDR: to erase
the trauma through desensitization and move forward in society. Acceptance or
discussion about where the patient is in his or her life is not an acceptable or valorized
way of being in the EMDR manual. Instead, the Shapiro (2001) manual promotes a
version of the enterprising self that has the intrinsic capability to heal (by activating the

51

In addition to being a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Holmes was also a proponent of
eugenics. He decided the Buck vs. Bell Supreme Court Case of 1927 which stated that it
was legal to forcibly sterilize intellectually disabled, unfit and female prisoners—a ruling
which still stands today (Lombardo, 1985). Holmes said,
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who
already sap the strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be
such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind… Three
generations of imbeciles are enough. (Holmes, as cited in Lombardo, 2008, p.
169)
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brains natural adaptive capabilities) and be freed from the past, “The purpose of the
eight-phase EMDR treatment is to help liberate the patient from the past into a healthy
and productive present” (p. xiv) and to “rapidly metabolize the dysfunctional residue
from the past and transform it to something useful” (p. xiv). In these quotations, the
dysfunctional residue from the past was presented as a resource that can be processed and
made available for the enterprising self to use.
Most all skills, relationships, and processes were presented as things that could be
used to help the enterprising self move forward. For example, learning was thought to be
a resource that was described as available for use:
A principle that is crucial to EMDR practice (but not specified in other
information-processing theories), and which is suggested by the consistent
application of the procedure, is that there is a system inherent in all of us that is
physiologically geared to process information to a state of mental health. This
adaptive resolution means that negative emotions are relieved and that learning
takes place, is appropriately integrated, and is available for future use. (p. 15)
The acontextualized nature of trauma in neoliberal trauma therapy. Human
relationships were also presented in the EMDR manual like a resource or standing
reserve (cf. Heidegger, 1977) to help the enterprising self move forward in life. For
example, relationships were described as social resource connections, “To be with
someone you feel loved or protected with is a social resource connection (SRC)” (Luber,
2010, p. 277). Instead of focusing on helping the patient develop actual human
relationships and seek connection or help with friends, family or their community, the
manual suggested that the SRCs be installed in the brain, like the safe place, so that they
can be recalled in any circumstance:
Take another moment to bring up the image of someone important to you, past or
present, someone you associate with feelings such as caring, comfort, safety,
protection, support, encouragement, acceptance, understanding, empathy, warmth,
or compassion, or with whom you are at your best. The person you are thinking of
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is your social resource. The name of the person is [blank]. Think of an event or
time you shared with that person. Choose a picture that represents the best part of
the event, or concentrate on your person’s image, saying your person’s name
while you notice the feelings you have inside. Then do some tapping to deepen
your connection with this resource. (Luber, 2010, p. 302)
Deeping actual social connections and political activities in the real world was
replaced in EMDR therapy with bi-lateral stimulation to deepen a connection to a socialturned-mental resource—the SRC. The benefit of transforming social relationships into a
mental resource is that the complexity and dependence that is involved in the real social
world is eliminated. SRCs can be recalled at any place and require no relational
investment; they are a resource to be used. With SRCs the enterprising self can continue
to move forward without actual social connection or dependence on other people.
A modular, efficient therapy designed for managed care. I outlined the timeline
of EMDR therapy delivery and cost of therapist training in Table 2. The evidence based
therapy guidelines for EMDR suggest that three, one-hour individual sessions can
eliminate symptoms of chronic PTSD (SAMHSA, 2013); this is extremely brief when
compared against the other trauma treatments examined in this study, and also when
compared to the comprehensive list of evidence-based trauma treatments (Table 1). In
fact, there are only two other evidence-based treatments that have a lower recommended
session limit. The brief, time-limited (or as the manual would say “time-free”) nature of
EMDR therapy makes it amenable to managed care settings and able to be reimbursed by
insurance companies who have a set limit for therapy.
Although the therapy itself is brief, it is expensive and time-consuming to train
therapists how to deliver the therapy. As seen in Table 2, the total cost for training a
single clinician can cost over $3000. Shapiro has succeeded in making a highly effective,
brief, and proprietary therapy for managed care; one that if accepted broadly would be
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profitable on a per-clinician basis when compared to other approaches (e.g., Cohen et
al.’s (2006) TF-CBT costs approximately $35 to train). Despite the high cost that might
be prohibitive for many managed care companies, the manual also suggested that after
basic training EMDR therapy can be immediately performed and the scripts can be read
directly from the manual. The Luber (2010), EMDR HAP (2010), and Leeds (2009)
supplementary manuals also included therapist scripts with fill-in-the-blank worksheets
that the therapist could directly read from in the therapy room in order to retain fidelity to
the treatment.
Although EMDR therapy can be performed by reading from manualized
protocols, the Shapiro (2001) manual highly recommended that potential EMDR
clinicians attend the in-person trainings:
A survey of the first 1,200 clinicians trained in EMDR showed that only 2%
considered the supervised training unnecessary. […]. Therefore, although this
book provides the necessary written instructions to begin using EMDR, it should
be used in conjunction with appropriate supervision and training. (p. xiii)
Shapiro (2001) also recommended that “Generally, clinicians should work with EMDR
for approximately 30 sessions before attempting the more advanced material” (p. 198).
In sum, EMDR is structured as a one-size-fits all three-session treatment that can
be easily trained for minimum therapist proficiency in managed care settings. The
treatment is highly amenable to managed care billing and insurance coverage given that
issues like chronic PTSD can be treated in three sessions. The therapy was promoted as
so efficient that it becomes “time-free” (Shapiro, 2001, pp. 48-50). Though clinicians
can read directly from the EMDR manual during therapy and begin treatment almost
immediately, it is also recommended that they attend a series of in-person workshops and
supervision.
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Thematic discussion: Neoliberalism in trauma therapy: The healed trauma
survivor as functional worker. Scholars who have critically interpreted neoliberal
culture in psychotherapy have identified two primary features: a) social identity is
continually removed from political, local, and moral tradition and context; and, b)
neoliberal culture has come to govern the lives of families, individuals and communities
via technologies of therapy and the role of the expert in therapy (e.g., Binkley, 2011;
Cushman & Gilford, 2000; Fine, 2012; Layton, 2010, 2013). I previously discussed these
features from the perspectives of critical scholars in the Background and Literature
Review (see Chapter II, pp. 100-109), in this section I briefly relate these features to my
interpretation of the EMDR manuals.
The enterprising self was represented in the EMDR manual as one that can erase
the past and move forward by turning traumatic events into resources for a future positive
and more adaptive self. Throughout the manual all life experiences are transformed into
what Heidegger (1977) has called standing reserve; friends are turned into SRCs and the
real world is replaced (or rather “installed” or “resourced in”) with positive images and
safe places. The healed trauma survivor according to the manual should be a hyperfunctional person who embodies the Oliver Wendell Holmes epigraph quoted in the
manual—a person who is moving forward, independent from all persons and traditions
and freed to make infinite positive choices in their world.
Shared Theme 3: Trauma Is Universal and Culture-Free (Versus Tied to a U. S.,
Western, White, and Middle-Class Context)
In all of the manuals, trauma was presented a universal human experience that
could be treated following the same culture-free treatment manual. I divided examples of
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this theme into the following categories: a) trauma symptoms are tied to universally
experienced organ malfunction (e.g., brain problems); b) flattening of all events, local
experiences, and narratives of suffering to diagnostic criteria for PTSD and the word
“trauma” or “traumatic events;” c) thought-terminating clichés (cf. Lifton, 1989) about
cultural competency; and, d) exclusion of forms of suffering from the definition of
trauma that are not from a U.S., Western, white, female, and middle-class context.
Thematic findings: Trauma is universal and culture-free. In this section, I
present quotations from the EMDR manual that are representative of the theme, “trauma
is universal and culture-free.” I divided the section according to the four assumptions
listed above.
Trauma symptoms are tied to universally experienced organ malfunction (e.g.,
brain problems). EMDR’s Adaptive Information Processing theory and the brain-based
approach to therapy described by the Shapiro (2001) manual were outlined in Shared
Theme 1. The Shapiro (2001) manual described trauma symptoms as the result of a brain
malfunction that is universally experienced and expressed in all humans (see quotations
presented on pp. 303 – 304 in this study). The manual used words like “human behavior”
and “genetically encoded responses in human beings” to suggest that what has been
observed by Western science about trauma must be universal to all humans. For example,
the Shapiro (2001) manual stated:
Human behavior is not random; patterns of reaction and behavior established in
the past are frequently triggered in the present. (p. 207)
Some cognitive therapists might say that a child placed in a room with a tiger
would not fear the beast unless the child was old enough to know that a tiger is
dangerous. However, it seems clear that if the tiger turned and roared at the child,
no matter what its age, fear and possibly traumatization would result. This
illustrates one of the genetically encoded responses in human beings, responses
that have developed through evolution and do not require the stimulus of
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language. Thus, while a person’s beliefs, stated via language, are clinically useful
distillations of experience, it is the affect feeding them that is the pivotal element
in the pathology. (p. 44).
These quotations exemplify the EMDR perspective that human beings
ultimately experience fear, anxiety and pathology predictably and similarly across
cultures on a biological level. The latter quotation suggests that language and
beliefs are “useful” (i.e., a tool for therapy), but that affect and raw emotional
experiences are disconnected and not shaped by cultural beliefs and language.
Cultural, regional, or personal experiences of trauma were also assumed to be
experienced similarly like a traumatic particle frozen in the brain in a disconnected neural
network (see “The presentation of trauma in the manual” section, pp. 297-298 in this
study). The aim of EMDR is to reintegrate the trauma through processing and
desensitization (Phases 4 and 5). The manual talked about modifying the brain in therapy
as if it was common-sense and that all therapies were ultimately oriented to work at the
neurological level:
The invocation of a neurophysiological level is a simple recognition that this is
where all change ultimately occurs. It is not assumed to be specific to EMDR;
rather, any form of successful therapy will ultimately be correlated with a
neurophysiological shift (p. 16)
At one point in the manual it appeared as if there was some recognition of the
social context and an acceptance different cultural interpretation and bodily reactions to
traumatic events:
In EMDR therapy each session should always be integrated into a full
treatment plan. The reevaluation phase is essential because every human
being is a complex individual incorporated into a complex social system.
Any profound treatment effect can have significant impact on the person’s
associated intrapsychic factors and behaviors. These, in turn, will have an
impact on the individuals with whom the client interacts, necessitating
attention to interpersonal systems issues. The number of reevaluations will
vary from one client to another. A client with a single trauma may require
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only one to three reprocessing sessions, followed by a revaluation phase of
one or two follow-up sessions to review the treatment outcome and the
log. (p. 200)
Though this section of the manual held promise for recognition of the complexity
of human being in a social system, the manual continued by recommending to think
about this complexity by simply varying the number evaluations and reprocessing
sessions. It was assumed that EMDR in its core approach would work regardless of the
cultural and sociopolitical context of the person and the only tailoring needed was the
amount of EMDR delivered. Again, this assumption was based on the cognitivist
ideology of the Adaptive Information Processing model which essentially suggested that
that human beings function similarly and predictably; because all humans have brains,
trauma must be encoded and stored in a universal way regardless of the language, belief
system and culture of the patient.
Flattening all local experiences and narratives of suffering to diagnostic
criteria for PTSD and the words trauma or traumatic events. The first instance of
reduction of narrative, nuance and local stories of trauma in the EMDR manual was the
recommendation to transform the outcomes of the initial clinical interview into a modular
treatment plan. This occurred primarily in Phase 1—History Taking—in which the
manual described that creating a specific desensitization treatment plan was the primary
purpose of listening to the patient’s historical narrative of the trauma:
Overall, the clinician is attempting in planning treatment to discover parallels
between the client’s past and present in order to identify patterns of responses.
Having delineated the present stimuli, dysfunctional cognitions, emotions, and
behaviors, the clinician must isolate specific targets, which can range from a
client’s earliest memories to the latest disturbing experience. (pp. 107-108)
In the EMDR manual, the process of listening to the patient was overshadowed
with the objective of identifying discreet predetermined targets for desensitization. The
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manual provided a transcript of a therapist performing history taking (Phase 1). The
transcript was annotated with what the therapist’s parallel thought-process should be
when listening to a patient narrative. According to the manual, most of the therapist’s
activity should be identifying targets (i.e., traumatic memories) for desensitization. For
example:
CLIENT: Boy, it’s difficult, because with my uncle I can more or less cut him off.
My dad was the person in my family who nurtured me, probably more than
anybody else. It’s always been really hard for me to individuate from my dad,
and—how can I say it?—there is still a lot of warmth and nurturing. A few years
ago I just really set a limit on his sexual comments and told him I couldn’t spend
time with him if he did that, and he stopped.
[Therapist]: Present relationship with father will be targeted. (p. 111)
CLIENT: The memory is of me, literally on my knees, with her screaming at me
and me saying, “What do you want me to do?” and she couldn’t answer.
[Therapist]: This memory will be targeted. (p. 112)
Other therapist activities in this transcript included, “Therapist summarizes
client’s negative cognitions and seeks more information” (p. 114); “The goals the client
states may constitute behavioral measures for later assessment” (p. 116); and, “Therapist
searches for a target for the negative cognition” (p. 116). In general, the therapist was
recommended to elicit complex narratives about the experience but to hear these
narratives in such a way that each upsetting memory was reframed according to EMDR
theory (e.g., as a negative cognition or treatment target) and could be fit into phases of a
treatment plan.
The label of trauma was used throughout the Shapiro (2001) manual to refer to a
wide range of social and political suffering. In EMDR, traumas were divided grossly into
to “big T” and “little t” traumas (p. 43); these terms were used in lieu of the description
of the actual events. Big T events included: rape, sexual molestation and combat
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experience. Little t traumas included “any event that has had a lasting negative effect on
the self or psyche” (p. 43). EMDR was designed to treat all of these traumas following
the same protocol (Table 3). Despite suggesting the same protocol could work for almost
all events, the manual and supplementary texts also included many specific
supplementary protocols that were tailored to the context of specific events (e.g., mining
collapse, single-trauma, emergency room worker, combat veteran).
Thought-terminating clichés about cultural competency. The EMDR
Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP) institute founded by Shapiro in 1995 offers
therapy to trauma survivors and pro-bono trainings in EMDR to local clinicians after
disaster; the organization has conducted trainings in over 40 countries. According to the
manual, HAP:
offers trainings worldwide to teach local clinicians how to administer EMDR to
those in need. Participating clinicians throughout the world have extended their
help, regardless of boundaries and borders, in order to assist in the alleviation of
suffering worldwide. It is hoped that through such elimination of suffering we can
also help to eliminate the cycle of violence worldwide. (p. 384)
Despite spread of EMDR via HAP pro-bono trainings, the EMDR manual did not
discuss the need to tailor the therapy to different cultures or for the clinicians to have
cultural respect or additional training for cultural competency. According to the manual
the treatment is actually “culture blind.” The Shapiro (2001) manual read, “Furthermore,
there are positive reports of the successful application of the standard protocols
worldwide, suggesting that its effectiveness is culture blind” (p. 384). This was one of the
only references to culture I found in the manual (the word culture was used only three
times in the entire manual). The lack of discussing culture perhaps demonstrates how
thought-terminating the “culture blind” cliché can be; no discussion of culture was
perceived as needed since the therapy was promoted as culture blind. The discussion of
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culture in EMDR could therefore be interpreted as a silence—something so taken for
granted by the manual that it is not even mentioned. There were other thoughtterminating clichés utilized in the manual that did not pertain to culture but the cultureblind reference was the only one that specifically reduced complexity and discussion
about culture.
Exclusion from the definition of trauma. How a manual excludes or includes
certain persons from the description of trauma is highly related to how the therapist uses
the manual and the recommended screening assessments of PTSD. It is also an indication
of how the manual functions politically within society. For example, to be considered as
traumatized and appropriate for trauma treatment one has to meet minimum criteria on
initial assessments of PTSD. As I described in Chapter II, certain populations, namely
female, black, American Indian/Alaskan Native persons as well as immigrants to the U.S.
are more likely to receive a diagnosis of PTSD than other groups but are also less likely
to attend treatment, perhaps due to access barriers (e.g., needing child care, having a dual
diagnosis such that the clinician excludes them from consideration) or lack of interest in
Western psychotherapy. Despite being more likely to be given a diagnosis of PTSD these
same groups are also more likely to be considered to fit under other social categories,
such as criminals, rather than trauma victims after encountering a traumatizing situation
(Fine, 2012).
Because I didn’t include observations of the therapy or assessment in this study it
was difficult to understand how the label of “trauma” and “traumatized” was being
applied in such a way that would exclude certain persons from trauma therapy or the
definition of trauma. The EMDR manual in fact suggested that therapists should be
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overly inclusive rather than exclusionary when considering persons as traumatized (e.g.,
EMDR is culture-blind, trauma is universal, every negative life event is a little-t trauma).
To understand how people are excluded from consideration as traumatized, I looked for
examples in the manual of persons that somehow didn’t fit the definition of traumatized
or didn’t behave how the manual would expect a traumatized person to act.
The following forms of resisting trauma therapy and recommended therapist
responses to these problem behaviors (noted in parenthesis) were described in the EMDR
manual:
•

Patient is not ready to engage in treatment (Therapist response: do not
force patient to begin treatment until they are ready);

•

Patient does not want to talk about trauma (Therapist response: inform
patient that, “the processing is happening internally, she need not divulge
the details of the memory,” p. 131);

•

Patient has significant abreaction and stops eye-movement such as
incessant crying, dissociation (Therapist response: follow 12-step
abreaction protocol to desensitize patient, pp. 174-180, then remind the
patient that s/he is safe and that abreactive responses can be passed
through most rapidly if the eye movements are continued]);

•

Patient agrees to participate in EMDR but has blocked processing and
cannot access any memories (Therapist response: change method of bilateral stimulation to different modality, like visual to touch); and,

•

Patient fears s/he is going crazy from the therapy (Therapist response:
reassure patient this fear is from old memories and fears will be lessened if
s/he progresses quicker through the therapy, but also let patient know they
can stop at any time).

There was also a section in the manual about patients who feared change and thus
were more likely to purse long-term therapies:
One such client, who had been involved in psychodynamic therapy for 25 years,
terminated his first EMDR session, which targeted a memory of a parental abuse,
by saying, “I can feel it leaving me, and I don’t want it to go. I feel there might be
a lot more to learn.” Such clients often can be recognized by pronounced
noncompliance with homework assignments, oververbalization [sic] of
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experiences, and attempts to rigidly control the therapeutic process. Unless their
fear of therapeutic change is addressed successfully, the clinical outcome may be
negligible. (p. 196)
The manual recommended that these patients who were seemingly resistant to
EMDR keep a log of their fears about changing and present these to the clinician for
targeting with reprocessing and desensitization.
Overall, the manual suggested that no person would be excluded from EMDR or
the definition of traumatized; any disturbance in the psyche would be targeted for
desensitization as a “little t” trauma. A patient’s resistance to therapy could be overcome,
depending on the situation, by encouraging but not forcing the patient to participate. This
encouragement often took the form of recommending the patient proceed more quickly
through the therapy and eye-movement procedures. Thoughts about fear of
desensitization and wanting to learn more from the trauma were reframed as fear of
change and identified as targets for desensitization.
Thematic discussion: Trauma is universal and culture-free. The spread of
humanitarian organizations like HAP has no doubt contributed to the international
popularity and interest in PTSD. Despite EMDR’s spread to over 40 countries and
popularity within the U.S. across many regions, the manual did not include discussion
about culture; apparently it was thought that this dialogue did not need to occur because
the treatment was “culture blind.” Sue et al. (2007) argued that statements about culture
or color blindness are essentially what white people say when they don’t want to
acknowledge race and ethnicity. These statements deny a person of color’s racial and
ethnic experiences and their existence as a racial and cultural being. To not see culture is
to essentially assume sameness in a way that presumes that others assimilate and
acculturate to the dominant white culture. Many scholars have argued that culture and
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color-blindness is the new form of racist ideology since the 1960s that has been less
critiqued than violent racism but is just as damaging (Bonilla-Silva, 2013; Neville,
Worthington, & Spanierman, 2001; Neville, Spanierman, & Doan, 2006; Richeson &
Nussbaum, 2004). Although violent forms of racism can physically destroy communities
and members of different racial groups, culture-blindness ignores difference to the extent
that specific ethnic practices and beliefs are not recognized, respected or provided
opportunities (Bonilla-Silva, 2013).
Where culture blindness may sound to some as pleasingly egalitarian, in the case
of the EMDR manual it suggests that the Western, U.S. and white cultural assumptions of
traumatization and healing that are embedded in the EMDR model (e.g., all of the shared
themes identified in this study) are appropriate for exportation to any culture, ethnic and
racial group. In other words, if the treatment works, culturally-specific assumptions about
EMDR are necessarily correct and acceptable to any cultural group. It assumes cultural
assimilation to the EMDR values and model simply because the symptoms (also
measured via scales developed in the U.S) have been shown to be reduced in research
trials with diverse participants.
The Shapiro (2001) manual did not include a discussion about how the therapy
may ignore, replace or destroy cultural values, may be intrinsically structured to exclude
different groups, or how suffering may not be understood expressed, and healed in the
same way across cultures; there was no proposed space in the therapy for these
discussions perhaps because the therapy was promoted as culture-blind and thus
acceptable to all groups. This assumption suggests that therapists using EMDR can and
should use the therapy regardless of national, racial, cultural, and ethnic background of
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their patient in order to alleviate suffering world wide. It’s striking how universalization
and inclusivity was so emphasized in the manual and yet it was this very act of assumed
inclusivity that became a form of assimilation and colonization.
Perhaps there was no proposed space in the therapy for a discussion of the cultural
values and political practices because EMDR practitioners, like the majority of training
therapists today, have not been adequately trained to engage in that type of historical and
political critique or philosophical discourse. Furthermore, discussions centered on this
topic might be avoided by practitioners because talking about these issues might call into
question some of EMDR’s foundational beliefs and justifications.
I was also disturbed by the vignette of the patient who had been in psychoanalysis
for 25 years and reflected on the desensitization of his traumatic memory during EMDR.
He said, “I can feel it leaving me, and I don’t want it to go. I feel there might be a lot
more to learn” (Shapiro, 2001, p. 196). From the limited context provided in this vignette,
it seemed as if the patient was mourning the loss of his trauma, an important life
experience, or perhaps participation in trauma culture within a certain light. There were
also many relational possibilities that could be explored in this vignette, such as the
patient telling the therapist they want to stop the therapy or don’t like what the therapist is
doing. Perhaps the patient was inviting the therapist to witness or mourn with them. What
was disturbing about the quote provided in the vignette was the sense that the patient felt
as if he were having a memory involuntarily erased and were not an active participant in
the process. There was no room for discussion of the meaning of the loss, what the
patient hoped to learn, and the passive sense of his participation in therapy. Instead the
therapist was asked to reframe the patient’s fears about losing the memory as resistance
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to change and the loss of the memory as a form of liberation. The description of the
vignette process was conceptualized in terms of a resistance-compliance dynamic and
therefore other relational possibilities could not come to light.
Shared Exemplar: Indoctrination into a Social Void of Scientistic Managed Care
Exemplars are stories or vignettes that capture what human being is like in a
particular cultural or historical situation. In this study I looked for exemplars that
captured what human being is like in trauma culture in such a way that it could be
recognized in other situations that might have very different objective circumstances,
including those outside of the practice of psychotherapy. In particular, I focused on
identifying the therapeutic techniques and practices that trauma treatment manuals
prescribed to training therapists, and noted the similarity between these techniques and
practices to others in the social world.
The shared exemplar, which I titled, indoctrination into a social void of scientistic
managed care, has four primary features: presentation of an origin myth, locating
pathology and healing within the dyad, overreliance on forms, hand-outs and
PowerPoints, and directive psychoeducation and thought-replacement.
Exemplar findings: Indoctrination into a social void of scientistic managed
care. This section presents quotations from the Shapiro (2001) manual and
supplementary texts that are representative of this shared exemplar. I have divided the
section according to the four features listed above.
Presentation of the therapy’s origin myth. Samelson (1974) coined the term
“origin myth” to describe the presentation of an apolitical, trans-historical narrative of
incremental progress towards an objective truth and science. In an origin myth, the
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subject is decontextualized and presented in the form of discoveries from individual
geniuses (typically white Euro-American men) who each contributed to the development
of the contemporary understanding of psychology. The purpose of an origin myth is to
provide legitimacy to contemporary psychological concepts by presenting them as facts
that have existed in the same form for hundreds or even thousands of years (e.g., as long
as our ancestors fought for food with lions in the Serengeti). Each of the manuals
included some version origin myth and often this myth was incorporated into
psychoeducation about why the patient should be attending the specific form of therapy
prescribed by the manual.
The origin myth of EMDR began with Shapiro’s (2001) preface:
We went from Kitty Hawk to a man on the moon in little more than 50 years. Yet
despite such monumental technological advances, millions of people suffer
unremitting pain and a cycle of violence continues unchecked worldwide. Surely
as a society we need to redirect some of our vast resources and pay greater
attention to the alleviation of global suffering. […] In 1989, 100 years after the
pioneering work of Freud and Janet in the treatment of trauma, when three major
orientations were compared in the treatment of posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), all were found to have only moderate, and equal, effects (Brom, Kleber,
& Defares, 1989). A lesson may be that the psychological treatment of individuals
demands a composite of knowledge from various approaches. I align myself fully
with those who believe that we strengthen clinical repertoires through integration,
not through displacement or exclusion (Beutler, 2000; Norcross & Goldfried,
1992; Norcross & Shapiro, in press; Stricker & Gold, 1993). In this spirit, the
development of EMDR over the past 14 years has moved it from a simple
technique to an integrated psychotherapy approach. (p. x)
This section of the preface aligns the development of EMDR with a history of
great scientific inventions, like landing on the moon and discovering flight, and implies
that EMDR could be a similar scientific solution to unchecked suffering worldwide.
Shapiro (2001) also suggested that EMDR has built upon a tradition of studying trauma
that began with Freud and that through integrating science and various clinical
approaches EMDR is poised to cure PTSD once and for all.
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The origin myth continues in the first chapter of the EMDR manual, which
includes sub-section called “theoretical convergence” (Shapiro, 2001, pp. 20-27) that
systematically describes how psychodynamic, behavioral, and cognitive-behavioral
approaches have contributed to the creation of EMDR and its associated theory of
information-processing (the Adaptive Information Processing Theory). In addition to
Freud and Pavlov, Shapiro cited Rodgers (1951) and Maslow (1970) as providing
evidence for the naturally positive direction of the brain’s information processing systems
(i.e., when activated the body will naturally heal and move toward a positive state).
Shapiro also related the idea that trauma causes an imbalance in the brain’s information
processing system to Janet and Pavlov and then connected these theories to contemporary
studies that invoke neuroscience (e.g., Andrade, Kavanaugh & Baddeley, 1997; van der
Kolk, 1994; Watson, Hoffman, & Wilson, 1988; Zager & Black, 1985).
At one point, Shapiro (2001) discussed EMDR’s conceptualization of information
processing as an actual paradigm shift in psychology and provided a litany of studies that
had similar ideas but were distinct from EMDR:
Although there are a number of other information-processing theories that have
great merit (Barnard & Teasdale, 1991; Chemtob, Roitblat, Hamada, Carlson, &
Twentyman, 1988; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Horowitz, 1979, 1998; Litz & Keane,
1989; McClelland, 1995; Rachman, 1978, 1980; Teasdale, 1999), the EMDRbased information-processing model is both generally compatible with them and
distinct in its elements and applications. (p. 13)
This origin myth encompasses almost all major theories in psychology
(psychoanalysis, humanistic, behavioral) and connects the work of famous psychologists
and analysts (Freud, Janet, Pavlov, Rodgers and Maslow) to rationalizing a brain-based
information processing theory that is central to EMDR. Consistent with the structure of
most origin myths, the work of these psychologists is invoked with little context and
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mentioned only in so far as it contributed a developmental step towards EMRD theory.
The myth suggested that EMDR was the culmination of research that has pulled together
historical tradition of psychology with the miracles of neuroscience. I discuss the
expansive integration of EMDR’s origin myth further under the section EMDR Theme 1
in this chapter (pp. 351-367).
The epigraphs before each chapter also served the purpose of an origin myth by
suggesting that the information in the chapter falls in line with a tradition of a great
master. For example, Shapiro (2001) began Chapter 2, which explains Adaptive
Information Processing therapy, with an epigraph from Albert Einstein, “ As far as the
laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; as far as they are certain, they
do not refer to reality” (p. 29). This epigraph appears to have been selected to prepare the
reader for Chapter 2, in which Shapiro makes the case that much of EMDR therapy defies
common sense and understanding (e.g., lifelong PTSD can be cured in three-sessions just
like a neurotransmitter crossing a synapse, and it’s unclear why bi-lateral stimulation
works but it does).
Chapter 10, which introduces cognitive interweaves (i.e., similar to hypnotic
command suggestions) for challenging patients, began with the epigraph, “As you go the
way of life, you will see a great chasm. Jump. It is not as wide as you think.—From a
Native American initiation rite” (p. 249). It is notable that the particular person or even
tribe that this quote originally came from could not be located, and instead the statement
was ascribed to a seemingly homogenous ethnic group of Native Americans. It perhaps
goes without saying that not all Native American initiation rites are similar across tribes,
contexts and history; to attribute the quote to Native Americans so broadly is similar to
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saying “From a Caucasian initiation rite.” If this quote was from an unnamed white
person it is likely that instead the quote would instead be attributed to “anonymous”
rather than to an entire race or ethnic group.
The reason I make this comparison is to point how the epigraph uses Native
American traditions in order to subtly align EMDR to a stereotype of this group. It
suggests that making change in EMDR requires a leap of faith that is a part of ancient
Native American wisdom and rites of passage. Furthermore, the use of this epigraph is
somewhat ironic because Chapter 10 (which this epigraph precedes) actually describes
what would be akin to the therapist pushing the patient off the chasm by introducing
cognitive interweaves to ensure that therapy proceeds as expected (see further discussion
of cognitive interweaves under Promotion of Doer-Done-to Relationships in this chapter,
pp. 356-358).
The Native American initiation rite was not the only example of a type of cultural
tokenism to legitimate EMDR therapy in the manual. Another decontextualized cultural
epigraph was presented at the beginning of Chapter 9- Protocols and Procedures for
Special Situations. It read, “You can outdistance that which is running after you, but you
cannot outdistance that which is running inside you—African Proverb” (p. 221). Again,
there is a huge amount of cultural and ethnic variation in the continent of Africa but the
epigraph reduces this variation into generic stereotype. (Now, imagine if the epigraph
read “North American Proverb.”) I was not sure how the African proverb epigraph
particularly related to the chapter on standardized therapy protocols, but it seemed to
suggest that the battle of overcoming trauma is an internal one that every culture and
nationality around the world faces—such as the entire continent of Africa.

340
Another epigraph that was taken out of cultural context to fuel EMDR’s pancultural origin myth was a quote from Confucius in the introduction to the chapters on
preparing the patient for EMDR (Chapter 5), “It doesn’t matter how slowly you go as
long as you don’t stop” (p. 121). This quote suggests that EMDR follows in the
Confucian tradition. The epigraph aligns with a taken for granted assumption about the
healed trauma survivor in EMDR as a self-actualizing, enterprising being that can forget
the past by moving forward; the quote suggests that we should go forward in life no
matter what, but at one’s own pace. The quote in context of Confucius’s writing was
probably not intended to be applied in the context of an EMDR manual as a reason that
humans should use therapy to become functional. D. L. Hall and Ames (1987), Confucian
scholars who have written about Western appropriation of Confucian thought, wrote, “An
appropriate and adequate explication of the meaning of Confucius’ thought requires a
language of immanence grounded in the supposition that laws, rules, principles or norms
have their source in the human, social contexts which they serve” (p. 14). In the EMDR
manual there is no sense of Confucian thought or self; the quote is completely out of
context and only serves as a reminder of an ancient tradition and idea that EMDR is
somehow tapping into transcultural and timeless conceptualizations of healing.
The remaining epigraphs include quotations from Herbert Spencer (19th century
biologist who coined the term “survival of the fittest”), Henry David Thoreau (19th
century transcendentalist author who wrote Walden), Carl Rodgers (20th century
American psychologist and founder of patient-centered, humanistic approach), Oliver
Wendell Holmes (20th century Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court and
eugenicist), Steven Levine (20th century American poet informed by Theravada
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Buddhism), Alexander Solzhenitsyn (20th century Russian novelist and critic of Soviet
totalitarianism), and Gregory Bateson (20th century anthropologist). The wide range of
backgrounds and contexts of each of these authors, along with the interdisciplinary
emphasis, again is part of the weaving of an origin myth for EMDR that suggests the
therapy is a cross-disciplinary solution to human suffering and part of a long-standing
universal tradition of healing.
In sum, the EMDR weaves an origin myth throughout the text to provide
legitimacy to the practice and theory of EMDR by presenting the therapy as supported by
principles that have existed for hundreds or even thousands of years. Origin myths appeal
to the patients’ common sense and reliance on expert authority because they believe the
therapist is proposing a state-of-the-art scientific discovery that is the culmination of a
pan-cultural ancient healing tradition merged with years of research on neuroscience. To
accept the origin myth is to see EMDR as ahistorical and true regardless of the
sociopolitical context of its development.
One of the dangers of presenting EMDR practices as ahistorical truths, that I
present in more detail during the discussion for this section, is that it can be more difficult
for patients to resist and question these practices and the embedded prescriptive moral
and political messages contained within the myth (e.g., to be a good trauma survivor you
need to replace angry thoughts with positive thoughts and not take action in the social
world).
Location of pathology and healing in the dyad. The primary human relationship
described in the EMDR manual was between the therapist and patient. Though the
primary human relationship discussed in the manual located healing in the dyadic
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relationship of therapist-patient, at times healing was proposed to be taking place
between the patient and his or her brain almost as a self-therapy. For example, the Luber
(2010) manual included a “blind to therapist” protocol in which the patient did not need
to talk to the therapist; the therapist’s relation to the patient was essentially to provide bilateral stimulation and the structure of therapy. In lieu of talking about the trauma, the
patient was to pick a cue word that had neutral value for the therapist to use when
directing the patient through the phases of therapy; the manual recommended cue words
like “lamp post” that may have a vague relationship to the memory but no descriptive
quality (Luber, 2010, p. 226).
In order to assess the progress of the therapy, the therapist was instructed to ask
the patient to report SUDs, therefore the content of therapy was proposed to primarily be
comprised of the patient undergoing bi-lateral stimulation while reporting quantitative
measures of distress to the therapist. While there is clearly a dyadic structure to healing in
EMDR, protocols like “blind to the therapist” and scripts about accessing the brain
almost frame the therapy as if the therapist is another resource or tool to activate the
natural healing process in the patient, rather than as another human in relationship to the
patient.
Overall, the relationship between therapist and patient was the primary healing
relationship mentioned in the manual and was often described in utilitarian terms. A
relational disconnect in the healing dyad was also described in the clinical case
presentation of an EMDR therapist (perhaps Shapiro) working with a Vietnam veteran
(Shapiro, 2001). In the case vignette, the veteran stopped the bi-lateral stimulation
suddenly and stated, “I just realized that this is the same anger that kept me alive in
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Vietnam and let me do what I had to do. I’m afraid if we continue that I will hurt you” (p.
306). After considering options, the clinician:
instructed the client to go to a nearby area that contained no people and to allow
himself to feel the emotion and pound the ground while verbally expressing any
thoughts that arose. The clinician instructed him to return when he felt ready.
Approximately ½ hour later the client emerged with a face of happy wonder. He
had found that he had not been overwhelmed by the emotion; instead, as he
allowed himself to express it, it had subsided. The client said that he felt he would
no longer be the victim of his emotion but, rather, its master. These thoughts were
used as the positive cognitions in successive sets. (p. 306)
In this vignette, the patient was directed to go somewhere that “contained no
people” and express the anger alone, without the therapist present. When the patient
presented to the therapist stating he would master the emotions (and presumably not let
the emotions affect or hurt the therapist), the therapist accepted the patient back into the
room. The therapist then responded by asking the patient to think about mastering
emotions while providing bi-lateral stimulation. The case vignette concluded with how
the Vietnam veteran was no longer angry and when he did feel angry it “was easily
handled with self-control techniques” (p. 306).
This vignette characterized another aspect of the independent, instrumental, and at
times distant nature of the dyadic healing relationship in EMDR—patients ideally should
state they are willing to be independent from the clinician (and in this case leave the
therapy room when angry) in order to proceed through the therapy and not be considered
a victim. The veteran was only accepted back in the therapy room when he had convinced
the therapist he could master his emotions and not allow his emotions to affect the
therapist or anyone else. This vignette was presented as a victorious case of EMDR but to
me it exemplified the isolating process of healing and self-mastery that is promoted
within the dyadic relationship of therapist-patient in EMDR.
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Over-reliance on forms, handouts, and PowerPoint in therapy. EMDR is
extremely reliant on the therapist reading from the manual protocol and filling in the
blanks on a worksheet or form in the room with the patient during the therapy. The
Shapiro (2001) manual and supplementary manuals included in this study each contained
protocols with scripts in which the clinician should write patient responses and monitor
positive and negative thoughts, SUDs, and VoC scores at each session. The Luber (2010)
supplementary manual contained over 35 different special scenario protocols (with over
350 pages of handouts and protocols). The Leeds (2009) supplementary manual
contained ten forms that should be completed as a part of standard EMDR therapy, in
addition to fidelity monitoring checklists for ensuring training EMDR clinicians are
adhering to the appropriate model in each standard phase of the treatment. The HAP
training manual included 18 pages of forms that should be completed as part of standard
EMDR therapy (Shapiro, 2010). The main Shapiro (2001) manual included six standard
forms with reference to the supplementary material for additional forms.
Table 3 includes a tasks column that lists how the therapists should be using
forms to essentially monitor the compliance of the patient during therapy. Over the
course of therapy the standard repertoire of forms that would be completed included:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Treatment goals and concerns;
Assessing stability and readiness for reprocessing;
Master treatment plan list of targets;
Record of treatment;
Basic or detailed level procedural steps and script for resource
development and installation;
Trigger log;
EMDR reprocessing procedural steps script; and,
Session summary.
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The majority of these forms would be completed by the clinician as they record
what the patient says and does during the therapy. The tasks listed in Table 3 included:
verify from log patient is helped by methods for self-control; record baseline measures
for SUD and VoC; and, adjust treatment plan based on patient report from log.
In EMDR, logs and forms take precedence over other forms of self-reporting as if
verification that the patient is indeed participating and improving in therapy is not
considered valid unless monitored on paper and in scientific ways.
Directive psychoeducation and cognitivist thought-replacement. The goals of the
first phase of EMDR were to obtain patient history, create the treatment plan with targets,
assess pre-treatment symptoms of PTSD (or other related disorders), and ensure that the
patient is an appropriate fit for treatment. Phase 2 (Preparation) was primarily composed
of directive psychoeducation in which the patient was informed about what problem they
have by using the language of EMDR theory (neurobiological trauma and Adaptive
Information Processing Model) and how EMDR was designed to alleviate the problem.
The psychoeducational scripts were designed to explain to the patient that their problems
are due to a trauma being frozen in their brain in disparate neural networks and then
explain how the brain can be activated with EMDR to naturally heal these networks. This
is summarized in the script:
When a trauma occurs it seems to get locked in the nervous system with the
original picture, sounds, thoughts, and feelings. The eye movements we use in
EMDR seem to unlock the nervous system and allow the brain to process the
experience. That may be what is happening in REM or dream sleep—the eye
movements may help to process the unconscious material. It is important to
remember that it is your own brain that will be doing the healing and that you are
the one in control. (Shapiro, 2010, p. 3)
I previously quoted similar orienting scripts in detail and explained the primary
psychoeducation orientation to EMDR earlier in this section (pp. 303-304; 324-236).
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What is important to note about EMDR psychoeducation is how the patient’s presenting
problem is reframed within EMDR theory, thus making EMDR treatment seem as a
natural and obvious choice for healing and solving the problem.
Thought-replacement was primarily utilized in Phase 5 of EMDR (Installation).
The aim of installation was to reprocess the target trauma (i.e., have the patient talk about
the problematic memory during bi-lateral stimulation) while identifying post-traumatic
negative cognitions and installing new positive beliefs or resources. The primary criteria
for a negative cognition was that it “represent the client’s current interpretation of the
self” (p. 58) (e.g., I am bad, I am useless). In situations where it’s ambiguous whether
the patient has negative self-attributions as a result of the trauma, the EMDR protocol
required that the therapist assist the patient in identifying negative self-attribution. For
example, when the therapist asks about any negative post-traumatic cognitions, if the
patient describes something situational or about another person the therapist should
encourage the patient to frame this as a self-oriented cognition (i.e., in an “I statement”).
The manual provided the example of a patient who suffered from parental abuse who
stated the primary negative cognition she had was “Mother didn’t love me.” The manual
acknowledged that while this may have been true it could not be the primary target
thought for desensitization because “an abusive parent cannot be turned into a nurturing
parent” (p. 60). Instead the resulting “self-attribution” of “There is something wrong with
me” (p. 60) can be desensitized by following the EMDR protocol.
If the patient does not provide any negative cognitions that can be reframed as
self-attributions, the manual suggests that,
The clinician may offer such a client a list of alternative negative cognitions to
help him understand the concept. … If a client has difficulty putting a negative
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cognition into words, offer some examples that, in your clinical estimation, seem
to be a good fit. As a rule of thumb, most negative cognitions seem to fall into
three categories: (1) responsibility/defective (“I did or am something wrong”), (2)
lack of safety, and (3) lack of control. (p. 60)
Table 4 includes selections from a handout Appendix (p. 434–440) in the Shapiro
(2001) manual that was designed to be provided to the patients to help them pick a
negative cognition, as if the patient were picking out correct answers for a test. What is
particularly concerning about the example of the patient who has a real awareness of her
mother as unloving is that the therapist directs the patient to replace this interpersonal
awareness with an attack on the person, perhaps because only it can be addressed within
the cognitivist model. Everything about the social world here (even within a limited
scope of the dyad) is transformed into intrapsychic self-talk which cognitivist practices
can address.52
Table 4
Selections From EMDR Handout on Positive Cognitions for Installation (Shapiro, 2001)
Negative Cognitions

Positive Cognitions

Responsibility

52

I am shameful

I am honorable

I am a bad person

I am a good person

I am different

I am okay as I am

I deserve to be miserable

I deserve to be happy

I did something wrong

I learned from it

I should have known better

I do the best I can

Cushman (personal communication, April 12, 2014) has referred to this as an example
of a self-sealing doctrine and circularity in research (see also Cushman, 1989).
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Safety/Vulnerability
I cannot trust anyone

I can choose whom to trust

I am in danger

It's over; I am safe now

I cannot let it out

I can choose to let it out

Control/Choices
I am weak

I am strong

I am not in control

I am now in control

I am helpless

I now have choices

I am a failure

I can succeed

Once the patient identified or was directed by the therapist to pick a self-focused
negative cognition, the therapist then is able to replace this cognition by installing a
positive one. The installation script read:
Do the words [repeat the positive cognition] still fit, or is there another positive
statement you feel would be more suitable?” “Think about the original incident
and those words [selected positive cognition]. From 1, completely false, to 7,
completely true, how true to they feel?” “Hold them together.” Lead the client in
an eye movement set. “On a scale of 1 to 7, how true does that [positive
statement] feel to you now when you think of the original incident?” VOC:
Measure the VOC after each set. Even if the client reports a 6 or a 7, do eye
movement again to strengthen, and continue until validity no longer strengthens.
Go on to the body scan. If the client reports a 6 or less, check appropriateness and
address blocking belief (if necessary) with additional reprocessing. (Shapiro 2001,
p. 432)
Installation occurs until the patient believes that the new positive thought is rated
as a 7 on the VoC scale meaning the thought is completely true.
In addition to installing thoughts, the Shapiro (2001) manual discussed
installation of other positive “resources.” According to the manual, “Resources are
normally developed through appropriate modeling by caregivers and authority figures,
instruction in practical and moral precepts, stories and metaphors” (p. 436). Thus the
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clinician is directed to model a surrogate caregiver and rebuild the appropriate
developmental resources. The Appendix (p. 434–440) provided examples of resources
that the patient may be interested in installing, which included:
•

Mastery resources: “a physical stance or movement that evokes a
functional affective state” (p. 435);

•

Relational resources: memories of positive role models or supportive
others; this is also described as a Social Connection Resource (SCR); and,

•

Symbolic resources: memories from the natural world such as “the ocean,
a rock, a tree, as well as religious, archetypal, totemic and transpersonal
experiences” (p. 435); The manual notes symbols from dreams can also be
installed.

Overall, in the installation and thought-replacement sections of the Shapiro (2001)
EMDR manual there was notable use of utilitarian (e.g., resource) and technology-based
(e.g., installation, processing) vocabulary, which gave the impression that the therapy is
scientific and mechanistic, and healing the patient can be similar to fixing or rebooting a
brain-based computer. The therapy also necessarily required that the patient understand
their problems as a self-focused failing (e.g., it’s not that mother didn’t love you, it’s that
you were unlovable), in order for EMDR to heal the identity crisis and self-degradation
that occurred from this self-oriented way of understanding the problem. The circular
irony of the therapy, which I discuss further in EMDR Theme 1, is that EMDR
encouraged patients and therapists that did not understand their problems as internal, selforiented failings to pick negative self-attributions in order for the therapy to resolve them.
Exemplar discussion: Indoctrination into scientistic managed care. This
exemplar had four primary features: presentation of an origin myth, locating pathology
and healing within the dyad, overreliance on forms, hand-outs and PowerPoints, and
directive psychoeducation and cognitivist thought-replacement. Many of these features
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are therapeutic techniques that shift therapy into a form of indoctrination into a world of
scientistic managed care that ignores social relationships outside of the dyad and values
compliance and control as a good way to be human. The techniques described in this
exemplar not limited to EMDR therapy or psychotherapy in general, which is why they
have been identified as part of an exemplar.
To indoctrinate the patients into the culture of managed care, EMDR utilized
origin myths in psychoeducational scripts and epigraphs to suggest to the patient and
therapist that the values and practices of EMDR have existed for centuries and are part of
an ancient tradition. Origin myths appeal to the patients’ common sense and reliance on
expert authority because they believe the therapist is proposing a state-of-the-art
scientific discovery that is the culmination of a pan-cultural ancient healing tradition
merged with years of research on neuroscience. Because the psychoeducation is designed
to present problems that the therapy will cure, it indoctrinates the patient to want the
exact type of treatment that is offered by the therapist. This is why forms of resistance to
treatment are often met with more psychoeducation; the assumption being that if the
patient were to be presented with more knowledge, science, and explanation about their
problem they will better understand their problems as rooted intrapsychically and
resolved through therapy.
The techniques (i.e., origin myths, psychoeducation, location of healing in the
dyad, and handouts) are all ways that messages about how to be a good human are
communicated by therapists serving in the role of experts in contemporary society. What
is of concern about these practices is that is that they rely on subtle assumptions about the
patient, such as that the patient does not know what s/he has experienced and need to be
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educated about his or her symptoms. The practices also rely on instrumental technologies,
such as worksheets and forms with quantitative monitoring systems, which are difficult to
become aware of and resist via therapy given their directive content, scientific
presentation, yet non-assuming delivery format. The form becomes an extension of the
clinical-gaze (cf. Foucault, 1975) and self-surveillance that is promoted in the manual
where one should always be aware of and control one’s thoughts. Like Foucault’s (1995)
description of the prison shifting to the asylum and then morphing into the clinic and now
into self-help books, this type of self-surveillance is completed not because the patient is
pressured or is forced to absorb the doctrine but because the form is associated with
healing from trauma and being a good trauma survivor. The patients want to comply and
control their thoughts because they are told and have come to believe through subtle
messages in therapy and in daily life (e.g., neoliberal ideals) that that is what they should
do to return to society as a functional worker and a good person.
EMDR Theme 1: The Grandiosity and Mania of EMDR
In this section, I present the first theme that I identified only for the EMDR
manual and that I did not interpret for the other two manuals.
Thematic findings: The grandiosity and mania of EMDR. I was struck by a
sense of grandiosity, narcissism, and mania throughout my reading of the Shapiro (2001)
manual. I have separated this EMDR-specific thematic finding into four sub-themes:
activating the innate perfectibility of humankind via therapy; the pursuit of moral
entrepreneurship; promotion of doer-done-to relationships; and, the mania of an overly
integrative origin myth.
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Activating the innate perfectibility of humankind via therapy. Throughout the
manual there was a reoccurring emphasis on the perfectibility of humankind. This was
first mentioned in the preface to the book where Shapiro (2001) discussed being drawn to
authors and psychologists “who believed in the perfectibility of humankind” (p. xi). First,
the brain was presented as a self-perfecting entity that innately possessed the tools for
self-healing, positivity, and adaptation; these skills could be activated through therapy
and the patient could then be rid of maladaptive and dysfunctional behavior (e.g., “The
intention in EMDR is to stimulate the dysfunctional material, activate the processing
mechanism, and allow information to flow along is natural course to adaptive resolution
[p. 147]). Thus, when appropriately activated, the brain was assumed to be able to solve
problems and improve the functional capacity of the patient in such a way that their life
could be completely positive (e.g., subjective units of distress at a 0, negative cognitions
completely un-true, and positive cognitions about self-image completely true). The
emphasis on perfecting thought processes to ensure maximum functional capabilities and
positivity occurred throughout the manual.
For example, after the primary traumatic memories and dysfunctional thoughts
were replaced or desensitized in Phase 5, the manual recommended the patient and
therapist continue to install positive cognitions to not just eliminate the patient’s
problems but to maximize their functional capacities:
Since new and more adaptive positive cognitions are possible once the memories
are processed, more adaptive actions can be envisioned by the client. The
clinician should use EMDR to metabolize the dysfunctional material that drives
the maladaptive behavior and to assist the client in imagining more life-enhancing
responses and in formulating appropriate behaviors in his mind. (p. 214)
The impatience of the therapist when assisting the patient to develop
progressively adaptive thought patterns was also discussed in the manual. The manual
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advised therapists in this situation to allow the incremental thought progression to occur
unimpeded despite “when the client’s statements appear to have flaws in logic or
imperfect understanding” (p. 156). The implied message here was that the patient can and
should reach perfect understanding and completely eliminate dysfunction throughout the
therapy. The therapist was portrayed as a coach that should restrain against the desire to
push the patient to be perfect too quickly.
Therapists were also encouraged throughout the manual to access their inherent
perfectibility. At the end of the manual, Shapiro (2001) discussed the ideal therapist and
noted that “training alone does not ensure competency and this is especially true for
students or researchers who have not perfected their general clinical skills through
extensive practice and clinical experience” (p. 341). The taken for granted expectation
that this quote communicates is that the aim of EMDR therapists should be to attain
perfect technique and competency. For both patients and therapists alike, the message
communicated throughout the manual was that operating in a highly functional, adaptive
and trauma-free world can be achieved in time.
In addition to reaching a state of functional perfection, the aim of thought
replacement and installation in EMDR appeared to be to maintain the patient’s cohesive
and all-positive self image—every negative self-assessment that was identified during
installation was replaced by a new positive “I statement.” As mentioned previously (pp.
339- 341), when the patient shared a negative cognition that was not a self-depreciating I
statement, the clinician was instructed in the manual to reframe the patient’s cognition to
be self-focused (e.g., “My mother didn’t love me” would be changed to “I am
unlovable;” then “I am loveable” would be installed by the clinician). Thus the therapy
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demanded that the patient pick-out and submit themselves to installation of first the
negative and then the positive self-assessment statements even when the patient did not
initially present with a damaged self image or conceptualize their problem as selffocused.
This self-focused thought replacement could be interpreted as a type of
narcissistic projection on the part of the therapy. In other words, the EMDR manual
required the therapist to insist that the patient repair a damaged self-image from an early
traumatic experience even when the patient may not perceive their experience in this
way. The healing described in the EMDR manual took the shape of narcissistic
maintenance of self-image but to do this the patient had to be set up to believe they have
a damaged self image in the first place. This is another example of the subjectivist
reduction in cognitive ideology (cf. Sampson, 1981) where the therapy is designed to
revolve around self-image and self-talk in order to be effective. In other words, altering
internalized self-talk is the only good way to reduce traumatic symptoms and change a
traumatic world according to the EMDR manual because the social world is considered to
exist primarily as an internal, mental map that can be controlled and manipulated via the
individual.
The pursuit of moral entrepreneurship. The EMDR Humanitarian Assistance
Program (HAP) institute founded by Shapiro in 1995 offers therapy to trauma survivors
and pro-bono trainings in EMDR to local clinicians after disaster and the organization has
conducted trainings in over 40 countries. The manual stated, “HAP therapists travel to
inner-city agencies [in the U.S.], war-torn regions, disaster sites and developing nations,
offering free and low-cost training to local mental health professionals” (p. 452).
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Nickolas Rose (2006) has labeled the international spread of Western anxiety
disorders and PTSD as partially due to a phenomenon of “moral entrepreneurship” (i.e.,
mental health problems are seen by American practitioners as a neglected source of
misery only they can identify and conquer through the use of Western psychotherapy).
He described an evangelical quality of psychiatrists who are excited by their capacity to
treat or even cure disorders. To do so, the healers first must convince the public of the
gravity of the problem to which their treatment is the solution; this also takes the shape of
therapists marketing and selling the problem and solution to different vulnerable groups.
Rose suggested that many of the technologies of anxiety prevention (that well-meaning
doctors who are interested in saving the world utilize) are often created with funding
from or proposed by pharmaceutical companies. Thus, what begins as a moral imperative
to help and heal is transformed into an economy of healing and marketing proprietary
treatments.
In the case of EMDR, even though HAP is a non-profit agency, it appeared that
there was some direct profit to be made from its global dissemination. The cost of inperson trainings and continued education in EMDR treatment, beyond buying the Shapiro
(2010) manual and attending the basic training provided by HAP can be upwards of
$3000 per clinician (see Table 2). Thus, it could be argued that there is a proprietary
benefit to spreading EMDR worldwide. Despite this potential for profit, it also appears as
if HAP was also created from an evangelical interest in spreading the treatment as a
particular form of eliminating trauma and suffering from the world. This is reflected in
the origin myth presented in the preface of the manual, which suggested that EMDR was
positioned to solve world suffering and be a great scientific discovery.
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From a psychoanalytic perspective, part of the moral entrepreneurship of EMDR
in reducing trauma could be interpreted as a narcissistic masochistic act to bring
constancy to the therapists representation of self (for further discussion see Chapter 2,
Narcissism as self-maintenance in the 20th century, pp. 109-114 in this study). It perhaps
goes without saying that it is not desirable for most people to repeatedly, sometimes for
40 or more hours a week, to listen to stories of trauma, violence and suffering. People
who are attracted to trauma therapies in particular (i.e., identify as a trauma therapist)
may feel a great sense of reward and honor when hearing horrific accounts. It is possible
that self-proclaimed trauma therapists may feel empty or lost in our contemporary culture
(cf. empty self; Cushman, 1995) or perhaps have come to identify with a sense of
victimhood, that the pain of repeatedly hearing traumatic stories from their patients may
make the therapist actually feel more connected, real and alive. This sense of subjecting
oneself to repeated pain to feel continuity has been described by Stolorow (1975) as part
of a masochistic narcissistic defense that stems from a desire to be in control of and avoid
possibly unpredictable pain of being in reciprocal and intimate relationships. The
therapists desire to bring wide-scale humanitarian aide through mass training programs
like HAP could reflect a narcissistic desire to find a mirror or sense of constant identity
by responding to all suffering in a pre-formulated way (i.e., through EMDR), no matter
what the culture or gravity of the trauma. Furthermore, the therapy is designed to suggest
that all traumatic problems in the world can be easily fixed and that the therapist can
control or even eradicate complex social and political suffering through three sessions of
therapy. Thus, the therapists may also gain a sense of reassurance or, in extreme cases, a
sense of omnipotent power to heal what are often complex social and political problems
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by defining them as flaws in the self that can be fixed simply with EMDR and by the
therapist. In these scenarios, the altruism of healing can become narcissistic and colonial
when humanitarian projects are used for self-betterment.53
Promotion of doer-done-to relationships. Jessica Benjamin (1988, 2004)
described psychic experience in psychoanalytic theories like object relations as a oneway street where one person is the subject (the doer) and the other is the object (the done
to). This subject-object relationship was structured into the EMDR therapy in an
instrumental and utilitarian way such that the patient was almost described as behaving
like a passive vessel (cf. empty self; Cushman, 1995) that consumes, or in this case is
subject to “installation” of positive objects from the therapist. In addition to the
installation of positive resources, the EMDR therapist periodically engages in cognitive
interweaves which Shapiro (2001) described as originating from a form of hypnotic
command suggestion (p. 249). I interpreted interweaves as a prime example of the doerdone-to relationship promoted by the manual and have described them in detail here.
Cognitive interweaves were presented in Chapter 10 of Shapiro’s (2001) manual
as “a proactive strategy for working with challenging clients” (p. 249) that called for “the
clinician to offer statements that therapeutically weave together the appropriate neuro
networks and associations” (p. 249). In other words, interweaves were recommended to
be used when the patient’s processing is not going in the way the therapist expects or
deems appropriate. The objective of interweaves, according to the manual usage, was, “to
53

Anecdotally, during my training in graduate school I encountered many narcissistically
masochistic therapists who, to the detriment of their lives and relationships, worked
overtime at their trauma focused clinic jobs. They appeared to enjoy discussing the
suffering they witnessed, the amount of overtime they worked for no compensation, and
seemed to look forward to solving the next big crises to come through the treatment
center. See further discussion in Chapter IV: Foregrounding, in this study.
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help clients (1) recognize and attribute appropriate responsibility and (2) discard the guilt
and self-blame that have undercut their sense of self-esteem and self-efficacy” (p. 253).
During an interweave, suggestions or questions are inserted during the bi-lateral
stimulation reprocessing phase to ensure the client follows the expected course of therapy
(e.g., participates openly in the installation procedures). An example of an interweave
was asking ,“Whose responsibility was it?” (p. 253) during a trauma narrative of child
abuse. Other examples of interweaves included, “Whose responsibility was it that you
learned not to be able to express anger?” (p. 254); and, “What happens if you think the
words, “It’s over, I’m safe now” (p. 257). The manual noted that when a clinician
interjects an interweave during processing, “The client does not have to embrace the
statement wholeheartedly at first. Simply attending to the suggestion allows the adaptive
information already inherent in her memory system to be stimulated” (p. 257).
The manual included the following scenarios as reasons to initiate interweaves:
•

Looping: “Even after successive sets the client remains at a high level of
disturbance with repetitive negative thoughts, affect, and imagery” (p.
249);

•

Insufficient information: “The client’s educational level or life experiences
have not given him the appropriate data to progress cognitively or
behaviorally” (p. 250);

•

Lack of generalization: “The client has achieved a more positive
emotional plateau or cognition with respect to one target, but processing
does not generalize to ancillary targets” (p. 249); and,

•

Time pressures: The client fails to process an abreaction or negative
thought sufficiently and there is not enough time left in the session for the
client to do so.

Many of the situations described above suggest that the patient’s intrinsic healing
capabilities were somehow faulty during the normal EMDR process and thus a more
directive intervention was necessary. While the above problems seemed to be considered
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issues of patient non-compliance or resistance, they could also be understood as failures
of the therapy—instances where the seemingly universal principles of Adaptive
Information Processing did not work.
Overall, interweaves created a relationship between the EMDR therapist and
patient where the patient was assumed to be the narcissistic object of cultural perfection.
The heavy-handed interventions (literally) in response to patient resistance or noncompliance prevented alternative ways of thinking about and acting in response to
trauma; they emphasized adherence and efficiency rather than contextual, creative and
critical thought.
The mania of an overly integrative origin myth. The origin myth of EMDR was
described earlier in this chapter (p. 255–261), where I focused on the use of this myth to
naturalize and legitimate the treatment as a form of meaningful change. Here I have
focused on the interpretation of the origin myth as compulsive in its over-inclusivity most
approaches to psychotherapy. The mania was not only present in historical span of the
inclusion (most all theories of psychology since the 1800s) but also in the massive
amount of detailed text that was provided in the manual to rationalize the EMDR origin
myth. One only need to peer at the table of contents to get a sense for the breadth and
detail included but I estimated that at least 100 pages of the 450 page manual were
devoted to expounding upon the origin myth of EMDR and its integrated nature.
For example, the first chapter of the manual includes a sub-section called
“theoretical convergence” which systematically lists psychodynamic, behavioral, and
cognitive-behavioral approaches and how they both contribute and culminate in the
creation of EMDR (pp. 20-27). The last half of the manual (pp. 315-357) was devoted to
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research on EMDR which included sections with titles such as “The Comparison of
EMDR and Other PTSD treatments;” “Hypothesis Regarding the Etiological Nature of
Memories;” “Hypothesis Regarding Orienting Response Mechanism;” “Hypothesis
Regarding Bi-lateral Stimulation Mechanism;” “Hypothesis Regarding the Distractive
Level of Stimuli;” and, “Hypothesis Regarding Free Association Summary of
Recommendations for Component” (pp. 356–377). Each of these sections connected a
wide range of diverse theories and research to support the utilization of EMDR and the
Adaptive Information Processing model that Shapiro (2001) called a “paradigm” (pp. 13;
16). The use of the word paradigm to describe this theory I found quite grandiose as it is
often associated with Thomas Kuhn’s (2012) Structure of Scientific Revolutions and has
come to mean a revolution in science. To refer to Adaptive Information Processing as a
paradigm or initiating a paradigm shift somehow suggests that it is not only uniquely
distinct from other cognitive information processing models but that the particular theory
behind EMDR has actually revolutionized science.
Additional manic findings in EMDR. One additional finding was the mania of
bi-lateral stimulation as a central activity of therapy. The manual instructs the therapist to
repeatedly and obsessively wave his/her fingers in front of the patients face in multiple
sets of over 20 repetitions over the course of the therapy session. The trust in the
compulsive motions of the therapist was represented in the manual’s first session bilateral stimulation script, which instructed the therapist to say, “I will ask you to
mentally focus on the target and to follow my fingers. Just let whatever happens, happen”
(Luber, 2010, p. 240).
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The manual’s description of bi-lateral stimulation seemed almost symbolic or
ritualized (e.g., bi-lateral stimulation increases as the patient repeats positive thoughts).
This repetitive motion constitutes such an active therapy that clinicians actually suffer
from shoulder injuries if they do not supplement their therapy with technologies like
light-bars and tappers (see neurotek.com). No other therapy that I am aware of involves
such frantic repetitive motion on the part of the therapist. (Even the debunked rebirthing
therapies, which are quite active on the part of the clinician, do not suggest a type of
movement that is as compulsive and repetitive.)
One could imagine how the heightened level of activity to the therapy session
would pull for different transference from patients (e.g., need to care take the clinician as
they work or annoyance at the intrusive presence of the clinician).54 Yet, this effect of the
therapy is not considered. In fact, there seems to be no examination of the effect of bilateral stimulation on the client from a perspective of transference and demand
characteristics. It is possible these influences could profoundly affect how the client
complies with the therapy and interprets their treatment.
Thematic discussion: The grandiosity and mania of EMDR. Emphasis on
narcissistic self-perfection permeated the Shapiro (2001) manual. There was extensive
and detailed background and research provided in the manual linked detailed research
and history from most psychotherapeutic theories to the evolution of EMDR and the
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Though this analysis does not include interpretation of therapy sessions, I will say from
my own experiences of training in EMDR, it was quite disconcerting at times to be
repeating a sensitive childhood memory and look past the moving hands and over to the
clinician who is sitting straight-up, watching your face, and sweating as they engage in
the bi-lateral stimulation (see Chapter 4: Foregrounding). My experience was similar to
the ritual described in the manual—when the clinician stopped waving her fingers, she
then checked in on a set of measurements (SUDs, VoCs, new thoughts) and repeated.

362
Adaptive Information Processing model. The manual’s psychoeducational scripts on how
to activate the innate positive healing in the brain and the natural perfection of
humankind did not seem to allow for patient or therapist exploration or mistakes; there
was not much room in the therapy for a way-of-being that involved acceptance of
negative affects, taking responsibility for traumatic participation, and perhaps redirecting
or creatively engaging with trauma rather than eliminating it. Similarly, when the therapy
didn’t work (e.g., when the patient began looping or the positive thought didn’t
generalize), this was framed as an issue of non-compliance. The therapist was directed by
the manual to perform interweaves (i.e., hypnotic command suggestions) to ensure the
patient would be symptom free by the end of a session.
The manual required that the therapist insisted that the patient repair a damaged
self-image from an early traumatic experience even when the patient did perceive their
experience in this way. This was first demonstrated in the manual in the presentation of
the vignette of a woman who became nervous every time she walked into a business
meeting. She was seen as suffering from the negative I statement, “I can’t get what I
want; there is something wrong with me” (p. 45- 46). Instead discussing social or
political interpretations of her experience (e.g., What are the factors in the corporate
environment that do not allow for or accept women’s voices and how can we talk about
this?), the patient’s behavior was narcissistically viewed as a product of her own
dysfunctional behaviors and negative self talk. This theme reoccurred with the patient
who stated that her mother didn’t love her, and the therapist insisted that the patient
reframe this belief into “I am not loveable.” (p. 60).
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In these vignettes, the patient could have understood their problems as stemming
from an interpersonal, social or politically rooted source but they were directed by the
therapist to reframe their conceptualization into an intrapsychic wound in the form of a
negative “I statement.” The vignettes present examples of the subjectivist reduction in
cognitive ideology (cf. Sampson, 1981) where the therapy is designed to revolve around
self-image in order to be effective. Altering internalized self-talk is the only good way to
reduce traumatic symptoms and change a traumatic world according to the EMDR
manual because the social world is considered to exist primarily as an internal, mental
map that can be controlled and manipulated via the individual. This is a narcissistic way
to understand the world because it is hyper-focused self-image management and the
grandiose, if not delusional, idea that the individual can completely control and alter the
world from their mind without necessarily interacting in the social world or with others.
The most concerning part of the therapy was not only its subjectivist reduction
that promoted narcissistic way of being, but that the therapy encouraged the patients who
did not naturally understand their world as self-focused to become narcissistically
wounded and adopt beliefs that problems in the world were due to negative self-images
by picking negative cognition “I statements” from a list in the manual appendix. In these
scenarios, the manualized therapy has a hand in creating the pathology in order to heal it.
This appears to be a narcissistic projection of the therapy—it demands the patient
conform to a particular way of being (i.e., self-focused) to ensure the therapy will work
appropriately; all beliefs and symptoms that do not fall within this narcissistic world view
are seen as problematic, pathological and deserving of more forceful interventions like
cognitive interweaves to actually “install” the negative self-talk via hypnotic suggestion.

364
McWilliams and Leppendorf (1990) have described the experience of being in a
prolonged or enmeshed relationship with a narcissist (i.e., being the narcissistic object) as
pervasive confusion, self-criticism, loneliness, and diffuse irritation. During the
interpretation of the EMDR manual, I felt somewhat similar to the experience of a being
in a narcissistic relationship like McWilliams and Leppendorf described; I felt largely
confused and irritated while reading. I also was somewhat exhausted by the mania of the
manual and extensive and dense descriptions of how the Adaptive Information
Processing model was related to all other psychotherapy theories. While I am in general
against increasing procedural aspects of therapy and reducing complexity in the
therapeutic approach, in this case I could understand why so many authors have
developed adjunctive forms and protocols to make the manual less overwhelming,
grandiose and compulsive—-as well as practical and easy to apply. From my perspective,
Shapiro’s (2001) manual demanded a lot of the reader, the therapist, and the patient. It
gave the sense to the training therapist that though one might not ever be able to fully
grasp why EMDR works (given the mysteries of neuroscience and brain-based therapies),
with dedicated study (and attendance of $3000 worth of therapy training) one could help
patients attain perfect replacement of thoughts and eventually complete autonomy and
freedom from the complexities and suffering that have become so common place in the
social world.55
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Though I didn’t initially interpret the EMDR manual according to literature on cult
indoctrination (see Specific Background Information Relevant to Results, pp. 116-124),
Heller’s (1988) triad of miracle, mystery, and authority could be applied to an analysis of
the EMDR manual (e.g., the miracle of the EMDR therapy healing complex trauma
across the world, the mystery of bi-lateral stimulation and necessity of advanced trainings
to learn special protocols to treat disorders, and the authority of the therapist requiring Istatement thought-replacement and inserting beliefs via cognitive interweaves). I return
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Though I was struck by a sense of the author’s grandiosity when I studied the
manual, I did not interpret the manual or its author, as uniquely emanating a form of
personal pathology. Rather the manual reflects and reproduces the social world in which
it was it was created. Shapiro developed EMDR in reaction to her diagnosis of cancer;
this type of response to a life-threatening disease could only occur in a world in which it
was seen as possible to save oneself through psychology and where it was possible for an
individual to believe they could bring psychological healing to the masses via manualbased technologies. While the manual may reflect the personality dynamics of Shapiro,
the popularity of EMDR and the way that it seems to speak the experience of traumatized
individuals could only exist in culture that identifies with and accepts the narcissistic
cultural ideals promoted in the manual.
Cushman, McWilliams and Leppendorf, and others have described the postWorld War II era and especially the early 1980s, when the EMDR manual was
developed, as a time of cultural narcissism (see review in Chapter II, pp. 109-114 in this
study). Around the time EMDR was created, analysts had high enthusiasm for Kohut
(1971, 2009, 1984) and there was an emphasis on describing narcissistic persons as being
obsessed with self-image maintenance (e.g., Stolorow, 1975). Cushman (1995) suggested
that the loss of tradition, religious certainty, and the effects of industrialization and spread
of capitalist business post World-War II created a sense of vulnerability, alienation, and
uncertainty that foreshadowed the societal embodiment of what he called the “empty
self.” The empty self experiences absences in the loss of community and tradition in an
interior and cognitive way, as a lack of personal worth or conviction, and strives to
to the interpretation of trauma therapies broadly contributing to the creation of a warrior
cult in the Paradigmatic Objects chapter.
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compensate for what has been lost politically by consuming products, goods, advertising
and therapy. The social embodiment of the empty self is somewhat similar to descriptions
of a narcissistic personality in the overwhelming need to maintain self-cohesion and
worth through utilizing and consuming things and relationships. Thus I would argue that
the EMDR manual ultimately embodies (and continues to support) the zeitgeist of the
1980s and early 1990s when the treatment was developed. EMDR was designed to thrive
in a narcissistic culture and I would suggest has actually contributed to reproducing the
culture and in particular, the idea that it is acceptable to respond to social problems
through self-work.
Engaging in EMDR therapy might likely be experienced as aspirational where
one hopes to emulate the perfection in the manual, but also as isolating and confusing
when daily experiences demand continual replacement and erasure of suffering via
cognitive processing. For the patients who attempt but cannot attain the image of human
perfection that is taken for granted as the hope for the healed trauma patient after EMDR
(i.e., the positive, entrepreneurial and functional worker), they perhaps remain
traumatized in a liminal state of having implicitly failed therapy. They may be
perpetually drawn to the instrumental and narcissistic therapeutic relationship promoted
by manualized therapies like EMDR (i.e., searching for the right fix or someone who
understands trauma). They may also feel defeated and afraid when attempting to think
about the daily experience of being alone in the world with the narcissistic culture and
therapeutic options with which they are provided.
Layton (2004, 2010) has described the experience of living in neoliberal culture in
a similar way. She wrote:
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When dependence and interdependence are repudiated and made shameful as they
have been in the neoliberal U.S.–-where the attack on the poor and vulnerable
continues unabated, where social politics tear away at the containment and care
offered by the welfare state, and where income inequality is at or close to historic
highs- you find the characteristic narcissistic defenses against trauma: retaliation
and withdrawal, oscillations between grandiosity and self-depreciation,
devaluation and idealization, denials of difference and the rigid drawing of
boundaries between who is “in” and who is “out.” (Layton, 2013, p. 77)
In sum, the EMDR manual reflects a way of being in trauma culture; it reflects an
expression of cultural grandiosity or narcissism in a time of political uncertainty and
social isolation in which resources and shifts in thinking are mistaken for human
relationships and social engagement. The Shapiro (2001) manual not only reflects this
way of being but it reproduces it by requiring patients to conceptualize their problems as
intrapsychic such that the primary focus of therapy necessarily is on assisting the patient
to build a positive self-image. What is particularly concerning about the narcissistic focus
on self-image maintenance is that the therapy actually plays a hand in destroying the selfimage first in order to repair it. The EMDR manual promotes a type of therapy that
dangerously creates a false sense of self-actualization and problem resolution that is
completely removed from the context of the patient’s life, political action and actual
problem resolution.
EMDR Remaining Questions
In addition to the hermeneutic interpretive categories outlined by Leonard (1993)
and others, I have added the category of question generation. Some questions that were
raised through the interpretation of the EMDR manual were unanswered by the text, the
interpreter (myself), and the immediate context (e.g., foregrounded assumptions). The
unanswered questions may be indicative of what Donnel Stern (2010) described as an
unformulated experience, where the answer is dissociated (and thus seemingly
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unanswerable). Answers to such questions may be first accessible only through
enactment and unconscious practice. Here I discuss the importance and context for each
question following reconstruction (Stigliano, 1989).
Why is EMDR so popular and why does it work so well right now? EMDR is
extremely effective and has been shown to cure lifetime PTSD symptoms within three
sessions. The fact that this therapy works so well tells us less about the timeless intrinsic
healing properties of EMDR and more about contemporary society. I was left a few
primary questions after this study: Why does EMDR work so well right now? What does
it say about U.S. culture that brief EMDR therapy is incredibly effective at curing trauma
in this historical moment? What does this say about human being in trauma culture?
EMDR’s effectiveness today suggests something about the constitution of the
contemporary self (cf. Cushman, 1995). After my presentation of the EMDR findings, I
discussed a range of theories about the appeal of the therapy in neoliberal, narcissistic
culture. I think there is something to be said about EMDR fulfilling the unarticulated
desires of living in trauma-culture: to be seen as helpless and freed from the
responsibilities of living in society, including the complexities of interpersonal and
political relationships, but also somehow more real, authentic and unique because the
trauma. The fantasy promoted by the therapy is that trauma survivors can accrue and
consume mental resources to maximize their happiness via therapy (cf. Binkley, 2011).
Any upsetting experiences or traumas do not need to be thought about or discussed, but
merely erased or desensitized over three one hour sessions. Though the trauma is in effect
erased or lost, it was conceptualized in EMDR as being transformed into a resource for
future growth. EMDR seems to embody the ultimate trauma fantasy of the 21st century:
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to quickly return to a pre-traumatic state as a functional worker within a few quick
sessions while also being able to retain a form of unique positive identity and spiritual or
mental fortification through trauma. Furthermore, the healed trauma survivor represents a
narcissistically fulfilled life that is completely unencumbered by dependence on or
attachments to the real world and social relationships; anything that impedes the healed
trauma survivor from reaching their goals must only be desensitized or replaced in within
the individual mind.
Summary of EMDR: Basic Principles, Protocols, and Procedures (Shapiro, 2001)
The specific themes from the manual suggest that all forms of suffering are
experienced in a universal way (stored as a fixed particle in the brain) and thus can be
healed through a procedural psychological treatment that directly accesses and
manipulates neural networks. The utilization of the over-inclusive origin myth and
watering hole metaphor suggested that contemporary responses to trauma responses are
natural, innate, pre-programmed, and as old as humanity. This discourse subtly reduces
all traumatic experiences to a rote or triggered response that lacks unique qualities (every
trauma is a lion or a trigger) and can be eliminated through similar protocols of EMDR.
Thus EMDR was discussed in manual as the universal treatment or solution to world
trauma.
Human being in trauma-based society according to this manual is managing,
negotiating with, and sometimes thanking your adaptive information-processing
computer: your brain. The model promoted in the manual extends the Cartesian split to a
space where the self and mind can manipulate the brain but the brain is primarily in
control of the self. While the therapy encourages the patient to directly engage the brain,
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it also acknowledges that EMDR therapy can access the brain and connect neural
networks in an unconscious way that at times is not well understood (e.g., bi-lateral
stimulation) given the nature of science (cf. mystery; Heller, 1988).
The self in EMDR reflects the critique of cognitivist ideology that Sampson
(1981) developed, and revealed the emerging contemporary way-of-being which N. S.
Rose (2007) described as managing the neurochemical self. Being in trauma-based
society according to the EMDR manual can mean submitting oneself or rather one’s brain
to the direct control of the therapist, and the therapist (in parallel process) submits to the
guidelines of the manual; sometimes both patient and therapist engage together by
complying with a form or protocol. These procedures guide the patient in becoming an
agentic, self-contained individual.
I also discussed how completing never-ending forms, worksheets, homework
assignments, and protocols in EMDR constitute the tools of a type of self-surveillance
that is complied with not because the therapist and patient are brutally pressured to watch
over and reveal themselves. Instead, these forms and activities are complied with
diligently because they are presented as the scientific interventions that unquestioningly
heal trauma, and when followed create a successful trauma therapist and survivor.
Patients want to comply and control their thoughts because they are told and have come
to believe through subtle messages in therapy and in daily life (e.g., neoliberal ideals) that
that is what they should do in order to return to society as a functional worker and a good
person.
The fantasy promoted by the EMDR manual is that trauma survivors can accrue
and consume mental resources to maximize their happiness via therapy (cf. Binkley,
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2011). Throughout the manual all life experiences were transformed into what Heidegger
(1977) called “standing reserve.” Friends are turned into SRCs and the real world is
replaced (or rather “installed” or “resourced in”) with positive images and safe places.
The healed trauma survivor according to the manual should be a hyper-functional person
who embodies the Oliver Wendell Holmes epigraph quoted in the manual—a person who
is moving forward, independent from all persons and traditions and freed to make infinite
positive choices in their world. Any upsetting experiences or traumas do not need to be
thought about or discussed, but merely erased or desensitized over three one hour
sessions. Though the trauma is erased or desensitized via therapy, it was conceptualized
as being transformed into a resource for future growth.
The popularity of EMDR and the way that it seems to speak the experience of
traumatized individuals could only exist in culture that identifies with and accepts the
narcissistic cultural ideals promoted in the manual. I found there to be a feeling of
constant demand for perfection from both the patient and therapist in the manual. I also
found there to be excessive, narcissistic focus on self-image maintenance and solving
social problems through creating, manipulating and eventually erasing negative selfstatements. Being a good trauma survivor in EMDR meant initially presenting to therapy
as a broken or damaged self (i.e., having a narcissistic wound from childhood). If this
was not how the patient presented, a good trauma survivor would be being willing to
accept the therapist’s help in reframing the world as a problem with self image or even
assistance in destroying the self-image (e.g., picking a negative “I statement” cognition
from an appendix) in order to repair the self image and heal from trauma.

372
Thus the EMDR manual promotes a type of therapy that dangerously creates a
false sense of self-actualization and problem resolution that is completely removed from
the context of the patient’s life, political action and actual problem resolution. It
indoctrinates the patient into particular a way of being a healed trauma survivor. In this
way of being, a good trauma survivor submits to sometimes mysterious procedures in
therapy (e.g., bi-lateral stimulation, cognitive interweaves) and reconstructs one’s self
image through the process of completing forms, and replacing thoughts. These
procedures substitute for meaningful social interaction, change, or dialogue that is
politically rather than self-focused.
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Manual 3: Battlemind Psychological Debriefing and Training
(Adler et al., 2007).
In this chapter, I present the results and discussion for the Battlemind
psychological debriefing and training series (Battlemind). After presenting the specific
context of this manual’s development, I introduce the shared themes and exemplars that
were found in all three manuals (TF-CBT, EMDR and Battlemind). After presenting the
shared themes and exemplars, I then introduce the themes and exemplars that I identified
only within the Battlemind series. Before proceeding to the next manual, I propose and
briefly discuss questions that may be unanswered by the text, the interpreter (myself), and
the immediate context (e.g., foregrounded assumptions) but are important to consider.
Thus the structure of this chapter is as follows: shared themes (findings followed by
discussion), shared exemplars (findings followed by discussion), Battlemind unique
themes (findings followed by discussion), Battlemind unique exemplars (findings
followed by discussion), Battlemind questions (questions followed by discussion), and
summary. Following the presentation of each manual, I include a final summary and
discussion in which I consider all of the manuals together in light of the areas of inquiry
(p. 131).
Battlemind had a complex structure and also utilized military jargon that may be
unfamiliar to a psychology audience. Thus, before presenting the interpretation, it is
important explain some of the terminology that will be used in this chapter and how I
refer to different aspects of Battlemind.
The primary manual (Adler et al., 2007) and subsequent publications describing
training efficacy (Adler, Bliese, et al., 2009; Adler, Castro, et al., 2009; Castro et al.,

374
2006) characterized Battlemind as an early mental health intervention for post-traumatic
stress disorder and other trauma related problems; however, the Battlemind training
scripts described Battlemind as a training or debriefing series and not as psychotherapy or
a mental health intervention. Therefore, in this chapter, I refer to the Battlemind training
and debriefing series as Battlemind, the Battlemind series, trainings, or debriefings.
Throughout Battlemind, the military service members were referred to as soldiers or
warriors; all of the solider trainings were referred to as warrior trainings. The Battlemind
trainers for the warrior trainings were the soldiers’ platoon leaders. Therefore when I
refer to trainer’s script for the warrior trainings this is in reference to the script that will
be read to the platoon by their leader.
The phases of Battlemind are represented in Figure 4 and are explained in detail
under the Treatment Goals, Structures and Principles Section in this chapter (p. 378).
Adler et al. (2007) was the primary training manual for Battlemind; it described the
structure of the trainings, discussed background research, and provided scripts that
trainers should utilize for the debriefing phase. There were also several trainer scripts and
PowerPoint presentations that were treated as the manuals for the pre- and postdeployment trainings of Battlemind. These included: the leaders pre-deployment training
(WRAIR, 2008a), the warrior pre-deployment training (WRAIR, 2008b), the warriors’
post-deployment training I (WRAIR, 2006a) and II (WRAIR, 2006b), and the postdeployment assessment training (WRAIR, 2006c). Some of the training scripts were
published before the primary manual in 2006. All of the training scripts and presentations
were interpreted in this study in addition to the primary manual.
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Context of the Manual’s Development
The Battlemind debriefing and training series was created as an early intervention
for PTSD, depression and sleep problems in U.S. and United Kingdom (U.K.) service
members returning from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF), and Operation New Dawn (OND), which are commonly referred to as the War in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The Battlemind series was developed at the Walter Reed Army
Institute of Research (WRAIR) in 2007 and was instituted in the U.S. Army Combat
Operational Stress Control course from 2007 to 2013 as part of required pre-deployment
Comprehensive Solider Fitness Training (Adler, Castro, et al., 2009). As a part of the
National Defense Authorization Act, all U.S. Army service members were required to
attend all phases of the Battlemind series and then complete a routine mental health
assessment (DoD, 2009). In 2013, Battlemind was replaced by a resiliency training series
(Reivich, Seligman, & McBride, 2011).
The content for the Battlemind training series was developed based on the Land
Combat Study, which included over 5000 surveys and interviews with service members
who deployed to OEF/OIF (Hoge et al., 2004; WRAIR, 2006c). Battlemind’s
effectiveness was assessed in a natural setting randomized study (Adler, Bliese, et al.,
2009). Service members returning from Iraq were randomized by platoon to receive the
complete Battlemind series (represented in Figure 4), standard post-deployment stress
education, or a small or large group Battlemind skills training (without in theatre
debriefing) (Adler, Bliese, et al., 2009). Groups receiving any component of Battlemind
in any size group reported significantly fewer symptoms of post-traumatic stress,
depression and sleep problems than those who received standard post-deployment stress
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education (Adler, Bliese, et al., 2009). The symptom reduction occurred regardless of
level of combat exposure.
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Figure 4: Battlemind training series (Adler et al., 2007; WRAIR, 2005, 2006a, 2006b,
2006c, 2008a, 2008b).
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Demographics of treatment population. In 2007, when Battlemind was initiated
494,465 soldiers were deployed on active duty for the Army (Tanielian & Jaycox, 2008).
Based on this rate, it can be estimated that from 2007 to 2013, when Battlemind was
required for all Army forces, over 3 million recruits received Battlemind training. The
average age of the trainee soldiers can be estimated from Army enrollment figures which
indicate that 50.6% of active duty enlisted soldiers were under the age of 24 years old
(with 6.7% under the age of 20) and 95% were under the age of 40 during the years
Battlemind was implemented (Fischer, 2014). Thus half of soldiers to receive Battlemind
trainings it can be assumed were between 16 and 24 years old and the other half were
between 24 and 40 years old. In the first study of Battlemind effectiveness in the Army,
the soldiers who received the Battlemind series (N = 1,146) were primarily male (95.8%),
single (67%), junior enlisted officers (66.2%) who were in combat arms (77.6%) (Castro
et al., 2006).
It is unclear what the rates of PTSD were for veterans during the years Battlemind
was instituted because longitudinal studies spanning from 2007 to 2013 have not yet been
published. During OEF in Afghanistan and OIF in Iraq, 21.8% of nearly 300,000
OEF/OIF veterans who first received care at a VA between 2002 and 2008 were
diagnosed with PTSD (Gates et al., 2012). Other studies on OEF/OIF post-deployment
have revealed rates of PTSD prevalence from 4 to 33% with the average around 15%
(Gates et al., 2012). Further details regarding rates of PTSD for the population of soldiers
who deployed to OEF/OIF were reported in the “PTSD Prevalence in the Military”
section of this study (pp. 33-35).
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Context of the authors. Although the Battlemind series was developed in 2007,
the phrase “Battlemind” was coined by General Crosbie Saint when he was the
Commanding General of the U.S. Army Europe in the 1980s (WRAIR, 2006c). General
Saint prepared his guidelines with the help of Dr. Halim Ozkaptan from the Army
Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences and retired combat veteran, Colonel Robert
Fiero. The trio has since published several books together about healing post-war injuries
(e.g., Ozkaptan, Fiero, & Saint, 2007) and Dr. Ozkaptan has published a manual on faithbased healing (Ozkaptan, 2008). The authors of the new Battlemind series (Adler et al.,
2007) incorporated Saint’s original definition of Battlemind in their definition, “A
warriors inner strength to face adversity, fear and hardship during combat with
confidence and resolution. It is the will to persevere and win” (WRAIR, 2006c).
There was minimal information provided about the background of the Battlemind
authors (Adler et al., 2007). During the development of Battlemind, the authors were
stationed at the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Europe, in Heidelberg Germany where
Lieutenant colonel (LTC) Carl Castro was the chief of military psychiatry and
commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit in Europe. Major Dennis McGurk
was involved in the Mental Health Advisory Team mission in Afghanistan where he
trained Leaders in Battlemind (US Army Medical Research Unit- Europe [USAMRU-E],
2008). LTC Castro appears to be primarily responsible for the drafting of scripts that
were intended to be read by trainers during the skills training PowerPoint presentations;
his contact information was provided at the beginning of every script. Dr. Amy Adler’s
research focus was brief intervention for trauma in the military and she was the first
author of the primary manual for the debriefing component (Adler et al., 2007).
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Treatment goals, structure, and principles. The overarching goal of the
Battlemind series was to provide systematic early intervention in the military to prevent
PTSD, depression, and sleep problems following deployment (Adler, Bliese, et al., 2009).
The intervention was designed in three parts: a) small group psychological debriefing
adapted for the military (Adler et al., 2007), b) a skills-based program called Battlemind
training delivered as a PowerPoint group psychoeducational presentation and group
intervention before deployment (WRAIR, 2008a, 2008b), and c) post-deployment stress
education group that emphasize management strategies (also delivered as a PowerPoint
group presentation) (WRAIR, 2006b, 2006c, 2007). Figure 4 shows the delivery timeline
and format for each phase of Battlemind. The skills-based training program included
three different versions for warriors (enlisted soldiers), leaders (officers and noncommissioned officers [NCOs]) and spouses. The training for leaders included the same
content as the warrior version with additional information on how to deliver the
Battlemind skills training to the warriors; it was designed as a train-the-trainers training.
The spouse skills training was not interpreted in this study.
In addition the goal of preventing PTSD, depression, and sleep related problems
post-deployment, each component of the Battlemind series had different specific goals
that were stated to the platoon leaders. The goals of the pre-deployment skills training for
warriors (Castro et al., 2006; WRAIR, 2008a, 2008b) were to:
1.

To prepare warriors mentally for the rigors of combat and other military
deployments;

2.

To assist warriors in their transition back home;

3.

To prepare warriors with the skills to assist their battle-buddy during
deployment as a well as to transition back home; and,
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4.

To prepare warriors to possibly deploy again in support of all types of
military operations including additional combat tours.

The goals of the in-theatre debriefings (Adler et al., 2007; Adler, Castro, et al.,
2009) were to:
1.

Support military personnel in their transition back to duty after a
significant incident (in –theatre);

2.

Reduce the overall mental health symptoms for the unit; and,

3.

Acknowledge combat events among unit members, discuss common
reactions and review actions that can be taken to facilitate transition back
to duty.

The goals of the post-deployment stress training were to:
1.

“Reset the soldier’s Battlemind” (Castro, 2006, p. 17); and,

2.

Adapting Battlemind skills so that they can be “just as effective at home as
they were in combat” (WRAIR, 2006b, p. 2).

Manual’s presentation of trauma. In Battlemind, the word trauma was notably
absent. PTSD and other trauma related symptoms were referred to as Battlemind injuries,
war stress injuries, or combat stress reactions. Reference to PTSD was limited and was
only mentioned twice: once in the leaders’ training in the context of debriefing (WRAIR,
2008a, p.35) and once at the end of the training in a unit on alcohol abuse and traumatic
brain injury (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 51).
Overall, there was emphasis on describing all reactions to war as normal survival
instincts rather than a mental disorder, “Reactions that are sometimes called PTSD can
help warriors survive in combat” (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 51). The leaders were informed that
they should expect these reactions:
Combat operational stress reactions are expected. Combat stress reactions are not
a sign of weakness. Why look at mental health injuries as a weakness? If Soldiers
deal with their combat stress reaction, they can come back to work. Treating your
Soldiers who have combat stress reactions just like you would any other injured
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Soldier is not just something that supports the mission, it’s the right thing to do.
(WRAIR, 2008a, p. 49)
Leaders were also told that the psychic impact of war needs to be understood like
a physical injury, “Mental health injuries need to be treated like all other battlefield
injuries” (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 57).
In Battlemind, the word trauma was not universalized to encompass all potential
traumatic experiences. Events that would otherwise be considered to lead to trauma were
mentioned by name and described as part of the normal day-to-day part of deployment.
These events included: combat, military operations, warfare, wounding, catastrophic
vehicle kill, cleaning-up of human remains, missing warriors and improvised explosive
device (IED) explosions.
Key sociohistorical context mentioned by authors: OEF/OIF/OND.
Battlemind was created as an early intervention for PTSD, depression and sleep problems
in U.S. and U.K. soldiers returning from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation New Dawn (OND), which are also commonly
referred to as the War in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively. OEF is associated primarily
with the joint U.S., U.K., Australia and Afghan military operation in Afghanistan from
2001 to present (2014), but has also included military operations in the Philippines, Horn
of Africa, Pankisi Gorge, Trans Sahara and Caribbean and Central America (Wright et
al., 2010). OEF was initiated in October 2001 in response to the U.S. September 11
attacks (described previously in this study pp. 206-207) (Wright et al., 2010). The initial
goal of the operation was to strike against the Taliban whom harbored al Qaeda terrorists
and provide humanitarian relief to the people of Afghanistan (Johnson, 2006; Tanielian &
Jaycox, 2008). The war against the Taliban ended in mid-December 2001 (Lambeth,
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2001) and the U.S. turned its efforts to what the U.S. government called “stabilization”
and “nation building” in Afghanistan (Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, & Steele, 2001;
Wright et al., 2010, p. 3). Critics since the war in Vietnam have pointed to the
paternalistic and colonial nature of the U.S. government’s use of words like stabilization
and nation building to describe the violence of the war (see e.g., Connor, 1972; Mylonas,
2013). The U.S. continues to maintain approximately 20,000 ground troops in
Afghanistan today (2014).
OIF began with a surprise invasion of Iraq led by U.S. forces in March 2003
(Wright et al., 2010). Prior to the invasion, the Bush Administration (2001-2009)
garnered support for the war under the suspicion that Iraq was manufacturing weapons of
mass destruction. The invasion led to the capture of then President of Iraq, Suddam
Hussein, who was tried in an Iraqi court of law and executed by the new Iraqi
government. Although no weapons of mass destruction were ever found in Iraq, Paul
Pillar, who coordinated U.S. intelligence on the Middle East, reported that since his
tenure the Bush Administration was more interested in what Saddam Hussein “could do”
rather than the existence of weapons and The Administration would have continued to
push for war regardless of their existence (Pillar, 2013).
In May 2003, President George Bush Jr. publically declared an end to OIF
military operations by landing on the deck of the Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier that
bore the infamous banner which read “Mission Accomplished” (Tanielian & Jaycox,
2008). After this time, U.S. military personnel continued to remain in Iraq ostensibly to
support the building of a new civil government, which later led the public to subsequently
critique Bush’s prior declaration of mission completion (Pillar, 2013; Ricks, 2006).
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After President Hussein’s execution, violence rose between various groups and
led to an Iraqi insurgency and the emergence of a faction of Al-Qaeda (Fisher, 2014). On
August 31, 2010 President Obama announced the end of the combat mission in Iraq but
forces remained until they were completely withdrawn on December 15, 2011 (Miles,
2010). Because the President declared an end to OIF but troops remained in Iraq it was
necessary to give the Operation a new title; thus, the period from September 1, 2010 to
December 15, 2011 was titled Operation New Dawn (Miles, 2010). There are no longer
U.S. military ground troops in Iraq today (2014), however the insurgency continues
between Sunni militant groups and the country’s majority Shia population and Shia-led
government (Fisher, 2014). There is also a question about the continued involvement of
private sector militia in Iraq despite withdrawal of U.S. service troops (Avant &
Sigelman, 2010; Carafano, 2008).
By 2014, it was estimated that between 120,000 to 130,000 civilians died in Iraq
and Afghanistan as a result of the violence (Dardagan & Sloboda, 2014). As of January
11, 2014, 184,000 people, including both civilians and combatants, in Iraq and
Afghanistan have died as result of the conflict. 6,750 U.S. service members have died todate in Iraq or Afghanistan (Jean-Louis, Linch, Fetterhoff, & Hadar, 2014) and 447 U.K.
service members (Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, 2014). Approximately 40% of
service member deaths were from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (P. W. Singer,
2012).
The veracity and amount of evidence of the initial reasons to enter war (i.e.,
weapons of mass destruction) have been questioned in post-hoc analyses (Johnson, 2006;
Mayer, 2009; Ricks, 2006). The primary controversies surrounding the U.S. invasion of
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Iraq and Afghanistan in OEF/OIF/OED have included but are not limited to: instigation
of the war on false pretenses for U.S. economic benefit (Maddow, 2014; Ricks, 2006),
the legality of the war (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2004), human and
financial cost of war (Project, 2014), lack of transparency and government control with
use of private sector military (Avant & Sigelman, 2010; Carafano, 2008), torture and
degradation of prisoners of war (e.g., Abu Graib; Gordon, 2006; Zimbardo, 2007) and the
use of off-shore prisons (e.g., Guantanamo Bay). Within the field of U.S. psychology,
there was much controversy about the APA not taking a stance on torture in OEF/OIF
and psychologists participation in torture during the war (Allen, Keller, Reisner, &
Iacopino, 2009; Lott, 2007; Soldz, 2008). It is beyond the scope of this study to review
these controversies here but further information can be located in the citations provided
above.
Presentation of OEF/OIF/OED in Battlemind. The experience of the
OEF/OIF/OED wars was characterized in Battlemind trainings as urban warfare with
organized terrorist groups who had limited resources (e.g., no air strikes, primarily using
IEDs)(WRAIR, 2008a, 2008b). The Battlemind pre-deployment skills training for leaders
(WRAIR, 2008a) and warriors (WRAIR, 2008b) prepared soldiers for the deployment
environment and war through a set of slides entitled “a profile of the hostile forces,”
which included a description of what soldiers may see, hear, smell, feel and think when in
combat. The training began with the trainer reading from the manual script, “What’s
deployment like?” A slide of a woman in a niqab and a child both holding an AK-47 was
presented while the script directed the trainer to remind the soldiers that “the enemy is
not going to fight fair. He is going to hide behind women and children, in churches and
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among civilians. Further, the enemy will not follow the laws of land warfare” (WRAIR,
2008a, p. 8). The trainer script continued, “What will you see?” A note instructing the
trainer read, “Ideally the new guys should hear it from the ones that deployed before.
This part of the brief should be interactive. Avoid turning this into a cultural brief…
focus on the sensory overload” (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 12). The trainer then was instructed to
show images of war while narrating what the soldiers will see, “extreme poverty, decay,
garbage and feces, people on rooftops, gawkers “just looking,” rubbled [sic] structures,
incoming/outgoing fire, raging infernos- your vehicle on fire, wounded/killed friends and
enemies” (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 13). The “what you will hear” slides showed women and
children begging and screaming next to pictures of an explosion. The trainer was
instructed to say, “You may hear: explosions, gunfire, ricochets and near misses, cries of
wounded, pleas of help or mercy, wailing of mourners, shouts of rage and taunts, and
multiple commands” (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 15).
The implications of these slides and the taken for granted messages about human
being in trauma culture that are reflected in the training I will discuss throughout this
section; however, I have presented the content of these slides here to show how a solider
might first learn about the war, deployment environment, and culture they are about to
enter.56
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The Battlemind manual (Adler et al., 2007) and randomized control trial (Adler, Bliese,
et al., 2009) also began with a review of debriefing literature. Although debriefing is not
recommended for PTSD treatment the authors discuss numerous reasons why this
literature is not relevant to the military population (Adler et al., 2007; Adler, Bliese, et
al., 2009). Namely Adler et al. (2007), argued that findings from meta-analyses are
irrelevant because they included studies that did not include control groups, were not
focused military populations, involved individuals and not groups, and study therapists
were not trained in standardized (i.e., manual-based) debriefing techniques. Adler, Bliese
et al. (2009) called for military-relevant research in their studies and suggested there were
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Table 5
Battlemind Is Adapted for Combat, Not for Home
Battlemind Skill Adapted
for Combat/War Zone

Battlemind Skill Not
Adapted for Home Zone

Maladapted Post-deployment
Thoughts

Thought-replacement to Reset
Battlemind for Home Zone

Buddies (cohesion)

Withdrawal

“No one understands your experience
except your buddies who were there
with you.”

“Provide and accept support from [your loved
ones]”(WRAIR, 2006a, pp. 8-9).

Accountability

Controlling

“Nobody cares about doing things
right except for you.”

“Small details are no longer important” (WRAIR, 2006a,
pp. 10-11).

Targeted Aggression

Inappropriate Aggression

“Kill or be killed.”

“Think before you act. Wait before you respond”
(WRAIR, 2006a, pp. 12-13).

Tactical Awareness

Hypervigilance

“Survival depends on being aware at
all times.”

“It takes time to learn to relax, monitor for revved-up
reactions to minor events” (WRAIR, 2006a, pp. 14-15).

Lethally Armed

“Locked and Loaded” at
Home

“You and your loved ones are not
safe without [weapons].”

“Follow all laws and safety precautions regarding
weapons” (WRAIR, 2006a, pp. 16-17).

Emotional Control

Anger/Detachment

“Controlling emotions is critical for
mission success.”

“Displaying emotions is not unmilitary and doesn’t mean
you are weak” (WRAIR, 2006a, pp. 18-19).

Mission Operational
Security (OPSEC)

Secretiveness

“Talk about the mission only with
those who need to know.”

“Tell your story, but in the way you want to tell it…Be
proud of your service” (WRAIR, 2006a, pp. 20-21).

Individual Responsibility

Guilt

“You have failed your buddies if they
were killed or seriously injured.”

“Your buddy would want you to drive on” (WRAIR,
2006a, pp. 22-23).
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Table 5 (continued)
Battlemind Is Adapted for Combat, Not for Home
Battlemind Skill Adapted
for Combat/War Zone

Battlemind Skill Not
Adapted for Home Zone

Maladapted Post-deployment
Thoughts

Thought-replacement to Reset
Battlemind for Home Zone

Non-Defensive (combat)
Driving

Aggressive Driving

“Driving fast is necessary to avoid
danger.”

“Control your anger. Obey traffic laws. Use turn signals.
Slow down” (WRAIR, 2006a, pp. 24-25).

Discipline and Ordering

Conflict

“Survival depends on discipline and
obeying orders.”

“A family is not a military unit” (WRAIR, 2006a,
pp. 26-27).
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Shared Theme 1: Mind-Brain as Protector and the Political Use of Cognitivist
Ideology
In this section, I present the first theme that was shared by all of the manuals I
interpreted. All of the manuals predicated therapy on three interrelated assumptions: 1)
You can change the world by changing your mind, 2) When you change your mind you
change your brain; and, 3) Your brain and mind can protect you from trauma (i.e., if you
have inner safety, you are safe and thus the world is safe). The main problem with these
assumptions is the confusion between shifts in individual subjectivity and shifts in the
social world, which can ultimately result in no change to the status quo of existing
political problems and arrangements of power and domination (cf. Sampson, 1981).
Thematic findings: Mind-brain as protector and the political use of
cognitivist ideology. This section presents quotations from Battlemind trainings that are
representative of the theme “mind-brain as protector and the political use of cognitivist
ideology.” I present content that supports the subthemes “your brain and mind can
protect you from trauma” and “you can change the world by changing your mind;” the
third subtheme, “when you change your mind you change your brain,” was infrequently
mentioned in the Battlemind series because the brain was not a central focus of the
trainings (i.e., brain and mind were referred to interchangeably) and thus, this subtheme
will not be presented.
Your brain and mind can protect you from trauma. The pre-deployment
trainings (WRAIR, 2008a, 2008b) were focused on arming soldiers with mental skills to
protect them during deployment. The specific skills that made up Battlemind are
represented in the first column of Table 5. Interestingly, these specific skills were mostly
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referred to in the post-deployment trainings. In the pre-deployment trainings, Battlemind
was generally referred to as mental toughness and inner strength. The trainings defined
Battlemind as, “A warriors inner strength to face adversity, fear and hardship during
combat with confidence and resolution. It is the will to persevere and win” (WRAIR,
2006c). The image of the mind as a tough, impermeable barrier between the soldier and
war was reiterated throughout the training from every PowerPoint slide bearing the logo
“Battlemind: Armor for your mind” to quotations like, “When a soldier is at war his [or
her] mind should be at Peace–Lord Moran 1943” (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 62).57 In a slide
titled “What a warrior should know and do” the first instruction was to “Steel your
Battlemind” (WRAIR, 2008b, p. 26). This was defined at a later part in the training to
mean, “Maintain your mental toughness, meet challenges head on, be confident, take
calculated risks and maintain positive thinking during times of adversity and challenge”
(WRAIR, 2008b, p. 30).
The pre-deployment training focused on what war will be like for the soldiers
(see section Battlemind’s Presentation of OEF/OIF/OED, p. 383) and reiterated the
message that these realities should not “get in the way of Battlemind” (WRAIR, 2008a, p.
16). For example, during the “what will you think” section of the warrior pre-deployment
training, the trainer tells the soldiers they will think, “There’ll always be war here; always
has been”, “I’m wasting my life here”, “They should be fighting for themselves”, “They
don’t want us here,” “There doesn’t seem to be a point to this,” “The sacrifices I’m
making are not worth it,” “No progress is being made here,” and “I’m tired of this shit!”

57

According to the Battlemind trainer notes Lord Moran of Manton (1882-1977) was
Winston Churchill’s travelling medical doctor who in the 1930s lectured to army colleges
on morale during war (WRAIR, 2006c, p. 62).
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(WRAIR, 2008b, p. 19). The leaders were instructed to tell their soldiers after presenting
the slide:
These are normal thoughts. And its good to recognize them now so that if you end
up having these thoughts when you’re getting through the worst days, or getting
through the sights, sounds and smells, you can remember that these thoughts are
just a normal part of being deployed. And these thoughts won’t get in the way of
maintain your Battlemind- of maintain your inner strength, your resilience.
(WRAIR, 2008a, p. 16)
You can change the world by changing your mind. Where in the pre-deployment
trainings, changing the world by changing the mind was referred to as a process of
“armoring the mind” against the world as previously described, changing the mind in the
post-deployment trainings was referred to as “resetting Battlemind” in order to integrate
into life back home after deployment (Adler et al., 2007, p. 23; Castro, 2006, p. 17).
Overall, there were two primary sociopolitical experiences that the Battlemind trainings
suggested could be changed or even not experienced through armoring or resetting
Battlemind: 1) the experience of participating in war, and 2) the experience of returning
home from war feeling angry, isolated, and guilty. In this section, I focus on how
Battlemind trainings assume that soldiers can continue to avoid reckoning with the
experience of war when they return home by resetting their Battlemind.
In the post-deployment training, the leader was instructed to present the paradox
of returning home from employment:
Let’s acknowledge right up front that the combat environment is very harsh and
demanding. You all know this better than I do because you just got back. It’s hot.
People are trying to kill you. People are shooting at you; there are IEDS; there is
frustration with locals for supporting or knowing about ambushes/attacks; there’s
no alcohol and there’s no sex, right? YET many soldiers tell us when they have
been home for about a month and back from block leave that life was simpler
while deployed: fewer tasking, fewer distractions, [and] Soldiers could focus on
the mission. (WRAIR, 2006a, pp. 3-4)
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The leaders presented the experience of returning home as problems or
frustrations with the process of adapting from living in the “war zone” to the “home
zone” (p. 5). The training proposed that the solution to the dilemma lay in adapting the
soldier’s Battlemind, “Battlemind is what helped you get through your deployment…You
must take your Battlemind skills and adapt them so that they are just as effective at home
as they were in the combat environment” (p. 5). Although Battlemind can be the solution,
the leader was also instructed to warn the soldiers that without properly resetting via the
post-deployment training, “Battlemind may be “hazardous” to your social and behavioral
health in the home zone” (p. 5).
A version of Table 5 was shown at the beginning of each post-deployment
training (I & II) (WRAIR, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c). The second column in Table 5 reveals
what can happen to soldiers who return to the home zone without appropriate
psychological resetting via the post-deployment trainings. Each of the problems listed in
the second column of Table 5 were discussed in the post-deployment trainings through
corresponding video vignettes (e.g., about aggressive driving, carrying weapons, and
fighting with spouses). The leader was instructed to tell their warriors that,
The key point is that if you used the same Battlemind-set you had in combat when
you get home you may have experienced some problems…If you are still thinking
and behaving, now that you are home, the same way you thought and behaved in
combat, then these are indicators you might need some help. (WRAIR, 2008a,
p. 7)
The majority of the post-deployment training proceeded through different
dilemmas that can occur when the solider does not reset their Battlemind for the home
zone; there was a scenario for each Battlemind skill listed in Table 5. For example, in the
“targeted versus inappropriate aggression” Battlemind dilemma (line 3, Table 5), soldiers
were reminded that they will “probably get very angry over the little things” (WRAIR,
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2008a, p. 13) and that “in combat, everything [occurs in a] split-second. Most places
where you’ll be back home, you don’t have to make an immediate decision” (WRAIR,
2008a, p. 13). The leader was then instructed to present a vignette of inappropriate
aggression at a club where someone accidently bumps into a veteran. The trainer warns,
“this is the time to turn to your buddy and get an azimuth check” (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 13).
An azimuth check is a metaphor broadly used in the military for stopping and thinking
about what you are doing; on deployment, an azimuth check occurs when troops stop on
their journey and take out a compass to ensure they are headed in the right direction.
Another example of failure to reset Battlemind was the mission operations
security (OPSEC) versus secretiveness dilemma (line 7, Table 5). In the secretiveness
scenario the leader explained that the veterans will face continual questions about what
happened on their deployment when the return home. The leader script read, “you need to
find a way to tell something about your deployment, to the degree you are comfortable…
Share with your significant other what you’re doing, day to day. …The key is to be proud
of your service and your accomplishments while you were deployed. Tell your story”
(WRAIR, 2006a, p. 21).
The vignette for the lethally armed dilemma (line 5, Table 5) explained to the
soldiers how “being lethally armed was one of Battlemind skills that kept you alive”
(WRAIR, 2006c, p. 7) but being “locked and loaded” at home may mean “you or your
buddy may have not transitioned that skill well” (p. 7). Another vignette focused on
reducing aggressive driving, “if you are afraid to get in the car while your buddy is
driving then you should get help or get your buddy help? [...] If you don’t get your buddy
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help, what’s going to eventually happen to that buddy? [Trainer:] Listen/say: he’s going
to kill himself or somebody else” (WRAIR, 2006c, p. 15).
While much of the training was framed as resetting one’s Battlemind internally,
the dyad of the self-buddy system was also heavily emphasized. The role of the buddy in
all of the vignettes was to help the veterans stop engaging their war zone Battlemind and
engage the Battlemind adapted for the home zone. All of the scenarios ended with selfand buddy-checks where soldiers were instructed to assess themselves and their comrades
for different symptoms of Battlemind not adapted to the home zone. The buddy’s role
was to help assess Battlemind and its lack of adaptation to the home zone and ultimately
to assist the veteran in getting help. Thus while the training was presented as teaching
soldiers how to reset their Battlemind to change their experience of the social world, the
training was also about monitoring and resetting your buddy’s mind. Examples of
though-replacement exercises that could be initiated by the veterans or their buddy to
reset Battlemind for each vignette are presented in the Directive Psychoeducation and
Cognitivist Thought-Replacement section of this chapter (pp. 424-425).
Thematic discussion: Mind-brain as protector and the political use of
cognitivist ideology. The Battlemind training and debriefing series manuals and training
scripts suggested that the problems veterans experience in post-deployment were
primarily due to a misapplication of a set of mental skills—the soldier’s Battlemind. The
post-deployment training turned the experience of returning from war to a series of
internal mental errors or skill misapplications; skills that simply needed to be
reprogrammed or reset via the post-deployment trainings.
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Vignettes from the post-deployment training presented real-life problems for
veterans that occur when they return from deployment (e.g., initiating fights, avoiding
communication, carrying a gun and aggressive driving). Although all of these problems
are located in the social world, in Battlemind the response to changing the world was to
reset the mind. For example, aggression and anger that soldiers can feel returning home
was presented in the training as the result of learning skills like targeted aggression and
tactical awareness on deployment. Veterans’ desire to avoid talking about the war upon
returning home was presented as a consequence of learning to keep missions secret.
Just as the soldiers were trained to arm their mind in the pre-deployment trainings,
the manuals and script suggested that they can also disarm it via post-deployment
trainings. If a solider cannot disarm their mind, then their buddy was instructed to assist
the solider to disarm it. The mechanistic experience of arming and disarming the mind in
Battlemind suggested asocial explanations of why soldiers feel angry or isolated upon
returning from deployment. This presentation of veteran’s experience is quite different
than the narratives described by Marin (1981), Young (1995), Lifton (1973), and Tick
(2005) in their studies of veterans. These authors presented alternative views on the
reactions to war. For example, they suggested that veterans may be angry at the military,
government and country for a range of reasons, including participation in at times what
felt like a pointless war (e.g., the “What you will think” section of WRAIR 2008a,
2008b); lack of appropriate compensation, jobs or other direction upon returning home;
distance and disconnect from family; and, shame for killing or other atrocities committed.
Veterans have plenty of reasons to be angry—social and political reasons to be angry—
yet these possibilities do not come to light in Battlemind. Veteran’s experience post-
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deployment was instead framed as if the soldiers are robots that are still on duty and their
software needs to be reset.
Similarly, avoidance of talking about what occurred in the war was interpreted in
Battlemind as a form of highly trained operations secrecy, as if veterans don’t talk about
their experiences in war because they can’t stop complying with the code against sharing
mission operation details upon returning home. While this may be one reason veterans do
not actively share war stories, it is also likely that soldiers feel isolated by the painful
knowledge they have learned about war and are perhaps annoyed at the lack of awareness
the general public has about the average soldier’s experiences. Despite the realities of
social isolation that veterans face upon returning home, the post-deployment training
urged veterans to adapt their Battlemind to “be proud of your service and your
accomplishments while you were deployed. Tell your story” (WRAIR, 2006a, p. 21). In a
sense, Battlemind suggested that veterans almost spread a type of propaganda about their
accomplishments that is perhaps unrealistic but that fits the stereotype of what war should
be about—something that is at least palatable if not aspirational for the general public.
As Marin (1981) explained, veterans return from war having learned a “terrible
and demanding wisdom”—the irreversibility of a type of knowledge where one’s actions
of killing and maiming in war irrevocably determined the destiny of victims such that
there is no way to deny one’s responsibility or culpability for those mistakes (p. 74).
Even if a veteran did not participate in combat while deployed but was incredibly bored
(e.g., waiting months for a part to arrive so they could repair a vehicle), telling a service
story of horror or boredom to friends and family may not be seen as heroic—it’s not
exactly the story to be proud of. Furthermore, while Marin suggested that knowledge
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born from war could bring veterans deeper into their community, it can be isolating for
veterans to talk about their experiences because by doing so they raise questions that our
society does not want to confront. They raise questions, as Marin aptly stated, “for which,
as a society we have no answers” (p. 74).
In the pre-deployment training, the soldiers learned that it is expected, normal,
and good to have certain individualized and interiorized expressions of stress injury upon
returning. This included a tacit expectation that if soldiers were really living as a warrior
on deployment they should also now be experiencing reactions listed in Table 5 like
wanting to be “locked and loaded” at home. Failure to have the expression of war stress
injuries presented by Battlemind may suggest to the soldiers that they did not participate
on deployment as they should have by arming their Battlemind, did not have inner
strength and were even cowardly because they could not appropriately “steel their mind”
(WRAIR, 2008b, p. 26) against the horrors of war. Veterans who may understand their
anger, isolation, or sadness in a different way than the training presented (i.e., understand
their symptoms more politically) must then also face the idea that perhaps they did not
absorb Battlemind like the rest of the group and were ultimately not good soldiers.
Overall, Battlemind provided soldiers with a script about what are acceptable
expressions of post-traumatic injury (e.g., you are angry because you are continuing to
fulfill your mission, not because you are angry at the military for broken promises).
Acceptable reactions to war were framed as individual problems in which soldier’s brain
needs to be reset before he or she continues to misapply their Battlemind training at
home. Unacceptable reactions (that were not mentioned in the Battlemind training)
included those directed at the military or government for leading the country and the
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soldiers to war or actions like homicide and suicide (insinuated by the locked and loaded
and aggressive driving scenarios). By locating the problems of OEF/OIF within the
individual solider and convincing them that they merely need to reset their Battlemind to
reintegrate into society, the military is allowed to continue to the status quo of initiating
and prolonging war without question. Reducing stress reactions in this way does not
question or destabilize military operations because the symptoms are attributed solely to
individuals.
Shared Theme 2: Neoliberalism in Trauma Therapy: The Healed Trauma Survivor
as Functional Worker
In this section, I present the second theme that was shared by all of the manuals I
interpreted. Economist John Williamson defined neoliberalism as moving control of the
economy from the public sector and government to the private sector and corporations
(Williamson, 1990). In neoliberal theory, there is emphasis on individual choices and
productivity as resulting directly in success or failure; if someone is not happy, is
impoverished, is starving or suffering, the theory would suggest that this is ultimately due
to an individual failing in neoliberal functionality (e.g., they should get control of their
life, return to work, etc.).
In all of the manuals, trauma was a major source of reducing neoliberal
functionality and thus the aim of therapy was to restore functionality in this system, like
getting the patient to return to work or school. There were three primary assumptions in
the manuals that are a reflection of neoliberal culture: a) valorization of the enterprising
self (cf. Binkley, 2011; Layton, 2010; Rose, N. S., 2007), b) the acontextualized nature of
trauma (Layton, 2006), and c) the privileging of modular, efficient therapy designed for
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managed care (Cushman & Gilford, 2000). I previously discussed these features from the
perspectives of critical scholars in the Background and Literature Review (see Chapter II,
pp. 100-109), in this section I relate these features to my interpretation of the Battlemind
series.
Thematic findings: Neoliberalism in trauma therapy. This section presents
quotations from the Battlemind series that are representative of the theme: neoliberalism
in trauma therapy. I have divided the section according to the three assumptions listed
above.
Valorization of the enterprising self. The Battlemind trainings mentioned
different historical figures as archetypes of the ideal solider. These included: Lord Moran
of Manton (WRAIR, 2006a), General Crosbie Saint (WRAIR, 2006c) and Audie Murphy
(WRAIR, 2006a, 2006c). All of the figures mentioned embodied a heroic solider who
witnessed atrocities but overcame his war wounds and inspired future warriors—a
militaristic version of the enterprising self. The icon perhaps most associated with the
enterprising self in the Battlemind trainings was Audie Murphy. The trainings described
Murphy as the most decorated solider in U.S. Army history. After receiving the highest
honors from the military, he was diagnosed with PTSD and spent the last years of his life
“trying to get Soldiers the help they need” (WRAIR, 2006a, p. 46). The trainers were
instructed to paint an image of Murphy to dispel the myth that “only weak soldiers have
mental health problems,” and point out that “everyone is affected by combat” (WRAIR,
2006a, p. 46). Murphy’s story was mentioned in both of the post-deployment trainings,
“Audie Murphy encouraged all Soldiers to get help when they wanted it or needed it. The
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key is that performance in combat is not related to whether you will or won’t have a
Battlemind injury” (WRAIR, 2006b, p. 27).
What was not mentioned explicitly in the trainings about Audie Murphy, but
perhaps would be known in military culture and amongst the soldiers attending the group,
was that after World War II he became a famous Hollywood actor and icon of American
heroism in movies (Graham, 1989). In Western films, Murphy was romanticized as an
image of rugged individualism (e.g., No Name on the Bullet, The Unforgiven, Night
Passage, The Cimarron Kid, and Gunsmoke). He also starred in several military dramas
as the classic war hero (e.g., The Quiet American, Battle at Bloody Beach).
Murphy was perhaps most famously known for playing a version of himself in the
movie To Hell and Back (Graham, 1989). The movie begins with Murphy as a child
growing up in a large family, as the son of a poor sharecropper. His father deserts his
family and his mother dies, leaving Murphy to fend for his family himself. He attempts to
join the military but is rejected because he is too small and youthful; he endures jokes
about being an infant sent to combat in the infantry division. (In reality Murphy did
illegally enlist at age 17 when he lied about his birthdate [Graham, 1989]). Despite being
small and young, Murphy fought his way up through the ranks in battle and earned the
respect of his fellow soldiers and superior officers. The movie ends with a depiction of
the scene for which Murphy won the U.S. Congressional Medal of Honor. In the scene,
his company is forced to retreat Murphy decides to single-handedly fight off the
Germany infantry by jumping on an abandon tank and using a machine gun to hold the
enemy at bay.
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While To Hell and Back parallels Murphy’s life as the young poor boy turned war
hero, it is undoubtedly infused with cinematic drama, war propaganda, and a larger than
life American dream. The movie, like the Battlemind trainings, neglected to explain the
less ideal details of Murphy’s life post-war, such as the gravity of psychological suffering
he endured as a veteran, and his activism in the Korean and Vietnam Wars (Hopper,
1956).58 Instead, he is framed as purely a mentally tough solider turned war hero and
movie star.
Battlemind’s glorification of Audie Murphy promoted the idea that soldiers
should be able to acknowledge they are suffering from mental health problems while also
retaining a hyper-masculine and superhuman functionality upon returning from war (e.g.,
the cowboys and war heroes of Murphy’s movies). The first post-deployment training
concluded: “Getting help for a Battlemind injury is NOT a sign of weakness. It takes
courage to ask for help and it takes leadership to help a fellow Soldier get help”
(WRAIR, 2006a, p. 34). In sum, soldiers are presented with the ideal that they must
somehow recognize their symptoms, reset their Battlemind, and still retain hero status
after returning from war.
The acontextualized nature of trauma in neoliberal trauma therapy. In
Battlemind, all trauma related psychopathology and reactions to war were referred to as
war stress injuries or Battlemind injuries. Framing reactions to war as injuries suggests

58

Murphy’s first wife described him as guilt-ridden; when he saw a newsreel of orphans
in Germany he wept to think that he was the reason they had no parents (Graham, 1989).
Murphy became more active in describing his post-war experiences and lobbying for
veteran mental health support during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Murphy eventually
came to star in The Quiet American that was based on Graham Greene’s anti-war novel
of the same name. Murphy clarified that despite his activism and involvement in the antiwar movie, he was decidedly not anti-war or anti-American (Hopper, 1956).
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that soldiers are experiencing something akin to a type of physical rather than psychic
wound. I previously outlined further examples of physical injury terminology and the
medicalization of trauma in the Manual’s Presentation of Trauma section (p. 290).
Describing traumatic events that are political and social in nature, like war, as physical
injuries removes them from their social context and suggests they can be treated like a
medical disease rather than a social problem.
The lack of acknowledgement of the military’s role in separating soldiers from
their families when discussing veteran’s problems reintegrating to the home zone is
another example of how Battlemind removes war trauma from its social context. The
military requires that soldiers be uprooted from their homes and families for deployment
overseas like in OEF/OIF. Even when not deployed, while in active service military
families are asked to move frequently from base-to-base across the nation or world; this
is called Permanent Change of Station (also known as PCSing) (United States
Department of the Interior [USDI], 2014). A family can move any number of times
during active duty, sometimes every two years.
The assumption that soldiers and their families should move for their job, and
move away from their families is one expression of the neoliberal ideal that independence
is seen as more acceptable than dependence. It should be expected that a veteran would
have problems returning to their community after deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan
because they have been separated from their family and community. Perhaps even before
they deployed they were moved from base-to-base such that there was no stable
community to return home to in the first place. Rather than frame the problems of
veterans reintegration to family life as rooted in repeated separation from home and
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community, the trainings suggest that difficulties returning home are related to the
soldiers lack of ability to adapt their mind; again, the social is framed as an individual
problem and dependence is seen as problematic. The ideal promoted by Battlemind is a
solider who can quickly and independently adapt to any setting and a family that is able
to function independently from the solider if the soldier is redeployed or moved.
The dyad of the buddy or spouse was the primary social context that was
recognized in Battlemind. The post-deployment training discusses how the veterans
should expect social relationships with their spouse and children to shift when returning
home from a war and how the soldiers should learn how to adapt their mind to
communicate as if they have left the military (e.g., Battlemind dilemmas of Discipline
versus Conflict and Mission OPSEC versus secretiveness). While many of the Battlemind
adjustment dilemmas focus on the dyad, there was no discussion about the larger social
and political domains, such as how veterans might experience applying for a job or return
to school after deployment. While a functional ideal for the solider is promoted what it
means to actually return to a neoliberal society and be expected to reengage in daily life
is not discussed on a community or public level. I continue discussion of how healing and
pathology is located solely in the dyad in a following sub-section (pp. 420-423).
Perhaps the greatest example of decontextualizing trauma from the social world
was that the Battlemind series did not actually discuss any specifics of the deployment or
the reasons for going to war in any of the trainings. The trainings were so broad in their
characterization of war that they could almost be used with soldiers deploying to OEF in
Afghanistan, OIF in Iraq, or missions in any Middle Eastern country. Furthermore the
trainings made gross generalizations about the nations the soldiers would be deploying to
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as being somehow evil or disgusting. For example, the pre-deployment training reminded
the warriors, “the enemy is not going to fight fair. He is going to hide behind women and
children, among civilians. Further, the enemy will not follow the laws of land warfare;”
(WRAIR, 2008a, p. 8). The trainer script continued, “Is the deployed environment a quiet
place? Is it easy to sleep at night? Mention the call to prayer five times a day. There are
often mourners;” (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 15); and “those of you [that] have been there
before, what did it smell like? It’s a smell a lot of third world countries have- a mix of
fuel, burning trash, open or burning sewage (shit). You may recognize that same third
world smell” (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 16). Then the trainer was directed to present a list of
“what you may smell” to soldiers which included, “rotting garbage, burnt flesh and hair,
heavy chemical and industrial smoke/fuel, open sewage.., and decaying animals”
(WRAIR, 2008a, p. 17).
This presentation of the national landscape lacks actual specific cultural or
national detail and paints a decontextualized picture of evil Muslim insurgents running
through an uncomfortable smelly landscape. Mourners’ prayers were presented as
annoyance that prevented soldiers from sleeping. There was no discussion about how
mourning was a direct consequence of violence and war. There was also no discussion
about how what the trainer is instructed to call a “third world smell” was actually created
by ongoing violence and war and would not necessarily be native to the country. The
emphasis on describing the countries as “third world” also connoted a colonial image of
the U.S. forces bringing civilization from the “first world” to the country in the form of
war.
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The decontextualized social and political context of deployment was also
demonstrated in the “what will you think” series of slides in the pre-deployment training.
The soldiers were presented with likely thoughts they will encounter on deployment such
as, “There doesn’t seem to be a point to this;” “No progress is being made here;” “I’m
wasting my life here;” and, “They don’t want us here” (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 19). Rather
than provide information about the real sociopolitical reasons for those thoughts, what the
point of the war is, why progress doesn’t seem to be being made and why the locals may
not want soldiers there, the trainer is directed to tell the platoon “these thoughts are just a
normal part of being deployed. And these thoughts won’t get in the way of maintaining
your Battlemind—of maintaining your inner strength, your resilience” (WRAIR, 2008a,
p. 19). Thus in the pre-deployment training, the leaders tell their platoon that they are
aware of these problems, they aren’t going away, they are natural automatic thoughts
caused by any deployment, and instead of discussing the specific conditions of OEF/OIF,
the soldiers should ensure these thoughts don’t get in the way of their mission. The
training suggests that nothing—not even reality—should get in the way of being a
functional solider on deployment and if it does, soldiers should use their mind to
persevere.
After the presentation of what soldiers are to expect upon deployment (e.g., the
What you will see, hear, smell, etc. slides) the training provides what they call a few
“positive reasons” for deploying:
Deployments can strengthen your Battlemind…So you’ve got the Worst Day
scenarios, the sensory input, the thoughts, the feelings and the hassles of
deployment. But you’ve also got some incredibly good things that might come out
of the deployment. How many of you will have a chance to move into a
leadership position? None of you know if you will be the one to demonstrate
courage but you’ll have that opportunity. You’ll get the chance to do what you’ve
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been trained to do…And you’ve got a chance to serve your country […] In
everything that you do in life that matters, mental toughness and extra effort is
required to be successful. (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 26)
This is where the connection between neoliberal theory and lack of social context
is quite apparent in Battlemind—in lieu of providing social and political context for the
war, the reasons for deployment are ultimately framed as a journey to personal selfbetterment. In this quote from the training, the war was transformed into a resource (cf.
standing reserve) to be used for the enterprising self, as an opportunity to increase in the
ranks, increase mental toughness, demonstrate heroic characteristics and as a “chance to
serve your country.” Where the military may in many ways weaken social ties to family
and local community through constant moves and relocation, the training presents the
endeavor as one that would actually solidify personal character and strengthen social ties
and connections to one’s country.
In sum, the pre-deployment trainings teach the soldiers how to ignore the social
circumstances of their world in order to fulfill the needs of the mission and the military as
a functional solider by retaining mental toughness. The post-deployment trainings locate
the political suffering and consequences of participating in war within the individual
veteran, thus relieving responsibility for these problems from the military, government
and public. Conversations about war are converted into conversations about preventing
PTSD and war stress injuries. The solider is given a narrative about how war is actually
an experience of personal growth and opportunity to become the ultimate warrior.
A modular, efficient therapy designed for managed care. Unlike the other
manuals interpreted in this study, Battlemind does not have to contend with making the
treatment amenable to billing private insurance. Battlemind was paid for by U.S. taxdollars as part of national defense; it was included in the Solider Comprehensive Fitness
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Program and required for all members of the military. Therefore, therapists delivering
Battlemind reported outcomes to the U.S. Department of Defense and the training was
subject to different evaluation criteria than private insurance would require. This being
said, given the massive scale of the military, outcome evaluation is also heavily
monitored, managed, and bureaucratic (albeit sometimes in non-efficient ways that halt
actual program evaluation; see review in Meredith et al., 2011). Battlemind does include
pre- and post-assessments of PTSD symptoms to demonstrate continued efficacy and is
designed to be cost-effective for widespread implementation in the military (DoD, 2009).
Thus, many of the same managed care principles, such as making a therapy efficient to
deliver in the least amount of time with the least amount of expense, have also shaped the
design of Battlemind.
The modular structure of Battlemind is outlined in Figure 4. Battlemind includes
three group trainings led by the platoon leader and in-theatre debriefings led by mental
health specialists, such as therapists, chaplains, social workers, psychiatrists or
psychologists in theatre. The design of Battlemind was cost effective because the
psychologist need only train the leaders in a single workshop how to deliver the
remaining trainings to their entire platoon (Adler, Bliese, et al., 2009; Adler et al., 2007;
Adler, Castro, et al., 2009). The PowerPoint lecture system and manual script also help to
ensure that the trainings are standardized and similarly delivered across platoons in the
military. The group treatment format also allows Battlemind to be more cost-effective
and encourages less tailoring of the treatment to individual needs and concerns. Thus, the
cost of treatment delivery is the cost of the initial training where the psychologists train
the leaders, and any ongoing involvement from the psychologists during debriefing in
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theatre. The leaders are told after their initial training in Battlemind that they are
essentially responsible for delivering the warrior treatment and monitoring the mental
health of their platoon (along with the deployment buddy-system; see examples in
Creation of Altruistic Cult Leaders in this chapter, p. 331).
In addition to the modular group trainings, the soldiers were required to attend intheatre debriefings that are approximately one hour each. Adler et al. (2007) suggested
that while the in-theatre debriefings are designed to be event-driven (i.e., given
immediately after a traumatic event):
there may be so many serious incidents on a combat deployment that the unit
becomes reluctant to hold a debriefing after each one. The unit members may
come to treat the sessions as a rote exercise. (Adler et al., 2007, p. 5)
Thus, to avoid repetition, it seems that in practice debriefings were often
scheduled on a recurrent, time-driven schedule unless something particularly
horrendous occurred. Ironically in attempt to prevent repetition, the debriefings,
while initially designed to be tailored to events and the specific situation of each
platoon, eventually become time-driven, structured, efficient, and undoubtedly
rote.
The beginning of the debriefings emphasized the time-limited nature of the
debriefing therapy and that the goal of the debriefing is to return as quickly as
possible to deployment duties in theatre. The debriefing script read:
The reality is that your unit is going to have to return to duty and at the same time
there needs to be time set-aside to talk about what happened. Other units that have
gone through this kind of training have found that this kind of training can help
units maintain focus and support each other as a team. Obviously one hour of
training won’t take away the things associated with what happened but by taking
a moment to assess how things are going, this training can help you anticipate
some of challenges you may face the in next few months and ways of dealing
with those challenges. (Adler et al., 2007, p. 11).
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Overall, the therapy was structured to be brief, efficiently delivered in
groups or on a set time schedule, and was standardized with PowerPoints and
training scripts.
Thematic discussion: Neoliberalism in trauma therapy. Scholars who have
critically interpreted neoliberal culture in psychotherapy have identified two primary
features: a) social identity is continually removed from political, local, and moral
tradition and context, and b) neoliberal culture has come to govern the lives of families,
individuals and communities via technologies of therapy and the role of the expert in
therapy (e.g., Binkley, 2011; Cushman & Gilford, 2000; Fine, 2012; Layton, 2010, 2013).
I previously discussed these features from the perspectives of critical scholars in the
Background and Literature Review (Chapter II), here I apply them to the interpretation of
the manuals for the Battlemind training series.
When traumatic events are located in the individual as an internal injury they are
less likely to be considered to be a social problem. By localizing the consequences of war
in the individual, as a disorder like PTSD or a mental injury, therapists do a disservice to
veterans by not taking public responsibility for the consequences of war (cf. Cushman,
2013). While understanding that how to respond to war, and in particular to OEF/OIF, is
complex, the lack of social context for trauma disorders presented in Battlemind helps to
retain the delusion that as therapists we are preventing trauma with psychotherapy
treatments, rather than by recognizing and discussing the social causes of war and thereby
opposing war. The existence of the Battlemind training and debriefing series suggests to
veterans they should not expect their struggles and reactions to their experience to be
something that incites public engagement. Instead, the training suggests that veterans
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should respond to war stress injuries in the private domain—as an internal, cognitionbased wound that can be kept at bay with improved cognitions through self- and buddymonitoring.
Limited details about the reasons for war and the social and political context of
the war from a U.S. and Afghan or Iraq perspective were not provided to the soldiers.
Perhaps to discuss the actual social and political context of the war or provide
humanizing details about Iraq or Afghanistan would deter them from participation in war.
Despite the shallow and offensive sociocultural portrait of Iraq and Afghanistan that was
painted by the pre-deployment trainings, I would assume that specifics of the soldiers
mission, history and purpose of the war and cultural briefings were provided in other
trainings. Even if this material was covered elsewhere, the exclusion of the context and
reasons for war from Battlemind suggests that these reasons are irrelevant to well-being
and safety on deployment. In lieu of providing social and political context for the war, the
reasons for deployment were ultimately framed as a journey to personal self-betterment.
War was transformed into a resource (cf. standing reserve) to be used for the enterprising
self for personal growth (e.g., war provides a developmental opportunity to increase
mental toughness and personal advancement).
The goals of Battlemind and recurrent discussion of enterprising figures like
Audie Murphy suggested that the Army’s goal for veterans was to make them into
functional and productive members of society after the war. The Audie Murphy
archetype presented a tension between the ideal of the impervious Battlemind warrior that
courageously drives on through any emotional or moral dilemma and the soldiers who
actively monitor their mental health, attend therapy and are obedient to social norms upon
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returning from war. Soldiers were presented with the ideal that they must somehow
recognize their symptoms, reset their Battlemind, and still retain hero status upon
returning from war. Given this tension between the ideals of the pre-deployment training
and post-deployment training, it is unsurprising that the psychologists inform the leaders
that 65% of soldiers don’t report seeking help for fear of being perceived as weak
(WRAIR, 2008a, p. 55). It seems that Battlemind and the military does such a good job of
convincing soldiers that they can reason their way through war as an enterprising
individual with a bulletproof mind that to admit that they are actually confused or
affected by war is seen as a personal weakness rather than a social problem for which the
society as a whole should all take responsibility. Overall, by framing responses to war at
best as a journey to self-betterment and at worst as an individual disorder that requires
self-focused mental maintenance and repair, the Battlemind training series may actually
contribute to the creation of traumatic symptoms such as confusion, guilt, isolation or
social avoidance, anger and associated depression or functional impairment. I explore this
idea further throughout the remaining themes, exemplars and questions.
Shared Theme 3: Trauma Is Universal and Culture-Free (Versus Tied to a U. S.,
Western, White, and Middle-Class Context)
In this section, I present the third, theme that was shared by all of the manuals I
interpreted. In all of the manuals, trauma was presented a universal human experience
that could be treated following the same culture-free treatment manual. I divided
examples of this theme into the following categories: a) trauma symptoms are tied to
universally experienced organ malfunction (e.g., brain problems), b) there is a flattening
of all events, local experiences, and narratives of suffering to diagnostic criteria for PTSD
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and the word “trauma” or “traumatic events,” c) the technique of thought-terminating
clichés (cf. Lifton,1989) about cultural competency are often employed, and d) there is an
exclusion of forms of suffering from the definition of trauma that are not from a U.S.,
Western, white, and middle-class context.
Thematic findings: Trauma is universal and culture free. This section presents
quotations from the Battlemind manual that are representative of this theme. Because
Battlemind avoided explanation of any trauma symptoms as rooted in brain malfunction,
there were no examples of the Shared sub-theme of: trauma symptoms tied to a
universally experience organ malfunction. I have divided the section according to the
three remaining assumptions listed above.
Flattening all local experiences and narratives of suffering to diagnostic
criteria for PTSD and the words trauma or traumatic events. Although Battlemind did
not mention the word trauma, the series was designed as a mental health intervention to
prevent symptoms of PTSD. After the final post-deployment training, all soldiers were
required to take an assessment called the Post-Deployment Mental Health Assessment
(PDHRA). All service members, including those on active duty, in reserves or in the
National Guard are at some point required to complete this assessment. The PDHRA is
conducted 90 to 180 days after post deployment (WRAIR, 2005 ); ideally, by the time of
assessment, veterans will have completed all the Battlemind stages.
The PDHRA assessment begins with the solider first filling out basic information
and a health questionnaire online; this is also known as the DD Form 2796. After the
solider completes this questionnaire, a clinician completes the PDHRA in person using a
form called the DD Form 2900. This is the assessment that determines the type of
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benefits and services the veteran will receive from the VA post-combat if they indeed
meet criteria for PTSD.
There are four questions on the DD Form 2900 that pertain to trauma and PTSD,
which were selected from the PCL-C PTSD screener (Weathers et al., 1993). The four
questions are about symptoms experienced in the past month (i.e., approximately 60 days
post-deployment) including nightmares, avoiding thoughts about a horrible, frightening
or upsetting experience, hypervigilance and feelings of numbness. If the solider endorses
at least two of these symptoms they must complete the full PCL-C, which includes 17
questions rated on a scale of 1 to 5 from no symptoms to extreme symptoms (Weathers et
al., 1993). The PCL-C also includes a final question about functionality, “How difficult
have these problems made it for you to work, take care of things at home and get along
with other people?,” which is to be rated from not difficult at all to extremely difficult.
After completing the assessment, the clinician is given an algorithm to understand
these symptoms and refer to care; this algorithm is publically available on the DD Form
2900 government document and has been reproduced in Figure 5. Experiencing no
symptoms at all on the PCL-C is equal to a score of 17, thus the range of 17 to 30 is
considered sub-threshold PTSD. The score of 30 to 39 is considered mild symptoms of
PTSD, a score of 40 to 49 is considered moderate, and a score of greater than 50 is
considered severe symptoms of PTSD. In the PDHRA algorithm (Figure 5) anything
above a score of 30 receives PTSD psychoeducation from the clinician. The only veterans
that necessarily must receive a referral to mental health care includes those who received
a PCL-C score equal to or above 50 for severe symptoms with severe functional
impairment (i.e. a rating of difficulty returning to work and usual function as very or
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extremely difficult). It is up to the clinician to consider a referral for those soldiers who
are in the severe range but do not report functional impairment or for soldiers in the mild
to moderate range of symptoms that do report functional impairment.

Figure 5. DD Form 2900 algorithm for military health care providers to provide PTSD
intervention based on PCL-C scores.
I wondered if soldiers who are indeed referred on (the percentage that endorse
above a 50 on the PCL-C and suffer severe functional impairment) would be provided an
opportunity to share their story or experiences in combat in more detail after referral to
psychotherapy. I examined the referral resources and the first source that PDHRA
clinicians are recommended to send veterans to is a website called militaryonesource.mil
which provides 12 sessions of confidential non-face to face counseling (i.e., telehealth)
for mental health problems. Other resources included referrals to the VA and VetCenters.
Examination of the VA clinical triage guidelines indicated that soldiers need to go
through further assessment and are more likely to be provided with
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psychopharmacotherapy before counseling (DoD, 2010). When counseling was
recommended, TF-CBT was the primary modality of choice followed by variations of
exposure-based therapies (e.g., Foa et al., 2009) and stress inoculation training. EMDR
was also suggested with caution because the guidelines noted:
Comparable effect sizes have been achieved with or without eye movements or
other forms of distraction or kinesthetic stimulation. Although the mechanisms of
effectiveness in EMDR have yet to be determined, it is likely that they are similar
to other trauma-focused exposure and cognitive-based therapies. (DoD, 2010,
p. 118)
Both EMDR and CBT begin with yet another standardized assessment of symptoms.
Overall, it seems that before a veteran would actually be able to explain any
narrative about the war, about what their problems were or what was upsetting them postdeployment, they would have gone through a minimum of three PTSD and trauma related
symptom checklists and assessments (PCL-C 4 item screener in DD Form 2796; Full
PCL-C 17 item screener in DD Form 2900, CAPS), one traumatic events assessment
(e.g., SLES-Q) and various baseline quantitative ratings of distress and functioning (e.g.,
another PCL-C to begin TF-CBT in addition to ratings of baselines SUDs or in the case
of EMDR SUDs and VoCs).
This process of repeated forms and quantitative measurements is an example of
the scientistic and procedural framework of managed mental health care. Through the
completion of these forms and assessments, narrative and local experiences of suffering
are reduced to check-boxes of symptoms and assessments of quantitative levels of stress
that can be easily monitored, triaged, and used as data to assess patient, therapist and
clinical program success. If a solider scores a 49 instead of a 50 on the PCL-C, this one
point difference means they do not qualify for referral to therapy or continued services
where they may actually get to explain what they experienced on deployment instead of
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being subject to filling out a form that lists symptoms. Overall, idiomatic, cultural, or
personal experiences of trauma that do not fit within the standard checkboxes cannot
come to light through the Battlemind assessment and conceptualization of trauma.
Thought-terminating clichés about cultural competency. Cultural competency
did not appear to be an aspiration of the Battlemind training, trainers or soldiers; if
anything the series encouraged cultural stereotyping and creation of a feeling that those
the U.S. was fighting were inhuman, evil, terrorists that could not feel or experience
suffering. Thus the thought-terminating clichés about culture in Battlemind were not
disguised as a form of cultural competency; discussions about culture were overtly shut
down by indiscriminately labeling persons in Iraq and Afghanistan as “the enemy.”
The portrayal of civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan in the training was almost a
caricature (e.g., prayer five times a day disturbing solider sleep, images of women in
niqabs or burqas holding machine guns (WRAIR 2008a, pg. 8), children reaching out of
the rubble to touch a solider (WRAIR 2008a, p. 14); for further discussion of cultural
tokenism through selected photo imagery see Lutz & Collins, 1993). Women and
children were overemphasized both in the trainer script and visually, as if to remind the
soldiers that devastating the country’s vulnerable civilians should be expected and that
this was ultimately the enemy’s plan and responsibility (e.g., “Remember the enemy is
not going to fight fair. He is going to hide behind women, children, in churches, among
civilians;” p. 8). Already within the first slides of the pre-deployment Battlemind
training there was a sense of reframing the soldier’s personal responsibility for civilian
death, and particularly guilt about killing women and children, as being the responsibility
of a faceless enemy.
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It was notable in the “what you will see, hear and smell” slide series that the
impact of war on the culture was not overtly recognized and was instead presented as part
of the environment of the “third world hostile forces.” Cultural notes were not intended to
be presented to the soldiers; anything that could possibly provide more detail or
humanize the civilians or combatants was omitted from the training.
While the intent of presenting the soldiers with what to expect on deployment was
to eventually argue that they must focus on fortifying their Battlemind, the presentation
had moral overtones that suggested that killing the enemy (and even children, women and
civilians when the enemy was hiding behind them) was somehow permissible or ethical
because the enemy would not be fighting fair and following the rules. All conversation
about the morality of war, let alone the culture of the persons and country that the U.S.
occupied, were avoided by reframing the environment as a third-world landscape of the
enemy. The involvement of the U.S. was presented as a moral mission in such a way that
people of Iraq and Afghanistan were seen as somehow incapable to defend themselves or
were some how amoral if they resisted the U.S. involvement.
Exclusion from the definition of trauma. From the two sub-themes of this
section presented above it was clear that Iraq and Afghani civilians and combatants were
excluded from being understood as experiencing trauma or suffering. U.S. forces were
seen as bringing stabilization and healing to the nation that was assumed to be already
undergoing civil war and filled with evil insurgents. From the PDHRA assessment, it was
apparent that having a symptom threshold below a 50 on the PCL-C excluded a solider
from PTSD treatment and related services. Other than these two major exclusions from
trauma conceptualizations, the Battlemind trainings steered away from labels of trauma
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and traumatized and instead suggested that some soldiers would have war stress injuries
but all would have problems with resetting their Battlemind. Almost all soldiers were
treated as if they were not traumatized per say but were experiencing the normal
problems of Battlemind adaptation.
This presentation of trauma and PTSD as a normal stress injury had a paradoxical
effect of excluding all soldiers from the definition of traumatized and trauma disordered,
while also including everyone in the definition of potential war stress injury and
Battlemind adaptation problems. The training allowed all soldiers to consider themselves
wounded from war because of a courageous and not pathological form of injury.
Thematic discussion: Trauma as universal and culture-free. While the
experience of a Battlemind injury was seen to be universal among soldiers, trauma was
not seen as universally experienced or culture-free; Iraqi or Afghani civilians or
combatants were not considered to be suffering or traumatized and the insurgents were
presented as evil and amoral. There was no discussion of prolonged violence existing in
Iraq and Afghanistan before or during OEF, OIF, and OND. Instead the countries were
presented as having “a third world smell” as if it was intrinsic that these countries would
naturally smell like fuel, burning flesh and hair, open sewage, and heavy chemical and
industrial smoke. These are the smells of a landscape of war; burning flesh should not be
considered to be a natural “smell that a lot of third world countries have” (WRAIR,
2008a, p. 17); these are the smells of a country that is undergoing chronic violence and
war. Overall, the experience of trauma was seen as personal injury endured only by
soldiers; Iraq and Afghani persons were not seen within the clearing of traumatic
suffering.
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In contrast to the exclusion of Iraq and Afghani persons from consideration of
trauma, within the military, trauma was seen as a culture-free universal experience to all
soldiers that could be easily understood and assessed as a skill malfunction (Battlemind
maladaptation) or type of physical injury. The symptoms of war-stress were seen as so
standard and universal that they could be identified according to symptom checklists of
four questions in the PDHRA assessment. The algorithms utilized by the PDHRA
clinicians were similar to those that Young (1995) witnessed being developed at the
National Center for PTSD. The assessment did not elicit any narrative about what
happened in the war or any of the unique qualities of soldiers’ experiences. In
Battlemind, the act of asking about mental health post-deployment was transformed into
an efficient algorithm to adequately triage service members to the appropriate care or
provide them a PTSD pamphlet. Overall, from the check-box symptom assessments to
the presentation of the war itself, in Battlemind there was no room for discussion or
consideration of the political and personal ramifications of war on the soldiers or civilians
in the U.S., Iraq and Afghanistan.
Shared Exemplar 1: Indoctrination into a Social Void of Scientistic Managed Care
Exemplars are stories or vignettes that capture what human being is like in a
particular cultural or historical situation. In this study, I looked for exemplars that
captured what human being is like in trauma culture in such a way that it could be
recognized in other situations that might have very different objective circumstances,
including those outside of the practice of psychotherapy. In particular, I focused on
identifying the therapeutic techniques and practices that trauma treatment manuals
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prescribed to training therapists, and noted the similarity between these techniques and
practices to others in the social world.
The shared exemplar, which I titled, indoctrination into a social void of scientistic
managed care, has four primary features: presentation of an origin myth, locating
pathology and healing within the dyad, overreliance on forms, hand-outs and
PowerPoints, and directive psychoeducation and thought-replacement.
Exemplar findings: Indoctrination into a social void of scientistic managed
care. This section presents quotations from the Battlemind series that are representative
of this shared exemplar. I have divided the section according to the four features listed
above.
Presentation of the therapy’s origin myth. Samelson (1974) coined the term
“origin myth” to describe the presentation of an apolitical, transhistorical narrative of
incremental progress towards an objective truth and science. In an origin myth, the
subject is decontextualized and presented in the form of discoveries from individual
geniuses (typically white Euro-American men) who each contributed to the development
of the contemporary understanding of psychology. The purpose of an origin myth is to
provide legitimacy to contemporary psychological concepts by presenting them as facts
that have existed in the same form for hundreds or even thousands of year. Each of the
trauma manuals interpreted in this study included some version of an origin myth and
often this myth was incorporated into psychoeducation about why the patient should be
attending the specific form of therapy prescribed by the manual.
The Battlemind origin myth begins with the original Battlemind trainings by
General Crosbie Saint (Saint, 1992). The term “Battlemind” was coined by Saint when he

421
was the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Europe in the 1980s (WRAIR, 2006c).
General Saint’s Battlemind Guidelines for Battalion Commanders (1992) described
Battlemind as “a soldiers’ fortitude, the inner strength to face adversity, fear and hardship
during combat with confidence and resolution…the will to persevere and win” (p. 1).
Saint’s guidelines were developed in the post-Vietnam era when the PTSD construct rose
in popularity and the normative history of PTSD (Appendix A) and several origin myths
about the timeless quality of PTSD were popularized (Young, 1995). Saint’s origin myth
locates Battlemind as a concept intrinsic to human society for thousands of years, “The
development of solider attributes underlying Battlemind is based on the principles of
human behavior and in part the practices of successful armies over a span of 4000 years
(e.g., Xenophon (Rouse, 1947) and Sun Tzu (Clavell, 1983)” (p. 15).
Adler, Castro and McGurk (2009) drew from Saint in their development of the
Battlemind training and debriefing series but slightly reworded the Battlemind definition
to be, “A warriors inner strength to face adversity, fear and hardship during combat with
confidence and resolution. It is the will to persevere and win” (WRAIR, 2006c, p. 3).
Throughout the contemporary Battlemind training and debriefing series General Crosbie
Saint was referred to periodically. For example, the final post-deployment training notes
that the term Battlemind was coined by Saint “to train his battalion commanders how to
develop the warrior ethos that they would be leading into combat” (WRAIR 2006b, p. 2).
Thus, while Saint located Battlemind as a concept intrinsic to humanity for thousands of
years, the authors of the contemporary Battlemind referred to Saint as further support for
a long tradition of training soldiers in building “armor for their mind” (WRAIR 2008a).
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The Battlemind I post-deployment training (WRAIR, 2006a) also began with an
origin myth about returning home from deployment:
History has taught us that combat veterans from every war America has fought in
from the Civil War to the Spanish-American War, to World War I and World War
II, from the Korean War to the Vietnam War to the first Gulf War to the present,
report being angry and edgy…but they’re always happy to be back home.
(WRAIR, 2006a, p. 2)
This myth suggests that veterans throughout time—from the Civil War to OEF—
have always experienced the same reactions to the war. The utilization of this origin myth
is problematic for many reasons, namely by naturalizing the state of war, existence of the
current expression of PTSD symptoms throughout time, and evidence-based trauma
treatments that currently reduce personal and public responsibly for killing (cf. Camus,
1946) and make it acceptable to turn inward (cf. cognitivist ideology; Sampson, 1981)
rather than to the social realm to discuss the implications of war and violence; this will be
discussed below.
Location of pathology and healing in the dyad. In the Battlemind training series
pathology and healing in human relationships were often described in dyadic form. There
was particular emphasis on the relationship between the soldier and their battle buddy.
The post-deployment training framed the relationship between the solider and their buddy
as one where the buddy was responsible for monitoring the well-being of their fellow
solider, “You know each other. Can you recognize if you buddy is having a hard time? If
no, this training will help you to recognize when it might be time to help a buddy or to
get help yourself. Look around and help out those who are struggling” (WRAIR 2006c,
p.4).
Buddies were particularly emphasized on the set of slides that presented a postdeployment reaction to war or readjusting home or what was framed in the training as a
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Battlemind maladaptation dilemma (described in the following section, Directive
psychoeducation and thought-replacement, pp. 424-425). Each dilemma included a
Battlemind check for self and buddy that listed three questions such as has your buddy,
“threatened someone with a weapon? Carried a loaded weapon in the car? Kept an
unsecured loaded weapon at home?” (WRAIR, 2006c, p. 9). After performing the selfand buddy-checks for each Battlemind dilemma the buddy’s role was to help the soldier
adapt their Battlemind and prevent the soldier from hurting themselves or another person
when adjusting to life at home.
The end of the training focused particularly on how the solider should get help
through the buddy dyad, “Here are some ways to get help. As we’ve already talked about
the first place Soldiers go to for help is to their buddies and to their good leaders”
(WRAIR, 2006c, p. 54). After presenting buddies as the first option the trainer suggests
the chaplain, “What’s the nice thing about going to a chaplain for help? It’s confidential”
(WRAIR, 2006c, p. 54). The trainer then suggests that soldiers go to the medical clinic
and to say, “If you need more help you can you go to? Behavioral Health. You can also
go off post. However, depending on where you are stationed, behavioral health specialists
may not speak English and you may have to pay out of pocket for it” (WRAIR, 2006c,
p. 54).
While inclusion of the buddy on some level may seem more relational or
community-focused than other forms of therapy that recommend complete reliance on or
calling the therapist instead of a community member when in distress, the buddy’s role
was prescribed as one that was surveillance and compliance oriented. For example, the
goal of buddy-checks was ensure the buddy follows the Battlemind training principles or
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is referred to behavioral health/therapy if they cannot. Thus the buddy, while supportive
and involved in the soldier’s life, was prescribed by Battlemind to ideally act as an
extension of the clinical gaze (cf. Foucault) to ensure that any solider that acted out of
line could be eventually referred to or flagged for mental health treatment- even when
this behavior occurred in social settings and outside of military service.
One of the final video vignettes in Battlemind II post-training (WRAIR, 2006c)
involved such a scenario where two senior non-commissioned officers (NCO) who were
assigned as buddies were discussing a solider “SGT Jones” or “Jonesy” (p. 85) who went
from being a “go-to-guy” to now getting into “all kinds of hot water” (p. 85). The video
appeared to have been set up to invoke a sense of care-free masculinity, as both NCOs
are out of uniform, bearing their muscles in casual tee-shirts, and working out together as
they play basketball in the sunshine. The first NCO recommends to his buddy that
Jonesy be referred to counseling. The buddy, who is “not a fan of mental health” accuses
the first NCO of “going soft” (p. 87). The first NCO then reveals to his buddy that he
actually once attended counseling because upon returning home from Iraq he was so
depressed and angry that his wife threatened to leave him and take their children. The
buddy asks if the first NCO’s Commander knew, and he reveals that in fact the
Commander recommended he go to counseling. The trainer script read:
This NCO believes the myth that only weak Soldiers have MH [mental health]
problems. He gives his buddy a hard time for suggesting that SGT Jones might
need some assistance…and he never would have guessed that his own buddy, a
senior NCO, would be going to counseling (p. 93).
By the end of the vignette everyone agrees that Jonesy should go to counseling
and that it is “a myth that only weak soldiers have mental health problems” (p. 94). Thus,
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the training recommends that the buddy-dyads encourage referral to therapy when the
buddy cannot directly assist in offering skills to reset their buddy’s Battlemind (Table 5).
In sum, all of the healing relationships were presented in dyadic form: self-buddy,
soldier-chaplain, solider-doctor, and solider-therapist. The other primary relationship
emphasized was returning home to a significant other or spouse. The assumption
appeared to be in the training that the solider would have one primary significant other
who would be affected by and would be a primary support for the solider. This was true
to the extent that Battlemind actually included a spouses’ training, which was not
analyzed as a part of this study. All of the dyads were described as supportive to the
solider suffering from mental health problems, and the aim of all the dyadic interactions
was to refer to mental health treatment. Thus the soldiers learn that suffering can be
expressed in the social sphere of the dyad (anything larger than this might be
unacceptable) and that referral to mental health is the most acceptable response to
soldier’s in distress.
Over-reliance on forms, handouts, and PowerPoint in therapy. Battlemind preand post-deployment trainings were designed as PowerPoint presentations where the
trainers (the psychologists or therapists and leaders) delivered the training by reading
from presenter notes on the PowerPoint. The PowerPoint format with trainer notes
allowed for the trainings to be standardized across platoons in the military and for any
leader to be able to deliver the exact same preparation for deployment to each platoon.
The experience of Battlemind training for soldiers would be sitting in a room watching a
screen and responding to prompts from the trainer.
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The in-theatre debriefings did not involve a PowerPoint presentation; however,
the interactions were also divided into modules and scripted (Adler et al., 2007). Each
solider was given a Battlemind resource card at the end of the de-briefing that apparently
contained all of the information a solider would need to respond to in-theatre distress:
We’re going to give you a card with all your local behavioral health resources on
it. [To trainer]: (review the resources briefly, especially ArmyOne Source).
Leaders may want extra cards. If you are a leader, or will be a leader soon, then
you don’t want to be fumbling around trying to find out where to get one of your
service members the help he or she needs. All the information you’ll need is here
on the card. (Adler et al., 2007, p. 23)
The assessment of the training effectiveness and solider mental health was
conducted by following the protocols outlined on several forms (e.g., PDHRA and
DD Form 2900; see further discussion of the assessment in the section, Flattening
of All Local Experiences and Narratives of Suffering, pp. 410-414). Overall, the
solider would encounter a total of three to four PowerPoint presentations, multiple
resource cards and referral handouts (depending on number of in-theatre
debriefings attended) and would complete upwards of seven mental health
assessments and related forms.
Directive psychoeducation and thought-replacement. The Battlemind predeployment training provided psychoeducation about what to expect during the war and
how to respond to these thoughts by engaging Battlemind. I have presented examples of
directive psychoeducation throughout this section such as the “What you will feel, think,
smell” on deployment slides. There was minimal directive psychoeducation about PTSD
and trauma related disorders in the pre-deployment training, except for one slide in the
Leader’s training which read, “Reactions that are sometimes called PTSD can help
Warriors survive in combat. Most Warriors (80-90%) do not develop PTSD but some
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need help […] [PTSD] is a very complex diagnosis that has several symptoms including
intrusive memories, flashbacks, nightmares, being hyped up, [and] sleep problems”
(WRAIR, 2008a, p. 51). This was the first mention of PTSD (out of two in the entire
training) and it was presented in the pre-deployment training as being adaptive for
deployment.
The post-deployment training utilized thought-replacement in each vignette of
how to reset their Battlemind skills for the home zone. As the training stated, “Battlemind
skills will help you survive combat and high-risk military deployments; however, these
same skills will cause problems when you get home if you fail to adapt them” (WRAIR,
2006c, p. 4). The training included thoughts soldiers might have after returning from
deployment and how to adapt Battlemind by resetting it with new thoughts (Columns 3
and 4 of Table 5). Table 5 presents how a Battlemind skill can go wrong post-deployment
followed by an example of a Battlemind replacement thought that the training suggested
would be adapted for the “home zone.” The training did not use or mention the language
of thought-replacement but the proposed interventions involved the trainer suggesting
alternative actions and thoughts for the soldiers to engage in as a part of resetting their
Battlemind to adapt to returning home post-deployment (Column 4, Table 5).
Exemplar discussion: Indoctrination into scientistic managed care. This
exemplar had four primary features: presentation of an origin myth, locating pathology
and healing within the dyad, overreliance on forms, hand-outs and PowerPoint
presentations, and directive psychoeducation and thought-replacement. Many of these
features are therapeutic techniques that are a form of indoctrination into a world of
scientistic managed care that ignores social relationships outside of the dyad, and values

428
compliance and control as a good way to be human. The techniques described in this
exemplar were not limited to Battlemind or psychotherapy in general.
To begin to indoctrinate the patients into the culture of compliance-oriented care
management, Battlemind utilized an origin myth to suggest to the warriors that values
and practices of Battlemind are static and have been accepted by soldiers for centuries.
What is particularly important about this origin myth was the idea that war itself was
somehow natural to humans and exists today in the same form as it did thousands of
years ago. As Camus (1946) pointed out, warfare has changed immensely with the
invention of modern technologies like the atomic bomb and more recently unmanned
aircraft drone strikes. These technologies and abstraction of bureaucratic procedures, like
attending PowerPoint trainings and filling out several DD Forms, have allowed for a
social distance between those who participate in or standby while war occurs; in short,
these technologies have allowed murder to become depersonalized. The war of one
thousand years ago that General Saint mentioned is not the same kind of war that is
fought today; and certainly the mental training to arm, reset and deprogram the modular
warrior reflects and reproduces a contemporary, industrialized and depersonalized world
that is not the same as it was in ancient Greece.
One danger in the origin myth of PTSD is acceptance that the current state of
dissociated and distant acts of killing that involved in war are somehow historically
similar and acceptable (i.e., natural, time-tested, honorable or traditional) to all wars. The
second danger is that naturalization of the particular symptom expression of PTSD as it is
presently represented in the DSM-IV. As I reviewed in the background the contemporary
medicalized expression of trauma is relatively recent historically. The normative history
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of PTSD (Appendix A) emerged in the 1980s after the National Center for PTSDs
development of the PTSD “knowledge product”, which included a DSM III diagnosis,
research and treatments for the disorder. The disorders listed in Appendix A are quite
different, but their compilation into a single history or origin myth that appears to make
incremental progression to modern-day PTSD suggests that contemporary expressions of
trauma (that are cognitivist, asocial and interior) have always existed in this way. Careful
examination of the table and the definitions of trauma suggest otherwise (e.g., reactions
to war post-OEF are rarely expressed as muteness, as was common post-WWI; women’s
experience of trauma was seen as categorically different to men’s experience). When
comparing the traumatic sequelae and context of wars like WWII and Vietnam (See
review in Chapter II: Background and Literature Review, pp. 76-88) to the Civil War and
to OEF, there are distinct differences, such as the reasons for war, countries and cultures
involved, political climates, technologies available, and public reactions to war, to the
extent that it would be nearly impossible for these veterans to experience and express
reactions to war in the same way.
Another danger of accepting the origin myth of PTSD and those included in
Battlemind is the tacit suggestion that because distress has been expressed similarly over
centuries, the healing technologies (e.g., form, worksheet and manual-based therapies)
are the natural, common-sense response to distress. The therapies in this instance
contribute to the maintenance of the origin myth and societal acceptance that war is
natural and responses to war should be apolitical and asocial; they should occur primarily
in the mind or in the privacy of a healing dyad (e.g., therapist-patient, solider-spouse).
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In Camus (1946) commentary on WWII, people were described as consumers or
spectators that could be appealed to by fear, rather than by interest in social relationships;
society was gripped by terror such that reflection was impossible. The Battlemind
trainings are perhaps Camus’ nightmare; they have been born from the continued reality
of a depersonalized dystopia that Camus recognized and feared post-WWII. The
Battlemind training series and the therapists who participate in this training are training
soldiers through thought procedures about how to avoid thinking politically and socially
about the moral consequences of murder.
Before continuing I should note that though the psychoeducation and thoughtreplacement exercises utilized in Battlemind provide a mental map for soldiers to follow
to reprogram or reset their mind, as if they were robots, I do not intend to collude with the
training in suggesting that soldiers actually are robots that simply can be programmed to
accept their trainings. They are not passive vessels that have lost the capacity to think
critically and morally and they are not completely subject to accepting and absorbing
Battlemind trainings. It’s possible soldiers have found ways to resist Battlemind and
express suffering in different ways than those suggested by the training.
Although I believe that soldiers may not accept or actively can resist the training,
from my interpretation of the Battlemind manuals, it was difficult to understand how
soldiers might do this. The training did not appear to not make room for varied forms of
suffering or resistance and certainly did not allow for reflective way of human being to
come to light. I have further explored the forces of thought-reform and milieu control that
make it difficult for soldiers to resist Battlemind training below.
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Battlemind Exemplar 1: Battlemind Creates the Warrior Cult
Exemplars are stories or vignettes that capture what human being is like in a
particular cultural or historical situation. In this study I looked for exemplars that
captured what human being is like in trauma culture in such a way that it could be
recognized in other situations that might have very different objective circumstances,
including those outside of the practice of psychotherapy. In this section, I present an
exemplar that I only interpreted for the Battlemind training and debriefing series:
Battlemind creates the warrior cult (cf. Lifton, 1973). I later present the Warrior Cult as a
paradigmatic object that exists as a way of being more broadly in trauma-based society;
however, here I focus on the technologies and techniques of therapy that create the
warrior cult. In other words, this exemplar describes how the cult is created. The cult
itself I later interpret as a way of being.
Exemplar findings: Battlemind creates the warrior cult. The structure of
military socialization in Battlemind resembled both a coming of age ceremony and cult
indoctrination. I reviewed the broad structure of cults and indoctrination and their
relationship to coming of age ceremonies in the Background and Literature Review
Chapter (pp. 119-128). Here I discuss specific examples of this structure in Battlemind.
Creation of altruistic cult leaders in Battlemind. The Battlemind training was
structured so that psychologists trained the leaders and the leaders trained the soldiers in
their platoon in Battlemind. The psychologists primarily used the thought-reform
technique of dispensing of existence (described by Lifton, 1959/1989) in the leader
training to ensure that leaders followed Battlemind guidelines and created an
environment of obedience and dependence amongst the soldiers. To emphasize the do-or-
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die nature of the training, the first responsibility the leaders were given via the training is
the responsibility of the health and well-being of the soldiers. The training stated, “As a
leader, you’re going to be the guy to get the bad news as it is. […] You have an
obligation to take care of your Soldiers, you are the ones to deal with the news. You need
a strong mind—your Battlemind—to accept those facts as they are” (WRAIR, 2008a,
p. 27); “Good leadership keeps up morale and cohesion and contributes to Soldier mental
health. I mean your level of leadership, not battalion or brigade leaders, you guys”
(WRAIR, 2008a, p. 43), and “The only real measure of leadership in combat is mission
success, valor in combat and leader performance, never personal gain. It’s about you
taking care of your Soldiers” (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 45).
Battlemind incentivized leaders for taking care of their soldiers by suggesting that
the leaders will get better performance and obedience from their soldiers if they take
responsibility for their wellbeing. For example, the leader training concluded with a slide
titled “The American Warrior” that featured a quote from Dwight Eisenhower:
The capacity of soldiers for absorbing punishment and enduring privations is
almost inexhaustible so long as they believe they are getting a square deal, that
their commanders are looking out for them, and that their own accomplishments
are understood and appreciated. (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 72)
The training also described how indecisive and poor leadership can cost-lives,
“combat is not time for a learning curve because mistakes cost lives. If you have a leader
who is struggling with his or her responsibility, you need to reassign them. This can be a
tough reality. But you owe it to your Soldiers” (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 44).
To gain the benefits of greater solider performance and endurance, the training
instructed the leaders on how to establish credibility and trust so that soldiers will be
more willing to rely on the leaders and eventually report problems, like traumatic stress
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injuries, to the leaders. The training described to the leaders how they can provide
financial incentives and light duty to soldiers when they are having problems to ensure
that the leaders are trusted:
Don’t let family problems go unanswered. When we give Soldiers predeployment Battlemind training we tell them to talk to their leaders if they are
having family problems and talk to you early. But what are you going to do with
that information? …If you listen, if you identify actions you can take (whether
through finance, the rear detachment, whatever) if you follow-up and check-in
with the Solider to see how things are going, then your unit will know you’re that
kind of leader. (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 45)
The training continued that leaders should create home-like environment to
further foster trust, “It doesn’t take a lot of effort to keep track of important milestones in
a Soldier’s life (the birth of a child, a graduation, anniversaries). But a little attention to
those details can go a long way” (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 61). The training also directed
leaders to ensure they give out resources including water, food and rest fairly among
team members to retain credibility (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 65).
Though the platoon leaders were in many ways trained to be positioned as cult
leaders (e.g., given ultimate control over sleep, eating, job responsibilities, physical and
mental well-being and many cases life-or-death), they may not meet the classic
description of a narcissistic cult leader that self-assigns these responsibilities and believes
they have a mystical connection to a higher power (cf. M. T. Singer’s (1995) definition).
Instead, the leaders were trained to foster extreme dependence of their platoon for the
purposes of the larger military goals, which on a micro-level was the early identification
of or overcoming of PTSD symptoms. On a more socio-political level, the early
identification of PTSD may also serve to identify soldiers that might seek support outside
the military, or otherwise be so outraged, violent, or depressed that they might instigate
some type of social change or rejection of the government’s prolonged involvement in
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war if they are not placed in therapy (cf. Young, 1995). The leaders face pressures to
foster dependence on the military that they in turn place on their soldiers.
Milieu thought-reform in Battlemind. I have provided examples of Lifton’s
(1959/1989) milieu thought-reform techniques in Battlemind. The format of this section
follows similar studies that have used Lifton’s identified structure of thought reform to
interpret cult phenomenon in psychology (Cushman, 1986, 1989). I did not include
detailed discussion of the techniques of mystical manipulation, scared science and the
cult of confession because there were few examples of these techniques in the Battlemind
training. I presented examples of Lifton’s thought-reform techniques here in order of
those that I found most to least salient in the texts:
Milieu control. This feature of thought-reform includes taking over the entire
social milieu through manipulation and control of bodies and their environment such as
controlling food, rest, time structure and human communication. The military structure
almost by definition involves milieu control (e.g., uniforms, set schedule, strict adherence
to military procedures, rules of engagement, leaders dole out resources and set sleep and
eating shifts). Prior to Battlemind it is likely the platoon already experienced milieu
control in other trainings (e.g., boot camp), and thus soldiers were already primed to
respond as a group rather than as individuals to the Battlemind pre-deployment training. I
was interested in how thought-reform was continued in the Battlemind psychological
training and debriefing over and above the general milieu structure of the military.
The first aspect of milieu control I identified was that attending Battlemind
trainings and debriefing was not optional. Battlemind was designed as a preventative
treatment for PTSD, sleep problems and depression for the Solider Comprehensive
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Fitness Program and was required for all recruits before deployment. Similarly, the intheatre Battlemind debriefings were required on deployment and often occurred on a set
schedule (Adler, Castro, et al., 2009). Given the absence of the words treatment, trauma
and PTSD in the Battlemind and the euphemisms for emotional reactions to war (e.g.,
Battlemind injury; see also thought-terminating clichés in Table 6), its unclear if soldiers
could gain awareness that they were attending a mandatory psychological training and
preventative treatment (cf. Heller’s (1988) secrecy).
The second aspect of milieu control that I identified was the requirement that
every person with which the solider has regular contact when deployed (i.e., leaders,
fellow warriors and spouses) was required to take a Battlemind training. This is a key
feature of creating in-group mentality with milieu thought-reform and distancing of
outsiders. By ensuring that the recruit will only have contact with those who have
undergone similar indoctrination processes they will be more likely to adhere to and
encourage the principles promoted in Battlemind. For example, the adage of “Battlemind
Check (Self & Buddy)” was repeated on every slide in the Warrior post-deployment
training (over 30 times in the hour long training); the message was that retention of
Battlemind and awareness of problems is the responsibility of first yourself, then one’s
assigned buddy. The buddy’s job was to help remind the warrior about the principles of
Battlemind. If the buddy somehow failed to address the warriors’ problem and convince
them to seek help, the soldiers were provided with a list of contacts, ranging from
therapists to chaplains, to talk to; none of the persons on the list were outside of the
military organization and culture and all had received Battlemind training.
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The dispensing of existence and doctrine over person. Dispensing of existence
indoctrination involves simulating the fear of extinction such that deviating from training
or attempting to leave the training suggests a life-or-death scenario. In doctrine over
person, the organization creates situations in which it respects and values its doctrine and
objectives more than individuals of the organization. This can lead to situations where the
brutalization of the individual is condoned or even encouraged (e.g., an individual’s
suffering may be attributed to misapplication or doubting of the group’s doctrine). In the
Battlemind trainings these two techniques were used in tandem. Deviating from the frame
of the Battlemind trainings was defined as leading to a potential safety risk or life or
death scenario (dispensing of existence) and those who did so were seen as not absorbing
the principles appropriately and being uncourageous (doctrine over person). On the other
hand, those who did die courageously by adhering to the principles of Battlemind were
seen as sacrificing their personal goals for the goals of the military, and ultimately for the
freedom of the country (doctrine over person). Either way death was explained according
to the doctrine or as ultimately due to the acceptance or rejection of the principles in the
Battlemind training.
In both the pre- and post-deployment training examples there was emphasis on
preventing death through engaging one’s Battlemind. The following quotations from the
Battlemind training for leaders demonstrated how the psychologist trainers instruct the
leaders to create an environment of dispensing existence. The quotations are presented in
the order they appeared in the training manual texts:
The first objective of Battlemind training is to prepare Warriors mentally for
rigors of combat and other military deployment…The final objective is to prepare
Warriors to possibly deploy again in support of all types of military operations
including additional combat tours. (WRAIR 2008a, pp. 4-6)
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The worst days are going to test your Battlemind- Your inner strength to face fear
and adversity in combat with courage. (WRAIR 2008a, p. 11)
If you don’t drive on, if you get stuck on decisions that you’ve made and feel
guilty about them, what will happen the next time you need to make a decision.
You’re probably going to freeze. And what’s the problem with freezing? What
may happen? People can get killed or injured. If you end up second-guessing the
decisions you made remember this training and focus on what you’ve learned.
Watch out for each other and encourage each other to get past the secondguessing, the guilt. Trust your training, trust your leaders, trust your buddies.
(WRAIR 2008a, p. 20)
These quotations demonstrate how the trainers build a progressive argument for
dispensing of existence as the training progresses. The argument demonstrated in the
quotations above can be summarized: 1) Battlemind is needed for protection in battle and
for possible redeployment (if you don’t attend you won’t be protected); 2) You will have
times when you will want to go home, but staying is considered courageous and your
Battlemind will protect you (if you try leave you will not be considered courageous so
strengthen your Battlemind now); and, 3) If you feel guilty about participating in war or
killing someone this could lead to freezing and eventual death (don’t think morally; don’t
second guess your Battlemind or you will die).
In the post-deployment training there was continued emphasis on not feeling guilt
or second-guessing their training and participation in war. The following quote focused
on what was referred to as “driving on” while feeling grief:
It’s 3 to 4 months since you’ve been back. Should you still be grieving? [Trainer:
Listen for/say: yes.] But if that grief or guilt is keeping you from enjoying your
life then you may need to get help. … It’s easy to say in hindsight to second-guess
your decision or the decisions of others. With the info you had at the time, would
you make the same decision? Probably yes. It’s learning from your decisions
without second guessing them that’s important. […] If you’re feeling so much
grief that you can’t be happy or appreciate life then you may need to go get help
(WRAIR, 2006a, p. 36-37).
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The post-deployment training continued by suggesting that the soldier’s “dead
buddies” would not want them to obsess about their actions, “Don’t allow your survival
guilt to destroy you. Your buddy would want you to drive on... If you could have gone
back to the day before your buddy died and [asked], ‘What if you died? Would you want
me to drive on?’ He’d say yes... Remember the fallen and live a life worthy of their
sacrifices” (WRAIR, 2006b). The emphasis in these sections was on adhering to the skills
learned in pre-deployment training and “driving on.” Driving on was a euphemism for
not thinking morally or at all about the war. After presenting several scenarios in which
the soldiers should “drive on” without thinking about consequence of their actions, the
trainers were then asked to “prompt for survivor guilt” and to elicit stories from the group
when they lost a comrade. The trainer then was to prompt the soldiers’ to give their
buddies “a head’s up before [they] go on about second-guessing” (WRAIR 2008a, p. 20)
because it could risk their life.
Overall, dispensing of existence was utilized in the pre-deployment trainings to
ensure that the soldiers absorbed the Battlemind doctrine (lest their Battlemind became so
weak, lacking courage and ambivalent that it leads to death) and that soldiers continued
to retain a mentality of “driving on” and “not second guessing” when questioning the
military or their participation in the war after they have returned from deployment. Those
who did second-guess suggested to be weak or problematic to the military.
While it is undoubtedly true that the threat to the soldiers’ life exists while
deployed, the element of thought-reform that was utilized in this part of the training was
the claim that the threat of death was more likely if the solider engaged in thinking,
doubting or experiencing any guilt about their actions in war. The message to the soldiers
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reiterated throughout the training was that they were also responsible for making sure
their buddy-comrades did not think about the morality of participating in war in order to
prevent the buddy’s death.
A final example of doctrine over person occurred when Battlemind rationalized
the suffering of the platoon and deaths of soldiers who did not second-guess and who
adhered to the Battlemind principles. The idea of an honorable death by adhering to
Battlemind principles and fighting for ones country was promoted in the final sentence of
the last post-deployment training, “Freedom is free for most Americans. But not for you
all. Everyone of you has made serving your country a personal priority and you’ve made
the sacrifices. Most American’s won’t make that sacrifice. So be proud of your service”
(WRAIR, 2006b, p. 30).
The demand for purity. The demand for purity involves creating an idealized or
perfect model to strive for in such a way that members never feel satisfied or competent;
this aspect of thought-reform increases reliance on the group leader and the official
ideology to guide the members. I interpreted there to be two primary idealized models
promoted in Battlemind: the mentally strong warrior solider who is unaffected by war
and the solider who gets helps for his problems. I refer to these models as the Battlemind
Warrior and Audie Murphy Solider respectively.
The ideal of the Battlemind Warrior was emphasized in the pre-deployment
trainings as a solider who continues to exude mental toughness in the face war. Examples
of the Battlemind Warrior ideal were represented in quotations like, “Deployments can
strengthen your Battlemind” (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 15), “You guys are tough. There is no
doubt about that. You are physically and mentally tough. You’ll be able to handle what
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the enemy throws at you” (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 26). In a slide titled “What a warrior
should know and do” the first instruction is to, “Steel your Battlemind” (WRAIR, 2008b,
p. 26) this was defined at a later part in the training to mean, “Maintain your mental
toughness, meet challenges head on, be confident, take calculated risks and maintain
positive thinking during times of adversity and challenge” (WRAIR, 2008b, p. 30).
The post-deployment trainings, emphasized the ideal of a solider who is mentally
tough but also knows when to seek help—the Audie Murphy Solider, which I previously
described in the section: Valorization of the Enterprising Self (pp. 397-399).
Both the Battlemind Warrior and the Audie Murphy Solider present masculine
archetypes, similar to those that Arkin and Dobrofsky (1978) described in their analysis
of military recruitment. 59 They wrote about how the military is designed to re-capitulate
the lifecycle where boys enter as a skinned-head recruit, attend warrior initiation, and for
some, leave the military as men—badged and rewarded in retirement. Arkin and
Dobrofsky’s thesis was that for soldiers between the ages of 17 and 20, a time period
often seen as the transition between adolescence and adulthood, the military creates an
environment for formation of a masculine military identity that is so powerful that
soldiers are unable to give up this identity during the transition back to life at home. This
leads to many of the problems that have now been identified as symptoms of PTSD (e.g.,
avoidance of relationships, anger, replaying military events).

59

Arkin and Dobrofsky (1978) identified three masculine coming-of-age archetypes that
emerged during each phase of military socialization: the heterosexual female archetype
which is to be dominated and conquered as a part of war, the team archetype in which
failing is letting down your friends and compatriots, and the family archetype in which
soldiers are prepared for ongoing separation from loved ones.
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Attaining both the ideals of the Battlemind Warrior and Audie Murphy Solider
presents an impossible bind for soldiers: the warriors should “steel their mind” (WRAIR,
2008b, p. 26), be courageous, and remain unaffected regardless of what the enemy throws
at them (e.g., drive on and don’t second guess); yet, after deployment, they are expected
to quickly recognize every reaction that they were previously asked to ignore during war
and seek help. They must somehow recognize their symptoms, alter their Battlemind, and
retain hero status. As I previously discussed, given these impossible glorified models it is
unsurprising that psychologists inform the leaders during their training that 65% of
soldiers don’t report seeking help for fear of being perceived as weak (WRAIR, 2008a, p.
55). Based on this trend, despite likely feeling the weight of confusion, guilt and
suffering after war (cf. Marin, 1981), the demand for purity prevails on the veterans.
Cushman (1989) has described the demand for purity as a major step in creating
what Lifton (1959/1989) identified as the “sacred science” and Heller (1988) called
“miracle” where the organization develops an ideology that embodies a universal truth
that is believed to be sacred, flawless and transcendent. The act of questioning, doubting
or disagreeing with the sacred science is considered to be an individual personality flaw.
In this case, because soldiers may perceive themselves as failing to meet the ideals of the
hyper-functional and masculine Battlemind Warrior and Audie Murphy Solider they
develop greater dependence on the military in hopes they will one day meet these ideals.
In turn they are less likely to question the idea that these two archetypes may represent
unattainable ideals or reject the notion that anger, confusion and other common reactions
to participating in war are due to personal failure. The demand for purity also contributes
to upholding the sacred science because soldiers may also be less likely to leave or to
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seek help from sources outside the military when distressed for fear of seeming weak or
not “man-enough.”
Loading the language. Speaking in thought-terminating clichés creates
intellectual confusion, maintains group cohesiveness, and keeps outsiders from making
meaningful contact with the group. Table 6 includes a list of clichés, jargon and
euphemisms that were repeated throughout the training. Many of the clichés represented
the moral doublethink (cf. Orwell’s 1984) that was promoted throughout the training: it is
noble, right and good to engage in warfare but it is not good or acceptable to think
critically about the morality behind decisions. The problem with thought-terminating
clichés is that the therapy contributes to creating the very symptoms, such as confusion
and avoidance, that it was designed to treat.
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Table 6
Battlemind’s Thought Terminating Clichés
Cliché

“Steel your
Battlemind”
(WRAIR, 2008b,
p. 26)

Quote of Trainer Script Surrounding One Utilization
of Cliché (Citation); Meaning

Potential Thoughts the Cliché
Terminates

“Maintain your mental toughness, meet challenges
head on, be confident, take calculated risks and
maintain positive thinking during times of adversity
and challenge” (WRAIR, 2008b, p. 30); Don’t let
war affect you.

• This experience can’t be
overcome mentally.

“Reset your
Battlemind”
(Adler et al., 2007,
p. 23; Castro,
2006,
p. 17)

Reset the soldier’s Battlemind “so they can be just
as effective at home as they were in combat”
(WRAIR, 2006b, p. 2); Reset your mind and you
won’t have problems.

• It will be difficult to adjust back
home.

"Freedom isn't
free" (WRAIR,
2006b, p. 30)

"You've made the sacrifices. Most American's won't
make that sacrifice. So be proud of your service"
(WRAIR, 2006a, p. 34); Your suffering was for the
greater good and safety of society.

All of the thoughts listed in the
“What you will think during
deployment” slide (WRAIR, 2008a,
p. 19), such as:

• This will be horrific and
incomprehensible.

Taken for
Granted Assumption About
Human being
• Problems in the social world
can be guarded against or
prevented through fortifying
the mental world.

• I shouldn’t or can’t do this.

• I don’t think my problems can be
fixed.

• No one will notice the sacrifices I
have made
• I've wasted my life here.
• There doesn't seem to be a point
to this.

• The mind is like a computer
that can be programmed and
deprogrammed.
• Suffering caused from war and
violence can be overcome
with mental skill.
• We are free because of war
and the sacrifices of soldiers.
• Killing is a necessary evil to
ensure safety.
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Table 6 (continued)
Battlemind’s Thought Terminating Clichés
"Drive on" (WRAIR,
2006b; WRAIR, 2008a,
p. 20)

“Don’t allow your survival guilt to destroy you. Your buddy would want
you to drive on. …If you could have gone back to the day before your
buddy died and [asked], ‘What if you died? Would you want me to drive
on?’ He’d say yes…Remember the fallen and live a life worthy of their
sacrifices” (WRAIR, 2006b); Don’t allow yourself to feel guilty.

• This was wrong.
• I am devastated.
• I did something
wrong.
• The war was
wrong.

• It is not good to
think critically
about the morality
behind decisions.
• Veterans that died
in war just want
you to be happy.

• I need to mourn
my friend.
• I am angry.
“Azimuth Check” or
“Buddy Check”

“Most places where you’ll be back home, you don’t have to make an
immediate decision this is the time to turn to your buddy and get an
azimuth check” (WRAIR, 2008a, p. 13); Stop and check the map before
you act.

• This can’t be
figured out with
my buddy.

• Problems in life
have concrete
answers.

• This problem
doesn’t have a
map.

• Your buddy has the
solution to
problems.

• I don’t know how
to think about this.
“No secondguessing”
(WRAIR,
2006a, p. 3637).

“It’s easy to say in hindsight to second-guess your decision or the
decisions of others. With the info you had at the time, would you make
the same decision? Probably yes. […] If you’re feeling so much grief that
you can’t be happy or appreciate life then you may need to go get help”
(WRAIR, 2006a, p. 36-37); If you aren’t happy post-deployment
something could be wrong.

• I don’t think I
made the right
decision.
• Something was
wrong here.
• I am sad about
what I did/what I
have participated
in.

• If you could go
back in time you
would do the same
thing again.
• Thinking can lead
to unhappiness.
• Thinking is a form
of uncertainty.
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Exemplar discussion: Battlemind creates the warrior cult. Overall, the
Battlemind training texts contained many elements of thought-reform that have been
previously identified as part of cult or restrictive organization thought-reform techniques.
The aim of the pre-deployment trainings was similar to that described by Lifton (1973):
to indoctrinate the soldiers into the warrior cult and the ethic of killing without secondguessing ones actions. The indoctrination process contained in Battlemind (and also
utilized in other aspects of the Army’s Basic Training) breaks down the recruits old
identities and commitments and reinvents them as violent soldiers—warriors, in the
vernacular of the military. The aim of the post-deployment training was to deprogram or
alter the dysfunctional Battlemind so veterans can integrate into society happily and
ignore or eliminate guilt and confusion that they are likely to experience post-deployment
(symptoms that are similar to those experienced after leaving a cult [West, 1993]).
Table 5 suggests that what is traumatizing about returning from war is not just the
experience of war, but also the experience of having been indoctrinated into the warrior
class and “arming your mind” through Battlemind. The therapy actually contributes to if
not creates the trauma by preparing the soldiers to accept the skills (Column 1, Table 5),
the ethics and values of what I have referred to as the warrior cult. The second training
would not be necessary if not for the first training. Thus the pre-and post-training
exemplify how iatrogenic traumatic illness can be created. First, the training principles
are instituted as a way of being (i.e., arming the Battlemind), then the veterans’ continued
participation in this way of being is reinterpreted as a set of pathological symptoms (i.e.,
PTSD or Battlemind that is not adapted to the home zone). Once framed as symptoms,
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the soldier’s experience is subject to the clinical gaze (cf. Foucault) of cognitive
reframing, thought-replacement, and dissociative strategies; these strategies are contained
Battlemind debriefings as well as in CBT and EMDR treatments that veterans may be
referred to post-deployment (after completing the DD Form 2900). The concerning
consequences of extending the clinical gaze to this iatrogenic set of trauma symptoms
include that the social, political and emotional depth of veteran’s experience in war and
the moral questions these experience pose to our society are erased, separated from the
veteran’s personhood, and re-conceptualized as something to be managed, contained and
monitored.
We must also remember that one of the primary stated goals of the Battlemind
training is to prepare soldiers for re-deployment—not just integration home, “The first
objective of Battlemind training is to prepare Warriors mentally for rigors of combat and
other military deployment… The final objective is to prepare Warriors to possibly deploy
again in support of all types of military operations including additional combat tours”
(WRAIR, 2008a, pp. 4-6). Thus, if soldiers develop dependency on their group, adhere to
the training, and report problems only within their group there is higher likelihood of the
solider being interested in or capable of re-deployment. In short, the post-deployment
training ensures that the soldiers are interested in redeployment to retain group cohesion
and do not question their responsibility or feel moral pain (cf. Marin) in such a way that
they might leave the group, or worse- take action against the military or contribute to
political discussions about their experience in the war.
What perhaps is telling of the U.S. military’s awareness of the damage that
Battlemind can cause, including the use thought-reform techniques, is the explicit need to
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reset the soldier’s Battlemind in the post-deployment training; the post-deployment
training acknowledges that the beliefs and behaviors that the military instills under the
banner of surviving war are highly dysfunctional outside of group membership and
deployment. Thus, the Battlemind training itself becomes what is traumatizing about
participating in war—the training that prepares soldiers to learn and accept an ethic of
killing in the warrior class with no recourse for thinking or discussing this ethic. The
trainings ignore the political context that causes the suffering and suggest that traumatic
symptoms are an anomalous (pathogenic) occurrence or personal failure.
Previous studies that have identified cult-like features of psychological
interventions have questioned the role of psychologists in these types of therapies, their
responsibility to prevent harm and whether such trainings should even be considered a
form of psychotherapy (e.g., Cushman, 1986, 1989). As Marin (1981) pointed out in the
Vietnam War, psychiatrists’ role was perversely to keep soldiers in the mood for killing.
For Battlemind a similar interpretation could be suggested; the pre-deployment trainings
were designed by psychologists to psychologically insulate soldiers from feeling the
debilitating effects of war and questioning their role in participation. The postdeployment trainings were designed to ensure that soldiers go to therapy rather than
funnel their suffering into alternative forms of coping such as self- or societal-destruction
(or perhaps worse, anti-war activism.) Arkin and Dobrofsky (1978), West (1999), and
others have identified symptoms of leaving a cult as similar to those represented in the
DSM-IV and V PTSD diagnostic criteria.
This brings up the question: are soldiers experiencing PTSD symptoms from the
acts of war, or from having undergone these treatments before entering war? In other
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words, is the trauma of war made worse and more traumatizing by having been
indoctrinated to accept the ethics of war, cut ties to all support and families and submit
oneself to milieu control? Given the limited focus on narrative assessment of PTSD
symptoms (e.g., utilization of three item PTSD screeners), it would be impossible to
discern from the military’s assessments of PTSD if the symptoms soldiers are
experiencing are due to participation in military operations and war or also due to feeling
betrayed by their government, indoctrinated into killing, and frustrated by the lack of
ability or space to discuss any reactions to war outside of those provided in narrow PTSD
assessments.
The role of psychologists in the military has been a point of tension and confusion
for the field of psychology (for debates on torture see, e.g., Allen et al., 2009; Gordon,
2006; Lott, 2007; Soldz, 2008; Zimbardo, 2007). Though it was beyond the scope of this
study to interview Battlemind trainers or interpret an in-person training, it can be
assumed that those psychologists who participated in Battlemind trainings were not
interested in keeping soldiers “in the mood for killing” as Marin (1981) put it, but rather
they were interested in helping veterans. What is also particularly unsettling about many
military-based trauma psychotherapy treatments is how the moral imperative to heal can
be transformed into an exercise in repeating and prolonging the trauma of war and social
denial of its consequences. How psychologists come to participate in such traumatizing
treatments (and perhaps the indoctrination they also receive in training) is an important
area of future study.
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Battlemind Remaining Questions
How is Battlemind a good way to respond to or prevent suffering through
war? We must find a place for reflection in the midst of the terror of war and ask
ourselves as a field: how has healing and helping come to take this shape? How has
helping others come to be expressed through a PowerPoint training that teaches thoughtreplacement? Is Battlemind a good way to respond to or to prevent suffering and war?
When considering the historical evolution of trauma treatments in the military
since the Vietnam War one can notice how the technologies identified in the Battlemind
exemplars (e.g., assessments and forms) have continued to evolve to an alarming level of
efficient proceduralism from Young’s (1995) description of inpatient psychoanalytic
treatment with in-depth clinical interviews at the VA to the recent (2013) utilization of a
three-item PTSD screener in the PDHRA. These technologies have assisted in insulating
psychologists from reflection and the kind of moral questions we should be asking about
the industry of trauma healing; they have distanced not just the therapists, but society as a
whole from facing with what veterans actually experience and feel. The unarticulated and
dissociated form of political and social suffering that we are experiencing in a climate of
war is further repressed and denied when trainings like Battlemind locate this suffering in
the form of an individual, internal disorder that can only be adjusted through thoughtreplacement in the dyad and in the confines of therapy rooms and forms. Yet this type of
therapy is seen as somehow helpful and good.
From my perspective, the ultimate irony of Battlemind treatment is the fact that
there is a pre-deployment training to prevent PTSD, but the training is part of the trauma.
In Battlemind, the prevention of war occurs in the mind, not in reality. The strong
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cognitivist ideology in Battlemind—if we arm the soldier’s mind for battle we can protect
them from the trauma of war—has reached a delusional level such that killing and death
are somehow acceptable as long as their consequences can be mentally controlled for.
This is not a unique phenomenon to Battlemind trainings. As mentioned previously, the
country spends millions of dollars in funding the VA and DoD to develop PTSD
preventative treatments (Basu, 2013; Baum, 2012) as if one day we can find the science
to erase the experience of war by manipulating the mental life of soldiers. This is also
reflected in the recent surge in research to identify biomarkers of PTSD (AFPS, 2012;
Baum, 2012), psychotropic medicines like propranolol that prevent formation of memory
and psychic pain during war, and thus consequently prevent PTSD symptoms posttrauma (Fletcher, Creamer, & Forbes, 2010; Pitman & Delahanty, 2007; Pitman et al.,
2002), and most recently a 70 million dollar grant awarded to DARPA to study the
implantation of electrodes in soldiers’ brains so clinicians may monitor and stimulate the
brain in combat to prevent PTSD (Hamilton, 2014).
For a field that prizes rationality so deeply, psychology’s acceptance of the
existence of preventative PTSD treatments in the military reflects such a skewed logic
that perhaps it can best be understood as a form of dissociation or denial from the
immense suffering war brings and the ways psychological techniques assist in that
suffering. To retain the belief that conducting these trainings is actually preventing rather
than contributing to trauma, one would have to ascribe to the ethic of the executioner (cf.
Camus, 1946) and believe that war is unavoidable or necessary and can only be mitigated
in the mental and not the social world.
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What would make therapists and recruits alike attracted to Battlemind in
this historical moment? In other words, why are we choosing the prevention of war and
suffering through evidence-based trauma treatments that resemble cult indoctrination?
Numerous authors believe that cults and totalitarianism emerge when traditional values
and structures of a society are weakened and when there is a period of historical
dislocation in which there is a breakdown in human meaning and culture (Appel, 1983;
Cushman, 1986; Hochman, 1990; Lifton, 1989, 2002; M. T. Singer, 1995).
While societal concern about cults was prominent in the late 1970s and beginning
of the 1980s (the Post-Vietnam era), since then interest in and discussion of cults has
waned. Hence many of the articles about indoctrination and cults I previously reviewed
are dated pre-1990. Importantly, as concern with cults waned, obsession with PTSD and
trauma has risen. It appears as if societal focus has shifted away from trying to dismantle
the authoritative structures that indoctrinate persons, to trying to cope with the
consequences of those restrictive, authoritarian structures.
Several scholars have interpreted trauma symptoms as a reaction to the decline of
the public realm, societal isolation and cultural degeneration (Furedi, 2004; Hillman &
Ventura, 1992; Layton, 2010; Szasz, 1974). Patrick Bracken (2002) in Trauma: Culture,
meaning and philosophy wrote that trauma is a cultural trope that expresses the concerns
and fears of our time. While describing a wealth of different ways Western science has
shaped trauma discourse, Bracken asked a similar question to one at the core of this
study: Why have we become so focused on trauma since the 1990s? He wondered if the
cultural shift away from spiritual and moral ways of understanding the self has left
modern society with a no narrative to understand our lives. Perhaps the dogma of trauma
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treatments have become a way that we are able to live with and encounter the coming to
terms with the fragility or vulnerability of the self in the postmodern world (like Sass’s,
1992, perspective on psychosis)—a way that we have come to live without having to face
an explicit sociopolitical critique. Bracken asked: is trauma a culturally-specific, Western
narrative that has emerged in the wake of the loss of spiritual, moral and other traditions
of meaning making?
While trauma may be the way we understand what it is to be human in the
contemporary world, the particular attraction to a procedural expression of life at this
moment may reflect the growing uncertainty and fear of living in the world—of a
helplessness and perpetual search for answers from experts and science rather than from
within local community, moral traditions, social relationships and through dialogue with
each other.
Summary of Battlemind Psychological Debriefing and Training (Adler et al., 2007).
The picture of human being in trauma-based society presented by Battlemind was
asocial and robotic. An ethic of war, murder or killing was central to the training and the
soldier’s mission, yet was completely unmentioned or discussed other than in simplistic
terms of fighting evil. The pre-deployment trainings taught the soldiers how to ignore the
social circumstances of their world in order to fulfill the needs of the military as a
functional solider. This involved retaining mental toughness and applying Battlemind
skills such as thought-replacement, like the concept of “driving on” when experiencing
emotional suffering. Throughout the pre-deployment trainings the solider was given a
narrative about how war is actually an experience of personal growth and an opportunity
to advance in the ranks and become the ultimate warrior.
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The post-deployment trainings located the political suffering and consequences of
participating in war within the individual veteran by suggesting that soldiers can
reintegrate into life as usual post-deployment by disarming and adapting their Battlemind.
The acceptable reactions to war were framed as individual problems in which a soldier’s
brain needs to be reset in order to avoid the misapplication of Battlemind after returning
home. The Battlemind training and debriefing series suggests to veterans that they should
not expect that their struggles and reactions to war to incite public engagement. Instead,
the training suggests that veterans should respond to war stress injuries in the private
domain- as an internal wound that can be maintained with self- and buddy- monitoring.
Reactions that were considered unacceptable, and thus were not mentioned in the
training, invoked the public realm, such as seeking help outside the military, critiquing
the military, government, or the ways political structures are arranged. Other reactions
that were not mentioned in the training but are common post-deployment include severe
depression and suicide, and the less common but also devastating, homicide (e.g., Fort
Hood shootings in 2009 and 2014). It’s possible soldiers have found ways to resist
Battlemind and express suffering in different ways, but the training does not make room
for these alternatives and does not allow for reflective way of human being to come to
light.
Thought-reform techniques were described in Battlemind manuals and appeared
to have been used to ensure group dependency and adherence to the military’s ideological
guidelines. By locating the problems of OEF/OIF within the individual solider and
convincing them that they merely need to reset their mind to reintegrate into society, the
Battlemind training and debriefing series allows the military to continue the status quo of
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prolonging war without question and leaves the veteran to take a personal and isolated
responsibility for their suffering. When traumatic events are located in the individual as
an internal injury they are less likely to be considered to be a social problem;
conversations about war are subtly converted into conversations about preventing PTSD
and war stress injuries. The technologies and bureaucratic procedures utilized in
Battlemind, like attending PowerPoint trainings and filling out several DD Forms, have
also allowed for a social distance between those who participate in or standby while war
occurs; in short, these technologies have allowed murder to become depersonalized.
It is important to recognize that therapists participate in and are partially
responsible for arranging the social world in this way. When therapists create and
participate in treatments like Battlemind that localize the consequences of war in the
individual, as a disorder like PTSD or a mental injury, they do a disservice to veterans by
contributing to the government’s and public’s avoidance of responsibility for the
consequences of war and the society to which they return. While understanding how to
respond to war, and in particular to OEF/OIF is complex, the lack of social context for
trauma disorders presented in Battlemind helps to retain the delusion that psychotherapy
treatments—rather than efforts to resist war or present the social causes of war—are
preventing trauma.
Battlemind reflects such strong cognitive ideology (i.e., if we arm the soldier’s
mind for battle we can protect them from the trauma of war) that I think it has reached an
almost delusional level such that killing and death are somehow acceptable as long as
their consequences can be mentally controlled for. Battlemind could only exist in a
culture that ascribes to the ethic of the executioner (cf. Camus, 1946), in which war is
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seen as unavoidable or necessary and can only be mitigated in the mental and not the
social world. I concluded by posing moral questions about therapists’ development and
participation in PTSD preventative treatments like Battlemind.
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Paradigmatic Objects
The paradigmatic object refers Heidegger’s (1977) notion of an object in the
clearing that focuses and gives constancy to the clearing; it re-organizes the background
against which the world shows-up. Dreyfus and Wakefield (1988) explained the
paradigmatic object “opens up and organizes a multidimensional world by highlighting
crucial issues that then become the locus of conflicts of interpretation and the starting
point of history” (p. 279). Heidegger’s paradigmatic object was highly quintessential to
the culture in the way it articulates the boundaries of what it is like to be human. For
more detailed information on Heidegger’s conceptualization of the paradigmatic object
(e.g., the Athenian acropolis; see Chapter III, Method, pp. 166-168 of this study). In this
study, I identified two paradigmatic objects: the trauma treatment manual and the warrior
cult.
Paradigmatic Object 1: The Trauma Treatment Manual
To practice therapy according to a manual allows for a particular transformation
of how therapists and patients relate to each other and how they live in a trauma-based
culture. Manuals, endless forms, and the individual, managed structure of therapy can
only exist in a world in which human being requires these things. In order to think of a
world in which a trauma treatment manual exists I would like to encourage the reader to
step back for a moment and reflect on what it was like to read the totality of the result
chapters. What were the most upsetting and most comforting parts? What was the
experience of reading the scripts, viewing the figures that represented the phases of
treatments, seeing selections from the handouts, homework and forms? While reflecting
on these questions, now imagine you are a trainee therapist in your first or second year in
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a clinical psychology program and you are handed one of the three manuals that were
examined in this study. You are advised by supervisor, probably someone you admire
and trust, to read from the manual, learn and perform the therapy. This is what being a
therapist is like in contemporary trauma-based society: complex problems are responded
to with manuals, procedures, forms, and handouts. Compliance and adherence to the
manual is the starting point for most training clinicians in contemporary psychology
programs. These same messages, as I demonstrated through the interpretation of the
manuals, are communicated directly to the patient.60
I came to realize that the manuals themselves are a paradigmatic object. The
trauma treatment manuals have become a contemporary response to important political
and moral questions like: What is trauma? How can I be understood by or talk to another
person about my life experiences, especially when I am not happy? How can I continue to
participate in a world that creates so much suffering without the opportunity to study and
talk about it? These are questions we ask when our life experiences have fallen out of
everydayness and they are critical to consider in therapy. But instead of seeing these
questions as an opening and laying out of what we have taken for granted, as an

60

I imagined an alien landing on our planet asking a group of typical therapists what they
have been doing to solve the world’s problems. The therapists might hand the alien a
trauma manual or show the alien two people sitting in a room talking and exchanging
forms. They might show the alien a vignette of a boy on a playground getting bullied and
threatened with a knife, and then returning to school the next day because, the therapists
would explain to the alien, “He has changed his perception of the events in his mind”.
They might show a mother in a war zone who continues to go to work and tells her child
she can resist terrorism by repeating the mantra, “This is my home, my country, and I
will not let these few evil people chase me away or frighten me into not living a full life.”
The therapists might also show how they would go to the war zone and rescue this
mother and child by removing them from their community, placing them in separate
rooms with therapists, and waving a finger in front of their face.
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opportunity to reflect on and think about our traumatic world, the therapist responds with
a preformulated set of rules that prepetuate the neoliberal status quo—a manual. Thus,
the trauma treatment manuals instantiate how to be human in contemporary society,
through compliance with managed care and the embodiment of scientistic and cognitivist
ideology.
Paradigmatic Object 2: The Warrior Cult
I interpreted the warrior cult previously as an exemplar in the Battlemind
trainings. In the warrior cult as exemplar section, I focused on how Battlemind, in the
name of preventative trauma treatment, utilized thought-reform techniques to indoctrinate
Army recruits into a violent, ideologically restrictive, and rigidly structured military
institution. I argued that these techniques were not unique to Battlemind or the U.S.
military but have been used in other restrictive organizations and practices. In this
section, I draw from my interpretation of the Battlemind manual to develop an
understanding of the warrior cult as articulating a way of being—it is a pervasive
dynamic and thus a paradigmatic object of contemporary U.S. society., I turn to focus
less on how cult indoctrination techniques are performed (described in Chapter VIII:
Battlemind Exemplar 1, pp. 423-428) and more on what it is like to live in the clearing of
the warrior cult.
The way of being that I fear contemporary society creates and idealizes is one in
which people easily assume the identity of trauma survivor: an enterprising, functional
and fiercely individual member of a warrior cult. In the warrior cult society, to think or
talk about social causes and public solutions to daily political suffering is thought of as
either non-germane or dangerous. In the warrior cult, individuals are seen as free from all
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dependencies and social ties, able to overcome personal and public adversity by arming
or forifying their brain and replacing thoughts in their computer-like mind. Warriors can
actualize their inherent potential by conceptualizing the world and relationships as
resources to propell the enterprising self forward (cf. Binkley, 2011). The world is seen
as structural and ulitilitarian; it can be known, studied, managed, owned, categorized and
used. Acceptance of ambiguity, social connection, reflection, feeling stuck or restful, and
thinking historically and politically are seen as impediments to actualizing the self,
embracing positivity, and achieving happiness in the warrior cult. Suffering from
complex, chronic, daily or even minor political strife is seen as a target for reduction.
Discussing suffering from a political, moral or historical angle is seen as overwhelming,
threatening, and confusing.
The language of trauma in the warrior cult serves to obscure political
understanding and flatten specific, local, cultural, and personal expressions of distress
that subvert or call into question the status quo of social arrangements that benefit those
who profit from neoliberal society. Thus when events happen that causes the world to
fall out of everdayness such that one questions participation in that type of society (e.g.,
one’s responsibility in creating suffering for others and their desire to connect to others),
the members of a warrior cult society may find themselves confused or unable to discuss
this phenomenon. They are encouraged—by society at large but in particular by
therapists—to turn to the language of trauma and the manual-based procedures they have
been taught in order to reduce political and moral complexity, explain political suffering
as a medical disease, and return to life as usual as an enterprising warrior self. This is

460
how the warrior cult dissociates from society’s violent ethics and practices and rejects
members who do not conform.
Thus, an important aspect of the warrior cult dynamic is that the political context
that causes the suffering is ignored, and thereby the suffering is then considered to be an
anomalous (pathogenic) occurrence or personal failure. In the case of family violence or
sexual attack, the larger sociopolitical causes of violence against women and children is
barely acknowledged and not treated as a realistic subject that can be understood and
successfully defeated. In the case of the suffering of soldiers returning from war zones,
the larger context that initially caused the violent behavior ⎯ that is, the indoctrination
centers on the techniques that turn civilians into soldiers and the national politics that
pursues colonial occupations and counter-insurgency tactics as part of a global strategy of
neoliberal domination ⎯ is never questioned or identified.
Membership in the warrior cult is aspirational and common sensical given the
current arrangement of the social world; however, therapists play a significant role in
retaining and promoting this way of being through their practices of healing the
traumatized self. As I came to realize in this study, therapists can contribute to
indoctrinating their patients into the warrior cult by following evidence-based manualized
trauma treatments that suggest particular ways that humans should be good trauma
survivors (e.g., the TF-CBT child-patient must erase the trauma and act age
appropriately, EMDR patients must repair their self-image until all positive cognitions
are completely true, and the Battlemind warrior must drive on and repress moral pain).
Indoctrination into the warrior cult in therapy occurs in a range of ways from promoting
psychoeducation that is imbued with cognitivist ideology (cf. Sampson, 1981) to enacting
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thought-reform techniques in the therapy room (cf. Lifton 1959/1989; Cushman, 1986,
1989). I believe that it is likely therapists are also indoctrinated into the warrior cult via
their education, trainings, and utilization of manuals that perscribe this way of being.
Thus both therapists and their patients may at times experience being like
members of a warrior cult society, but for those who are successfully indoctrinated,
membership in the cult is the solution to healing trauma and not the problem. Though
there is tension to recognize the realities of daily political suffering, and perhaps give in
to the malaise that has come to represent neoliberal life (cf. Layton, 2010), it is also
possible that members of the warrior cult society may become so feverently devoted to
regimes of thought-replacement and rejection of moral conversations (e.g., Battlemind’s
“driving on”) that they do not sense these problems and desperately strive to be happily
ignorant. Others may feel confused and traumatized by the contemporary way of being in
the warrior cult, but it will be less obvious that the therapies they learn and participate in
prepetuate this way of being. They may feel unable to resist or talk about why the cult is
problematic, especially because the ideals of the functional trauma survivor are held so
highly and the language of trauma is so widely accepted as an expression of social
distress (cf. Haaken, 1995).
In a warrior cult society, patients and therapists are unable to articulate that there
is a lack of social support for thinking politically and historically. Therapists may not
question the role psychotherapy has played in creating an isolationist, hyperindividualized and compliant way of being—a way of being that cannot hold political and
moral discussions about the causes of suffering in the world. These thoughts do not come
to light in the warrior cult. Instead, the patient and therapist will feel tired, confused,
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depressed, avoidant and possibly experience a range of symptoms that psychology has
come to label as PTSD, secondary traumatic stress or compassion fatigue, but that other
scholars have recognized as also related to cult indoctrination (Appel, 1983; Cushman,
1986; Lifton, 1989; West, 1993). Given the complusion to retain the ideals of the
enterprising self in the warrior cult, this malaise only strengthens dissociation from daily
political suffering, and a commitment to therapy and a cognitivist lifestyle.
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Conclusion
In this study, I interpreted the concept of trauma as a way of being human and as a
taken for granted way of expressing enactments of dissociated, unformulated or
unarticulated political arrangements and events in contemporary U.S. culture. In a more
general sense, I treated the concept of trauma through my interpretation of evidencebased trauma treatment manuals as a system of references to historical discourse and
traditions that were relevant to contemporary life. The purpose of my study was to
interpret the world that gives rise to and maintains distinctions like victims, survivors,
perpetrators, rescuers, PTSD, trauma burden and traumatic stress—a trauma culture.
Through thinking about trauma from a historical, philosophical and moral perspective, I
described insights about how people think and act in trauma culture as they were
reflected and reproduced in three widely used evidence-based trauma treatment manuals.
I argued that it is not enough to simply realize and identify that trauma abounds in the
social world, and thus an aim of my study was to describe how contemporary society
identifies and understands trauma, to interpret what it means, what it stands for, what it
substitutes for, and the many political meanings—especially discomforting or dangerous
political meanings—it contains. One of my primary hopes in conducting this study was
that through thinking about trauma from historical, philosophical and moral perspectives,
alternative, perhaps previously unformulated insights, about how we think and act in this
traumatized world may come to light.
In this chapter, I present the process of the hermeneutic interpretation known as
reconstruction (Stigliano, 1989; see Figure 2). I first summarize the interpretations that I
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previously described in the results and discussion chapters and then re-approach my
foregrounded assumptions, and discuss limitations and areas for future inquiry.
Summary of Intepretation of TF-CBT, EMDR, and Battlemind Treatment Manuals
Each of the three previous chapters were devoted to the findings and discussion
for the three evidence-based trauma treatment manuals: Cohen et al.’s (2006) child TFCBT manual, Shapiro’s (2001) EMDR manual, and the Battlemind Debriefing and
Training series (WRAIR, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008a, 2008b), as well as their associated
supplementary texts (see Table 2). I decided to analyze treatment manuals because they
are an integral component of contemporary psychotherapy. Studying the messages
embedded in these manuals and thinking about the world that gave rise to them was
imperative given their increasing utilization and the continued cultural focus on trauma,
especially within the U.S. but increasingly internationally since the 1980s. The manuals
communicated important messages about what constitutes a good way to be human and
how people should act socially and politically within this traumatized and traumatizing
world. How therapy is being conceived, trained, practiced and exported across the world
has been increasingly determined by a manual rather than mentorship and supervision;
what constitutes good therapy and what it means to be disordered and healed was
represented in these texts.
Summary of shared themes. I identified the following shared themes across all
three manuals and provided quotations of examples of each theme that I identified.
Shared theme 1: Mind-brain as protector and the political use of cognitivist
ideology. All of the manuals predicated therapy on three interrelated assumptions: 1) you
can change the world by changing your mind, 2) when you change your mind you change
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your brain; and, 3) your brain and mind can protect you from trauma (i.e., if you have
inner safety, you are safe and thus the world is safe). Following Sampson (1981), I
argued that the main problem with these assumptions is that they create a confusion
between shifts in individual subjectivity and shifts in the social world, which can
ultimately result in no change to the status quo of existing political problems and
arrangements of power and domination. When a cognitivist ideology prevails in
psychology, people accept—in fact strive for—changes in their subjective experience
instead of changes in their material reality, thus allowing existing arrangements of power
and domination to occur. In this sense evidence-based trauma treatments, while
performing cognitivist ideology in the guise of healing, serve to maintain the isolationist
status quo in neoliberal society: by shifting the way we perceive the world we overlook
the need to change it and the need to turn to each other to make meaning of and address
social problems. In a world in which cognitive psychology is dominant, the necessity to
change the material arrangement of the social world does not come to light.
Shared Theme 1 highlighted various conceptualizations of what human being is
like in trauma culture, and from a hermeneutic perspective, how contemporary social
practices have come to constitute a particular version of the self. Cushman (2013)
suggested that the reason that patients accept the practices suggested by evidence-based
treatments, like TF-CBT, is not that they are mandated or are better than other practices
but that they “fit hand-in-glove with the predominant self of the early 21st century. They
seem to mainstream therapists and researchers to be unquestioningly correct because they
speak the predominant language of our time” (p. 2). Given the cognitivist ideology
presented in this theme, the contemporary self is seen as constituted through a scientific
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framework. Hacking (1998) argued that the notion of soul has been replaced with
memory and moral behavior that has become naturalized in the sciences (almost
hardwired in the brain) rather than contingent on a relationship with the Devine. The idea
of placing the brain rather than the socially embedded human in therapy has been
identified by Nikolas Rose (2008) as reflective of a shift in contemporary culture that
understands human beings as “neurochemical selves,” in whom variations in mood,
emotions, desires and thoughts are reduced to variations in brain chemicals. Rose
discussed how health is a central ethical principle in contemporary society and has
recently taken the shape of “somatic individuality” in which the self is understood in
terms of biological health, “we understand ourselves, speak about ourselves and act upon
ourselves as the kind of beings whose characteristics are shaped by our biology” (p. 480).
The shift to a neurochemical self has allowed society to become amenable to economies
of vitality where health care corporations and insurance companies can profit from
manipulating different parts of the healthy self by marketing and selling treatments that
link social ills to discreet psychological symptoms and neurochemical imbalance. When
trauma treatment research describes symptoms as residing in the brain or neurons, it
necessarily suggests that these symptoms can be manipulated through
psychopharmaceuticals and evidence-supported psychotherapies, like TF-CBT, that
target brain function.
Shared theme 2: Neoliberalism in trauma therapy: The healed trauma survivor
as functional worker. In all of the manuals, trauma was understood as a major source of
undermining neoliberal functionality and thus the aim of therapy was to restore
functionality in this system, like encouraging the patient to return to work or school.
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There were three primary assumptions in the manuals that were a reflection of neoliberal
culture: a) valorization of the enterprising self (cf. Binkley, 2011; Layton, 2010; Rose, N.
S., 2007), b) the acontextualized nature of trauma in neoliberal trauma therapy (Layton,
2006), and c) the privileging of modular, efficient therapy designed for managed care
(Cushman & Gilford, 2000). The way of human being that was reflected and reproduced
by these manuals is so amenable to management and managed care that the therapist’s
and patient’s daily life and practices reflect decision trees and symptom monitoring
technologies (e.g., SUDS, worksheets, electronic charting).
Following the interpretation of the manuals developed in this study, what it means
to be a good human in trauma culture is to respond to upsetting, confusing and violent
social and political events by going to therapy and accepting the interpretation that
understands symptoms as uncomplicated, asocial, and acultural, symptoms that align with
the cognitivist psychoeducational trauma narrative about PTSD. In this world, the patient
comes to present their political distress in such a way that their symptoms are amenable
to the specific structure and assumptions of managed care, evidence-based therapies,
which ultimately serve the needs of insurance companies and the state, not the patient or
their community. For example, the practices of restricting anger and reframing responses
to political events as erroneous fantasies or pathological anomalies have existed in
different forms historically (see e.g., Cushman, 1995; Foucault, 1995; Marin, 1995).
Now these practices have become an integral part of therapy to such a degree that they
are viewed as benign or even helpful rather than as restrictive, isolating, or promoting a
politicized cognitivist ideology that has a hand in silencing dissent.
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Shared theme 3: Trauma is universal and culture-free (versus tied to a U.S.,
Western, white, and middle-class context). In all three manuals, trauma was presented
as a universal human experience that could be treated following the same culture-free
treatment manual. I divided examples of this theme into the following categories: a)
trauma symptoms are tied to universally experienced organ malfunction (e.g., brain
problems); b) a flattening of all events, local experiences, and narratives of suffering to
diagnostic criteria for PTSD and the word “trauma” or “traumatic events,” c) the
technique of thought-terminating clichés (cf. Lifton, 1989) about cultural competency;
and d) exclusion of forms of suffering from the definition of trauma that are not from a
U.S., Western, white, and middle-class context.
The manuals reduced the unique, personal and culturally-specific expressions of
trauma through the process of standardized assessment (e.g., counting total traumas,
symptoms checklists), applying the word “trauma” to all life experiences that involved
suffering, not eliciting trauma narratives or re-writing the end of the trauma narrative as
necessarily positive and happy, and the lack of acknowledgement of the specific cultural
context (e.g., U.S., middle-class, white) that was embedded in and reproduced by the
manuals’ scripts and structure. The manuals suggested that trauma therapy functioned
optimally regardless of the national, racial, cultural, and ethnic background of the patient
in order to alleviate suffering world wide. When considering the exclusion of non- U.S.,
white, middle-class persons from the label of traumatized that Leary (2005), Fine (2012),
and Gone (2007) discussed, it was striking how universalization and inclusivity was often
emphasized in the manuals and yet this act’s assumed inclusivity became a form of
assimilation and colonization.
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I argued that the developers of manualized trauma treatments benefit from
universalizing trauma and seeing the treatment as culture-free because it allowed their
manual and protocols to be used in a wide-range of settings and countries. On a political
level, when personal narratives of trauma are disappeared or flattened (and thus amenable
to a one-size fits all treatment), it makes responding to disasters and crises much easier:
train therapists in a treatment manual and send affected persons to therapy. Thus it is not
only the developers but also those who wish to retain the status quo of political and
power arrangements who benefit from broad applications of the word trauma and
manualized treatments.
Summary of shared exemplar. I also identified one shared exemplar in all three
of the manuals.
Shared exemplar: Indoctrination into a social void of scientistic managed care.
The shared exemplar, which I titled, “indoctrination into a social void of scientistic
managed care,” had four primary features: presentation of an origin myth; locating
pathology and healing within the dyad; overreliance on forms, hand-outs and
PowerPoints; and directive psychoeducation and thought-replacement. This exemplar
described the techniques and technologies that reflect and perpetuate a particular way of
being. The techniques (i.e., origin myths, location of healing in the dyad, forms and
handouts, and directive psychoeducation) are all ways that messages about how to be a
good human are communicated by therapists serving in the role of expert in
contemporary society. These practices rely on subtle assumptions about patients, such as
that they do not know what they have experienced and need to be educated about their
symptoms; these assumptions have associated moral implications and political functions.
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The social understandings about the causes of trauma cannot come to light within
the manuals. The patient is encouraged by the therapy to present as a particular type of
traumatized human whose symptoms emerge within the dyad, whose symptoms fall
within a cognitivist understanding of PTSD that gives primacy to the individual and the
interior self, and can easily fit within a modular, predetermined checklist. Following this
way of human being, the self is compliant, easy to make sense of, and readily adaptable
or even replaceable in the moment (e.g., one can change one’s thoughts like switching
channels on the TV). For example, in each manual the patient was prescribed a range of
treatment modules. In one module, the therapy describes, elicits and accepts a type of self
that is deeply emotional (e.g., trauma narrative exposure) and in another module the
patient is expected to restrain and shut off emotions and thoughts as needed (e.g., thought
stopping, emotional regulation). The way of human being that is reflected and reproduced
by the manuals is highly compliant, performative, and modular. It is so amenable to
management and managed care that the therapist and patient’s daily life and practices
reflect the decision trees and symptom monitoring technologies (e.g., SUDS, worksheets,
electronic charting) that are used in the treatment planning (cf. N. S. Rose’s (2007)
economy of the neurochemical self).
What it means to be human according to the manuals is to respond to upsetting,
confusing and violent social and political events by going to individual therapy and
embodying uncomplicated, asocial, acultural symptoms that align with the cognitivist
psychoeducational trauma narrative about PTSD. According to my interpretation of the
manuals, the patient should come to present daily political distress in such a way that
their symptoms are amenable to the specific structure and assumptions of managed care
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(e.g., can be quantitatively monitored in therapy for both clinical and administrative
purposes). Thus evidence-based therapies ultimately serve the needs of insurance
corporations and not the patient or their community.
Summary of specific themes and exemplars. After presenting shared themes
and exemplars, I discussed some specific themes and exemplars present in each one of
the three manuals. For the Cohen et al., (2006) manual, I described the following themes:
children are born with pre-traumatic innocence, children are not sexual, children have no
agency during traumatic events, and parents are protectors or perpetrators. I also
described the specific exemplar of the benevolent restriction of angry responses to
political events via therapy. For the Shapiro (2001) manual, I described the specific
theme of the grandiosity and mania of EMDR. For Battlemind, I described the specific
exemplar of Battlemind creating the warrior cult. In contrast to the paradigmatic object
where I described what human being is like in the warrior cult, in the specific exemplar I
described the process of how the warrior cult is created through therapy.
Summary of questions. After presenting my interpretation of these specific
themes and exemplars I asked questions about why trauma and human being was
presented in the specific way that it was in each of these manuals at the moment of the
respective manual’s creation. For the TF-CBT manual, I wondered why the traumatic self
was represented as a destroyed child innocent. For the EMDR manual, I wondered about
the constitution of the contemporary self that would accept a therapy that can be so selfcentered. For Battlemind, I wondered if the treatment was an important part in creating
the trauma. Broadly, I asked questions about how has healing and helping come to take
this shape (i.e., how helping others has come to be expressed through a PowerPoint
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training that teaches thought-replacement). I also wondered if Battlemind was a good
way to respond to or prevent suffering from war.
Summary of paradigmatic objects. Finally, I presented two paradigmatic
objects: trauma treatment manuals and the warrior cult.
Paradigmatic Object 1: The trauma treatment manual. I suggested that trauma
treatment manuals have become a contemporary response to important political and
moral questions. Instead of seeing these questions as an opening and laying out of what
we have taken for granted, as an opportunity to reflect on and think about this traumatic
world, I argued that trauma treatment manuals imply that a good way to be human in
contemporary society is to respond to these questions with a preformulated set of rules
that prepetuate the neoliberal status quo.
Paradigmatic Object 2: The warrior cult. I presented the warrior cult as a
traumatic way of being that I feared contemporary society embodies and idealizes, in
which the populations aspires to be trauma survivors who are enterprising, functional,
and fiercely individual members of a warrior cult. In the cult, members disavow society’s
violent ethics and practices. It is seen as confusing and at worst dangerous to think or talk
about social causes and public solutions to daily political suffering. Membership in the
warrior cult is aspirational and common sensical given the current arrangements of the
social world; however, therapists play a significant role in indoctrinating and promoting
this way of being through the practices of healing the traumatized self. As I came to
realize in this study, therapists can contribute to indoctrinating their patients into the
warrior cult by following evidence-based manualized trauma treatments that suggest
particular ways that humans should be good trauma survivors (e.g., the TF-CBT child-
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patient must erase the trauma and act age appropriately, the EMDR patients must repair
their self-image until all positive cognitions are completely true, and the Battlemind
warrior must drive on and repress moral pain).
Study Limitations and Future Directions
The primary limitation of my study was my interest in how the text engages in and
shapes practice and lived experience, yet I did not actually witness or interview therapists
and patients about how they engaged with the manual in therapeutic practice. Thus, this
study lays the groundwork for future investigation into the practices of evidence-based
training of trauma treatment manuals. I am particularly interested in the experiences of
early carreer psychologists, therapists, and young trainees as they approach the field with
an overwhelming desire to help and are directed to evidence-based treatment manuals. I
am interested in how these trainees comply with or resist trainings and what it means to
them to be a trauma-focused therapist (e.g., what does it look like to be a good trauma
therapist).
The order in which I approached the interpretation of texts had a particular
influence on the way I interpreted each manual. After interpreting the first manual (TFCBT) I had refined my conceptual map and themes such that by the time I approached the
second manual (EMDR) I was already identifying and expanding upon these lines of
inquiry. Then by the time I analyzed Battlemind I was struck by the exemplar of the
warrior cult, which I hadn’t thought about when interpreting the first two manuals. If I
had analyzed these manuals in a different order it is likely I would have had a slightly
different intepretation, namely in that what I selected as a shared theme or exemplar may
have been different. After completing the final results and discussion chapters I
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contemplated returning to the interpretation again with a final conceptual map. I wanted
to collapse a few of the specific themes into the warrior cult exemplar and perhaps
identify specific themes in all of the manuals. Though it is likely that these revisions
would have made for a more elegant study, I did not reapproach my interpretation with
fewer themes because I was reminded of the cyclical and seemingly never ending nature
of hermeneutic interpretation. Because hermeneutic interpretation is always incomplete, I
can re-enter the circle again in another, future study. Perhaps this is not a limitation of the
current study, but it is worth awknowledging when considering future investigation.
Revisitation of Foregrounding
In this section of the conclusion, I return to reflect on the foregrounding of my
study (Chapter IV, pp. 167-187) and how my experience and interpretation of trauma
culture has changed through the process of this study.
When I presented the proposal for this study to colleauges at my school, some of
the initial feedback I received was a concern that thinking about trauma-culture and the
world that produced and sustains trauma treatment manuals was too broad of a topic.
Indeed, this study has spanned a wide breadth of literature—from understanding what
constitutes a child to U.S. complacency with the war in Iraq. While in many ways I
sacrificed depth and nuance to identify broader patterns, I approached the study of trauma
culture with an awareness that thinking about trauma critically is somehow
overwhelming to the field and would likely be difficult for me to conceptualize. What I
found truly interesting about my colleagues’ concern as I embarked on this study was the
urgency with which they discouraged me from approaching this question because of its
overwhelming scope; yet in everyday practice it is not overwhelming to them that trauma
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treatment manuals exist in the first place. How can there be a book that perscribes a
universal treatment for all forms of human suffering known as trauma? Utilizing a
manual that purports to provide a solution to all human experiences of trauma was
somehow less problematic for my colleagues than thinking about the world that produces
that manual.
The concern that was directed at my study, should be directed at all trauma
treatment manuals and the world that produces them. Psychotherapists should be
wondering about how one can simply approach the topic of trauma. They should be
concerned about why the field does not ask questions that are historical, political and
moral and that speculate about the treatments that therapists produce and practice. In the
case of evidence-based manuals, I think the field should be suspicious of treatments that
are seen as formulaic, acultural or universal solutions to all types of human suffering.
Some of the other reactions I found noteworthy during the process of writing this
study included those from colleagues who are engaged in what might be called
mainstream, federally funded quantiative research (e.g., persons conducting randomized
control trials funded by NIMH R01 grants). Many of them were perplexed by my topic.
They stated things like, “Oh, so your writing kind of like a book-type of dissertation, like
a philosophy one.” Some of them critiqued the inclusion of only three manuals and
particularly of the inclusion of Battlemind (e.g., How could I possibly compare two
trauma treatments to a preventative intervention and de-briefing?) Others asked questions
about what was the practical value of my study. How would I judge the quality of these
treatments? Could I make a recommendation about the best treatment? In general, the
majority of people I encountered in psychology had some discomfort with this topic but
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couldn’t seem to describe what their discomfort was, other than to talk about problems
with the scope of the topic and the interpretive methodology.
Many practicing therapists I talked to about the topic seemed to understand the
idea of the existence of a trauma-culture. Some of them shared their experiences of losing
patients because the patients wanted to find a therapist that “got trauma” or was a
“trauma specialist.” Others talked about a cultural divide at conferences in which trauma
therapists saw themselves as wearing a badge of unique sensitivity to patient problems.
Some colleagues shared my experience of EMDR training as being cult-like and
described to me their successful or unsucccesful attempts to leave training seminars and
excercises. Others, who I would characterize as EMDR evangelists, seemed pleased to
hear that the CBT approach was included in the study but were disappointed that I
included EMDR too. They (perhaps jokingly) wondered if my inclusion of both EMDR
and CBT in the same study meant that I just “hated all therapy”—as if thinking critically
about EMDR was somehow problematic or destructive to the entire field but critiquing
CBT was not.
With laypersons to whom I talked about the topic, the mention of the word trauma
instantly invoked a sense that I was doing something important. Without hearing much at
all about the study, they said things like how thankful they were that I was “looking out
for veterans” or “saving abused children.” I couldn’t help feeling the privilege of being a
psychologist in training, and the deference these people were paying to me as an expert;
deference that came with the automatic assumption that as a future psychologist, all my
endeavors must be ultimately helpful—especially because I was writing about trauma.
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During the writing phase, my school required a dissertation course in which we
are supposed to submit periodic evidence that we are actually working on our dissertation
by emailng a small group of students our weekly progress. I sent my foregrounding
chapter (Chapter IV, pp. 167-187) out to a group of students and received no response
from them. To my surprise however, the professor for the course read this section and
recounted to me her similar experiences during training in evidence-based
psychotherapies, which she characterized as extensive and adversive. She reported
feeling saddened by the direction of our field and was left wondering about the morality
of our training practices.
When I return to the foregrounded assumptions from which I approached my
study, I believe my experiences of training in evidence-based therapies were critical in
order to approach this interpretation with an awareness of how texts reflect and shape
lives. These manuals are not passive documents; they are both a prescriptive authority
(e.g., when used in therapist fidelity monitoring) and a reflection of daily social practices
that therapists and patients live out. When we engage with these texts, we are changed by
them. Thus when we are assigned to read them in our training this has an impact on how
we talk about the world, how we conduct our practice, how we conceptualize trauma and
healing. The manual assists in constituting the boundaries of our cultural clearing as
practicing psychologists.
When I compare my first encounters with these texts to my interpretation in this
study, they are quite different. The experiences learning EMDR and TF-CBT that I
outlined in Chapter IV: Foregrounding I believe were mainly characterized with an
awareness of discomfort and isolation—a feeling of failure to resist the procedural,

478
hyper-individualist and cult-like elements of training. My experiences were characterized
by rejection or repression of a desire to think about how therapists participate in the
traumatic world we live in that often left me feeling angry or helpless to continue
traumatic enactments. Writing this thesis and reinterpreting these texts was filled with
somewhat similar experiences, but this time, in large part due to the support of my Chair
and Committee Members, I did not feel helpless or isolated. Instead I knew that the
interpretation process would be extremely challenging, but that it was important to think
about the difficult political and moral questions about our field and therapeutic practices;
this is one of the only ways to break the silence around how the profession might be
contributing to the social world that creates trauma.
By thinking about the interpretation of the manuals with the idea that I was in
dialogue with my Chair, Committee Members and other supportive members in the
community, I felt more free to think in a political, exploratory and creative way about
trauma that was not bound by the compliance of scientsitic proceduralism that
characterized my prior training. Perhaps what I have come to experience through this
study, following in the tradition of psychoanalysis, is that the process of political and
social interpretation in dialogue with others may be a good way to resist and change our
traumatic world.
Implications for Clinicians
In this study, I discussed several ideas about how being human in trauma-based
society has come to take the shape of responding to political problems and traumatic
suffering by complying with manualized treatments and colluding with the warrior cult.
What should be of particular concern to therapists is the way that manual-based practice
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perpetuates the social problems and traumatic symptoms that these trauma treatments
purport to treat. What is unsettling about the consequences of practicing manual-based
trauma therapies is how therapists’ moral imperative to heal can be transformed into
exercises that repeat and prolong trauma.
Beyond the specialized field of trauma therapy, the field of clinical psychology at
large has largely shifted away from attempting to change our world and the social causes
of suffering except in a token manner. Several clinicians and scholars have described the
consequences of mainstream psychology’s disinterest in political action (see, e.g.,
Bracken & Thomas, 1999; Fine, 2012; Hillman & Ventura, 1992; Hoffman, 2009). The
profession shows little interest in resisting neoliberal demands through community
development or the dismantling of authoritative structures that indoctrinate persons
(Binkley, 2011; Cushman, 2011, 2014; Cushman & Gilford, 2000; Layton, 2004, 2013).
Instead, the field promotes the use of manualized trauma therapies that focus on how to
cope with the consequences of living in a traumatized world in an internal, asocial and
isolated way—a way that ultimately benefits managed care corporations over the public
welfare. Thus clinicians from all areas and specialties within psychology are in the
difficult position of struggling to practice morally and with integrity, while also
attempting to comply with the demands of an increasingly scientistic, apolitical and
profit-driven field. Thus a final question that remains is how can clinicians resist
reproducing the social world that creates traumatic suffering?
The answer to this question is not simple but it is possible to discuss. To think or
talk about trauma in nuanced and complex ways takes time and responsibility on the part
of clinicians and their community. Despite being embedded in a traumatized culture and
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warrior cult, I argued in this study that patients and therapists are not naïve drones or
empty vessels that simply perform or absorb restrictive practices and therapeutic rules.
While we may live out many of the problematic practices described in this study, many
clinicians and patients feel uncomfortable with their participation in such practices. From
my experiences in training (Chapter IV: Foregrounding) and the review of the literature,
it is apparent that there are many clinicians and scholars who have resisted traumatic
ways of being by thinking critically and historically about trauma, by questioning our
field, (see e.g., Brave Heart, 2003; Clancy, 2009; Cushman, 1995; Farrell, 1998; Fassin &
Rechtman, 2009; Foucault, 1973; Haaken, 1995; Layton, 2010; Rose, N. S., 2006;
Tolleson, 2009; Young, 1995) and by refusing to participate in practices that they see as
amoral or colonial (see e.g., Altman, 1993; Bracken et al., 1995; Fine, 2012; Gone, 2009;
Leary, 2005; Smith, 1999; Szasz, 1974). One thing I have learned from these clinicians
is that the world cannot always be understood in instrumental ways, with problems and
solutions that are readily available and easy to come by.
Despite there being no ready answers, something I have learned from this study
that may contribute to clinicians who are struggling with these issues is to first
acknowledge that as psychologists and trainees in our increasingly procedure-focused and
apolitical field we may unavoidably enact and participate in traumatic ways of being
(Layton, 2006; Stern, 2003, 2010). One of the ways we do so is by participating in trauma
therapy as a way to express unarticulated, dissociated, or unformulated political
arrangements, events and suffering without attempting to talk about, act or change the
social world that produces this suffering. In acknowledging our participation in traumatic
ways of being, it is important that we find compassion for each other and ourselves when
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attempting to think, talk about, and resist traumatic ways of being (Cushman, personal
communication, May 27, 2014). Thinking about these things may require tolerating
ambiguity and the time to develop interpretations that are uncomfortable or complex (i.e.,
interpretations that stand at the edge of the clearing). It may also require the ability to
engage in therapeutic practices oppose mainstream American understandings of the good
but may resist problematic aspects of trauma culture (e.g., acknowledging dependence on
others, learning to live with anxiety caused by not being able to erase trauma, taking
responsibility for mistakes). Beyond acknowledgement, we can strive to become
politically and socially active as therapists in the therapy room and beyond (Altman,
2010; Botticelli, 2004; Cushman, 1995; Layton, 2005; Tolleson, 2009).
Finally, as I mentioned previously, my hope for this study was to break a
traumatic enactment by thinking differently about trauma, but I wouldn’t have been able
to do so without continual dialogue about these important social and political problems
with my colleagues and mentors. I would encourage clinicians, perhaps while feeling
angry, unsure or afraid, to continue the process of political and social interpretation in
dialogue with others as a way to resist and change our traumatic world.
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Disorder

Originator,
Profession

Year

Country, Notable
Events; Historical
Period

Etiology, Symptoms and Treatment

Affected
Population

To be broken:
Estar Roto, el
mal de Corazon1

Unknown

164048

Spanish Army of
Flanders, Thirty Years
War; Age of Reason

Despair among Spanish soldiers who were forced into
service to the Netherlands with no prospect of leaving;
those affected were considered useless to the military and
discharged to their homes.

Spanish soldiers
(men)

Homesickness:
Nostalgia,
Heimweh,
Schweizerheimw
eh,
Mal du Suisse2

Johannes Hofer

1688

Switzerland; Age of
Reason

Repeated memories of one’s homeland led animal spirits
to dwell in fibers of the middle-brain where traces of
home clung. The spirits stopped flowing to other areas of
the brain needed for human life, which resulted in
excessive physical fatigue, inability to concentrate,
insomnia, anorexia, feelings of isolation and frustrationeventually leading to functional impairment and possible
death. Symptoms disappeared upon returning home.

Swiss soldiers
(men); migrant
peasants and
servants (women
& men); any
person forced
from home

Sickness for
one’s Country:
Maladie du pays3

Dominique Jean
Larrey, Military
Surgeon

17891821

France, French
Revolution, Napoleonic
Wars; Enlightenment Era

Melancholic madness that included rejection of food,
depression, and interest in committing suicide. Soldiers
could be predisposed through a “lymphatic idiosyncrasy.”
Symptoms developed when soldiers were placed in
foreign environments, engaged in too much sexual
activity or masturbation, or faced “slavery, imprisonment
or idleness” in the military. Structure, “gymnastic
amusements” and “Warlike music” during hours of
recreation (p. 348) prevented development. The only
treatment was discharge from the military.

French soldiers
(men)
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Neurasthenia,
Nervosism,
American
Nervousness,
“Americanitis” 4

George Miller
Beard,
Neurologist

1829/
1869/
1880

U.S.; Enlightenment to
Victorian Era

Exhaustion of the central nervous system from the stress
of “modern civilization” characterized by “steam-power,
the periodic press, the telegraph, the sciences and the
mental activity of women.” Factors increased
nervousness: the dry climate of the U.S., “the beauty of
American women”, “premature baldness” and “the greater
intensity of animal life [in the U.S.]” (p. viii). No
prescriptive treatment as “No two cases are alike in all
details” (p. 177). Recommended treatment included: rest
and isolation, changing employment, and “mental
therapeutics.”

Americans
engaged in
sedentary,
repetitive,
competitive work:
women, “brainworkers” (e.g.,
lawyers,
clergymen),
“muscle-workers”,
students;
“inebriates”

Soldier’s Heart,
Da Costa
Syndrome5

Jacob Da Costa,
Surgeon

1874

U.S., Civil War; Victorian
Era

Cardiac condition resulting from strain and over-action
during “excessive fighting and marching.” Treatment
included reduction in exhausting activities.

Soldiers (men)

Irritable Heart5

Jacob Da Costa,
Surgeon

1874

U.S., Civil War; Victorian
Era

Cardiac condition resulting from fear, emotional suffering
and inactivity. Treatment involved maintaining schedule
of activities.

Women

Railway Spine 6

John Erichsen,
Surgeon

1867/
1882/
1889

U.K., Industrial
Revolution; Victorian Era

Spinal fractures caused by jarring from railway work; fear
and terror could also create nervous shock to the spinal
cord. If patient did not progress to secondary symptoms
(lesions of spine) treatment included removal from
railway work; otherwise prognosis was “unfavorable” (p.
98).

Working-class
men: railroad

Traumatic
Hysteria:
idées fixes 7

Jean Charcot,
Neurologist

1887

France;
Victorian Era

Psychic trauma in those who were hereditarily
predisposed to enter hypnotic auto-suggestive states that
allowed allow for a fixed idea to root in the unconscious
(the seed of traumatic hysteria). In women, neuroses were
often physically located in their uterus and could be
released through erogenous zones.

Women; children;
sickly, drunken,
timid or stupid
men

Traumatic
Hysteria 8

Hermann
Oppenheim,
Neurologist

1888

Berlin, Germany;
Victorian Era

Traumatic events created tiny lesions in the brain and
nervous system that were undetectable; physical trauma
and psychic shock after the experience of terror led to

Working class:
railroad and
factory (men)
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traumatic responses: paralysis, fits, intrusion and neurosis.
No successful treatment identified.
Traumatic
Hysteria 9

Pierre Janet,
Neurologist

1892

France; Victorian Era

Fixed ideas in the subconscious led to a split in
consciousness that created mental weakness; those who
suffered had pre-existing fissures that predisposed them to
splitting. The goal of therapy was to excise the fixed
traumatic memory, which can sometimes be done by
converting the memory into the action of telling a story.

All persons with
preexisting mental
weakness
(women, children,
men)

Traumatic
Paralyses 10

Sigmund Freud,
Neurologist

1893

Europe; Victorian Era

“Any impression in which the nervous system has
difficulty in disposing of by means of associative thinking
or of motor reaction becomes a psychical trauma;” this
trauma as foreign body created a form of hysterical
reminiscing.

All persons
(women, children,
men)

Hysteria:
Seduction
Hypothesis 10

Sigmund Freud,
Neurologist

1893

Europe; Victorian Era

Hysteria was due to mental splitting when “an
incompatibility took place in…emotional life- that is to
say an idea or feeling which aroused such a distressing
affect that the subject decided to forget about it because
he had no confidence in his power to resolve the
contradiction between that incompatible idea and his ego
by means of thought activity.” Believed that “coitus-like
acts” in childhood, perpetrated from anyone, was the root
cause of hysteria. Treatment is through what is now
known as Freudian psychoanalysis.

All persons
(women, children,
men)

Hysteria 11

Joseph Breuer

1895

Europe; Victorian Era

Hysterical people are prone to fantastical reverie that
produced a twilight state that splits consciousness; the
splitting produced mental weakness because conscious
activity was divided. Those prone to hysteria were “of a
very lively disposition, to whom monotonous, simple and
uninteresting occupation is torture.” Treatment was
psychoanalytic catharsis.

Persons forced to
engage in boring
or restricted
activities
(Women)

Shell Shock:
Sickness 12

Charles Meyers
& William
McDougall

191416

U.K. Army in France,
World War I; High
Modern Era

Heightened sensitivity and arousal manifested in sensorymotor problems called “hyperaesthesia” or dissociated
numbing called “anesthesia” following exposure to shell

Soldiers with
weak mental
disposition and
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Neurologist,
Psychologist

explosions during war; this led to a form of hysteria.
Those affected were seen as predisposed to nervousness
and were not entitled to a pension, unlike those classified
as Shell Shock: Wound (vs. Sickness), who received
greater benefits. “The essential therapeutic step is the
relief of dissociation” (Leys, 2000, p. 86) or amnesia
through conscious reintegration of dissociated memory
into conscious thought.

nervousness prior
to entering war
(Men)

War Neurosis 13

William Brown

1920

U.K., High Modern Era

Symptoms included mutism, loss of sight or hearing,
spasmodic convulsions, trembling, sleeplessness,
depression, and terrifying repetitive nightmares as
expressions of “repressed” emotions; unable to discharge
emotions through action or speech the trauma
unconsciously “materialized” as physical symptoms. The
traumatic events were often dissociated or unremembered.
Treatment was to bring the patient back to the front-lines
to abreact the emotional experience and give it verbal
expression.

Soldiers, veterans
(men)

Acute Stress
Response 14

Walter Cannon

1920

U.S., High Modern Era

All animals, including humans, reacted to threats and
traumatic exposure with an instinctual “fight-or-flight”
response located in the parasympathetic nervous system.
This instinctive response could be altered, reduced
through behavioral and operant conditioning (cf. Watson,
Skinner).

All persons
(women, children,
men)

Traumatic
Neurosis 15

Sándor Ferenczi

1932

Germany, Europe,
Beginning of WWII; High
Modern Era

Incest, rape and violent sexual experiences as children are
the root of adult traumatic neurosis. Symptoms include:
identification with the perpetrator (who was often a parent
or family member), introjection of adult guilt, defiance,
inability to account for or describe defiance, split sense of
self, seeming maturation or precocious sexual behavior as
a child and caretaking of family members including
abuser. Treatment involved regressive enactments in
psychoanalysis to allow for a form of relational resolution
in therapy; emotional distance or over-intellectualized
therapy may actually reenact the neglect of the abusive

All persons
(women, children,
men). Middle and
upper class girls
and boys were
emphasized
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parent.
Reactive
Attachment
Disorder (RAD)

John Bowlby,
Mary
Ainsworth,
Rene Spitz

19401980

U.K., WWII; Postmodern
era

Children who experienced extreme insufficient care
became emotionally withdrawn towards adult caregivers,
with social and emotional disturbances characterized by
minimal social and emotional responsiveness, limited
positive affect or episodes of unexplained irritability.
Preventative treatment was recommended where mothers
remain primary caregivers and do not separate from child
for work or other responsibilities. Mothers can be referred
to therapy if they are physically but not psychologically
available to nurture child. Attachment-based therapies for
parents and children were developed from this approach
to treat RAD.

DSM-III: Children
less than 8 months
DSM-III-R to
DSM-V: Children
of at least 9
months of age but
no older than 5
years of age.
Mothers and/or
primary caregivers
were considered
primary in
treatment.

Traumatic
Neurosis 17

Abram Kardiner

1941

U.S., WWII; Postmodern
era

A “physio-neurosis” in which one’s “effective ego” and
“body ego” become disorganized in response to a
traumatic event; the instinct of self-preservation drives the
neurosis, this effects “effectual adaptation” or the ability
to protect oneself and control the world. Ultimately the
patient experiences shock and a loss of meaning. Kardiner
recommended Freudian psychoanalysis but found it
ineffective in attempting to help war veterans.

Soldiers, veterans
(men)

Gross Stress
Reaction 18

DSM-I

1952

U.S., WWII; Postmodern
era

Under conditions of great or unusual stress (e.g. combat
and civilian catastrophe) “a normal personality may
utilize established patterns of reaction to differ from
neurosis or psychosis…when promptly and adequately
treated the condition may progress to one of the neurotic
reactions…this diagnosis applies to previously more or
less “normal” persons who have experienced intolerable
stress” (Jones & Wessely, 2006, p. 688).

Normal persons
(women, men)

Post-Vietnam
Syndrome 19

Robert Jay
Lifton

1973

U.S., Post-Vietnam War;
Postmodern era

The Vietnam War was described by Lifton as the
“destroyer of psychological continuity, individual and
collective” (p. 404) such that it was impossible for
soldiers to “achieve the psychological status of a
meaningful combat ritual” (p. 38). Effects of war

Vietnam veterans
(men)

16
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included: guilt related to the death they witnessed,
survived and created, rage related to government betrayal
and apathy of civilians, and self-judgment. To ward off
rage and violence, symptoms of restlessness,
psychosomatic freezing, numbing, recurrent nightmares,
anxiety, depression, suicide and psychosis occurred (p.
157). Additional problems included: feeling of isolation
from average citizens, emotional desensitization and
problems with intimacy in relationships (p. 279).
Soldiers’ reactions to war were not conceptualized as
pathological or amenable to psychological treatment.
Adjustment
Disorder 20

DSM-III

1980

U.S., Post-Vietnam War;
Postmodern era

Previously known as Adjustment Reaction of Adult Life
(DSM II, 1968). A maladaptive reaction to an identifiable
psychosocial stressors were indicated by impairment in
social or occupational functioning and symptoms in
excess of normal or expectable reactions to the stressors
(p. 299).

Adults (women,
men)

PTSD 20, 21

Bessel van der
Kolk, DSM-III

1980

U.S., Post-Vietnam War;
Postmodern era

van der Kolk’s research established intrusive symptoms
of PTSD, such as nightmares as flashbacks, as accurate
replicas of the traumatic experience. PTSD emerged in
DSM-III (1980). Criterion A was defined as an external
event that was “a recognizable stressor that would invoke
symptoms of distress in almost everyone” (p. 238). The
diagnosis included four symptoms from three clusters: reexperiencing, numbing and detachment, and changes in
personality that were not present before the trauma.
Recommended treatment is psychoanalysis, group
treatment and or/ psychopharmacotherapy.

Adults (women,
men)

PTSD 22

Mardi
Horowitz,
DSM-III-R

19861987

U.S., Post-Vietnam War;
Postmodern era

Horowitz defined emotional distress as intrusive,
unbidden, involuntary and unexpected. In 1987, the word
“flashback” (stemming from van der Kolk’s research) was
added to the DSM-III-R diagnosis, as well as Horowitz’s
language of intrusive re-experiencing as well as a cluster
of physiological arousal symptoms. Recommended
treatment was psychoanalysis, group treatment and or/

Adults (2omen,
men)
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psychopharmacotherapy.
Complex PTSD

Judith Lewis
Herman

1992

U.S.; Postmodern era

Persons exposed to chronic trauma held in state of
captivity, physically or emotionally experienced
symptoms of PTSD and difficulties with: emotional
regulation, dissociation or forgetting events, distorted
perceptions of perpetrator or self, distrust or repeated
search for rescuer, and loss of meaning.

Persons in
captivity (women,
children, men)

Developmental
Trauma Disorder

Bessel van der
Kolk and
NCTSN
Developmental
Trauma
Disorders Task
Force, DSM-5

2013

U.S.; Postmodern era

Chronic exposure to developmentally aversive
interpersonal trauma (e.g., abandonment, physical or
sexual assault, emotional abuse) and subjective
experience of rage, betrayal, fear, resignation, defeat or
shame. Resulted in “triggered pattern” of repeated
dysregulation in response to trauma cues, persistent
altered attributions and expectancies, and functional
impairment (p. 14). See Table 1 for suggested treatments.

Children

Disinhibited
Social
Engagement
Disorder 25

DSM-5

2013

U.S.; Postmodern era

Categorized under Trauma- and Stressor- Related
disorders in the DSM-5. Child must demonstrated
indiscriminant attachment and over familiarity with many
adults, have experienced extremes of insufficient care,
which is presumed to be responsible for the uninhibited
attachment. Treatment is attachment-based therapy.

Children 9 months
and over who
demonstrate these
symptoms for at
least one year

PTSD 25

DSM-5

2013

U.S.; Postmodern era

Clusters of intrusive, avoidance (persistent negative
changes in mood and avoidance) and arousal symptoms
that occur after a traumatizing or life-threatening event.
See Table 1 for suggested treatments.

All persons
(women, men)

23

24, 25
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Appendix B: Specific Research Questions for Hermeneutic Inquiry
1.

What is the historical context of the particular manual or document of
interpretation? What is the setting of the document’s creation and the
context of its authors?

2.

Who is thought to be involved in the therapy and how is their relationship
described? (e.g. dyadic relationships like: practitioner- trauma survivor,
therapist-patient, counselor-consumer)?

3.

How is trauma described? How are human relationships described in the
context of trauma (e.g., perpetrator, survivor, victim, rescuer)? How are
traumatic events described (e.g., random, in the world)? What is the
conceptualization of the etiology and location of trauma? What
assumptions of gender, class, race, health, bodies, responsibility and
human agency (i.e., passivity, activity) are built within these
conceptualizations?

4.

Who or what do the authors state is responsible for causing and treating
trauma? Who benefits (i.e., is not “guilty” of causing trauma) within
these descriptions, and who does not benefit?

5.

What is the intended context for utilization (e.g., ideal setting, patient and
practitioner)? What criteria are used to identify a “traumatized” patient?
What criteria define the ideal practitioner? What is the ideal manner and
context in which the therapists are trained in the treatment manual?

6.

What is recommended for pre-session preparation or patient engagement?

7.

What are the goals of therapy?
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8.

What is considered trauma treatment (vs. prevention, debriefing,
assessment)?

9.

How are the actors (both therapist and patient) supposed to behave while
delivering treatment?

10.

How are the actors prescribed to interact with the manual (e.g., does the
therapist bring it into the room and read from it)?

11.

How should practitioners respond to unexpected circumstances in therapy
or “unsuccessful delivery” of treatments (i.e., patient avoidance, drop out,
“lack of compliance”)?

12.

How is an individual supposed to respond to treatments and what does it
look like when a patient is “healed”? How are treated individuals
supposed to behave and think (i.e., what constitutes a “good” survivor or
victim)?

13.

What are the moral judgments around good and bad responses to trauma
that are embedded in the text (e.g., problematic or adaptive symptoms
and behaviors that come from being traumatized, contexts in which
traumatized responses are acceptable)? What is considered to be a
normative, acceptable response to trauma? What is considered to be a
good or bad therapist and patient within this conceptualization?

14.

What is left out of the above descriptions or taken for granted about
individual and collective experiences of trauma in the text?

